Training
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ELEMENTS OF ANCIENT INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

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
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PREFACE

That the ancient Indian thought is replete with profound psychological reflections and theories is well recognised in India and abroad. Over several decades, my friends who have been Heads of Psychology Departments in the various universities in India have been expressing their eagerness to start a course in Ancient Indian Psychology. But the lack of a suitable textbook has been a great impediment.

In my undergraduate course, I took not only a three-paper course in Experimental Psychology, but also had the advantage of taking a course in Indian Philosophy. Even as a student I was struck by the wealth of psychological material in the various systems of Indian Philosophy. I have been continuing to cherish the idea of dealing with the problems in a systematic manner. One of my early papers in 1932 dealt with the problem of testimony as a *pramana* by the ancient Indian thinkers. Later on I contributed several papers on perception, imagery, etc., to the sessions of Indian Philosophical Conference and the Psychology section of Indian Science Congress.

In the late fifties, my esteemed friend, late Professor Gardner Murphy of United States wanted me to write two survey papers, one on the Upanishads and the other on the Gita for his book *Asian Psychology* which was published in 1968.

My aim has been to present ancient Indian psychological thought in a manner that will conform to the new methods of exposition developed by Woodsworth and other modern psychologists.

I have called this work *Elements of Ancient Indian Psychology* because this is only a groundwork to introduce subject in systematic manner to modern students in the various universities in India and abroad.

The first past has four chapters. The first chapter deals with scope and methods of Indian psychology and the second chapter deals with the problem of consciousness as delineated in the Vedic hymns and the *Upanishads*. The next chapter analyses the contribution of the *Gita* in this field. The fourth chapter describes the evolution of mind as it is given by the *Samkhya* and *Yoga* theorists. The appendix to the first part gives a brief survey of the reflection

of ancient thninkers on the relationship between mind and body.

The second part has six chapters dealing with cognitive processes. The fifth and sixth chapters deal with the reflections on sensation, perception and illusion. A brief description of the controversies, including the theories of error, has been given The seventh chapter deals with the problems of attention and distraction and the eighth with the reflections on learning. It will be seen that the analysis of these processes has not been as productive as the analysis of the processes involved in remembering and imagining. Above all, the tenth chapter on thought and language deals with astoundingly incisive ways in which these problems have been tackled.

The third part deals with the problem of motivation, emotion, feeling and action. In the thirteenth chapter, an attempt has been made to unravel the theoretical aspects of the two concepts, *Samskara* and *Vasana* which have been used extensively from the days of the Buddha. An attempt has been made to discuss these concepts in the light of the modern concept of attitude. The last chapter of the third part deals with the problem of self and personality. The philosophic literature has recognised how the problem of self has been the greatest contention between the *astika* and the *nastika* systems of ancient Indian thought.

In the last part of the book, an attempt has been made to describe the way in which these principles have been used by the ancient thinkers in the fields of meditation, psychotherapy, sex and religion. The last two chapters of the book deal with the most advanced and profound thinking of the ancient Indians in the fields of psycholinguistics and aesthetics.

Throughout the work, my aim has been to emphasise the principles rather than the controversies and the metaphysical presupposition.

I must, however, acknowledge that my equipment is wholly inadequate to undertake this task. My only justification in doing so is my profound interest in the field. I have generally based my exposition on English and Kannada translations of the ancient works. I have gone to the originals when I felt that the available translations did not do justice to the original thought.

The great work of Jadnnath Sinha in two volumes, *Cognition* (1958) and *Emotion* (1961) has been my mainstay. Similarly, the two volumes of *Indian Philosophy* by Radhakrishnan, the first two volumes of *A History of Indian Philosophy* by Dasgupta and the

Outlines of Indian Philosophy by Hiriayanna have been of immense help, Ramachandra Rao's *Development of Pyschological Thought in India* (1962) has been very useful. I am happy that recently Raghunath Safaya of Chandigarh has brought out his *Indian Psychology*, a good survey of the various systems of thought.

Above all I must thank the following scholars who readily helped me whenever I went to them about some problems with remained obscure : Pandit Sudhakar Chaturvedi, the great *Vedic* Scholar; Prof. M.A. Krishnaswamy, formerly of Bangalore University; Prof. K.T. Pandurangi, formerly of Bangalore University; Prof. L. Ananthachar, formerly of Vijaya College, Bangalore, and Shri D. K. Hanumantha Rao, a great lover of Sanskrit texts.

As noted above, I have under taken this task with full knowledge of my limitations. The great problem now is that the Sanskrit scholar is unfamiliar with psychological problems and the psychologist, trained in experimental psychology, is unfamiliar with the disciplines of Sanskrit etymology and Sanskrit Grammar.

It is my fervent hope that this book will open out a new field to the teachers and the young students who may be inspired to undertake studies in this field.

B. KUPPUSWAMY

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Part I

EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER 1

Scope and Methods

It is well known that ancient Indian thought is not only rich in metaphysical but also in psychological thought. However, there was no special discipline to study psychological problems as there was to study problems of epistemology and logic.

As Radhakrishnan has pointed out, "the source of man's spiritual insight are twofold: Objective and Subjective—the wonders of the world without and the states of the human soul. In the Vedas, the vast order and movement of nature engages attention. In the Upanishads, we return to explore the depths of the inner world" (Vol. I, p. 143).

Right from the days of Vedic hymns, the interest of the sages has been in understanding and in controlling the mental processes. The great Gayatri mantra is a prayer offered to the Sun, the illuminator of the universe, to stimulate and enlighten the mind. Another great Vedic hymn desires that man's resolves should be auspicious—*siva samkalpamastu*.

One of the Upanishads, the Kena Upanishad starts with the questions : "Who impels the mind to alight on its objects . . . At whose behest do men utter speech ? What intelligence directs the eyes and the ears ?" And the preceptor answers that it is through the power of the self, the *atman*, that the ear hears, the eye sees, the tongue speaks and the mind understands.

In Prasna Upanishad, the disciple asks "What are they that sleep in man and what again are awake in him ? Of these which God sees dreams ? Whose is the happiness?"

Thus the Vedic thinkers were concerned not only about the order in the outer universe but also about the order in the inner world. This is clear from the fact that the whole of Mandukya Upanishad is devoted to a study of the altered states of consciousness (ASC) as they are now called.

As Sinha (1958) has pointed out, "There is no system of Indian philosophy which has not advanced a theory of knowledge and which has not appealed to the facts of our experience. Every school of philosophy has made valuable contributions to psychology and

other mental sciences. But these have never been treated as separate branches of study" (Preface).

A brief description of the scope of ancient Indian psychology may now be given. The problems dealt with by the ancient Indians from the Vedic days (2000 B.C) to the age of systems of philosophy or philosophical sutras (500 A.D.), that is, roughly a period of 2500 years, are very wide. As indicated above, the Vedic thinkers were chiefly preoccupied with the problem of consciousness, the relation of body, sense organs, and mind to consciousness and the states of consciousness, viz., waking, dreaming, sleep and the fourth or *turiya*. With the rise of materialism (*charvaka*), Buddhism and Jainism, the problems of attention, perception and illusion become prominent. Apart from dealing with the problems of memory and imagination, feelings and emotions, considerable attention was given to the problem of thought and its relation to language. Apart from these general problems of behaviour, there was a great deal of concern regarding meditation, aesthetics, sex and religion. The two-volume *Indian Psychology* published by Sinha in 1958 and 1961 is a mine of information regarding the views of various systems of Indian thought in all these fields. My intention in the present work is to delineate in a brief way the problems which were of great interest to the ancient Indian thinkers and their views about them.

It is obvious that there will be a great deal of interest to understand the methods adopted by these ancient thinkers to analyse and study these problems. However, it must be borne in mind that there are no records of these methods. Still an attempt will be made in this section to indicate briefly the methods that might have been used on the basis of the analysis given.

I. A study of the Upanishads clearly reveals that ***observation*** was a very important method in the study of behaviour. A few illustrations will indicate the importance attached to the method of observation by these ancients themselves more than three thousand years ago.

(*a*) In Chandogya Upanishad, it is said that "one utters speech while one neither breathes out nor breathes in" (I, 3.3). "One sings the Saman when one neither breathes out nor breathes in" (I, 3.4). "Therefore whatever other actions require strength, such as the kindling of fire by friction, running a race towards a goal, the bending of a strong bow, are all performed, while one neither breathes out nor breathes in" (I, 3.5). It is clear that it is observation of behaviour that helps the conclusion that speech, song, as

well as every action, that requires effort, is possible only when one holds the breath.

(*b*) In the same Chandogya Upanishad, Uddalaka Aruni tells his son Svetaketu, that a man can survive on water even if he is fasting for fifteen days. To test this the son did not eat for fifteen days. He survives and goes to his father, who asks him to recite the Vedas. But the boy says "Sir, they do not at all arise in me." The father says that out of sixteen parts of man, only one part survives when one fasts for two weeks. He now asks him to eat, so that he can understand the truth of what he is telling. The son eats and finds that he could now recall and repeat the Vedas at ease. The father now asserts "Just as when a single ember of the size of a firefly left over from a large burning fire, is made to blaze up . . . the body being nourished by food, has been made to blaze up." He concludes, "the mind is made up of food, the *prana* (life) is made up of water." Thus, here we have a very fine example of testing the truth of a proposition regarding memory by conducting, as it were, an experiment. Life survives when one fasts, but memory requires food (Chandogya Upanishad, 6, 7-8).

(*c*) In the same Upanishad there is a description of the way in which one merely accepts and arrives at a false conclusion or may persist and test and arrive at the truth.

Prajapati, the very *brahman*, asserts that *atman* is free from evil, sorrow, hunger, thirst, old age and death, and that he who understand this will attain "all the worlds and all the desires." The gods as well as the *asuras* hear this and send their respective representatives, Indra and Virochana to learn about this from the great God. Prajapati says that "the person seen in the eye is the *atman*." The disciples question whether *atman* is he whom one can see in the water or a mirror. Prajapati affirms it and asks him to see in a pan of water and report. They look at themselves in the water and announce "we see the very image of ourselves even to the very hair and nails." Prajapati next asks them to become "well adorned, well dressed, and well groomed" and look at themselves in the water. They find that the image in the water reflects correctly. That is the *atman*, says Prajapati. Both the disciples are satisfied with the teaching and go back. But Prajapati looks at them and says, "They are going away without having perceived, without having understood the *atman*." Virochana, the profligate, fully believed the teaching and his experience and announced to his followers, "the bodily self alone is the *atman*. He is to be worshipped and attended upon." His followers, the Upanishad says, "even to this day, adorn

the body both of the living and the dead." But Indra pondered about this teaching and realised that if this doctrine were true, one perishes when one's body perishes on death and so the teaching that "*atman* is free from sorrow, old age and death" will not be true. So he goes back to Prajapati, who gradually makes him understand that the self cannot be identified either with the body or with the dream self or with the self in deep sleep and that the real self is like *akasa*, space, unaffected by all the experiences (Chandogya Upanishad, 8, sections 7-12).

(*d*) The story of Ajatasatru and Gargya in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad also indicates the role of observation. Ajatasatru takes his pupil to a sleeping man and calls out to him to rise. He does not get up. Ajatasatru then pushes him and rouses him. He then asks the people to think where the self of the man had gone when he was asleep. The pupil was unable to answer. The teacher then asserts that during the sleep, the intellect (*buddhi*), the mind (*manas*), and the sense organs (*indriya*) are all withdrawn and so the sleeper is unaware of anything. "The self remains in its own nature beyond all attributes during profound sleep." All of them return to function when he wakes up (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, II, section 1).

II. The second method adopted to analyse the mental processes is *introspection*. One of the most celebrated verses of Katha Upanishad asserts, "the self-existent (*brahman*) created the senses with outgoing tendencies. Therefore, man beholds the external universe and not the *antaratman*, the internal self. Some wise men, perchance, turn the eyes inward and behold the *pratyagatman*, the self within" (II, 4.1). Like children, it is said people pursue external pleasures and fall into the snare of the phenomenal. But the wise turn their vision to the real (II, 4 2). The two terms *antaratman* and *pratyagatman* are perhaps used for the first time in the above verse. These verses show that the introspection, is a rare phenomenon. Very few are interested to know the nature of the self.

It is a familiar fact that when one tries to concentrate or meditate one automatically becomes aware of innumerable sensations, thoughts and feelings which interrupt concentration. However, few persons pay attention to them, so they are unaware of themselves and the processes within.

Attention may be drawn to the views of Sri Aurobindo (1951) with respect to introspection. He writes, "But always the whole foundation of the gnostic life must be by its very nature inward and not outward. In the life of the spirit, it is the inner reality,

that has built up and used the mind, vital being and body as its instrumentation" (p. 904). In the growth into a liberated life, the self must be our first preoccupation, as the Upanishads put it. Another great modern sage, Shri Ramana Maharishi, made self-enquiry, the basis of attaining *jnana*, real knowledge.

III. However, it is true that introspection may become morbid. Preoccupation with self may lead to self-disintegration, rather than self-integration. Long ago, some thinkers of the Mimamsa School, for instance, entertained doubts about the very possibility of introspection. One cannot both live through the process and reflect on it, they asserted.

So introspection was either supplemented with or supplemented by reasoning (*yuktI*). As noted above, Indra started thinking about the body being the *atman* or even the dreamer or the sleeper being the *atman*. Reasoning is the main process involved in the analysis of the states of consciousness and in analysing the relation between the image and the object and the relation between the idea and the word, as will be shown in the sequel.

IV. Probably, the most important method followed by the ancient thinkers was the analysis of experience, the *anubhava*, and in producing the experience in order to test the validity of assumption by *sakshatkara*—direct realisation. It is the firm stand on experience and its analysis that helped the Upanishadic thinkers to arrive at very insightful reflections regarding dream state and deep sleep state. The great emphasis on *dhyana*, meditation, is to enable an individual to follow the path so that he can have his own experience and verify for himself. A glimpse of this is obtained in two verses in Katha Upanishad. This *atman* cannot be attained either by study or by deep reflection. Nor can it be attained by those whose senses are not subdued and whose minds have not gained tranquillity through meditation. The experience of self-realisation arises only when one gains tranquillity of mind by gaining control over the sense desires and emotions, one who is highly ethical in his behaviour (Katha Upanishad, II, pp. 23-24). It must be remembered that this emphasis on experience and realisation is the dominant feature of all Indian systems of thought, whether they are absolutistic, theistic or atheistic. As Hiriyanna (1932) remarks, "the ancient Indian did not stop short at the discovery of truth, but strove to realise it in his own experience. He followed up *tattva-jnana* (knowledge of true principles), which therefore, and not merely an intellectual conviction, was in his view the real goal of philosophy" (p. 18). As Max Muller put it,

philosophic pursuit in India was not merely "for the sake of knowledge, but for the highest purpose that man can strive for after this life" (*Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 370).

V. Above all, there is the guru-shishya (teacher-pupil) relationship which is looked upon as very important for an individual to progress in his studies as well as in his experiences (*anubhava*). As noted above, the Upanishads contain the questions asked by the pupil and the replies and directions given by the teacher. In my paper (Kuppuswamy, 1953), I have referred to this as a form of Clinical Method. It is well-known that the Prasna Upanishad derives its name from the six *prasnas*, questions, asked by the pupils to the preceptor. Similarly, the Kena Upanishad contains the questions of the pupil and the answer by the preceptor. The famous *Gita* starts with the questions of Arjuna which arise in him because he has to face his teachers, elders and other relatives on the battle-field. The *Gita* reports, as it were, the conversation between the person in anguish and the wise teacher. Similarly, in another part of *Mahabharata*, the celebrated Shantiparva, describes the anguish of Yudhishthira at the end of the great war. It is the conversation between him and Bhisma. Finally reference may be made to another great ancient work, namely, *Yoga Vasishtha*. It is the conversation between the adolescent Rama and the great thinker Vasishtha. The occasion for this work is the crisis of identity in Rama (Kuppuswamy, 1977).

The guru-shishya relationship is akin to the relationship between the psychoanalyst and his patient, in some respects. This is why it can be looked upon as a form of the clinical method.

Long ago Geraldine Coster (1949) showed the resemblances and differences between the patient who goes to the psychoanalyst and the person who goes to the yogi. "The student of yoga is necessarily one who is dissatisfied with his own adaptation to life and to the world; for no other reason would be sufficient to induce a man to engage in an exacting course of training which he knows from the outset will strain all his powers to the uttermost. Moreover, since such deep dissatisfaction brings conflict and tension, he is likely to be the one who suffers from the nervous fatigue, ill-health and ill-success in ordinary life that characterise the candidate for analysis" (p. 30).

Just as the insights of Freud into the mental processes and mental mechanisms deepened by treating the patients, it may be said that the guru's insights will be deepened by discussing with the disciples the problems which they encounter in the course of

their ***sadhana***, the efforts toward growth and integration.

It is possible that all these five methods, namely observation, introspection, reasoning, experience and the clinical guru-shishya relationship, contributed to the development of great insights into the self and into the mental processes and led to the development of the techniques of meditation to enable an individual to become an integrated personality.

SUMMARY

This chapter has indicated in a brief way the scope of psychology as it is possible to obtain from various ancient Indian works on philosophy and other subjects. Also an attempt has been made to describe the various methods that may have been used on the basis of a survey of fragments available to us from the published books. It must be recognised that these are mere hunches.

In the following three chapters, an attempt will be made to give a broad picture of the foundations of psychological thought according to the Vedic Samhitas and the Upanishads, the *Gita* and the Samkhya-yoga systems. These three sources constitute the basic thinking in the centuries from 1000 B.C. to about 200 B.C. A special chapter on the contribution of Jainism and Buddhism has not been incorporated since they develop the basic ideas in the Upanishads and either support them or criticise and reject them.

CHAPTER 2

The Concept of Consciousness

In the Vedic Hymns

Three very important hymns reveal the way in which the concept of consciousness pervades the Vedic prayers.

The famous *Gayatri* mantra in the Rig Veda (III, 62.10) and in the Yajur Veda (III, 35 and XXII, 9), runs as follows:

Om bhurbhuvah svah tat savitturvarenyam
bhargo devasya dhimahi dhiyo yo nah prachodayat

Raghavan (1963) has rendered it thus: "We meditate upon that adorable effulgence of the resplendent vivifier, *Savitur* (Sun); May he stimulate our intellects" (p. 5).

This mantra was revealed to and by the sage Visvamitra. It is named after its metre *gayatri* which means 'the saviour of the singer". It is looked upon as the essence of the Vedas. The essence of the prayer is "stimulation of one's intellect; the enlightenment of one's mind." In this prayer, man asks, not for happiness or riches, but for a keen intellect and for enlightenment. It embodies in the form of a prayer, the highest aspiration of which a human being is capable of. It is a prayer seeking the unfoldment of one's intellectual potentialities. As Taimni (1974) observes, there is here an aspiration of man to come into contact with the universal consciousness

The second famous Nasidiya Hymn (Rig Veda X, 129) of the Rig Veda refers to *kama*, desire as the primal urge, creative energy of mind: "There was then neither what is nor what is not. . .darkness there was. . .thereafter rose desire (*kama*) springing from mind. . ." As Radhakrishnan writes, "According to the hymn, desire constitutes the secret of the being of the world. Desire or *kama* is the sign of self-consciousness, the germ of the mind, *manaso retah*. It is the ground of all advance, the spur of progress. Desire is more than thought. It denotes intellectual stir, the sense of deficiency as well as an active effort" (Vol. I, p. 102). This verse also occurs in

Atharva Veda (19, 52.1). As will be seen later, desire as the primeval urge to express is found in many passages in the Upanishads.

The third is the famous *siva samkalpa* hymn of Yajur Veda (34, 1-6). Jwala Prasad (1958) writes, "In the six verses of the Vajasaneya Samhita, mind appears as a distinctly psychical faculty. They contain, although in the form of a hymn, the most remarkable description of mind that I know of in the whole Vedic literature, and it is strange that they have remained unnoticed so far by scholars" (p. 29).

A free translation of these verses follows:

1. May the mind (*manas*), which goes out afar when I am awake and comes back when I am asleep and which is the light of lights, be of auspicious resolve (*siva samkalpamastu*).

2. May the mind, with the aid of which wise and brave men diligently perform their duties during the times of war and peace, be of auspicious resolve.

3. May the mind, which is intelligence (*prajnanam*), feeling (*chetah*) and determination (*dhriti*)—the eternal light in all beings and without which nothing can be accomplished—be of auspicious resolve.

4. May the mind, which holds the past, present and future together and with the aid of which the seven sacrificers (the five cognitive senses and the two breaths—inhalation and exhalation) operate, be of auspicious resolve.

5. May the mind, in which the hymns of the Vedas are fixed like the spokes in the chariot's nave and in which all the thoughts (*prajnanam*) of all are held together, be of auspicious resolve.

6. May the mind, which leads and controls men in the way in which a skilful charioteer controls the horses with the reins and which is the swiftest be of auspicious resolve.

In the above verses, the mind is described as "that which goes out afar" in waking state and returns to rest in sleeping state. It is looked upon as being swift in motion, unhampered by the limitations of time and space. It is said to consist of intelligence, feeling and determination. The mind is spoken of as 'the light of all lights' which illuminates all cognitions. It is the principle which is the basis of memory and anticipation (past, present and future). It holds all experiences and all memories together. It is that which leads and controls all the activities of man. The analogy of the charioteer is used which becomes more specific in some Upanishads and the *Gita*. It is the basis of all accomplishments in

war time as well as in peace time. Thus in these six verses, the various psychological processes are named and classified.

Manjunatha Sastri (1975) asserts that in these verses a picture is given of the need for unification of thoughts, speech and actions. He points out that *samkalpa*, resolve, is the essence of mind. *Samkalpa*—resolution, decision and *vikalpa*—indecision, irresolution, doubt and hesitation are the two facets of the mind. The seer of this hymn prays that his mind should not only be of firm resolve but also of auspicious (*siva*) resolve, that is constructive and growth-oriented.

Manjunatha Sastri also draws attention to another verse in Atharva Veda (7.50.8), where the poet asserts, "let my right hand hold *kritam*, performance and my left hand, *jaya* victory, so that I can aquire wealth, fame, etc." That is victory comes with *samkalpa*, resolve and with *kritam*, performance, action.

In another verse, the poet forbids the mind from "saying what none should say". He asks such thoughts to go away to "the forests and tress" so that "his heart is in his home and the cows" (Atharva Veda, 6.46). This indicates the recognition of the power of thoughts. Evil thoughts, that is, thoughts which are anti-social and destructive, lead to anti-social and destructive deeds. So the task of man is to reject them, not to entertain them.

This is reinforced, as it were, in another verse which calls out, "let the Gods purify me, let *Pavamana*, the sacred fire, purify me" (*Atharva Veda*, 6.20, 1-3).

Thus, the Vedic poets were keenly aware of the role of desire and resolve which guide our thoughts and actions properly in a constructive way. Otherwise they will destroy us by misleading us.

Finally, attention may be drawn to the famous allegory of two birds (Rig Veda I, 164.20): "Two birds knit with bonds of friendship perch on the self-same tree. One of them eats the fruits of the tree with relish, while the other looks on without eating." Sayana, the great commentator on the Vedas, asserts that the two birds refer to the individual self and the Supreme spirit dwelling in one body. While the individual self is enjoying or suffering, the Supreme spirit is merely a passive spectator. This is a clear indication of the recognition of two aspects of personality, one eager to satisfy the bodily needs and experiencing the resulting joys and sorrows, while the other, the enlightened aspect of personality is a mere witness, unaffected by the experiences. It may be pointed out that the self-same verse occurs in Mundaka Upanishad (III, 1. 1-2) and in Svetasvatara Upanishad (IV 6-7). And the idea is

also given in the *Gita* (VI, 5-7). This problem will be discussed in subsequent sections.

In the Upanishads

The Upanishads, which form the concluding portions of the Vedas, laid the foundation, as it were for all the later philosophic thought in India. As Radhakrishnan puts it, the aim of the Upanishads was "to bring peace and freedom to the anxious human spirit" (Vol. I, p. 138). Thus, the psychological problem has dominated Indian thought down the ages, though there was no systematic attempt to deal with the problem as a special field.

While the earlier parts of the Veda are concerned with the vast order and movement of nature and the complex rituals and sacrifices, the *yajnas*, to control them, the Upanishadic thinkers were concerned with the exploration of the depths of the inner world, the consciousness. Instead of appeals to the Vedic gods to increase material prosperity, the Upanishads deal with the *atman*, the self. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad asserts "This (self) was *brahman*. So the self realised *aham brahmasmi*, I am *brahman* (the ultimate reality) . . . . An ignorant person who adores another God thinking, 'He is different from me and I am his subordinate' does not know the truth" (I, 1.10). The expression *aham brahmasmi* is one of the great expressions of the Upanishads, the *mahavakyas*. It affirms that the inner self of man and the great cosmic power are one and the same. It is this realisation that led to the quest for inner perfection, abandoning the outward, the worldly prosperity in India down the ages. Chandogya Upanishad asserts, "He is *manomaya*, permeating the mind, *pranasarira*, has *prana* for his body, *bhurupah*, whose nature is consciousness" (III, 14.2). "The mind is the *brahman*, thus one should meditate" (III, 18.1).

The Katha Upanishad asserts "The self-existent pierced the openings of the senses so that they turn outwards; therefore man looks outward, not inward into himself; some wise man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for immortality, saw the self behind" (IV, 1). Thus, according to this Upanishad, the man is concerned with the information secured by the sense organs and who is concerned with the objects and events outside in the world cannot secure a sense of permanence and peace of mind. It is only the wise man who turns its attention inwards, to his consciousness, and follows the path of meditation that can secure real and enduring peace of mind. As Radhakrishnan puts it picturesquely,

"The soul of man is the keyhole to the landscape of the whole universe, the *akasa* within the heart, the limpid lake which mirrors the truth" (Vol. I, p. 145).

The seers of Upanishad did not take for granted the truth of the report of the senses. They looked upon knowledge, mind, the senses and their objects as being finite and conditioned. They looked upon the pleasures of the senses, and the world as transient. These pleasures arise and pass off. They were rather in quest of that which is not transient. They looked upon consciousness, the *chit* as being the reality, the *sat* and that its nature is more delight, *ananda*. They described the *brahman*, the ultimate reality as *satchitananda*. They identified the *brahman*, the fundamental reality, as being identical with the *atman*, the innermost reality in man, his consciousness.

The States of Consciousness

This is clearly illustrated in the dialogues between the teacher Prajapati and his pupils given in the Chandogya Upanishad (VIII, Section 1-12). The seer says that the aim of the seeker should be to understand the self within. When the disciple asks what there is within, the teacher replies, "within it, indeed, are both heaven and earth, both fire and air, both sun and moon, lightning and stars. Whatever there is of him in this world and whatever is not, all that is contained within it" (VIII, 1, 2-3). In this way, the universe without is equated with the self within. The teacher proceeds further and asserts that this self, the consciousness, does not age with the aging of the body, nor is it killed when the body is killed. It is free from hunger and desire (VIII, 1.5). The teacher also declares that the fruits of Vedic rituals are transitory, but the understanding of *atman* is imperishable (VII, 1.6). The teacher proceeds further and declares "This is the *atman*. This is the immortal and fearless. This is the *brahman*" (VII, 3.4). Thus, it is declared that the Supreme self is of the nature of pure consciousness. The seeker who realises this becomes merged in his own true form. This is likened to the state of deep sleep. "Therefore, when one is this sound asleep, composed, serene, so that he knows no dreams, then he enters the space within. Then no evil touches him, for then he is filled with the light of sun" (VIII, 6.3). The pleasures and pains of waking life and of dream life do not touch one who is in deep sleep. In that condition of deep sleep, the seeker is in the pure state of consciousness which is free from evil, free from sorrow, free from hunger and thirst, free

from death (VIII, 7.1).

When the gods and the demons heard this from the teacher, they were eager to reach that state. So the gods sent Indra and the demons sent Virochana to find out from Prajapati the means to attain this state of serenity, the state in which one can "attain all the worlds and all the desires". This is how the Upanishadic seer looks upon the state of serenity. It is looked upon as a state of fulfilment, a state free from all lacks. This is where confusions regarding interpretations arise. This state is looked upon by people as one in which all desires will be fulfilled. This is clear in the reply given by Indra and Virochana to the question of Prajapati as to their purpose. They reply that they want to know the *atman* by knowing whom, "all desires are attained" (VIII, 7.3). Prajapati tells them that, 'the person which is seen in the eye is the *atman*". This raises a doubt whether the self is what is perceived in the mirror and what is percieved in the water, namely, the reflection of the body (VIII, 7.4). On Prajapati affirming that the *atman* is reflected in water, the two pupils go away satisfied that they have learned the truth from the teacher. Virochana, the representative of the demons was satisfied that the body is the selt, and so, the Upanishad asserts, "They (the demons) adorn the body of the deceased with enjoyable things, cloths and ornaments" (VIII, 8.5). They looked upon the body as the self and imagine that on death, the body attains "the yonder". But, Indra, the representative of gods, reflected that if the body is the self, then the self of the blind man should be blind and the self of the person with a crippled body should also be crippled. And when the body perishes, the self should also perish. This reflection on the teaching made him come to the conclusion that this could not be the implication of the teacher (VIII, 9.1). When Indra goes back to clarify the doubt, the teacher says, "He who moves about in dreams, he is the *atman.*" Thus, the pupil progresses from the identification of the self with the physical body, to the identification of the self with self in the dream state. But again, he is troubled by the doubt that the dreamer is subject to pain and pleasure in the dream state. He may also dream that he is dying (VIII, 10.1-4). The teacher next informs that the self is, "He who is fully asleep, composed, serene and knows no dream." While being inclined to identify the self with the condition of deep, dreamless sleep, Indra discovers that in that state one has no self-consciousness whatever. "It seems as if he has gone to annihilation. I see no good in this" (VIII, 11.1.2). The teacher clarifies the pupil's doubt and says, "Verily, the embodied self is

held by pleasure and pain" (VIII, 12.1). He adds, "As an animal is attached to a chariot, even so is the *prana* attached to his body" (VIII, 12.2-3). Continuing, the teacher asserts that sensations as well as thoughts arise as a result of identification of the self with the body. But when one identified oneself with the whole universe, rather than with one's body, "all the worlds and all the desired objects are held by them," asserts the teacher (VIII, 12.6). This identification of the *atman*, individual self, with the ***brahman***, the universal self is the state of pure consciousness.

Thus, this famous story of Prajapati and Indra in Chandogya Upanishad, leads one, step by step, from the identification of oneself with the body in the waking state, to the identification of one's form in the dream state, to the experience, or lack of it, in the dreamless sleep and finally to identification with the universe as a whole, from the narrower to the wider, from the finite to the infinite.

In the above dialogue, Prajapati makes it clear that the self of man can never become an object. The self is the person that sees, not the object seen (VIII, 7.1). "It is not the bundle of qualities called the 'me' but the 'I' which remains beyond and behind, inspecting all the qualities. It is the subject in the truest sense, and it can never become the object" (Radhakrishnan, Vol. I, p. 152).

Secondly, this dialogue makes it clear that in normal life, the individual is preoccupied with his desires and with the actions undertaken to satisfy the desires and with the fears and hopes regarding the possibility or not to satisfying those desires. Absorbed in such thoughts, feelings and activities, man does not have any time or inclination to think of his self, the *atman*. The normal man is like Virochana. He seeks knowledge to satisfy his cravings and stops short with the identification of the self with the body. He decorates the body even when it is just a corpse. On the other hand, Indra, the true seeker, is not satisfied with the answers given by the teacher and goes to him again and again, till he gets the answers which are not limited to the experiences of daily living, dreaming and sleeping.

Thirdly, the aim of the teacher in this remarkable dialogue is to make Indra realise that all experiences are changing, fleeting, and that it is necessary to assume the self, the *atman*, which endures as the basis of all the experience while awake, dreaming or asleep. The continuity of consciousness can be accounted for by assuming the self. In Chapter 14, exactly opposite views held by Buddha will be described. But in this dialogue, Prajapati endeavours

to make Indra understand that the continuity of experience requires us to admit a self, underlying all the varying contents of consciousness.

Indra, in this dialogue, questions the need to posit the self during deep dreamless sleep. "If the self is not what it knows, feels and reacts upon, if it is divorced from it and thus emptied of its content, what remains?" "Nothing," said Indra. "On this view in dreamless sleep, there is no self at all" (Radhakrishnan, *ibid.*, p. 155). Later on, Buddha raised this very question and asserted that there is no evidence to posit an enduring self. It is well-known that thousands of years later, the empiricists like Locke and Berkeley raised these same questions in 18th century. As Radhakrishnan puts it, "This contentless ego, this abstract cogito of Descartes, this formal unity of Kant, this objectless subject supposed to stand behind unrelated to all empirical consciousness, is an impossibility. Philosophical reflection as well as psychological analysis leads to this result." But, Prajapati was trying to emphasise the identity of the self which is unaffected by the changes of experience. He was anxious to point out that "while the self was not exclusive of conscious states it was not the conscious states" (*ibid.*, p. 156).

In the dialogue, Prajapati seeks to point out that the self is not a mere abstract and formal principle, but an active universal consciousness. It is the universal self which is immanent as well as transcendent. This is the Upanishadic contribution to the problems of consciousness and self.

This universal self, which is at the centre of all our states of consciousness, by its very nature, cannot be perceived. It is not a datum of experience. Though it is the principle of seeking, it is not a thing seen. To quote Radhakrishnan again, "the subject of all experience cannot itself be an experience. If it is experience, the question arises, by whom is it known? Knowledge always works dually. This self, therefore, is indefinable. Like all ultimate principles, it has only to be accepted (*ibid.*, p. 159).

All that can be said is that the Upanishadic seers refuse to identify the self, the *atman*, with the body or the various mental states in waking or in dreaming. Secondly, they accept the reality of universal consciousness, that it is the basis of all individual consciousness and that it persists even in the deep sleep which is devoid of any contents.

The Mandukya Upanishad also analyses consciousness in a similar way. While the other Upanishads conveys their teaching

through anecdotes or dialogues between the imaginary persons, this short Upanishad of twelve verses goes straight into the problem of states of consciousness. It is the second verse of this Upanishad, which contains one of the *mahavekyas*, the great utterances of the Upanishads, namely, *ayam atma Brahma*—the *atman*, the self of man, is *Brahman*. The verse proclaims that the self has four quarters or four conditions. The third verse says that the waking state, the *jagrit*, is the first quarter. This the state common to all men and animals. Here there is consciousness of the external objects. It is called *Vaisvanara*, because it is the general consciousness and leads to the enjoyment of the objects of the world. This is the normal consciousness. It is outgoing. As Rohit Mehta (1970), points out, in the waking consciousness, man makes his choices and comes to his decisions. All actions in this state are impelled by desires and motives. "In this outgoing state man wants to appropriate to himself whatever he considers essential for his existence and expansion" (p. 150 f). Our choices are determined by our memory. That is, our choices and decisions are not free. They are conditioned and restricted by our upbringing and personal experiences. Thus, in the waking state, man is not only influenced by his body and the bodily needs, but also by his upbringing and his personal experiences, that is, by his social needs and fears as well.

The second condition is that of dreaming (*svapna*). It is the *taijasa*, the shining or the bright. It is *antah prajnah*. Here, consciousness is inward. All the sense organs operate in this condition also, but there is no cognition of the external world. Here also the desires and motives operate to generate the experiences. Below a brief description of the Upanishadic views regarding dream experience is given. The experiences in the dream state are conditioned not by external objects but rather by the memories, desires and imagination. While the *jagrit* state—the waking state—is outward moving and stimulated by external objects, the *svapna* state—the dream state—is inward moving, stimulated by internal factors.

When one is in deep sleep, one feels no desires and sees no dreams. In deep sleep, all experience becomes undifferentiated and unified. It is a state of bliss. This third quarter is designated *prajnaghana*, pure consciousness. It is an objectless condition. While in the waking state and in the dreaming state, there is the phenomenon of duality, the subject-object condition, in this state, duality is absent. Secondly, it is a state of bliss. "In sleep, it is said to be released from the shackles of the body and to gain back

its own nature" (Radhakrishnan, *ibid.*, p. 160).

However, according to Mandukya Upanishad, this state of sleep, the dreamless sleep, is not the highest state. There is a fourth state, the *turiya* condition. It is described in the seventh verse. In this state, one is neither conscious of the internal subjective world nor of the external objective world. This state is neither perceivable, nor is it inferable. It is unthinkable and indescribable. It is essentially of the nature of pure consciousness. It is peaceful, blissful and non-dual. This is the *atman*, the self. This is what each person has to realise.

What then is the difference between the third state and the fourth state? In the next five verses (8 to 12), the Upanishad gives an analogy of the three states of consciousness with the three letters of *Aumkara*, namely, A-U-M, which stand respectively for the three states of waking, the dreaming and the sleeping states and identifies the total sound with the fourth state. That is, this fourth state is not another state. It really includes the first three states. This state does not involve the abolition of the first three states. The waking state involves the abolition of the dream state and deep sleep state. Similarly, the dream state can arise only in the absence of the waking and deep sleep states. Finally, the deep sleep state can arise only when the waking and dream states are abolished. By contrast, the fourth state is an inclusive state. "Objects of the world are known and loved by us only in so far as they enter our self, which comprehends in itself all objects of the universe and has nothing outside. It is the unchanged and persistent identity which continues in the midst of all change. The moods pass and vary but the self remains the same. It has no beginning, no end, though the objects of which it is conscious have a beginning and an end" (Radhakrishnan, *ibid.*, p. 161). That is, self-realisation consists of becoming aware of this underlying self. The self not only underlies all the states of consciousness, it is also the basis of all the modifications in the universe. This is why the Upanishad declares at the beginning itself *ayam, atma, brahma*. This *atman* is *brahman* and it has four quarters (verse 2).

While in the third condition of dreamless sleep, we have no distinct cognition of anything external or internal, the fourth state includes and transcends all the three states of consciousness. It is like the witness, aware without being a participant. Secondly, this state of consciousness is characterised by spontaniety and it is free from influences of both the past and the future. It is free from predispositions and attitudes based on memory and anticipation and

hopes of the future. The individual reacts to the present in a spontaneous way.

Thus, the analysis of the self and the various states of consciousness, is the central theme of the Upanishads and is a legacy to all the subsequent systems of thought in India, whether they are *astika* recognising the authority of the Vedas or *nastika*, not recognising them as authority.

Analysis of the Dream State

A brief description of the dream state according to the Upanishad may now be given. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad asserts that in the dream state, the individual makes use of the impressions of the experiences in the waking state and builds for himself a new body, by his own lustre, free from the contact of the elements and their derivatives (IV, 3.9). In the dream state, there are in reality neither objects nor animals nor men. They are all created by him. Similarly, the joys and sorrows. The dreamer is the creator, the *karta* (IV, 3.10). Thus, here there is a clear recognition of the creativity of the dreamer on the basis of impressions from the experiences in his waking life. He perceives in the dream only mental modifications, his body being *abhiprahatya*, inert. Being possessed of constant vision, he never falls asleep, but remains eternally awake. It is the *suptan*, the dormant impressions, which form the contents of the dream (IV, 3.11). It may be recalled that the recent researchers on dream state call it the "paradoxical sleep". Reference is also made in the Upanishad to the beliefs and controversies regarding the dream state and dream experiences. It is stated that some believe that the dreamer should not be awakened because the self has gone outside the body and may not be able to return to the body which is in a different condition. Reference is also made to the view of some that the dream state is the same as the waking state, since one sees in the dream only those objects, animals, etc., that one sees in the waking state. But according to some others this is not correct because, all the sense organs are at rest. That is, one dreams only when the sense organs cease to function. The dreamer is really self-luminous, *svayam jyotih*. After the dream, he goes to deep sleep. From the deep sleep, he again lapses into the dream state and then he wakes up (IV, 3.14-15). The question arises as to the effect of the experiences in the dream state. Yajnavalkya asserts that the dreamer remains unaffected (*ananvagatah*) by them because he is *asangah*, unattached (IV, 3.16).

Similar view is expressed in the Prasna Upanishad. The dreamer,

it is said, sees again whatever has been seen before in different places. He also sees what has never been seen before and also what is not real (IV, 5). Attention is drawn here to the influence of impressions from waking life and also the fantasies created by the dreamer, because only the *manas* is operative and not the intellect, the *buddhi*.

The Mandukya Upanishad refers to the dream state as the *taljasa* the shining or the bright state. In this state, he is *antahprajnah* (4). His consciousness is inward in contrast to the waking consciousness which is *bahihprajnah*, outward directed. The objects in the dream are looked upon as being subtle objects based only on the impressions in the mind caused by the waking experiences. That is, the dream state is innermoving, that is moved by internal factors, unlike the waking state that is moved by external factors.

Thus, we have in the above three Upanishadic passages, a fairly detailed and convincing picture of the contents of dream consciousness, their origins and consequences.

Consciousness—A Basic Feature of Reality

According to the Upanishads, the self is not a mere abstraction or nothingness. It is the fullest reality, the completest consciousness.

One of the unique features of the Upanishads is the recognition that the ultimate reality, *brahman*, and the immediate reality of the individual, the self, are both characterised by *jnanam* or *chit*, intelligence or consciousness. The Taittiriya Upanishad expresses this by defining *brahman*, as it were, as, *satyam, jnanam, anantam brahma*. That is, according to the Upanishad, consciousness is not a mere characteristic feature of the individual human being. The individual could not have been characterised by consciousness if the universal self itself had not been characterised by it. The essence of the individual, and the essence of the universal also, is consciousness, according to the Upanishadic seers.

The Aitareya Upanishad contains the *mahavakya prajnanam brahma*, consciousness is *brahma*. It says, "everything is guided by *prajna* (consciousness). The whole world is founded on *prajna* and therefore *prajna* is *brahman*" (III, 1). This is indeed one of the most daring declarations of the Upanishadic seers. Consciousness, according to this view, is neither an adjunct nor an evolute, but the essential nature of the absolute. If consciousness does not manifest itself, it is due to some limitation in the organism or in the situation.

The Doctrine of Koshas

The Taittiriya Upanishad delineates the famous doctrine of five *koshas*, five sheaths.

From *brahman-atman*, the first principle, the whole universe has emanated. From the pure consciousness emanated space (or ether) with time. From the ether emanated air, from it fire, from it water, from it the earth and from it the *atman*, food (II, 1). All living beings have arisen from food. Thus matter in the shape of food is the first evolute (II, 2). From matter arises life, *prana*, the vital. All living beings are born from food, enclosed within the life sheath in the *manomaya kosha*, the mental sheath. Manas is the organ of perception, memory, understanding, etc. Perception and memory give rise to modification of the mind, the *samskaras* (II, 3). Within the mental sheath is the *vijnanamaya*, the intelligence sheath. Thus, a difference is made between the merely mental and the intelligent aspects. The mental, at the perceptual and memory level, is common to human beings and the animals, birds, etc. It is the intelligent, the intellectual and the rational processes which differentiate between the animal and human behaviour and between the behaviour of human beings at different stages in this life. While the *manomaya* is characterised by egoism, memory and imagination, the *vijnanamaya* is characterised by discrimination, discernment and determination. This shows a clear insight into the various levels of behaviour (II, 4). Within the *vijnanamaya kosha* is the *anandamaya kosha*, the sheath of bliss. This state is characterised by love, delight and bliss, (II, 5). At this level, the individual is free from the notions of egoism and sense of agency, the characteristic features of *manomaya* and *vijnanamaya*, respectively. At this level, the individual is close to the level of pure consciousness as it were.

The Modes of Mentation

The seventh chapter of Chandogya Upanishad relates to the teaching of Sanatkumara to Narada. It is declared the *vak*, speech is greater than mere *namna*, the name, the word. *Manas*, the mind is greater than speech. It is mind which encompasses the name and speech. A man learns and does only what his mind intends. So *samkalpa*, the resolve, the desire to realise what is not yet, is greater than the mind. It is when one makes a resolve in the mind that it is possible to speak of it and achieve it. Higher than *samkalpa* is *chitta*, thinking. It is when one thinks that he knows the relation of an object or event to time, place and situation. He will be able to examine and accept or reject it. Mere knowledge or learning

that is devoid of thinking, is of no use. He who thinks, will be able to accomplish and be free from distress. Higher than *chittham* is *dhyanam*, meditation. The small people, *alpah*, devoid of meditation are quarrelsome, abusive and slanderous. Higher than *dhyana* is *vijnana*, understanding (Chandogya Upanishad VIII, 2-9).

The Self, Mind and the Senses

In the third section of the first chapter of the Katha Upanishad, the analogy of the chariot is used to show the inter-relationship between the self (*atman*), the intellect (*buddhi*), the mind (*manas*) and the senses (*indriyas*): "Know the self as lord of the Chariot and the body as the Chariot. Know the intellect as the Charioteer, the mind as the reins. The senses are horses. The object of the senses are the paths they range over. The self, associated with the body, the senses and the mind; is the *bhokta*, the enjoyer," (Katha Upanishad I, 3, 3-4). Thus these verses clearly set down the various aspects of mind. A distinction is made between the self, the intellect and the mind. Secondly, the Upanishadic thinkers speak of two sets of *indriyas*, sense organs—the five *jnanendriyas* (the eye, the ear, the skin, the nose and the tongue) and the five *karmendriyas*, the motor organs (speech, manipulation, walking, evaluation and reproduction). The Upanishad looks upon the development of the self as the aim of the human being and the human society. The mature and well-integrated self is the goal so that the mind and the ten organs are under firm control, as the horses and the chariot are under the control of the charioteer, the intellect, which is under the control of the self, the lord of the chariot.

In the next two verses, the analogy is extended to show that an individual, who has no understanding (*avijnanavan*) and whose mind is unrestrained (*ayuktenamanasa*) will have his senses out of control. They will behave like the wicked horses which smash up the chariot, the charioteer and the Lord of the Chariot. It is only the person with understanding, whose *manas* is restrained, who will have all the cognitive and executive senses under control. Such a man will reach the end of his journey, that is the goal of human development, namely, serenity and peace (Katha Upanishad I, 3, 5, 6 and 9).

The other verses show that there is a hierarchy in this structure. The *manas* is superior to the senses. The *buddhi* is superior to the *manas*. The great self (*mahan atman*) is superior to the *buddhi*

Thus the self here, is equated with the individual consciousness, and ultimately with the pure consciousness, the indvidual and absolute (I, 3, 10-11).

One of the most famous verses of Vedas occurs in this Upanishad. "Arise (*uttishtha*), awake (*jagrata*): Realise the *atman*, having approached excellent teachers" (I, 3.14). However, the sage warns that the path to development is like the sharp edge of a razor, difficult to cross and hard to tread. It is indicated that the path to self-realisation is strenuous. But it is necessary. The aim of every human being should be to arise and wake up. It may be added, the aim of every society should be to provide the facilities for every human being and stimulate his intellect, (*dhiyo yo nah prachodayat* as the *Gayatri mantra* puts it), so that he can grow to the highest he is capable of.

And what is that self, the *atman*? The next verse (I, 3.15) states that the *atman* is "soundless, touchless, formless, imperishable, with neither a beginning nor an end."

As noted above, the Taittiriya Upanishad declares *Satyam jnanam anantam brahma*. "The Absolute is existence, consciousness, and infinity" (II, 1). That is, the *brahman* (the Absolute) and *atman* (the self) is characterised by *jnanam* or *chit*, consciousness. The same is expressed even more clearly in Aitareya Upanishad. *Lokah prajna pratishtha prajnanam brahma*, "the whole world is founded on self-consciousness. It is self-consciousness which is the Absolute," (III, 3). In Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Yajnavalkya declares, "Your own self is the very self of all beings" (III, 4.2). As Ranade (1968) concludes, "Self-consciousness thus constitutes the ultimate category of existence to the Upanishadic philosophers" (p. 97).

The Individual Self

According to the Upanishads, the individual self is the highest reality among the finite objects. It comes nearest to the absolute. As noted above, according to the Taittiriya Upanishad, all the several elements of the cosmos are found in the individual. That is, man is the meeting point of the various stages of reality, from elements like air, water and earth right up to the ananda state. They look upon the individual as the finite self, as the *atman* embodied and coupled with senses and the mind.

The Prasna Upanishad enumerates the ten *indriyas*—five sensory and five executive or motor (IV, 2). These *indriyas* work under the control of the *manas*, the central organ whose chief functions are perception and action. Without mind, the senses are useless,

(Brihadaranyaka Upanishad I, 6.3). This is why the mind is called the chief of the senses. Without mind or *prajna*, speech does not make anything known. "I was absent in mind, I did not see; I was absent in mind, I did not hear: in this manner, it is evident that a person sees with the mind, hears with the mind" (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad III, 1.4). For perception, what is necessary is neither the mere sense nor its mere functioning, but a self which perceives through the sense, a seeing eye.

Aitareya Upanishad also describes the functions of the *buddhi*. "Sensation, perception, ideation, conception, understanding, thought, resolution, opinion, imagination, feeling, memory, volition, the will to live, desire and self-control, all those are different names of *prajna* consciousness" (II, 1).

The self controls *buddhi*, *manas*, the *indriyas*, the *prana*, etc. (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad IV. 4.5, I.4.17; V. C, II, 1, 17; III, 7, 22; IV, 3.7; IV, 5.13). The self is known to be all-pervasive and absolute (Katha Upanishad I, 2.21; Mundaka Upanishad I, 1.6).

The Two Levels of Self

Attention has already been drawn to the Rig Vedic allegory of two birds (Rig Veda I, 164.20). As noted above, the same verse occurs in Mundaka Upanishad (II, 1.1-2) and in Svetasvatara Upanishad (IV, 6.1). The two birds stand for the individual consciousness, the *chitta* aud the pure consciousness, the *chit*. The individual consciousness is the mind together with the ten sense organs (five cognitive and five executive), involved in perception, attachment and action. By contrast, the pure consciousness, also in each individual, is like a witness, not involved in attachment and action, not involved in the satisfaction of the bodily, mental and social needs. However, the two are inseparable. The two exist at the same spot and at the same time. The individual who identifies himself with the participant bird, the lower bird engaged in eating the fruit of the tree, feels miserable when the fruit is bitter and happy when it is sweet. These joys and sorrows are due to delusion. They are due to the fact that he forgets that he is not totally the bird sitting at the lower level. When he realises that he is really the witness and not forever the participant, he becomes free from misery. Identification with the body, mental abilities, social status, etc., generate egoism and attachment to his needs, activities and the social group. But when he overcomes the egoism, frees himself from attachment to his needs, status, etc., he develops the universal

outlook and does not look upon his failures as catastrophies. In other words, detachment from the bodily and social needs enable him to become free from frustration and anxiety and develop in him rational rather than emotional ways of resolving conflicts and, above all, to develop compassion towards other persons in the society.

As Radhakrishnan puts it, "The empirical self is tethered to a local and temporal environment . . . . It constructs for itself an imperfect world of imperfect data. It has no freedom. It is a mere flux of states" (Vol. I, p. 153). All changes, all experiences, assume a subject, the ground and sustainer of all experiences. This higher self is there in all the three states of waking, dreaming and sleeping.

Self—Neither Perceivable nor Conceivable

As noted above, the characteristic feature of Upanishadic thought is the assertion of identity of the objective, the *brahman*, the cosmic principle, with the subjective, the *atman*, the psychical principle. Commenting on this the German thinker, Deussen (1906) said, "It was here for the first time, the original thinkers of the Upanishads, to their immortal honour, found it when they recognised our *atman*, our inmost individual being, as the *brahman*, the inmost being of the universal nature and of all her phenomena" (*Philosophy of Upanishads*, p. 40). This is enunciated in the *mahavakya*, *tat tvam asi* in the Chandogya Upanishad (VI, 8.7).

Can this self, the *atman*, be seen? Can it be perceived? In the famous dialogue between Yajnavalkya and his wife Maitreyi, the sage says "How should he know him by whom he knows all this? How, O Beloved, should he know himself, the knower?" Brihadaranyaka Upanishad ii, 4.13; also iii, 4.2). Objective knowledge of the subject, he says, is impossible. He points out that it is "unseen but seeing, unheared but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing" (*Ibid*. iii, 7-23). The self exists, but it cannot be objectively represented. The Kena Upanishad, asserts, "That which one cannot think with the mind, but that by which they say the mind is made to think, know that alone to be *brahman*" (Jana Upanishad I, 5).

That is, *manas* can only perceive through the sense organs, and *vijnana*, intellect, can work only with the categories of time, space, cause, etc. But the self is beyond perception and conception. "Our intellectual categories can give descriptions of the empirical universe under the forms of space, time and cause, but the real is beyond these. While containing space, it is not spatial; while including time, it transcends time; while it has a causally bound

system of nature within it, it is not subject to law of cause" Radhakrishnan, *ibid.*, p. 1.4). This is why the Katha Upanishad declares, "Not by learning is the *atman* attained, not by genius and much knowledge of books" (Katha Upanishad ii, 23). The self can only be *realised*; the self can neither be perceived nor conceived. Self realisation is the supreme aim of man. "This is the supreme end of that this is the supreme treasure of that, this is the supreme dwelling of that, this is the supreme joy of that" (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad iv, 3.32).

Thus, according to the Upanishadic seers, life and consciousness, do not develop from matter, as the materialists assert. Matter cannot develop life or consciousness unless it had those potentialities. According to the Upanishadic view, development is really the manifestation of the potentialities already there. The multiplicity of things and beings is based on the *brahman*. For Upanishads both form and matter, the ever active consciousness (*chetana*) and the non-consciousness (*achetana*), are the aspects of a single existent.

The Aitareya Aranyaka asserts, "In herbs and trees sap only is seen, but *chitta* or consciousness is an animated being. Among animated beings, again, the self develops gradually, for in some sap is seen as well as consciousness, but in others consciousness is not seen, and in man, again, the self develops gradually, for he is most endowed with knowledge. He says what he has known, he sees what he has known, he knows what is to happen tomorrow, he knows the visible and the invisible words with regard to other animals, hunger and thirst are a kind of understanding. But they do not say what they have known, nor do they see what they have known. They do not know what is to happen tomorrow, nor the visible and the 'invisible words. They go so far and no farther" (II, 3.1-5).

Meditation, the Means to Realise

The beginnings of the yoga system are to be found in the Upanishad. The mind of man was compared to a mirror. The extent to which we know reality depends on the state of our mind. The understanding will be imperfect if there is a taint or imperfection clinging to the instrument. The selfish desires and passions get between the instrument of mind and the reality. The ignorance of the observer clouds the object with his fancies. Error is due to the defects of the instrument. An impartial and impersonal attitude is necessary to refine the mind and improve the mirror. It is only through discipline that we can rise to that height of impersonality and impartiality. This method is in consonance with the Upani-

shadic theory of self (Chapter 1 5).

The Mundaka Upanishad declares "Having taken the bow furnished by Upanishad, the great weapon, and fixed in it the arrow rendered pointed by constant meditation, and having drawn it with the mind, fixed on the *brahman*, aim happy youth at the mark, the immortal *brahman*" (II, 2.3).

Prasna Upanishad speaks of the method of meditation (V, 1), mystic words such as *Aum*, *Tadvanam* (Kena Upanishad IV, 6), *Tajjalan* (Chandogya Upanishad III, 14.1) are recommended for concentration.

The Svetasvatara Upanishad says, "Practicing *dhyana yoga* they realised the veiled *devatmasakti*" (I, 3). "This is to be known as eternally existing in one's own self. Indeed there is nothing to be known beyond this. As a result of meditation, the *bhokta*, the enjoyer, the *bhogya*, the enjoyed, and the *preritaram*, the power which brings about the enjoyment—all the three are declared to be the three aspects of *brahman*" (I, 12). "Making one's own body the lower piece of wood (*aranim*) and *pranava*, the *omkara*, the upper piece through *dhyana*, meditation, one should realise" (I, 14).

Jnana, the Means to Realise

Isa Upanishad declares, "When unity is realised and every being becomes our very self—how can there be any delusion or sorrow then" (Isa Upanishad, 7). It is the affirmation of the finite self that is the obstacle to self-realisation. According to the Upanishads the cultivation of *Vairagya*, detachment and acquisition of *jnana*, knowledge, are the two requisites for realisation. To quote Hiriyanna (1932), "*vairagya* is the name given to that attitude towards the world which results from the successful eradication of the narrow selfish impulses" (p. 75). The Upanishads, in many verses, indicate that man's limited outlook and consequent suffering is due to a lack of knowledge of the real self. As Brihadaranyaka Upanishad puts it, "Having become calm, subdued, quiet, patiently enduring and collected one should see the self in the self" (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad IV, IV, 23). It also prescribes the famous threefold path for self-realisation, namely *sravana* (study) *manana*, reflection and *nididhyasana*, meditation. The great sage Yajnavalka tells his wife Maitreyi, who wants to have knowledge of the self, "The self should be the object of realisation, *atman drashtavyah*. For that pupose, the self should be first heard of from a teacher, *srotavyah*, then reflected on through reasoning, *mantavyah*, and then steadily meditated upon, *nididhyasitavyah*"

(Brihadaranyaka Upanishad II, iv, 5). As Hiriyanna puts it, "when a person who has morally purified himself (by *vairagya* detachment) and has, after formal study add reflection, convinced himself intellectually of the truth of unity, succeeds through *nididhyasana* in transforming what was heretofore known only mediately into an immediate certainty, he attains the spiritual goal" (p. 78).

SUMMARY

It is clear from the description of the reflections of the Vedic seers in the Samhitas and the Upanishads that they put the stamp, as it were, on all the later developments in thought by boldly expressing their views on the self and mental processes. It is true that their aim was not to build any system. Their aim was to grasp the true nature of the self and describe the ways in which altered states of consciousness arise, to use a current phrase. There is no doubt that these reflections of over three thousand years ago give us a theory of mind and theory of consciousness which are valid even today. They point out that in the highest state of consciousness, the subject and object become one. The methods to arrive at this are *dhyana*, meditation and *jnana*, understanding. This is the goal of man's supreme effort. This is the supreme treasure and the supreme bliss (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad IV, 3.32). To reach this, the Upanishads ask us to renounce all selfish desires, the tyrannies of lust and greed. The mere striving to satisfy the instinctive cravings and social needs, they declare boldly, is not the goal of human life. They affirm values which are higher than the physical, the biological and the social. They also affirm that it is the pursuit of those higher values which lead to an integrated and whole life.

CHAPTER 3

The Psychological Aspects of the Gita

The Setting of the Gita

Arjuna, the great Warrior of Mahabharata, asks his Charioteer, the sage and statesman Krishna to take the chariot between the armed forces which are in readiness to start the great war. He surveys the two sides and realises for the first time the terrible catastrophe which will be all the country when the war starts. Elders, friends and relatives are on either side of the battlefield. There will be large-scale destruction of relatives and friends irrespective of which side would be victorious. Did he not know of this all those months when negotiations had been started and it was found that the only solution to the conflict was on the battlefield? The author of the *Gita* shows the difference in perception. Getting justice was the main motive all along. But the actual sight on the battlefield makes Arjuna realise vividly the enormity and the monstrosity of the situation. The objective conflict between the two side now becomes a subjective conflict in Arjuna's mind. His conscience is troubled. He is torn with anguish. The poet has entitled the first chapter "Arjuna, Vishada Yoga", the "despondency of Arjuna". Thus the basic problem of the *Gita* is to help Arjuna to overcome this despondency so that he can wholeheartedly resolve to do the duty he has undertaken to do, namely, to face and fight the enemy on the battlefield. From this point of view, the *Gita* may be looked upon as an essay in conselling, an attempt to help man to perceive the situation in the proper perspective, so that he neither breaks down and becomes a victim to mental illness nor withdraws from the struggle in life and attempts in a futile way to become a *sanyasin*. Even if he becomes a *sanyasin*, he will have to be bear the conflict, because it has not been resolved. To make individual is the aim of the *Gita*.

There is a very vivid description of the effect of mental conflict on the body. Arjuna says, "my limbs sink down, my mouth becomes parched, my whole body is trembling, my bow is slipping from my hand. My skin is burning all over. I am unable to stand, My mind is reeling" (I, 29-30). He is thus overpowered by a sense

of compassion and a sense of guilt. He is confesses that he is confused about what his duty is in this situation. He asks the teacher to instruct him. He seeks the counsellor's help (II, 7).

Mental Structure

Krishna gives an outline of the mental structure in order to enable Arjuna to understand the problem. There are the sense organs which form the most important parts of the body. But *manas*, mind, is superior to the senses. Superior to *manas* is *buddhi*, the intellect. Above all there is the self. So the task of man is to understand the interrelationship between these various aspects and steady the lower self by the higher self. Man's real enemy is not there outside. He has to destroy the enemy which is in the form of desire, *kamarupam*, and which is hard to conquer (III, 42-43). *Kama*, desire and craving and *krodha*, wrath, constitute the all-consuming passions in man. Just as dust covers the mirror, so that it is incapable of reflecting persons and objects before it, so is the wisdom covered by passion and man is not able to think clearly about the situation which confronts him (III, 37-39). Desire and frustration are the two great enemies within man and the important task of man is to understand and conquer them.

This whole process of desire and emotion overpowering intelligence and wisdom is described in two very famous verses. When a man dwells in his mind on objects of sense, attachment to them is produced. From attachment springs desire. When desire is frustracted, wrath arises. Anger and wrath give rise to bewilderment and delusion (*sammoha*). Delusion leads to loss of memory. When memory is lost, there is destruction of *buddhi*, intelligence and reason. With the ruin of reason, man perishes (II, 62-63). But when a man has a disciplined mind, his senses are under control, he is free from attachment and aversion. He gains tranquillity. With tranquillity the mind becomes stable (II, 64-65). So according to *Gita*, the task of a man is to lift himself by himself, *atmana atmanam uddharat*. One should not let down the self. For the (higher) self is the only friend of the self and the (lower) self is the only enemy of self. The self is a friend to one who has conquered his (lower) self by the (higher) self. When no so conquered, the (lower) self will be one's great enemy (VI, 5-6). Thus, according to *Gita*, the task of man is to gain control over himself by keeping the lower self, that is, the sense desires and passions, under proper control. Disaster occurs when one is under the control of one's desire and emotions. He must be a *niyatamanah*, of controlled mind

(VI, 15).

It is needless to mention that above statement of the *Gita* is in line with Katha Upanishad description of mental structure and of the notion of two birds on the same tree in Rig Veda and the Upanishad.

The Eightfold Prakriti

The *Gita* makes a difference between *prakriti*, nature or objective world and *purusha*, the self, as does the Samkhya system, (Chapter 4), though there is considerable difference.

In the seventh chapter, this distinction is brough about in very clear terms. "Earth, water, fire, air, ether, *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahamkara*, constitute the eigthfold division of *prakriti*. This is my lower nature, the *apara prakriti*. But there is also my *para prakriti* which is different from it and by which this world is maintained (VII, 4-5). The significant feature of these verses is that mind, intellect and self-sense are looked upon as being part of the lower nature along with the five elements of earth, etc. That is, the three psychological principles of mind, intellect and self-sense are constituents of material nature. These three along with memory, *chitta*, the fourth psychological principle, from what is later designated as the *antahkarana* (B. Kuppuswamy, 1952). This is where the *Gita's* view of mind is in accordance with the Samkhya view of mind.

Kshetra and Kshetrajna

The thirteenth chapter is devoted to a further discussion of the two principles enunciated in the seventh chapter. The body is called the *kshetra*, the field and *kshetrajna* is the knower of the field (1). While the body is subject to changes, the conscious principle is inactive and detached. It is the witness, the bird that is perched on top of the tree of life looking on at the bird lower down, which is participating in the life processes. That is, man has a two fold nature. He is at once "free and enslaved" or in the language of ancient thinkers, "bound and liberated". As a "fallen" being, he is subject to the bodily needs of hunger, thirst, sex, etc. and the social needs of love, recognition, esteem, etc. But he is also the *kshetrajna*, the knower of the field, the subject of experience. As Radhakrishnan says, "the human being is a union of the universal-infinite and the universal-particular. In his subjective aspects, he is not a part of a whole but is the potential whole. To actualise it, to accomplish the universality is the ideal of man" (The Bhagavad Gita, p. 301 f).

The *kshetra*, the field is declared to consist of the five gross elements, the ten sense organs (five cognitive and five executive), the five objects of the senses, the self-sense (*ahamkara*), the understanding (*buddhi*) and the mind (*manas*). Also included here is the *avyakta*, the unmanifest. The total thus makes up 24 principles (XIII, 5). The modifications of the field are desire (*iccha*), hatred (*dvesha*), pleasure (*sukham*), pain (*duhkham*), these feelings, together with the principles of association (*samghata*), intelligence (*chetana*) and steadfastness (*dhriti*), constitute the field (XIII, 6). Thus, the psychological experiences as well as the psychological instruments or agencies, are all treated as part of the field. It must be remembered that the term *manas* does not correspond to the term *mind*.

The knower of the field, the *kshetrajna*, is decribed in verses 13 to 17 of the 13th chapter. The knower is the self who is "without and within all beings. He is unmoving as also moving. He is far away and near. He is too subtle (*sukshma*) to be known" (15) This description of the self is like the Upanishadic descriptions. The terms used in the five verses from 13 to 17 are from several Upanishads reviewed in the previous chapter.

It is further asserted that the *kshetra* is the *prakriti*, nature, and that the *kshetrajna* is the *purusha*, the self, the knower and that both of them are eternal, without beginning and without end (19). The body, the senses and the mental apparatus belongs to the *prakriti*. The self, the *purusha* is the empirical self, who is attached to the various experiences (20-21). But beyond the empirical self is the *paramatman*, the supreme self, the onlooker (*upadrishtha*), the permitter (*anumanta*), the supporter (*bharta*), the experiencer (*bhokta*), the Supreme Self (*parah purushah*) (22). The aim of human life is to become aware of these various constituents in knowing and in the knower (23). The means is also described. By meditation, (*dhyana*) some perceive the self. Some through reasoning (*samkhya yogena*). Some through the path of work (*karma yogena*). Others through the path of worship (*upasana*) (24-25). Thus, the Gita is aware that one means may not be suitable to all persons. This is a recognition of the fact of individual differences and differences in temperament. This will be discussed in a chapter dealing with psychology of religion (Chapter 18).

In verses 27 and 28, the Gita declares the principle of golden rule in social behaviour. It is declared that he sees truly, who sees the supreme abiding equally in all human beings and will not injure anyone because he is fully aware that he will only harm himself when he harms anyone else (XIII, 27-28).

Another very significant statement is made in the next verse. The higher self is merely the witness. It is the lower self, moved by impulses and needs, who is the doer. That is, the true self is not the doer. He is merely the witness, the spectator. He should not lose himself by identifying himself with bodily and the social needs (29). A person with such an attitude and frame of mind will be able to keep his equanimity (*samatva*) under the varying conditions of life. This certainly contributes to mental health and well-being.

The Theory of Gunas

While in the above two sections, the influence of *prakriti* on behaviour has been seen in terms of the sense organs, sense objects and the mental apparatus of *manas*, *ahamkara* and *buddhi*, the *Gita* also emphasises another aspect, the influence of *prakriti* on behaviour, through the three *gunas*.

Early in the work, it is declared that all kinds of work, all kinds of activity, are due to the *gunas* of *prakriti*, but that the person clouded by egoism (*ahamkara*) imagines that he is the doer. He who knows that the self is different from both *gunas* and the actions (*karma*), will know that *guna guneshu vartante*, that *gunas* act on the *gunas*. Knowing this he will not be attached to actions (III, 27-28).

The term *guna*, literally a strand in the rope, refers to the quality of *prakriti*. Nature or natural phenomena are characterised by *sattva* (essence), *rajas* (energy), and *tamas* (mass). As mental states, they are the states of clarity, restlessness and torpidity respectively. The three *gunas* are referred to in the seventh chapter also. All the three states, by they clear and harmonious (*sattvika*), restless and passionate (*rajasa*) or slothful and torpid (*tamasa*), all of them proceeds from *prakriti*. It is also asserted that persons who are deluded by those qualities, or modes of nature, do not recognise the truth (VII, 12-13). Thus all mental operations and the physical actions consequent on them are all due to these three qualities or modes of nature. The self as witness does not participate in them.

The fourteenth chapter, entitled *gunatraya vibhoga yoga*, describes the influence of these three qualities on mental phenomena and behaviour. All the three bind the human being. But there is a difference. *Sattve*, being pure (*nirmalatvat*), illuminating (*prakasakam*) and free disease (*anamayatvat*), binds one to bliss and to knowledge. But *rajasa*, being of the nature of desire and springing from craving and attachment, binds one to action. *Tamasa*, being born of ignorance (a*jnana*) and delusion (*moha*) leads one to negligence, indolence and sleep. In any individual, one of these three

qualities may be dominant and so may become the prevalent quality restricting the operation of the other two. Of course, it is possible that one of these may become dominant in any given situation and characterise his action at the moment. For example, a higher integrated man may lose his equilibrium when he is insulted or when he is in a crowd or when he is confronted by a snake or a mad dog. These three terms, *sattvika*, *rajasa* and *tamasa*, are well known and in use throughout India to characterise the behaviour of persons and their actions in a specific situation. The saint is *sattvika*, the politician and policeman are *rajasa* and the mentally retarded is *tamasa*. As Radhakrishnan writes, "while the activities of a *sattvika* temperament are free, calm and selfless, the *rajasa* nature wishes to be always active and cannot sit still and its activities are tainted by selfish desires. The *tamasa* nature is dull and inert, its mind is dark and confused and its whole life is one continuous submission to environment" (*Gita*, p. 319).

The aim of life, according to the *Gita* is not only to be free from the influence of *rajasa* and *tamasa*, but even from the *sattva* (XIV, 20).

In one of the most celebrated sections of the *Gita*, the poet describes the character of one who is beyond the three *gunas*. He is one who is not miserable when illumination, activity and delusion operate nor when they cease. Knowing that it is only the *gunas* that are operating, he is unperturbed. He looks upon pain and pleasure, blame and praise with equanimity. Above all, he is able to look upon a clod of earth, a piece of stone or a bit of gold as of equal worth (XIV, 21-25).

In the seventeenth and eighteenth chapters various aspects of life and behaviour are described using these three modes of activity—three kinds of faith, three kinds of food, three kinds of *yajna* (sacrifice), three kinds of *tapas*(austerity), three kinds of *danam* (gifts), three kinds of *tyaga* (renunciation).

Two Classes of Human Beings

In the sixteenth chapter are described the characteristics of two classes of human beings, those with godlike mind and those with demoniac mind. This distinction is a very ancient one that can be traced to the Rig Vedic hymns. Those who are always truthful, non-violent, with compassion towards others, who are gentle and modest, who are ready to forgive and who are free from malice and pride are said to have divine qualities. Those who are arrogant, full of self-conceit, who are harsh towards fellow human

beings are designated as being demoniac. They are bound by desires and are given over to lust and anger. Their one aim is to gratify their desire for wealth and social esteem. In pursuit of these ends, they are ready to destroy others.

Five Factors of Action

There is an interesting section in the eighteenth chapter which analyses the factors contributing to accomplishment of all actions. In each action of man, it is stated, five factors are operating, namely, the body, the agent, the various instruments, the various kinds of effort and providence, the *daivam*, the unforeseen (XVIII, 14).

One's body, one's strength and physical efficiency, is a very important factor which contributes to one's success or failure. The growing child and the aging person may overestimate their physical ability and may come to grief. Similarly the convalescent may lapse back into illness or disability. It is a well-known fact that the aim of hatha yoga is to develop one's physique so that one is in a healthy state.

Secondly, there is the *karta*, the agent, the empirical self. Aspiration and faith in self to accomplish the task undertaken is a very important factor. Need for achievement and level of aspiration are very important factors which determine one's level of functioning and the utilisation of abilities which one has. Inferiority feelings and over-ambition are factors pertaining to self, the agent and which definitely influence the outcome of one's actions.

The third factor refers to the perceptual and motor organs, which constitute the *karanam*, the instruments through which the individual accomplishes his activities.

The fourth factor identified is the various *cheshtah*, the varied kinds of effort. There is no one and only way of accomplishing one's tasks. This may be taken as an indication of the varied efforts necessary to bring about success. Reference may be made to the series of trials that are necessary to overcome the errors and to discover the right movement which ensures success.

The fifth factor, *daivam*, refers to the indeterminate factor, which is very important. One cannot foresee all the circumstances and control them in order to ensure success in one's endeavour. Sometimes some unforeseen circumstances may bring about some obstructions which may thwart our efforts. He is indeed a wise man who takes such failures in his stride instead of succumbing to the frustrations which may thus arise.

Because these five factors are operating in each action, one should not imagine that the success or failure in one's endeavours are due to one's self as the sole agent (XVIII, 16), that is, arrogance. By hypothesis, the real self is a non-doer (*akarta*). The author of the *Gita*, by analysing action as being due to the five factors, shows that the assumption of the unthinking man that he is solely responsible for the success or failure or his actions is indeed foolish. This analysis, it may be pointed out, is helpful to build up the right attitude towards one's actions and their success or failure, particularly the latter.

Attitude towards Action

What then should be one's attitude towards one's actions, if by hypothesis one is ultimately only an *akarta*, a non-doer?

"No one can remain even for a moment without doing work. Everyone is made to act by *prakritijairgunaih*, by the impulses born of nature" (III, 5). Life cannot be sustained without breathing, intake of food, rest, sleep, etc. Inaction is impossible; only the corpse is inactive.

One of the most famous verses of the *Gita* tells us how we should act. "On action alone let thy interest be fixed, not on its fruits" (II, 47). It is based on the principle of disinterestedness. That is, one should be concerned with the action on hand and not dissipate one's energies on thinking about the consequences of one's actions, like success, income, fame, prestige, etc., all of which are extraneous to the task on hand. The previous section makes it clear that success or failure does not depend solely on the individual. It depends on other factors as well. Another verse clarifies this. "Therefore, do whatever has do be done free from attachment, *asaktah*. By performing actions without attachment, man is attaining the highest" (III, 19).

What will be the motive for such action? The motive is *lokasamgraham*, welfare of people, world-maintenance. Secondly, each person should be aware that his behaviour is a model to others (III, 20-21). It is true that the child's behaviour, like that of the animal, is based on bodily needs. Before long, the behaviour of the child is motivated by social needs like belongingness, social approval, prestige, etc. But, with further growth, the motive should be the concern for the welfare of the group in which we live, if not of the whole of humanity. This implies that each man has to be aware that he has to behave in a very responsible manner. One must be aware that one's behaviour has consequences far beyond what one

imagines at the moment. One must feel that he is a citizen of the world and not a mere cog in the wheel.

A very important consquence of such an attitude towards one's work relates to mental equilibrium of the individual. Detachment generates mental balance and mental peace. The attitude of such a person is described in verses 19 to 22 of the fourth chapter. Actions which are free from personal desires can arise only when one is free from attachment to the fruits of one's work. Another verse says, "He who does the work which he ought to do without seeking its fruit is the true yogin" (VI, 1).

In describing the duties of the four varnas, in the last chapter, the term *svabhavajam* is used. That is, the duties are born of nature (XVIII, 41-44). In the following four verses, the emphasis is laid on *svadharma*, which is *sahajam karma*, work suited to one's nature and that *paradharma* is work alien to one's nature (XVIII, 45-48).

What is the relation between *svadharma* and *svabhava*, one's duty and one's nature in the sense of talent, temperament, training, etc.? As Radhakrishnan puts it, the import of the *Gita* is that "each individual has his inborn nature (*svabhava*), and to make it effective in his life in his duty (*svadharma*)" (*Gita*, p. 364).

Because the *Gita* asserts that *svadharma* is based on *svabhava*, it rejects *paradharma*, duty that is alien to one's nature. If a person takes up a job that does not suit his abilities and temperament, he is bound to be a misfit and may cause injury, not only to himself, but also to the organisation in which he works.

The concepts of *svadharma* and *svabhava* are significant in the light of vocational guidance and vocational selection.

Importance of Aptitude

The general notion regarding the term *svadharma* is that it is *varna dharma*, the duty which devolves on one because he belongs to a *varna* or class, or *jati dharma*, the duty which devolves on one because of his birth in a family which belongs to a group. Arjuna is not only a great warrior, he is also born in the kshatriya family. So it seems legitimate to interpret that he must fulfil his *svadharma* by fighting. He is a warrior by birth as well as by training. Not choosing to fight is a crime (or sin) because he will be abandoning his *svadharma*, caste duty. By choosing to become a *sanyasin*, he is guilty of choosing *paradharma*.

Elsewhere, the present writer (Kuppuswamy, 1977) has dealt with this problem in the light of the other concept in the *Gita*, namely, *svabhava*.

In modern language, the term *svabhava* refers to a person's activities, aptitudes and temperament. The choice of occupation has to take into account these characteristics of an individual. Failure and frustration will be the inevitable consequences, harmful to the individual as well as the society, when persons take up work that is not in line with their aptitudes. Mere birth in a group should not determine the choice of occupation. This is the aim of modern development with respect to aptitude testing, vocational guidance and vocational selection.

Meditation—the Means to Development of Personality

The technique of mental discipline constitutes the theme of the sixth chapter. As Radhakrishnan writes—the main purpose of this chapter is to raise consciousness from its ordinary working condition to higher levels until it attains universality (*Gita*, p. 192). Let the yogin try constantly, to concentrate his mind, by restraining his mind from desires (bodily and social) and from the longing to accumulate his possession (VI, 1). Directions are given here regarding the way in which one has to sit and engage himself in *dhyana*, meditation. He has to be temperate in food, recreation and sleep (VI, 17). His mind should be free from wandering. It should be like a lamp in a windless place (19). When thought comes to rest he will find satisfaction in the self by beholding the self. That bliss will be beyond the reach of the senses. When that is gained there is nothing else or nothing higher to be gained (20-22).

Arjuna asks the teacher whether it is ever possible to control the restless mind. Is not the very nature of mind to be restless—*chanchalam hi manah*. Krishna agrees that it is very difficult to curb the restless mind. Two ways are described as being helpful and effective in this difficult task, namely, *abhyasa*, constant practice and *vairagya*, detachment (VI, 33-35). It will be seen that these are the very two techniques recommended by Patanjali in the *Yoga Sutra* (I, 12).

The *Gita* also describes the social and personal consequences of such a state. He whose self is harmonised by yoga sees himself in all beings and all beings in himself. He looks upon others as being like himself, *atma aupamya*, whether in pleasure or in pain (VI, 29-32).

The famous section in the second chapter, dealing with the characteristics of *sthitaprajna* the person with steadfast wisdom, was made popular throughout the country by Gandhiji by making its recital a part of the evening prayer wherever he went. A person

with steadfast wisdom is one who is untroubled by sorrows and pleasures. Joys and sorrows will always be there in every human being. The characteristic of a well-developed personality is that he is unaffected by feelings of pleasure and pain that result from the success or failure of his undertakings. Secondly, he is not moved by the emotions of passions, fear and rage—*vita ragabhayakrodah*. Thirdly, he draws away his mind from the objects of senses (Kuppuswamy, 1959). Does this mean that his sense organs, perceptual and motor are unaffected? No. He is rather like the sea which always receives the waters from the rivers without overflowing. Things affect him, but he is unaffected by them (II, 54-72).

The Final Choice

One verse in the *Gita* which is of very great interest to students of modern psychology occurs in the last chapter. After the whole teaching, Krishna tells Arjuna, "This has been expounded the wisdom that is more secret than all secrets. Reflect upon it fully—*Vimrisai etad aseshena*—and do as you thinkest best—*Yatha tcchesi tatha Kuru*" (XVIII, 63). Arjuna is asked to reflect upon the teaching. He is not asked to accept anything merely on the basis of the prestige of the teacher. He is asked to think on his own the implications of the teaching. Secondly, he is asked to choose for himself the action he desires to pursue in the light of his own reflection. Neither blind faith nor total surrender to the dictates of the teacher is required. The teacher is only a counsellor. The final decision is left to the individual.

Freedom to think, to reflect and question and freedom to choose one's own path of action are the two basic freedoms enunciated in this verse. It recognises man's responsibility for his decisions and actions.

It is true, however, that this is in utter contrast to the actual social life which is based on conformity to custom at every step in a man's life. It is not the real and the actual. The individual avoids the burden of responsibility for his decisions and actions by conforming to the customs, however unsocial or even anti-social it may be The group insists on such conformity for it holds that customs are perennial and permanent. Any deviation from them may be disastrous to the very survival of the group.

Summary

The *Gita* depicts the anguish of Arjuna when he realises that the

war means destruction and death to relatives and friends. So Arjuna wants to retire from the battle and take up *sanyasa*. He seeks the help of Krishna. He is facing not only a moral problem but a mental problem. He is torn by mental conflict. Thus, the *Gita* can be looked upon as an essay in counselling. To resolve the mental conflict and to make man an integrated individual is the aim of the *Gita*.

A description of the mental structure is given by Krishna to enable Arjuna to understand his problem. It consists of the five perceptual and five motor organs, the *manas*, the intellect, and the self. Man has two selves, the lower self which seeks gratification of biological and social needs and the higher self which seeks understanding and is a mere witness. Desires, feelings and emotions must be conquered to realise the higher and the true self. Two pairs of verses, II, 64-65 and VI, 5-6 are referred to in this context. Integration as well as disintegration of personality is in one's hands. No outside force operates. Man's problems are mental and the solutions to these problems are also mental.

The other important characteristic of the analysis is that the mental apparatus is physiological. The self, the pure consciousness, is the only non-physical aspect.

Next the difference between *kshetra* and *kshetrajna* is described in chapter thirteen. This chapter, it is shown, also indicates the awareness of individual differences by mentioning different paths as being suitable to different persons with varying talents and temperaments.

Reference is made to the famous doctrine of three *gunas* which is used by the *Gita* to differentiate between various kinds of behaviour and attitude. The aim of man is to be a *gunatita*, to be beyond the operation of the three *gunas*.

Analysis is made of the factors of action asserted in the 14th verse of the last chapter, namely, the body, the agent, various instruments, different efforts and the influence of the unforeseen and the unpredictable.

Next is indicated the attitude to action as declared in the famous 47th verse of the second chapter which enunciates the principle of *nishkama karma*. What then will be the motives for one's actions? One motive is *lokasangraham*, welfare of people. The other is fulfilling one's duties, *svadharma*. The implication of the latter to vocational guidance and selection is briefly indicated.

The sixth chapter in particular and verses in many other chapters are devoted to a description of meditation as a technique for self-

realisation. A brief section is devoted to this. It is acknowledged that controlling thoughts, feelings and emotions is indeed very difficult. The means to gain such control are practice and detachment.

Finally, reference is made to one of the most unique verses in the *Gita*, namely, the 63rd verse in the last chapter. At the end of the long discussion and discourse, Arjuna is requested to reflect on the teaching and arrive at his own decision. Krishna is only a counsellor. He merely points out the alternatives and their implications. The final choice is left to Arjuna himself.

Thus, the *Gita* is indeed a very great work of psychological import. Along with the Upanishads, the *Gita* has been a great influence on the thought in India for over two thousand years.

CHAPTER 4

Samkhya-Yoga

1. SAMKHYA

Samkhya and Yoga are two philosophical systems. While being independent, they are closely related to each other. Scholars trace their origins to Upanishads. However, the texts of these two schools now available, namely, *Samkhya Karika* of Isvara Krishna and *Yoga Sutra* of Patanjali are believed to be works of fifth century A.D. (Hiriyanna 1932, p. 269).

The Samkhya system starts with the practical problem of overcoming the three sorts of pains to which human beings are subject to, namely, *adhyatmika*, the ills arising from the body and mind, *adhibhautika*, the pains arising from other human beings and animals, insects, etc., and *adhidaivika*, the unforeseen pains arising from natural phenomena like floods, droughts, etc. The chief aim of these thinkers was to find out the root-cause of all these various kinds of pain. So they undertook a rational analysis of experience and found that pain is concomitant with the association of the self (*purusha*) with the non-self, the *prakriti*. A man can be free from every kind of pain if he is able to isolate himself from *prakriti*. Thus, it may be asserted that Samkhya was the first attempt to arrive at a system of thought on the sole basis of reason.

The aim of Yoga philosophers was even more practical, that of developing concrete methods of discipline by means of which the individual can free himself from *prakriti*—methods which include the control of the body, breathing and the concentration of mind.

It is little wonder that these two systems, the theoretical and practical, became the base for all the various systems of thought with respect to psychological analysis and practical discipline.

Purusha and *prakriti* or spirit and nature are the two basic conceptions of this system. The origin of the physical world is traced to *prakriti*. The theory assumes that all the various objects and living beings are the evolutes from this one principle, namely, *prakriti*. To start with, it is *avyakta*, unseen or unmanifested. It changes from the undifferentiated state of existence to the most

differentiated state of existence because of the three *gunas*, namely, *sattva, rajasa* and *tamasa*. According to Samkhya, the *gunas* constitute the substance of *prakriti* and also the qualities of *prakriti*. According to *Samkhya Karika*, the *gunas* are the functional modes of the *prakriti*, ways in which it manifests itself (*Samkhya Karika*, 16).

The Samkhya system postulates the *prakriti* on the basis of the principle of causality. It starts with the doctrine of *satkaryavada*. It defines cause as the entity in which the effect subsists in a latent form. That is, cause and effect are the undeveloped and developed states respectively of one and the same substance. The system also distinguishes two kinds of causes, material and efficient, the former entering into the effect while the latter influences from outside. For example, the groundnut seed contains oil, but the oil has to be pressed out. That is, though the effect is potentially contained in the cause, the efficient intervention is necessary to actualise the potentiality.

According to *Samkhya Karika*, the development of *prakriti* arises on the basis of the three *gunas*, its constituent strands of powers (*Samkhya Karika*, 16). This is why *prakriti* is called the *pradhana*, because it is the first cause of all the evolutes. The original, unmanifested state, is *samyavastha*, state of equilibrium, state of rest. The tendencies to manifestation (*sattva*) and activity (*rajasa*) are held in check by the tendency to non-manifestation (*tamasa*). When there is a disturbance of the equilibrium, evolution, *parinama*, starts. *Prakriti* evolves under the influence of *purusha* (*Samkhya Karika*, 20, 21).

The apparatus of thought as well as the objects of thought evolve out of *prakriti*. The first evolute is *mahat*, the great. It is the basis of *buddhi*, the intelligence in the individual. As Radhakrishnan writes, while the term *mahat* brings out the cosmic aspect, *buddhi*, which is used as a synonym for it, refers to the psychological counterpart appertaining to each individual (Vol. II, p. 267).

Buddhi is the subtle substance of all mental processes. It is the first evolute or manifestation of *prakriti*. The *sattva guna* predominates in it. Like *sattva, buddhi* is illuminating. It is the 'discriminating' and 'determining' principle. The functions ascribed to *buddhi* clearly show that it can operate only when the latter evolutes like *ahamkara, manas* and the *indriyas* as well as the gross elements, which are the objects of knowledge, come into being. Since it is the first evolute with definite functions, it has to be assumed that what is referred to is its cosmic rather than its individual aspect. Further,

it should also be remembered that *buddhi* (or *mahat*) as the first product from *prakriti* is the precursor of both the subjective and the objectives evolutes.

Ahamkara, the self-sense, the principles of individuation arises from *buddhi*. This will be clear from the following diagram.



Thus, there are 24 principles, including *prakriti*, which of course is not an evolute. It is the original principle without beginning and without end. *Purusha* is the 25th principle of the system.

Buddhi, ahamkara, manas, and the ten *indriyas* have psychological functions. They are called 'organs' or 'instruments'. They are divided into two groups, internal and external. *Buddhi, ahamkara* and *manas* constitute the internal instruments, the *antahkarana* or the *chitta*. The *indriyas* constitute the external instruments, the *bahyendriyas*. The main function of the *indriyas* is to receive impulses from the environment and to transmit them to the *antahkarana*.

Ahamkara, the second evolute is responsible for the further evolutes. The *sattvic* aspect leads to the development of the *manas*, the five sense organs and the five motor organs. The *tamasic* aspect leads to the evolution of the material universe. *Ahamkara* also has its psychological functions. On the one hand, it is responsible for generating the sense of agency and *abhimana*, the self-love in the individual. It is also responsible for the formation of concepts and decisions.

Manas works in close association with the ten outward-directed organs. It has the important function of synthesising the sense-data into percepts. It is also involved in suggesting alternative courses of action. Thus it has the functions of perception and action. The main function of *manas* is *samkalpa*, meaning literally 'constructing well'. While the sense organs receive specific stimula-

tion from the environment lacking in 'meaning' and functioning only in the present, it is the task of *manas* to take the information, select and process it, so that it has meaning to the organism and relates action to future.

The *buddhindriyas* are the organs of perception, the eye, the tongue, the nose, the ear and the skin. Each sense grasps one quality of the environment.

The five *karmendriyas* are the organs of action, namely, speech, hands (manipulation), feet (movement), the organs of excretion and sex organs.

The world as an object of perception has the five *tanmatras*, the subtle, imperceptible principles and the five gross elements, the *mahabhutas*, which are perceptible. They produce the stimuli which are perceived by the five organs of perceptions.

However, *prakriti* with all its evolutes does not help us to understand how experience arises, because by definition, *prakriti* is insentient. The principle of sentence, according to Samkhya is the *purusha*. *Purusha*, however, is devoid of all *gunas*. He is inactive. He is merely a *sakshi*, witness. He is *akarta*, non-doer. He is pure consciousness, *chetana*. Another significant feature is that the system recognises a plurality of *purushas*. The *purusha* is described as *bhokta*, an enjoyer, or experient, without being a *karta*, a doer or agent. The system establishes *purusha*, the psychic entity also on the basis of reason, as it does with respect to the *prakriti*. The 17th stanza of *Samkhya Karika* asserts that it is necessary to postulate the *purusha*, psychic entity, because the physical universe, being insentient requires a sentient principle to experience it.

The description of *purusha* as the sentient principle and of *buddhi* (*mahat*) as the insentient principle gives rise to difficulties in understanding how experience arises. As Hiriyanna puts its, "Though neither by itself can serve as the subject, it is stated, they do so together, the *buddhi* contributing all the activity involved in it and the *purusha* the element of awareness (*chaitanya*). The *purusha* illumines or is reflected in the *buddhi*, which though physical is fine enough to receive the reflection and thus illumined, it serves as the conscious subject. The *buddhi* may therefore be viewed as the physical medium for the manifestation of spirit" (Hiriyanna, 1932, pp. 283-284).

The association of two elements, viz., *purusha* and *buddhi*, according to *Samkhya Karika*, leads to the emergence of the empirical self, the non-sentient *buddhi* becoming sentient, as it were, and the passive *purusha* becoming active (*Samkhya Karika*, 20). The

illustration given is the 'red-hot iron ball' in which the cold iron when heated gives rise to a spherical glow of fire The iron is hot only so long as the heat is there and the formless fire assumes a form so long as the iron ball is hot. Essentially, the two, namely, the iron ball and the heat are unrelated. *Buddhi*, etc., are psychological only because they are lighted up by the *purusha*. Essentially, *buddhi, manas*, etc., are physical, like the other physical objects. To quote, Hiriyanna again, "the functions that we describe as mental are really mechanical processes of physical organs, which assume a psychical character only when illumined by spirit" (*ibid.*, p. 285).

As noted above, the *buddhi*, the first evolute of *prakriti* is generated by a preponderance of *sattva* As such *buddhi* "resembles the purity and intelligence of the *purusha* to a very high degree, so much so that it can reflect the intelligence of the *purusha*, and thus render its non-intelligent transformations to appear as if they were intelligent" (Dasgupta, Vol. I, 260).

The Self

What is the nature of the self, according to Samkhya? It is clear that consciousness does not belong to the body or to the senses. The senses are the instruments of seeing and not the seer. The senses bring about modifications in the *buddhi*, but by definition *buddhi* is non-conscious. It is the *purusha* which holds the different states of consciousness together. It is *purusha* which illuminates thought and feeling. As Radhakrishnan puts it, "*Purusha* is the light by which we see that there is such a thing as *prakriti*. It does not depend on anything else for illuminating objects. *Prakriti* and its products are not self-manifested, but depend for their manifestation on the light of *purusha*. Consciousness though physically mediated, is not physically explained. *Buddhi*, *manas* and the like are the instruments or the means; they cannot explain the end of consciousness which they subserve" (Vol. II, p. 281).

Another very important assumption of Samkhya is that *purusha* is only *chit*, consciousness and not *ananda*, bliss. According to this system, bliss and happiness are due to *sattva guna* which does not affect *purusha*. *Purusha* or self is pure consciousness, unaffected by and not involved in thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.

Since *purusha* is pure consciousness, it is beyond *buddhi*, *ahamkara* and *manas*. It is the reflection of *purusha* in *buddhi* that appears as the self, the ego, cogniser of all our states. "The ego

is the psychological unity of that stream of conscious experiencing which constitutes what we know as the inner life of an individual self. This unity is a temporal one, which is ever changing and not the *purusha*, which is timelessly present as the presupposition of the temporal unity" (Radhakrishnan, *ibid.*, p. 283 f). The empirical self is thus a mixture of *purusha* and *prakriti*. It is subject to pleasure and pain, action and its fruits. Activity belongs to the *manas* and the *indriyas*. Sense of agency belongs to the *antahkarana*, the inner organ, which is lighted up by *purusha*.

All the miseries of life and the delights are due to the fact that *purusha* forgets its true nature and is under the delusion that it thinks, feels and acts. To quote, Radhakrishnan, "Losing the peace of eternity, it enters the unrest of time . . . The experience of pain (*duhkhasakshatkara*) is only in the form of reflection, which is the modification (*vritti*) of the *upadhi*. The real bondage is of the *chitta*, while only its shadow falls on the *purusha*" (*ibid.*, p. 286).

It must be recognised that the most perplexing problem in the Samkhya system is the relation between *purusha* and *prakriti*. The evolution of *prakriti*, according to the system is not due to any conscious direction and the *purusha*, the conscious principle, has no part in it at all. It is the union of the two that is assumed to bring about the changes. *Samkhya Karika* gives the analogy of the cooperation between the lame man with good vision sitting on the shoulders of the blind man (*Samkhya Karika*, 21). But this is hardly convincing; the mere presence of the *purusha* is said to disturb the balance of forces in the *prakriti* and set in motion the evolutionary process, which comes to an end when the *purusha* is released. The influence of the *purusha* on *prakriti* is likened to the attraction of iron filings to the magnet (*Samkhya Karika*, 57).

Of all the evolutes of *prakriti*, *buddhi* is the most important. The senses and the *manas* present the experiences to the *buddhi* (*Samkhya Karika*, 37). It is the *buddhi* which enables the individual to realise that he is the experiencer. As Kunhan Raja (1963) remarks, "We may see so many things; we may do so many things; yet there will not be the impression in the form, 'I have seen' or 'I have done' until the intellect too has functioned in respect of that object" (p.129). This is why the difference is made between the ten *indriyas*, *manas* and *ahamkara* on the one hand and *buddhi* on the other, though all the thirteen of them form the instruments of knowing. It is assumed that *purusha* is immediately connected with the *buddhi*, while being indirectly connected with the the rest. The *purusha*, the self. is the *sakshin*, the witness, of the states of *buddhi*

without any other intermediary. Thus in the Samkhya system, the self, the pure consciousness is the knower. It becomes aware of the *vrittis*, modifications, in the *buddhi*. That is, experience belongs to the *purusha*, *buddhi* (intellect), *ahamkara* (self-sense), *manas* (mind) and senses are merely the apparatus for knowing. It is the *buddhi* which contains the impressions (*samskaras*) and tendencies or predisposition (*vasanas*) which are revived under suitable conditions. To quote Radhakrishnan, "the psychic functions of perception and thought, desire and choice, are strictly speaking, mechanical processes of the products of *prakriti* which constitute the inner organs. They would remain unconscious but for the *purusha* which illuminates them, i.e., makes them conscious" (Vol. II, p. 296). The self, however, being *asanga*, free from attachment, is not subject to any modification. All the modifications are of the *antahkarana*, the internal organ and not of the *purusha*, the self, whether in the waking, dreaming or deep sleep state.

Yet the problem remains. *Purusha* being pure consciousness and *prakriti* being non-conscious, the system cannot explain how experiences arise. The analogies of proximity, reflection, etc., do not really help to bridge the gap between the subject and the object.

However, as Radhakrishnan remarks, "The fundamental truth intended by the Samkhya theory of *purusha* is that consciousness is not a form of energy like motion, heat and electricity. The most advanced science has only established a relation in which certain nervous processes are coordinated with certain conscious occurrences" (Vol. II, p. 320).

As pointed out above, while Vedanta, following the Upanishads, looks upon *chit* as being pure consciousness and bliss (*ananda*), Samkhya looks upon *ananda* as being only a variety of pleasure and a characteristic of *prakriti* and not a characteristic feature of *purusha*. However, both Samkhya and Vedanta agree in their analysis of knowledge, namely, that knowledge consists of images, ideational pictures of objects. As Dasgupta writes, "The sense data and images come and go, they are often the prototypes of external things and as such ought to be considered as in some sense material, but the matter of which these are composed is the subtlest" (Vol. I, p. 239).

The Functions of Antahkarna

As noted above, the Samkhya system calls the *buddhi*, *ahamkara* and *manas* as *antahkarana*, the inner organ, in contrast to the five sense organs and the five organs of action which are external organs,

the *bahyakarana*. The psychological functions of the three internal organs will now be described.

Buddhi (*mahat* in its cosmic aspect) is the first evolute. *Buddhi* is the instrument by which we distinguish objects and perceive what they are, The functions of *buddhi* is *adhyavasaya*, ascertainment and decision (*Samkhya Karika*, 23). It is *buddhi* which works directly for the *purusha* and enables it to experience and discriminate between itself and *prakriti* (*Samkhya Karika*, 37). *Buddhi*, according to the system, is a product of *prakriti* and is the generator of *ahamkara*.

As the first evolute of the *prakriti*, *buddhi* is generated by a preponderance of *sattva*, which is characterised by *prakasa*, illumination, goodness, pleasure and so on. It is because of the predominance of sattva in it, that *buddhi* is very close to *purusha*, which by definition, is pure consciousness.

Manas (mind) is an evolute from *ahamkara*. Its task is to synthesise the sense-data into percepts and suggest alternative courses of action to *ahamkara* and *buddhi* and carry out what is determined by *buddhi* through the organs of action. According to the system, *manas* is said to be the doorkeeper, while the senses are regarded as the doors or channels (*Samkhya Karika*, 35). The cooperation of *manas* is necessary for both perception and action (*Samkhya Karika*, 27).

The function of *manas* is *samkalpa*. That is, it is not entirely an organ like the other ten which merely receive sense-data or execute the necessary action. It cognises besides being a channel for the subject to contact the objects. "*Manas* has a double function. It is the subject that knows, that cognises, and as such, the mind can be regarded as a subject too, besides being a channel for the subject to contact the object" (Kunhan Raja, p. 111). It is the process of determining *samkalpaka* making up one's mind as to how and when the *indriyas* have to operate. But apparently the final decision is not with the *manas*. By definition, it is with the *buddhi*, not even with *ahamkara*. The *manas* does the preliminary function of coordinating the various sense-data, becoming aware of their characteristics and making preliminary decisions about the necessary actions necessitated by the perception. It organises the perception and the ideas generated by them and the desires and intention of the individual.

Ahamkara (Self-sense). It is the first development from *buddhi*. The predominance of *sattva guna* produces in the 'I' sense and 'mine' sense. It is the *abhimana-dravya* in it which leads to ego-

formation (*Samkhya Karika*, 24).

Out of the *sattva* aspect of *ahamkara* arise the *manas* and the ten *indriyas* which help in perception and in action.

Out of the *tamas* aspect of *ahamkara* arise the *tanmatras*, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements (*Samkhya Karika*, 22, 24 and 25).

Psychologically, the sense of self-hood is impossible without the subject and the object, so according to the system the cognitive evolutes as well as the material evolutes arise from this.

Ahamkara has not only *abhimana* or self-love, it has also the sense of agency. In other words, the sense of agency belongs to this evolute from *prakriti* and not to the *purusha*, which by definition is pure consciousness. Also, it individualises the impressions from the sense organs and the *manas*. While the desires and tendencies may continue to subsist during sleep, there is no *ahamkara* in that state. As Ramachandra Rao (1962) puts it, "Ego as an evolute from general consciousness is doubtless an important concept. The presence of *purusha* represents merely a favourable condition for consciousness to function; *buddhi* is the actual consciousness ready to develop into an experience; and *ahamkara* facilitates the development by furnishing a fixed frame of reference in the individual, viz., the ego. *Purusha* with the ego is spoken of as the person, *jiva*, the empirical self" (p. 426).

As Radhakrishnan points out, "*Buddhi*, *ahamkara*, *manas* and the rest need not be taken as a series of chronologically successive stages of evolution. They are the results of the logical analysis of evolved selves. Vachaspati writes, "Every man uses first his external senses, then he considers (with the *manas*), then he refers the various objects to his *ahamkara* and lastly he decides with his *buddhi* what he has to do" (Vol. II, p. 275).

In brief, this is the psychological contribution of the Samkhya system. It starts with the fundamental experience of the knower and the objects known. It shows that all mental processes arise from the evolutes of *prakriti*. It is the *purusha* who is the psychological reality. Consciousness is not a product of the material or mental processes. It postulates an empirical self, the ego which cognises with the help of the *purusha*, the principles of consciousness.

The rest of the chapter will be devoted to a description of the psychological contribution of the Yoga system.

II. YOGA

The *Yoga Sutra* of Patanjali is the oldest work on the subject, though the Katha Svetasvatara and Maitrayani Upanishads refer to meditation as a means for self-realisation. Reference has already been made to the description of yoga practice given in the *Gita*.

While the Samkhya system was interested in the theoretical problems and looked upon *jnana*, knowledge, as the means to obtain liberation, Patanjali systematised the conception of Yoga in the theoretical framework of Samkhya and developed the practical aspects and insisted on the methods of concentration and active striving. That is, mere theoretical realisation is not enough. It is the actual practice that leads to liberation. The Yoga system accepts the twenty-five principles of Samkhya. It also accepts that the universe is uncreated and is eternal. However, one very important difference between the two systems is the fact that Yoga brings the three internal organs of Samkhya, namely, *buddhi*, *ahamkara* and *manas* under one concept, namely, *chitta*.

The self, *purusha*, is pure consciousness. It is merely a spectator of the mind's activities. All the mental processes are due to the *chitta*. Mental processes are termed *chitta vritti*, the modification of the *chitta*, the mind. When the self is freed from the *chitta*, it will resume its normal and original state of being pure consciousness, and is a mere witness. So the main task of the Yoga system is *chitta vritti nirodha*, the restriction of the modification of the mind (I, 2). The self can be liberated from the bonds of *prakriti* only when it is free from mental modifications. Vyasa, in his commentary, *Vyasa Bhashya* asserts that the mind is normally subjected to *kshipta*, restlessness, *mudha*, infatuation, *vikshipta*, distraction and oscillation, *ekagra*, one-pointedness and *niruddha*, restraint and restriction (*Vyasa Bhashya*, I). He declares that in the first three states, namely, restlessness, infatuation and distraction, Yoga is not possible. It is possible only with the practice of restriction of mental processes and with success in being one-pointed.

Chitta and its Modes, Vrittis

The second sutra introduces the two terms *chitta* and *vritti*, and defines that the task or aim of Yoga is to restrain the *chitta vritti* (I, 2).

The Absolute is described in the Upanishads as being characterised by *sat*, *chit* and *ananda*. The term *chitta* stands for the manifestation of the *chit*, pure consciousness, in the individual. *Chitta*

is the instrument through which the individual lives and evolves. In a broad way, the term *chitta* corresponds to the term mind. However, it is not an exact equivalent as the subsequent description will show. *Purusha* is the term that is equivalent to *chit*, the pure consciousness.

The basic assumption of not only the Yoga system but of all the systems of Indian thought is that the *purusha*, the *atman*, the self in the individual, functions through the *chitta* or the *antahkarana*. The second assumption is that *chitta* being an instrument prevents man from realising the self. That is, it is a sort of hindrance. But, it is also recognised that it is the only instrument through which self-realisation is possible. In short, mind can be conquered only by the mind.

The *chitta* is always characterised by *vritti*, modification, not only when we are awake or dreaming, but even in deep sleep. So man is aware of only these modifications. He is not aware of the self. That is why, according to Patanjali, the essential task of man is to restrain these modifications so that he can become aware of his real self.

Patanjali classifies the mental modification into the following four groups:

(*a*) a group of five cognitive functions consisting of *pramana*, etc.;
(*b*) a group of five *klesas*, afflictions, consisting of *avidya*, etc. (II, 3);
(*c*) a group consisting of *samskaras* (I, 18) and *vasanas* (IV, 8 and 24);
(*d*) a group of *aklishta vrittis*, affliction-restraining processes consisting of *vitarka*, etc., the cultivated conditions which lead to emancipation (I, 17).

(*a*) The first group of mental modifications arise from the contact of the individual with the world of objects, persons, events, etc., whether it leads to perceptions, misconceptions, fancy, etc.

(*b*) The second group of modifications produce pain, affliction or misery.

(*c*) The third group consists of the latent impressions which these experiences, whether cognitive or emotional, produce on the mind. The individual is not aware of these impressions. Nevertheless, they influence his cognitions, feelings and action. They are stored, as it were, in the *karmasaya* and constitutes, in modern phraseology, the unconscious. The third group also consists of *vasanas*, the predispositions, the desires which are the drives to thought and action.

(*d*) Finally, there is the group restraining the mental process

which helps the individual to gain control over the first three groups of mental modifications and lead him to self-realisation. They help in promoting *ekagrata*, one-pointedness.

Patanjali classifies the innumerable mental modifications into two groups on the basis of their influence on the mind. One group is designated *klishta*, producing afflictions of the mind and the other group is designated *aklishta*, since they restrain the afflictions (*Yoga Sutra* I, 5). In his commentary on this sutra, Vyasa asserts that the two groups produce their own *samskaras*, impressions or latent deposits on the mind. Vyasa describes this as *vritri samskara chakram*. The fluctuations in the mind produce the subliminal impressions, not accessible to consciousness, which in their turn affect the mental process and thus form a cycle.

This is indeed one of the most significant contributions of the Yoga system. The mental processes just do not arise in the mind and pass off. They produce the *samskaras*, impressions, which affect the mental structure and the personality whether they are *klishta*, afflictions or *aklishta*, capable of restraining the afflictions.

One group of mental processes are called afflictions, *klishta*, because they produce pain in the individual. The other group, are called *aklishta*, non-painful, because they produce *vishaya viveka jnana*, knowledge which helps in discrimination. That is, they do not generate affective responses. They are neither pleasurable nor painful. One of the basic assumptions of the two systems, *Samkhya* and *Yoga*, is that an affective response, whether pleasant or painful, leads ultimately to pain. While pain is unpleasant directly, pleasure also leads to pain when that experience ceases or because it may be repeatable. Man wants pleasures to be repeated and experiences pain because they do not want them repeated.

The General Mental Processes

Patanjali next proceeds to describe the general mental processes, *vrittis*. They are fivefold: *pramana*, right knowledge; *viparyaya*, wrong knowledge or misconception; *vikalpa*, fancy, imagination, or delusion; *nidra*, sleep; and *smriti*, memory (*Yoga Sutra* I, 6).

As Taimni (1961) has interpreted "*pramana* and *viparyaya* comprise all those images which are formed by some kind of direct contact through the sense organs with the outer world of objects. *Vikalpa* and *smriti* comprise all those images or modifications of mind which are produced without any kind of direct contact with the outer world" (p. 14). *Nidra* is the state of complete withdrawal of the mind, both from sense experiences generated by objects and

the images generated secondarily by the mind on its own. Thus, this fivefold classification of mental processes is quite comprehensive and rational. Only, it has to be conceded, that sleep is also a mental state though devoid of all experience at the time.

Pramanas, facts of knowledge, according to Patanjali are threefold—perception, inference and testimony (*Yoga Sutra* I, 7). *Viparyaya*, illusions and mistaken notions, also arise on the basis of sense perceptions, but they do not correspond to objects (*Yoga Sutra* I, 8). They are errors of perception. *Vikalpa*, imagination, delusion, is described by Patanjali as consisting of images which are conjured up by words, without any substance as basis. He calls them *vastusunyah*, devoid of objectivity (*Yoga Sutra* I, 9). They are the products of fancy. They are delusory. In passing, it may be noted that Patanjali clearly differentiates between illusions, which have a sensory basis, and delusions, which are devoid of any sensory basis, the rope being mistaken for a snake is an illusion, a case of *viparyaya*. The confirmed alcoholic who sees red rats is an instance of *vikalpa*, delusion. Patanjali describes *nidra*, sleep, as a state of mind which is devoid of all modifications, perceptions, illusions and delusions.

In short, this fourfold classification corresponds to the three states of mind, *pramana* and *viparyaya* relate to the waking state, *vikalpa* to the dream state and *nidra* to the deep sleep state.

Smriti, memory, is the fifth category. It involves the retention in mind of the experiences in all the three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep. Patanjali describes memory as not forgetting, not allowing to escape, *asampramoshah Yoga Sutra* I, 11). In his *bhashya* to this sutra, Vyasa raises the very important question whether memory involves the recall of experience or the recall of the object experienced. In answering this he refers again to the concept of *samskara*, subliminal impression. What is remembered may be merely what is imagined as in the case of dream or illusion. In either case memory does not go beyond previous experience. And it depends on the storing of impressions in the mind. So memory refers to the recall of the idea as well as to the recall of the objects which gave rise to the idea (*Vyasa Bhashya* I, 11). It is also pointed out that the mere latent impression, the *samskara*, is not a mental modification, *vritti*. The *samskara* is only a potential, a mere impression in the mind. When the actual idea or thought or feeling arises, it can be classified as *vritti*. That is, the *samskaras* operate at the sub-conscious or unconscious level. Only the *vrittis* operate at the conscious level.

The Theory of Klesas

Another very important aspect of the system consists of the description of five afflictions or *klesas*, namely, *avidya*, ignorance; *asmita*, egoism; *raga*, attachment; *dvesha*, aversion; and *abhinivesa*, will-to-live or changing to life (*Yoga Sutra* II, 3). The theory of *klesas* constitutes the very foundation of the Yoga system. The term *klesa* means pain and affliction and what causes it. As Taimni (1961) puts it, the theory of *klesas* attempts to analyse "the underlying and fundamental cause of human misery and suffering and the way in which this cause can be removed effectively" (p. 135).

Avidya, ignorance or lack of awareness of the reality, is described as the source or the root-cause of all the remaining four afflictions. Thus, all the five kinds of afflictions are interrelated. The afflictions are described as being in one or the other of four states, namely, *prasupta*, dormant; *tanuh*, attenuated; *vicchinnah*, scattered or dispersed; and *udara*, expanded (*Yoga Sutra* II, 4). In the dormant condition, the pain exists in a latent form. In the attenuated condition, the pain is in a feeble or rarefied form. That is, it can become active with slight stimulation or opportunity. In the scattered condition, it may be overpowered by an opposing pain. But in the expanded condition, it is fully operative. So one must be aware of these varying conditions under which affliction operates in one.

What is *avidya*? This is described in the next sutra. It consists of mistaking the casual and transient as being eternal, the impure as being pure, the unpleasant as being pleasant and the non-self as being the real self (*Yoga Sutra* II, 5). Often we are overpowered by experiences in life. There is the student who fails in an examination or the young man who is jilted in his love or the adult who loses his job or business. Each one of them may be overpowered by the experience, lose his balance and may either commit suicide or homicide. Such crimes in essence arise out of ignorance, the inability to see the problem in its perspective. The term purity in Indian thought refers to being unaffected by *gunas*, particularly, *rajasa* and *tamasa*. Similarly, the unpleasant may be taken to be pleasant. The cultivation of the habits of smoking, drinking alcohol, using drugs, are examples of this. Above all, there is the important problem of taking the body, one's status, caste, creed, etc., as being one's self. Most social conflicts arise on the basis of such wrong identification, whether it is in the field or race or nation or religion. It is obvious that the term ignorance refers to a lack

of understanding of the import of one's experience.

Asmita, which literally means "I-am-ness", arises out of a confusion between *drik sakti*, the seer, the powers of consciousness and *darsana sakti*, the instrument of seeing or mere cognition. While *purusha*, the self, the pure consciousness, is the seer, he is wrongly identified with the *chitta*, the mind stuff through ignorance (*Yoga Sutra* II, 6). As a result the self is conditioned by the limitation of the intervening instruments like the body, the sense-organs, etc.

The third affliction arises out of *raga*, attachment to whatever is pleasant (*Yoga Sutra* II, 7). When we analyse our attachment to persons, objects, places and so on, it will be observed that the basis for attachment is pleasure.

The opposite of this arises when there is aversion to a person, object or place because he or it is associated with pain (*dukha*) (*Yoga Sutra* II, 8).

These two, the attraction and repulsions, bind the individual and condition, his attitude and behaviour towards persons, institutions, etc. It is only *vairagya*, being unattached and unaffected, that can free the individual from this bondage.

Another source of affliction is identified as *abhinivesa*, the will-to-live, the strong desire for survival and the fear of death. Patanjali asserts that this tendency is automatic and flows on its own inherent strength even in the *vidushah*, the learned people. It is one of the most difficult tasks to overcome this biological need.

It may be pointed out that the last three afflictions, namely, attachment, aversion and desire for survival are common to animals and human beings. It is only ignorance and egoism which are exclusively human.

In the following two sutras (*Yoga Sutra* II, 10 and 11), Patanjali describes the means to overcome these five kinds of afflictions. It is pointed out that these afflictions have two manifestations, one subtle, taking the form of *samskara* and being inaccessible to experience and the other the more perceptible in the form of *vritti*, mental modification. The *samskaras*, subtle ones, have to be destroyed by tracing them to their origin, namely, to the *chitta*, the mind. That is the individual should realise that these afflictions or hindrances are mental, products of his own mind. When they are thus traced to their origin in the mind, their influence can be eliminated. As regards the actual mental modifications, they can be destroyed through *dhyana*, meditation. As noted above, according to the fourth sutra, all the afflictions to which a person is subject

to are traceable to *avidya*, nescience, not knowing. It was also stated that they may be dormant, or attenuated or overpowered by a contrary tendency or may be expanded. In all these various states, the different afflictions can be overcome either through tracing them to their origin in one's mind or through the concentration or meditation on the self itself or on God and thus not allowing them to affect oneself.

It is obvious that the plan suggested by Patanjali in these sutras is quite against the normal tendency of seeking causes for one's troubles and tribulations in some outside agency, whether in the other person or institution or fate and so on. Thus, Patanjali explains in these few sutras the full import of the supreme dictum 'know thyself'. All our afflictions arise due to ourselves. They arise in our minds, either because of ignorance or egoism or being subjected to attractions, repulsions and keen desire for survival.

Whether it is introspection or meditation, successes can be achieved only through *abhyasa*, persistent practice and *vairagya*, non-attachment (*Yoga Sutra* I, 12). That is ultimately through *chitta vritti nirodha* (*Yoga Sutra* I, 2).

Karmasaya

In the 12th sutra of the second chapter, Patanjali speaks of the *karmasaya*, the reservoir of actions; the sum total of *samskaras* which have their roots in the *klesas*, afflictions which lead to all kinds of actions in the present and future.

The general Indian concept is that desire arises in the mind. It generates thoughts. This leads to action in order to fulfil the desires. Another basic concept is that these desires, thoughts and actions have, over and above the manifest results, latent results, which, in the form of *samskaras* leave an impression on the mind. Even when the actions are over, the impressions in the mind persist and influence the *chitta vrittis*, the mental modifications. Thus, as noted above, Vyasa speaks of the *vritti samskara chakra* (*Vyasa Bhashya* I, 5). The main task of man is to break this cycle through the two techniques of introspection, tracing the origin of affliction to one's own mind and meditation, making the mind free from all modifications. The main point to be noted is that the process of desire→thought→action does not end with action and that, whether the action succeeds in fulfilling the desires or fails, *samskaras*, latent impressions are generated which persist and influence further series of desire→thought→action. As Swami Vivekananda puts it picturesquely, "whatever work we do, the mind is thrown into a wave

and after the work is finished . . . it becomes fine and is stored up; there" (p. 195).

Patanjali goes on to assert that as long as the root is there, it will ripen and result in further experiences and action (*Yoga Sutra* II, 13). The subconscious impressions left behind by our desires thoughts, feelings and actions survive and influence our future experiences. An attempt may now be made to obtain a clear notion of the two concepts of *samskara* and *vasana*.

Samskara and Vasana

The term *samskara* occurs in seven sutras, namely, I, 18 and 50; II, 15; III, 10 and 18; IV, 9 and 27 and the term *vasana* in IV, 8, 24, in two sutras.

All the sutras in which the two terms *samskara* and *vasana* occur are given below.

In the *asamprajnata samadhi*, it is said, as a result of constant practice, there is cessation of all mental activity, but the *samskaras* will be retained (I, 18). The *samskara* born of *sahija samadhi* obstructs all other *samskaras* (I, 50). To the people, who have developed discrimination, *viveka*, everything is painful whether it is change or anxiety or due to *samskara* and because of conflicts between the functioning of the *gunas* and the *vrittis* of the mind (II, 15), control of mind becomes steady as a result of repeated *samskaras* (II, 10). By perceiving the *samskaras*, knowledge of the past birth arises (III, 18).

In the fourth chapter, both the terms *vasana* (8 and 24) and *samskara* (9 and 27) occur. As a result of the ripening, the *karmas* are manifested by those *vasanas* for which conditions are favourable (IV, 8). In spite of differences in class, locality and time, because of memory and *samskaras*, there is consecutiveness in the desires (*vasanas*) (IV, 9). Though variegated by innumerable *vasanas* the mind acts for the *purusha* (IV, 24). Even when mind is inclined towards discrimination, at intervals, thoughts arise by the force of *samskaras* (IV, 27).

All the various sutras in which the two terms, *samskara* and *vasana*, occur in the *Yoga Sutras* have been given in order to enable us to grasp the import of these two technical terms and to grasp the difference, if any, or the relation betweem them.

Before proceeding further, it must be pointed out that considerable difficulty in understanding and interpretation arises because of the different terms used to translate them. For instance, Woods (1914) uses the term "subliminal impression" for *samskara*

and "subconscious impression" for the term *vasana*. Swami Vivekananda uses the term "unmanifested impression" or "impression" or 'habit" for *samskara* and "desire" for *vasana*. Taimni uses the term "remnant impression" or "impression", or "tendency" for *samskara* and "potential desire", "tendency" for *vasana*.

In general, it may be said that the term *samskara* stands for latent or subconscious or unmanifested impression. That is, the impression made on the mind by the experience but it is not available to the consciousness. However, it influences the course and character of the thoughts, feelings and desires.

Though the terms *vasana* has been used only twice by Patanjali, it has been used very often by Vasishtha in *Yoga Vasishtha* and by Vidyaranya in *Panchadasi* and in *Jivanmukti Viveka*.

One of the chief difficulties in interpreting terms in ancient Indian thought is the fact that the earlier thinkers did not define the terms. They just used them as they were current among the scholars at the time.

Another factor which complicates the problem is the assumption of the doctrine of *punarjanma*. The terms *samskara* and *vasana* are linked up not only with the impression on the mind as a result of experiences in the present life but also as being the impressions, made by experiences in a supposed series of past lives. Most thinkers look upon the past life or lives as being factual and not as being merely hypothetical.

For example, Dasgupta writes that "*Chitta* contains within it the root impressions (*samskaras*) and the tastes and instincts or tendencies of all past lives (*vasanas*) (Vol. I, p. 263). In the footnote on the same page, he writes that *samskaras* "mean the impressions (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in sub-conscious states and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (*smritti*)."

"The word *vasana* seems to be a later word. The earlier Upanishads do not mention it nor do the Pali texts. It comes from the root *vas* to stay. It is often loosely used in the sense of *samskara*. But *vasana* generally refers to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this life. But *samskaras* are the sub-conscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. *Vasanas* are innate *samskaras* not acquired in this life" (Vol. I, footnote on p. 263).

It is obvious that these extracts from Dasgupta confused rather

than clarified the position. It is also clear that he brings in the doctrine of *punarjanma*, which confuses the issue further.

However, it must be recognised that Dasgupta makes one point clear. He writes "*Samskaras* are the sub-conscious states which are being constantly generated by experience." On the basis of this statement, two things appear to be clear: (*i*) *Samskaras* are sub-conscious states; (*ii*) they are being constantly generated by experience. On the basis of these two characteristics, the term *samskara* may be defined as the latent impressions which are left on the unconscious mind and which go on accumulating as each individual grows up and which affect his behaviour, feelings and thought without his knowing it.

The term *vasana* may be defined as the innate, biological and acquired social needs in the individual. *Vasanas* thus are predispositions, whether instinctual or merely social.

Taimni (1961), in his comments on the 8th sutra of *Kaivalya pada*, puts clearly the ancient Indian standpoint regarding desires as the driving forces behind all thoughts and actions. He writes "Desire in its most comprehensive sense is thus a more fundamental factor in our life than our thoughts and actions, because it is the hidden power which drives the mind and body in all kinds of ways for the satisfaction of its own purposes. The mind is thus mostly an instrument of desires and its incessant activity results from the continuous pressures of these desires upon it . . . . The word used in Sanskrit for this power which works at all levels of the mind is *vasana*. Just as the *chitta* is the universal medium for the expression of mind principle, so *vasana* is the universal power which drives the mind and produces imprisoned consciousness" (p. 395).

Thus the term *vasana* indicates the operation of desires or drives at the biological as well as social, the unconscious as well as the conscious level. As noted above, the great medieval thinker Vidyaranya of 14th century speaks of three kinds of *vasanas*, namely, (*i*) *Loka vasana*—conformity to custom and desire for name, fame, and respect. (*ii*) *Deha vasana*—desire for various kinds of food, drinks, cloths, cosmetics, ornaments, and such other material goods. (*iii*) *Sastra vasana*—a kind of 'addiction' to study as many books, in as many subjects as possible, and fastidious observance of injunctions laid down in religious books (*Panchadesi*, IX, 104 and *Jivanmukti-Viveka*, p. 263).

From the ancient and medieval writings, it is possible to differentiate clearly between the two terms, *samskara* and *vasana*. While the term *samskara* refers to the impressions left on the mind by

various experiences and which are unconscious, the term *vasana* refers to the biological and social drives, and predispositions. According to Patnajali, the *samskaras*, sub-conscious impressions and the *vasanas*, the predispositions, together constitute the motivational dynamics, the springs for all thought and action in man.

It is hoped that these definitions and descriptions clarify the two terms. They also dissociate the two terms from the traditional hypothesis of past lives which is not open to any operational definition or verification.

The Concept of Karmasaya

The 12th sutra of the second chapter, states that the *karmasaya*, the reservoir of *karmas*, that is, works, has its root in the *klesas*, afflictions and that they are experienced in the seen and unseen future. Thus, *karmasaya* is the store house of all *samskaras*, subliminal impressions. That is, the impressions of all the actions, feelings and thoughts of the individual are stored up in the *karmasaya* (*Yoga Sutra* II, 12).

As noted earlier, the *chitta vrittis*, the mental modifications, have two aspects. As *vrittis* they are manifest, available to consciousness. But they also leave their impressions on the mind, of which we are not aware. That is, *karmasaya* constitutes the unconscious in the individual. Secondly, the contents of the *karmasaya* influence the later *vrittis*. As noted earlier, Vyasa has described this as the *vritti samskara chakara*, the wheel of fluctuation and subliminal impressions (*Vyasa Bhashya* I, 5).

Karmasaya is the repository of all the *samskaras*, the sub-conscious impressions left by our experiences. According to the sutra (II, 12), these sub-conscious impressions arise from the *klesas*, the hindrances or afflictions, namely, *avidya*, etc. According to the *guna* terminology, the *klesas* arise as a result of the operation of *rajasa* and *tamasa*. They arise out of attachments and aversions and out of the egoism. They arise as a result of *avidya*, nescience, that is, lack of understanding of the realities regarding the self and the situation.

The next sutra states that the root being there, when conditions permit their ripening affect the course of life, now and later (II, 13). As Swami Vivekananda writes, "All our works now are the effects of the past *samskaras*; again, these works becoming *samskaras* will be the causes of future actions, and thus we go on. So this aphorism says that the cause being there, the fruits must come" (p. 199). This is clarified by the next sutra, that the fruit may be

joy or sorrow depending on the nature of the actions and thoughts which led to the formation of the *samskaras* (II, 14).

Some of the assumptions of virtue and vice, and the assumption of *punarjanma*, the concept of *karmasaya* as the storehouse of *samskaras* implies that when these unconscious impressions keep on increasing, they are bound to lead to the breakdown in the personality.

The Problem—The Task of Man

Our analysis so far has shown that, according to Patanjali, the main task of man is the restraint of the modifications of the *chitta* (I, 2). The various mental processes, whether they are normal and cognitive (I, 6) or they give rise to affliction (II, 3), generate the subconscious impressions, the *samskaras* (I, 18) or lead to the development of predisposition, *vasanas* (IV, 8 and 24) have to be restrained. Thus, the subsidising task is gaining control over pain causing mental modifications, the *klesas* so that the *samskaras* do not go on swelling in the *karmasaya* and to see that one is not a victim to one's *vasana*, predispositions. It also involves the reduction of the mental modifications based on the *rajo guna* and *tamo guna* and the increase in the mental modification base on *sattva guna*.

The Means

Constant repetition and meditation on the *pranava*, namely, Aum, is prescribed as the means to reintegrate the pesonality (I, 28). The next sutra asserts that two results follow from this, namely, *pratyakchetana, adhigamah*, the inward turning of consciousness and the destruction of various obstacles or hindrances, *chitta vikshpah*, namely, disease, languor, doubt, carelessness, etc. (I, 29-30).

The normal condition of the mind is that it is turned outwards, *vikshapa* and is subject to distraction. The symptoms of a distracted mind are grief, mental distress, tremor of the body, irregular breathing, etc. (I, 31). To overcome this concentration, some particular subject is prescribed (I, 32). Further, in order to overcome the distraction which normally arises in social relations, one is asked to cultivate friendliness (*maitri*) toward those who are happy, compassion (*karuna*) towards those who are in misery, gladness (*mudita*) towards those who are virtuous and cooperation and indifference (*upeksha*) towards those who are non-social (I, 33). This shows the awareness of the significant part played by proper social relations in the promotion of mental health. The next sutra says

that the mind becomes clarified not only by cultivating the above social attitudes but also by *pranayama*, the expiration and retention of breath (I, 34), indicating the relation between regulated breath and a clear mind.

Proceeding further, Patanajli prescribes the eightfold method of Yoga to overcome all the afflictions and hindrances and to attain an integrated personality. The characteristic feature of the Yoga system is the recognition of the close relation between body and mind. Secondly, the importance of ethical life through *yama* and *niyama*. Disciplined way of living is thus emphasised.

In the eightfold technique of Yoga, *pranayama* plays a very important role (II, 49-53). *Prana* is looked upon as the connecting link between consciousness and mind as well as between mind and body. By regulating and controlling the breath, the *chitta vritti* is controlled and the mind is prepared for the practice of concentration.

As noted above, Patanjali fully realises the value of the dictum that mind can be controlled only by mind. This he has formulated in the following sutras (*Yoga Sutra* I, 12-16).

The restraint of mental modifications is brought about by *abhyasa*, persistent practice and *vairagya*, non-attachment. Continuous effort to keep the *vrittis* perfectly restrained is *abhyasa*. It becomes firmly grounded on being continued for a long time, without any interruption and with great interest in the end to be attained. *Vairagya* is that consciousness of perfect control over desire and the complete cessation of all craving for objects whether seen or heard. In supreme *vairagya*, the effects of all the three *gunas* are overcome on account of the awareness of *purusha*, the pure consciousness (I, 12-16). That is, all the mental modifications will be restricted.

When all the *chitta vrittis* are restricted by means of *abhyasa* and *vairagya*, how are we to describe the ensuing concentration?

Concentration then becomes conscious of its object by assuming the form of reasoning (*vitarka*), reflection (*vichara*), bliss (*ananda*) and sense of pure being (*asmita*) (I, 17).

According to Taimni, these four are the successive stages or states of mind described by the Upanishadic doctrine of *kosas* (p. 37).

Vitarka is the basic perceptual functioning at the *manomaya* level by which a particular object is differentiated from all other objects. At this level, there is the most elementary form of reasoning. While *vitarka* isolates a particular object from all other objects, *vichara* is at the conceptual level, the *vijnanamaya* level. While commenting on *Yoga Sutra* II, 19, Taimni warns, "It may be point-

ed out that the simple mental process of *vitarka* or *vichara* which we may engage in during the course of our studies and thinking should not be considered equivalent to the corresponding mental process as they take place in the state of samadhi" (p. 182). Next arises the *ananda* state of the *anandamaya kosa*. Finally arises the consciousness of pure being, *asmita*, in which every awareness of duality is obliterated.

It is necessary to distinguish between the two meanings of the term *asmita* used in the two sutras II, 3 and I, 17. In II, 3 the term *asmita* is used in the sense of egoism which arises as a result of identifying the pure self with the cognitive instruments. This leads to the sense of agency. To quote Taimni, "the moment conscious identifies itself, with the vehicles, it has fallen from its pure state and it becomes bound by the limitation of avidya" (p. 143). But in sutra I, 17, the term *asmita* is used in the sense of the *purusha* or pure consciousness. That is, *asmita* in this context is free from *avidya*.

Thus by the process of meditation on the twin bases of *abhyasa* and *vairagya*, there is, as it were, a progressive expansion of consciousness at the different stages of *samadhi*.

The significant point to be noted is that with the practice of Yoga, it is possible to restrain all mental modification, to become aware of all the *samskaras* which are in the *karmasaya* and be free from all *vasana*, predisposition.

The term *pratyaya*, Taimni writes, "is the technical word used in Yoga to denote the total context of the mind at any moment. This *pratyaya* may be of any kind and may exist on any plane of the mind. A mental image of a child, a concept of a mathematical principle, an all-embracing vision of the unity of life are all *pratyayas* of different kinds and belonging to different planes" (p. 34) and *samskaras* are used to indicate the manifest and the latent contents or rather the two processes of mind, respectively Through *vairagya* and *dhyana* both of them are under control. There is a deliberate check over the *chitta vrittis* and the *vasanas*. Secondly, because of full degree of consciousness, the *samskaras* are also brought to conscious level. So the practice of Yoga, according to Patanjali, helps one to gain control over the conscious processes to become fully aware of and to control the *vasanas*, the predispositions, biological as well as social, and finally, to bring to consciousness the *samskaras*, which tend to influence thought, feeling and behaviour unconsciously. In short, the aim of Yoga is to enable men to develop complete integration of personality, so that each

thought, feeling and action is fully conscious. There will be no scope for the operation of any unconscious motivations.

Summary

This chapter briefly describes the theoretical and practical problems regarding the structure of mind and the means to control the mental processes, conscious as well as unconscious developed by the two systems of thought, Samkhya and Yoga, which are closely related.

The Samkhya system postulates *prakriti* on the basis of the principle of causality. All the various phenomena in the universe are assumed to arise as a result of the permutation and combination of the three *gunas*: *sattva, rajas and tamas*. It is further postulated that all physical, biological and psychological processes can be traced to this one source of energy. It is assumed that all these various processes arise when there is the proximity of the *purusha*, the second postulate of the system, evolution, *parinama*, starts when there is a disturbance in the equilibrium of the three *gunas*, by the proximity of the *purusha*.

The *purusha* by definition is pure consciousness and *prakriti* is non-sentient. The objects of thought, the physical universe, as well as the apparatus of thought, the psychological equipment all evolve out of *prakriti*.

The Samkhya system starts with the practical problem of overcoming the pains which arise from one's body and mind, from the other human beings and animals and from the natural events like floods, droughts, earthquakes, etc. The Samkhya thinkers were interested in theoretical analysis of the predicament of men and suggested that clear awareness of the difference between *purusha* and *prakriti* will enable one to overcome the three types of misery.

The Yoga thinkers and practitioners on the other hand, developed a practical system by which it is possible for man to gain peace of mind and tranquillity (*a*) by controlling all the mental processes, (*b*) by becoming aware of the various *vasanas*, the predispositions, whether biological or social which influence behaviour, and (*c*) by making conscious the various *samskaras*, the unconscious impressions, left on the mind by the various mental operations and experiences, so that man is not subject to the operation of unconscious motivations.

The Samkhya system is naturalistic in its outlook and in the analysis of the various aspects of the mental equipment. It draws a clear distinction between the physiological and psychological

processes which arise from the body, matter and energy and the pure consciousness which cannot be reduced to any physiological or material process.

The Yoga system has clearly indicated how the only means to control the mental processes and to rescue the mind from the operation of the unconscious processes is the mind itself and the control of breathing process. Thus, *pranayama*, the control of the breathing process, and *dhyana*, the control of the mental process, are suggested as the sure ways to develop an integrated personality.

things of experience by the aid of reason alone. As the material causes of these things, it should consist of what is common to all of them; for the effect, according to the fundamental postulate of the system, must be essentially the same as the material cause. By the process of analysis, the essential physical characteristics of the physical universe are reduced to three—named *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*; *prakṛiti* is conceived as constituted of them. It is thus complex in nature, though single. These three factions are termed *gunas*, whose conception is of the utmost importance in the system (p. 271). The *gunas* thus are the components of *prakriti*. *Sattva* represents whatever is time or light. By contrast, *tamasa* represents whatever is worse or heavy. *Rajasa* represents whatever is active. The diversity of the entire universe is due to these three components of *prakriti*.

There is dualism between *purusha* and *prakriti*, spirit and matter. Their mutual association is necessary for the evolution of the cosmic universe and the human body. Evolution starts from the subtle and becomes the gross. The body together with the psychological elements of *buddhi, ahamkara* and *manas*, on the one hand, the five cognitions and the five motor organs on the other and finally, the entire bodily structure, constitute the subtle and the gross elements. The subjective elements of *buddhi*, etc., and the cognitive and motor organs evolve under the influence of *sattva guna*. The gross physical body evolves under the inference of the *tamas guna*. Thus, according to the Samkhya, there are two bodies—the *sthula sarira*, the gross physical body and the *linga sarira* or *sukshma sarira*, the subtle body with the *buddhi*, *manas* and sensory and motor organs. Both the bodies, the gross and the subtle are necessary to give rise to experience. As *Samkhya Karika* puts it, the mental apparatus (*linga*) cannot subsist without the physical body. However, it must be borne in mind that the subtle *linga sarira* is also material. It is not spiritual. According to the system, only the *purusha* is the spiritual or non-material element. It is the subtle body which stores all the impressions, *samskaras*, and tendencies, *vasanas*, which constitute the basis for memory and for the subconscious. But the subtle body is, by hypothesis, non-conscious, since only the *purusha* is the conscious principle in the system. The *linga sarira*, the subtle body, is compared to an actor in the drama. As *Samkhya Karika* (42) puts it, "for the sake of the *purusha's* wish, the subtle body exists before it, like a dramatic actor, on account of connection of causes and effects and by union of all-embracing power of prakriti." That is why, according to the

system, there is *apavarga*, deliverance when one realises the distinction between the body, the psycho-physical organism and *purusha*, the pure consciousness that is unaffected by all the pleasures and pains and memories of the body and is free from the three *gunas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. That is, *purusha*, the pure consciousness is neither bound nor liberated. It is only the psycho-physical organism, the evolute of *prakriti*, that is bound and that is to be liberated. *Purusha* is ever free. The evolution of the *prakriti* and the consequent results like mind, life and body arise when by the mere presence of *purusha*, the equilibrium of the three *gunas* of the *prakriti* is upset.

However, *purusha*, is not one without a second like the Upanishadic *atman*. The system postulates a *purusha* for each organism. That is, each individual human being has to arrive at the wisdom which brings a halt to the activities of the *prakriti*. *Prakriti* retires like the dancer who retires after her performance (*Samkhya Pravachana Sutra*, 70). Even after the liberation *purusha* may have minimum of impulse for sometime (*ibid*., 83).

Thus, according to Samkhya, matter as well as mind and all their effects, are merely the various aggregates of all the *gunas* in the *prakriti*. The system recognises three levels of existence, the inorganic, at which there is no growth or reproduction, the organic at which there is metabolism, the capacity to grow and reproduce and the psychological, at which there are thoughts, emotions and feelings. In the human being the psychological level includes awareness of the psychological phenomena and inference of their occurrence in others. But, as Dasgupta (1941) points out, all these three levels of organisation, physical, biological and psychological are merely abstructions. In reality, they are the manifestations of the same ultimate reals, namely, the *prakriti* with its *gunas*. That is, mind and body are not two dissimilar wholes. There is neither interaction nor paralellism, but cooperation. There is only an apparent duality between the physical and physiological, the physiological and the mental. There is a continuity (p. 317 ff).

Purusha, the principle of consciousness, in the system is like a witness who enjoys the play being enacted by the *antahkarana* which is influenced by the psychological, organic and inorganic events.

4. Vedantic Non-dualism

The relation between body and mind according to the Vedanta may now be described in brief:

As noted above, the Upanishads had a synthetic and monistic

view and declared that the ultimate reality, the *brahman*, is identical with the *atman*, the individual self. But the Samkhya-Yoga systems repudiated this position and asserted that all phenomena are due to the activation of *prakriti* by the *purusha* and that there is a plurality of *purushas*. The Vedantic doctrines repudiate this dualistic position and go back to the monistic position of Upanishads. They accept the Upanishadic doctrine that *brahman* is consciousness, *prajnanam brahma* (Aitareya Upanishad III, 1). It declares that perception, understanding, retention, desire, etc., are all the names of *prajna* or conscionsness, that the whole world is founded on and is guided by *prajna*. In other words, according to Vedantic thought *brahman* is both the material cause (*upadana karana*) and the efficient cause (*mimitta karana*) of the universe As Radhakrishnan writes, "According to the *Vedanta Sutra*, the *purusha* and *prakriti* of Samkhya are not independent substances, but modifications of a single reality. A plurality of true infinites is not possible" (Vol. II, p. 486). According to the *Vedanta Sutra*, every material element is created by *brahman* (ii, 3.7) After creating the elements, *brahman* enters them and it is *brahman* dwelling in the elements that effects the production of other things (ii, 3.13). *Brahman* and the world are not *ananya*, different (ii, 1.14). "While the commentators agree that the cause is not different from the effect, the nature of the identity of *brahman* and the world is differently explained by them" (Radhakrishnan, Vol. II, p. 438). According to Badarayana, the author of the *Vedanta Sutras*, the self is *jna*. Other Vedantic thinkers interpret *jna* as the intelligent knower. Birth and death refer to the body and not to the self (ii, 3.16). Badarayana accepts the Upanishadic view that *brahman* is in the individual self, but is untouched, unaffected by the acts and feelings of the individual self (i, 1.17). As Radhakrishnan observes, "It is not clear from Badarayana's account, in what exact manner the individual is related to Brahmin, as a part (*amsa*) or reflection (*abhasa*) of the universal self (ii, 2.43 and 50) (*ibid.*, p. 439).

The evolution of the universe, according to Vedanta, obeys an order. *Akasa*, the prius of space, and matter arises first and later on the other elements in succession, viz., air, fire, water and earth.

As Hiriyanna comments, the Vedanta resembles the Samkhya-Yoga is regard to the conception of the psychological apparatus. The *antahkarana*, the internal organ, is here also conceived as being *bhakttka* and as constituted by all the five elements, with *tejas* predominating (p. 341). The *antahkarana* is conceived as being always active, except in the deep sleep state, when it becomes

latent. "The explanation that all these organs are *bhautika* is important on account of the recognition it implies of the indispensableness of physical aids for the manifestation of consciousness" (*ibid.*, p. 342). Vedanta, thus traces the origin of the psychological apparatus to the *brahman*, unlike Samkhya-Yoga which trace it to the *prakriti*. The truely psychological element in Vedanta is the consciousness, which is called *sakshin*, the disinterested witness. Here also there is a similarity between Vedanta and Samkhya. In both systems, consciousness, whether it is *sakshin* of Vedanta or *purusha* of Samkhya, is a passive observer of the states of the internal organ, the *antahkarana*, as they unfold themselves. The difference between the two systems is that according to Vedanta, the passive *sakshin* and the active *antahkarana* constitute a unity. As the *sakshin* is pure consciousness, it is not knowable. That is, it cannot become an object of knowledge. As the author of *panchadasi* puts it, the *sakshin* is self-luminous (ix, 32).

According to Vedanta, the essence of personality is the self, the *sakshin*, the pure consciousness. It is beyond the body, mind and intellect. As Safaya puts it, "The self exists before, in and after the various states of consciousness, wakeful, dream and sleep. We are aware of ourselves as the subject of experience. Denial of consciousness mean denial of everything else. Hence mind and self are not-identical. The self is the knower (*kshetrajna*), the seer (*drishtha*), the witness (*sakshin*)" (p. 212). The body as well as the mind are non-self.

The *atman*, the self, is pure consciousness. It is the ultimate and irreducible reality. Out of this, pure consciousness proceed both mind and matter. The *atman* is *chit*, consciousness. Mind and matter are both *achit*, non-conscious. It is the mind which limits consciousness. But it is the mind which enables the empirical ego to have experience. That is mind impiles consciousness. However, the *chit*, the pure consciousness is *amanah*, mindless.

As the Mandukya Upanishad puts it, "*sarvam hyetad brahma, ayamatma brahma, sah ayamatma chatushpad.*" All this is verily *brahman*. This *atman* is *brahman*. This *atma* has four quarters" (I, 2). The first quarter is *vaisvavara*, common to all men, the material condition with the waking to all men, the material condition with the waking state for its field. It is *bahit prajna*, conscious of external objects and its experience consists of gross objects. The second quarter is *taijasa*, the shining or mental condition with the dream state for his field. He is *antahprajna*, inward by cognitive and enjoys the subtle objects. The third quarter is *prajna* just the

cognitional state without any experience of the gross objects or the subtle objects. The cognition is reduced to a mere indefinite mass, *prajnana ghanah*. This is the state of deep sleep, *anandabhuk*, enjoying bliss. It is the *chetomukhah*, the gateway to all definite cognitions in waking and in dream states.

The samkhya system postulates two bodies, viz., the *sthula sarira*, the gross physical body and the *linga sarira*, subtle body. The physical body is composed of the firm elements The subtle body consists of the *antahkarana* (consisting of the three internal organs, *buddhi*, *ahamkara* and *manas*) and the ten external organs (five sensory and five motor). However, the Nyaya-Vaiseshika systems argue that it is not necessary to postulate any subtle body.

Vedanta adds one more body, namely, the *karana sarira* or the causal body. All these three bodies, the physical, the subtle and the causal are looked upon as adjuncts to the self.

In the waking state, there is awareness of the world and its objects through the five sense organs and the *antahkarana* (including the *buddhi*, *ahamkara*, *manas* and *chitta*). Vedanta looks upon *chitta* as the fourth constiuent of the *antahkarana* while Samkhya-Yoga recognises only three by subsuming *chitta* under mind and *buddhi* and the body reacts to the objects. through the five motor organs. In this state, there is *bahih prajna*, awareness of the external object and *sthulabhak*, enjoyment of the objects through the sense organs.

In the dream state, the self is called the *taijasa*, the brilliant, because one is able to see and experience objects when there is no sunlight or any other light. The self in this state is *antahparjna*, aware of all the dream images. In this state, neither the objects, nor the ten organs of sense and action are working. Only the *manas* is working. So the images are perceived. These images are produced by the memory and imagination and they are enjoyed.

In the *sushupti state*, the state of deep sleep, there are neither the external objects nor the internal images. It is just a cognitive mass, *prajnana ghana*, that is undifferentiated as subject or object. There is in this state neither the awareness of the self, nor awareness of the objects, whether external or internal. While in the waking state there are objects and senses, and the four-aspects of *anntakarana* are all operating without any sense organ, in the state of deep sleep; even the *manas* is not operating. In this state there is only *anandabhuk*, the experience of joy which, one is not aware of at the time, but can recall on waking up The body, in this state is called the *karana sarira*, the causal body, because it is the

seed state from which will arise the dream and waking states in due course. However, the *ananda*, the joy or bliss in this state is not pure. It is only in the fourth state, the *turiya* state that pure bliss is there.

What has been stated about the three states could now be put in a tabular form to clarify the Vedantic position regarding the self, the mind and the body.

THE THREE STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The State	Field of experience	Field of awareness	Field of joy	Adjuncts Operating
Jagrat (waking)	*Visva*	*Bahih prajna*	*Sthula bhuk*	Objects, senses and mind
Svapna (dreaming)	*Taijasa*	*Antah prajna*	*Pravivikta bhuk*	Only mind
Sushupti (deep sleep)	*Prajna*	*Prajna ghana*	*Ananda bhuk*	Not even mind

The aim of meditation, it may be pointed out, is to transcend all these three states and be in the *turiya* state, which, as the Mandukya Upanishad puts it, is neither inwardly cognitive, nor outwardly cognitive, nor even an indefinite mass of cognition. It is *ekatmapratyayasaram*, the essence of cognition common to all the states of consciousness, which is *santam*, peace and *sivam*, bliss (I, 7).

5. The Buddhist View

The Buddhist view regarding the relationship between body and mind can be inferred from the two basic doctrines, five *skandhas* and twelve interdependent links, *pratityasamutpada*. Buddha never believed in an enduring matter or an enduring self. He spoke only of aggregation. The *skandhas* are the aggregates of bodily and mental states, viz, (1) *rupa*—the four elements, the body and the senses; (2) *vedana*—feelings, (3) *samjna*—canceptual knowledge; (4) *samskara*—mental dispositions; and (5) *vijnana*—self-consciousness. *Rupa* stands for the body and the sense organs, including hunger and thirst. As Dasgupta observes, "Buddhism did not probably start with the same kind of division of matter and mind as we now do. And it may not be out of place to mention that such an opposition and duality were found neither in the Upanishad, nor in the Samkhya system" (Vol. I, p. 95). Feelings

and conceptual knowledge arise out of the *rupa*, the body and sense-organs being in contact with the four elements, *akasa* not being regarded as an element by Buddha. The main problem of Buddha was to discover how human suffering, viz., disease, old age and death arise. He wanted to find out the conditions which give rise to these phenomena. He called this the law of dependent origination—*pratitya samutpada*—"That being present, this becomes; from the arising of that, this arises." Decay and death arise because of birth. When does birth arise? Birth could arise only when there is *bhava*, some previous existence. Buddha traced birth itself to *trishna*, desire and that ultimately all suffering can be traced to *avidya*, ingnorance. This is what he called the *bhavachakra*, the wheel of existence.

All the systems of ancient Indian thought were preoccupied with the problem of human suffering and the inevitability of death. Self-consciousness is there. But self-consciousness arises only in the living organism which ends ultimately in death.

Avidya starts the series. It arises because of *aasava*, depravity or intoxicant. So the way to destroy *avidya* is through the destruction of depravity. The depravities are classified as *kamasava*—desire, attachment, thirst for sense-pleasures; *bhavasava*—attachment to existence, *ditthasava*—holding wrong views and *avidyasava*—ignorance of sorrow, its cause and its extinction. Thus the ultimate means to overcome physical and mental suffering is to get over the attachment to sense-pleasure. This is possible through the practice of discipline (*sila*), concentration (*samadhi*) and wisdom (*prajna*).

6. The Jaina View

Radhakrishnan characterises the Jaina thought as pluralistic realism. Dualism of mind and body is admitted by the system. The five sense organs are looked upon as being physical and having five mental counterparts. Sense perception is the result of contact between the sense organ and the object. The self is a knower, an enjoyer and a doer. It recognises three forms of consciousness—knowing, feeling and willing. There is first feeling, then willing and finally knowing. The self is a *jiva*, living organism and it is in contact with *pudgala*, the physical objects. Every *jiva* is a composite of body and self—the self being active while the body is passive. As Radhakrishnan writes, "Jainism avoids the defects of both mentalism and materialism by recognising the correlativity of mind and matter" (Vol. I, p. 309). According to Jainism, the self is intrinsically perfect and is characterised by infinite intelli-

gence, infinite peace, infinite faith and infinite power. But because of union with the matter, the body, all these intrinsic features are obscure. The aim of life is to subdue the material element so that the *jiva* is able to reveal all its inherent excellences in their fulness. This is possible by the practice of three *gunas, tri-ratna*, the three precious principles of life, viz., right faith, (*samyag darsana*), right knowledge (*samyag jnana*) and right conduct (*samyag charitra*). Thus the final aim of Jainism is the perfection of the self. As Dasgupta puts it, "When by the continued practice, man becomes unattached to all things and adopts equality to all beings, and becomes disinclined to all worldly enjoyments, then with a mind full of peace, he gets rid of all passions. He takes to the performance of *dhyana* or meditation by deep concentration. The *samatva* or perfect equality of the mind and *dhyana* are interdependent, so that without *dhyana* there is no *samatva* and without *samatva* there is no *dhyana*" (Vol. I, p. 202).

7. Medical Speculations

The same general frame of thought is to be found even in the medical systems of ancient India. As Dasgupta writes, "A human body is regarded by Charaka as a modification of the five elements, ether, air, fire, water and earth and it is also the seat of consciousness, *chetana*" (Vol. II, p. 302). The medical thinkers also accepted the Samkhya concept of subtle body, which they called the *aativeahika sarira*. They also accept the notion of three *gunas* and add the *dhatus* or *doshas*, viz., *vata*, *pitta* and *kapha*. While these three elements affect the well-being of the body, it is asserted that the *rajas* and *tamas gunas* affect the well being of the mind (*ibid.*, p. 319). Like the philosophic thinkers, Charaka also looked upon the heart as the vital centre of the *prana* as well as the *manas*. Charaka asserted *Hridayam chatanadhishthanam ekam* (*Charaka Samhita* IV, 7. 8) following the Taittiriya Upanishad (1.6.1). However, another medical thinker, "Bhala, who is as old as Charaka admires the brain (*mastishka*) to be the centre of the *manas* . . . has its seat between the head and the palate (*sirastaalv-antar-gatam*). Being situated there, it knows all the sense-objects and tastes" (*ibid.*, p. 340 f). However, even Bhala looked upon *chitta*, the cause of all feelings and judgements as being situated in the heart

8. Body-Mind Relationship According to the Tantras

An attempt may now be made to briefly describe the *shat chakras*, the six bases of meditation and indicate the relation of self, body

and mind according to the tantra doctrine.

All the various systems of ancient Indian thought except the charvakas; the materialists, look upon consciousness as non-material, that it is not a product of the bodily processes. It is a pity that none of the works of the materialists, of sixth century B.C. have come down to us due to various reasons.

As Dasgupta observes, "The nerve system of the tantras, however, is entirely different from the medical system of Charaka and Sushruta. It starts with the conception of the spinal column (*meru danda*), which is regarded as one bone from the bottom of the back to the root of the neck. In the passage inside this spinal column there is a nerve (nadi) called sushumna" (*ibid.*, p. 353).

Even though the doctrine of six chakras appears to have some physiological basis, it must be recognised, as Woodroffe (1973) has asserted that it is purely conceptual.

The entire design is based on the concept of lotuses at the various centres of the body. On the petals of these lotuses are the fifty letters of the Sanskrit alphabet. The design is intimately connected with the notion of five elements. Some of these ideas will become clear in chapter 10 on language and thought.

As Swami Vivekananda wrote in his *Raja Yoga*, "The Yogis claim that of all the energies that are in the human body highest is what they call 'Ojas'. . . the same force which is working outside as electricity or magnetism will become changed into inner force; the same force that is working as muscular energy will be changed into Ojas. The Yogis say that part of the human energy which is expressed as sex energy, in sexual thought, when checked and controlled, easily becomes changed into Ojas and as the Muladhara guides these, the Yogi pays particular attention to that centre. He tries to take up all this sexual energy and convert it into Ojas" (1959 p. 72 f).

The tantra tests assert that there are six chakras in the body along the spinal column. The human body is made of five *kosas* (Vedantic) and six chakras. *Annamaya kosha*. the bodily sheath consists of three elements, viz., earth, water and fire which provide over the three lower chakras, viz.. *muladhara*, *svadhishthana* and *manipura*. The food consisting of earth and water is digested by fire and converted into the body. The gross body consists of six substances—flesh, muscle, bone, marrow, blood and hair. The *pranamaya kosha* manifests itself in the other two of the five elements, viz., air and ether, which are the presiding elements of the fourth *anahata chakra* and the fifth, the *visuddha* chakra. The *ma-*

nomaya kosha and the *vijnanamaya kosha* constitute the *antahkarana* which is fourfold including the *buddhi, ahamkara, manas* and *chitta* and are related to the sixth chakra, viz., *ajan*. The *anandamaya kosha* is in the *sahasrara*, the thousand petalled in the brain.

Thus, the tantra tests makes a system of the Upanishadic doctrines of five *koshas*, the five *mahabhutas*, the ten *indriyas* the fifty letters of Sanskrit alphabet, the three *gunas*, *bhutas* and the six chakras.

A brief description of the six chakras and the same organs associated with them and the fifty letters of the alphabet, is given below.

The *muladhara* is situated below the genitals. It is the base on which a person sits. It has a lotus of four petals. The element is *prithvi*, earth, and the sensation connected is smell. The motor organs are the feet. The four petals have for letters of the alphabet.

Next, above the genitals is *svadhishthana* with six petals and six letters. The element is *ap*, water. The sensation is taste. The motor organs are the hands.

At the navel region is *manipura*, a lotus with ten petals and ten letters. The element is *tejas*, light. The sensations are form and colour. The motor organs connected are of evacuations.

Higher up, at the heart region is *anahata*. It has 12 petals with as many letters. The element here is *vayu*, air. The sensation is touch. The motor organs are the generative organs.

In the throat region is *visuddha* with sixteen petals and on these petals are the vowels. The element connected with it is *akasa*, the sensation is hearing and the motor organ is the mouth which produces speech.

Between the eyebrows is situated *ajna* with two petals with the letters *ha* and *ksha*. It is the seat of *manas*.

Beyond is the *sahasrara*, the thousand-petalled lotus in the brain. It hangs with its head downwards. It has in it potentially all the powers and all the *gunas*.

By reciting mantras and by meditation it is belived that the boiled and sleeping *kundalini* is awakened and is made to leave the *muladhara* and proceed upwards from lotus to lotus so that it ultimately reaches the *sahasrara*.

Muladhara is the seat of dormant cosmic energy. It is also the seat of *para vak* (Chapter 10). As Sinha writes, "It is the seat of massive pleasurable sensation and voluminous organic sensation of repose" (Vol. II, p. 8). The svadhishthana chakra is the seat of

sexual feelings, lassitude, stupor, cruelty, suspicion and contempt. It is also the seat of credulity, disdain, delusion and false belief. Meditation on it destroys lust, anger, greed, delusion, pride, envy and facilitates the acquisition of knowledge (Woodroffe, 1952). Thus it is clear that the second lotus is the seat of *tamasa*. By meditating on it, one becomes free from the dominance of *tamasa*. Similarly, the third chakra, namely, ***manipura***, is looked upon as the seat of shame, treachery, jealousy, desire, worldliness, aversion and fear—emotions associated with *rajo guna* The fourth chakra, the *anahata* is looked up as the seat of egoism, hope, anxiety, doubt, remorse. Meditation on this centre enables one to obtain sense-control and gain wisdom. Meditation on the next, namely, the *visuddha* chakra, makes the person become merciful, gentle, steady, modest and self-controlled. He will become free from greed, malice, pride and other antisocial tendencies. Meditation on the *ajna* chakra between the eyebrows, the seat of ***antahkarana***, makes him wise and overcome attachment to worldly objects. When he goes beyond and meditates on the ***sahasrara***, the thousand petalled lotus, all nescience (*ajnana*) and delusion (*moha*) are destroyed. He attains his *svarupa*, his real form. He is pure consciousness and pure bliss.

Thus, the aim of all sadhana is to overcome the limitations of egoism, emotionality and delusion and attains enlightment, the six chakras and the other elements of the system are all conceptual. By sublimating the physical and the mental through medidation, it is hoped that one can overcome those limitations and become pure consciousness.

SUMMARY

A brief study of views put forth by various schools of ancient Indian thought with respect to the problem of the relation between body and mind show the great influence of the Upanishadic assertions.

The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad asserted "This *brahman* is without a prior or a posterior, without interior or exterior, this *atman* is *brahman*, the experiencer of every thing" (II, 5.19). The Mundaka Upanishad asserted, "All this manifested universe is verily *brahman* the Supreme" (II, 2.12). The Aitareya Upanishad declared *prajnanam brahma* "*brahman* is pure consciousness" (V. 3). These three statements leads to the following prospositions: (1) The entire universe is *brahman*; (2) *brahman* is pure consciousness; and (3)

the self of man is ultimately *brahman—tat tvam asi*—that thou art (Chardogya Upanishad VI, 8.7). When the ultimate reality is pure consciousness and the ultimate goal of all human endeavour should be to realise this, it follows that the body as well as the mind are mere *upadhis*, limitations imposed on the self through *avidya*, ignorance. It must also be realised that in the ancient times, knowledge about the physiological aspects was very limited.

When we keep these two conditions in view we can understand why the problem of the relation between body and mind is practically non-significant. However, it must be acknowledged that right from the Upanishadic times there was great emphasis on meditation as well as on regulated breathing in order to develop an integrated personality.

The Charvakas, the materialists, as well as the Buddhists, asserted that there was nothing like an enduring self behind all the changing experiences. Either the self and mind are mere byproducts or a mere *skandha*, an aggregate. It is only in Samkhya-Yoga, and in tantra that there is some detailed consideration of the problem.

Though the Upanishads look upon consciousness as the fundamental reality, the various doctrines of the five *kosas* or sheaths, the five *pranas* or vital energies, the five sense organs, the five motor organs, the four aspects of the *antahkarana*, the internal organ, are all put forth.

A brief description of the problem as treated by the pluralistic realism of Nyaya-Vaiseshika systems, the dualistic position of Samkhya-Yoga and the monistic or non-dualistic analysis of Vedanta has been given. Next the Buddhist and the Jaina views have been described. Finally, a brief description according to the Ayurvedic (medical) thinkers and the tantra thinkers has been given. The tantra conception of the six chakras in their relation to the five *kosas* and the three *gunas* show the influence of Upanishadic thought on these systems.

The chief aim of the respective schools of thought is to control the various bodily urges of food, thirst and sex and to control the emotions like fear, anger and greed, through regulated breathing and through meditation so that an integrated personality, which is unaffected by the bodily or emotional needs and the varying consequences of social interactions, is built up.

Part II

COGNITIVE PROCESSES

CHAPTER 5

Sensation and Perception

One of the outstanding features of ancient Indian thought is the great concern with respect to the problem of perception. Each philosophical system has given an account of sense-organs, the *jnanendriyas*, as they called them, in its treatment of the problem of perception. It is clear that their account of the problem sensation is based on the analysis of the facts of experience though it is in the light of their metaphysical assumption.

However, side by side with the philosophical analysis, the medical schools also put forward their views on the basis of empirical works. In his monumental work on *Indian Psychology*, Sinha (1958) has written, "Charaka had a clear conception of the sensory nerves (*manovaha nadi*) and the motor nerves (*ajnavaha nadi*)" (p. 1). It is impossible to know whether the anatomical work had progressed enough to separate the two sets of nerves. But there is no doubt that these terms are based on analytical work. It must however be noted that the great philosophic writer, Dasgupta has called his chapter "Speculations of Medical Schools" (Vol. II).

Upanishads on Sensations and Sense Organs (I, 3. 3-6)

In Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (I, 3.3-6) there is reference to the various sense organs. It is assumed that the sense organs become godly when they are under the influence of thoughts and actions recommended by the scriptures or become demonical when they are used for more enjoyment. Each sense organ, it is said, spontaneously runs after the corresponding sense-object. So the task of man is to prevent the sense organs from becoming attached to the respective sense objects. Reference is made to the nose, eyes and ears. When attention is paid to the hymns by some, so that they may become godly, the demons rush and charge the sense organs, with attachment to sense objects, it is said.

Similar statement is made in Chandogya Upanishad (I, 2.1-5). The term gods and demons, devas and asuras, refer to the organs of sense and action. The sense organs are looked upon as divine when they are used for noble purpose and demoniac when they are utilise for ignoble purposes (Radhakrishnan, 1953, p. 155 and p. 339).

This is clear from another passage in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad in which the seven sense organs are called the *sapta rishis*, the seven sages. It is declared that the two ears are the two sages Gautama and Bharadvaja, the two eyes are the two sages Visvamitra and Jamadagni, the two nostrils are the two sages Vasishtha and Kasyapa. The tongue is the sage Atri. The tongue is used both for eating and speech (II, 3.4). The reference may be to the fact that men get messages about the world through the sense organs and so they are looked upon as sages.

The relation between sensation and preception is brought out in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad I, 5.3. "They say I did not see the object as my mind was engaged elsewhere. Every one sees and hears through the mind." Thus, it is realised that mere stimulation of the sense organ is not enough. Attention is necessary for the awareness of the sensation.

It is further stated that the mind assumes the form of watever is clearly to be known. *Yat kincha vijijnasyam manas tad rupam mano hi vijijnasyam* (I, 5.9). This may be the first expression of the Vedantic and Samkhya theory of perception (Chapter 6).

Elsewhere Yajnavalkya describes eight sense-organs and eight objects of sense, namely, nose and odour, speech and name, tongue and taste, eye and form, ear and sound, mind and desire, hands and work, skin and touch (III, 2.2-9), that is, speech, hands and mind are also included along with the five sense organs. In another section Yajnavalkya says that eye and ear are the sense organs which give us the truth and should be worshipped as *brahman* (IV, 1.4-5). In the sixth chapter of the same Upanishad there is the contest between the six bodily functions. They went to Prajapati to find out who is the most superior among them. He said that the sense organs whose departure makes the body most deficient may be considered to be the highest. On this the organ of speech went away and on return asked what the position was in its absence. The body could get along without speech like the dumb one. Next the eye left and found that blindness is not such a calamity either. Similarly the absence of the ear and even that of the mind was found to be no calamity. But when *prana* wanted to go out, all of them cried out that they could not live without it. This established the supremacy of *prana*, the vital breath (VI, 1.7-13). The same context is to be found in Chandogya Upanishad (V, 1.7-12).

The fivefold principle of the universe is asserted in the Taittiriya Upanishad, in which sight, hearing, touch, mind and speech are

grouped (I, 7). In the Aitareya Upanishad, is discribed the way in which the cosmic person created food out of waters and tried to seize it with speech but could not. It is said that had he succeeded one might have satisfied one's hunger with mere speech. Later he tried to seize the food with *prana* and could not. Nor could he with sight nor by sound nor by touch nor by mind, nor by the generative organ (I, 2-9).

As noted earlier there is the parable of the chariot in the Katha Upanishad in which it is said that the *indriyas* are like the horses which are constantly seeking the sense-objects. The wise look upon that person as the real enjoyer who controls his body, senses and mind (III, 4). There is also the statement regarding a hierarchy— beyond the senses is the mind, beyond the mind is the intellect and beyond the intellect is the *atman* and beyond the *atman* is the *avyakta*, the unmanifest (VI, 7).

There is, as it were, a statement of the five sensory, the five motor organs and the mind as the eleventh in Kanshitaki Upanishad (I, 7). There is also another version of the contest between the various organs, in which it is shown that neither speech, nor the eye, nor the ear, nor the mind could become effective without the *prana* entering the body (II, 14 and 15 and III, 2-5) The supremacy of consciousness over the sense organs, speech and *manas* is described vividly (II, 6-8).

Thus the Upanishads contain a good deal of analyasis regarding the processes of sensation and perception. A clear distinction is made about the purpose. The sense organs may be used purely to obtain pleasure. This is behaviour at the animal level. It is also recognised that each sense organ runs spontaneously towards its sense object. The task of man is to direct them for higher purposes, viz., to get knowledge and enlightenment. Secondly, there is the problem of attachment. The normal tendency is for the sense to become attached to objects So it is the task of man to prevent the development of such attachment. Another important point is that the sense-organ by itself cannot give rise to perception. It is the mind, it is attention, which give rise to perception. It is clearly recognised that *prana* is essential to give rise to perception. It is asserted that the mind assumes the form of the object perceived indicating the *antahkarana* theory of perception developed later on. Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that motor functions are also recognised in the Upanishads as belonging to the class of *indriyas*. The three aspects are sense organ, sense object and perception.

In the various system of philosopny, perception is one very important problem for analysis. Practically each system has its own way of analysing perception and the functions of sense organs.

However, it appears to be a general agreement among the various systems that there is a tripartite relationship between the sense-organs, the *vishaya*, the object and the perception. It is clearly recognised that each sense organs has its own specific function and that it is related to the elements, the *mahabhutas*. All the various systems of thought generally agree with the Nyaya-Vaiseshika view that the relation between the sense organs and its object is based on the principle of "like affecting like". As Hiriyanna puts it, "the principle underlying the explanation is that like only can affect like—since without kinship between a sense and its object distinctive capacity cannot be satisfactorily accounted for. The organ of sight alone, for example, apprehends colour, for it alone is made of *tejasa* atoms whose characteristic quality is colour" (p. 248).

The following table gives the relation between the *mahabhuta* (elements), the *indriya* (sense organs) and the sensation:

Mahabhuta (element)	Ether (*akasa*)	Air (*vayu*)	Light (*tejasa*)	Water (*apas*)	Earth (*prithvi*)
Sense organ (*indriya*)	Ear (*srotra*)	Skin (*tvak*)	Eye (*netra*)	Tongue (*jihva*)	Nose (*nasika*)
Sensaton	Sound (*sabda*)	Touch (*sparsa*)	Form (*rupa*)	Taste (*rasa*)	Smell (*gandha*)

The Controversy on Contact of Sense Organ with the Object

However, there is considerable difference of opinion about the contact of the sense organ with the object. Each system classifies the sense organs on the basis of contact—*prapyakari* or lack of contact *aprapyakari*. While the Nyaya-Vaiseshika, the Mimansa, the Samkhya and the Vedanta systems hold that all sense organs are *prapyakari*, that they apprehend objects by direct contact with the objects, Buddhists and Jainas, hold that some sense organs are *aprapyakari*, that some sense organs do not come into contact with the objects. They hold that distant objects can be perceived even though there is no contact. Both the Buddhists and Jainas agree that the sense of vision does not came into contact with the object in order to give rise to perception. While the Buddhists hold that the sense of audition is also a distant sense the Jainas look upon hearing as living based on contact.

As Kalghatgi (1961) puts it, "although the ear is a *prapyakari*, although some form of physical contact is necessary for the auditory experience, it is not direct physical contact with the stimulation

as in the case of smell or taste . . . Stimulation like sound waves issuing from the object come in touch with the organ of hearing and we get the auditory experience" (p. 61).

This is indeed a very significant advance. The Jaina theorists have anticipated the modern theory of sound waves. In this the Jainas had a realistic approach. They refund to believe like the other ancient analysts that the sense organ goes out to meet the object (Kalghatgi, p. 62).

Thus the Jainas differ from all the other ancient theorists. The Jainas and the Buddhists agree that vision does not involve any contact with the object. While the Buddhists maintain that both vision and audition are *aprapyakari*, the Jainas think that only vision is *aprapyakari*.

According to Mimamsaka view, perception of sound is produced when the air-waves produced by the sound reaches the ear-drum. That is, the ear never comes into contact with the locus of the sound. It comes into contact with the sound only through the air-waves (Sinha, I, p. 141).

By contrast, all the other systems of ancient Indian thought hold the view that the sense organs get sensory experience through direct contact of the object stimulating. While "the olfactory organ, the gentatory organ and the factual organ, apprehend their objects remaining in their seats, the visual and auditory organs, go out to their appropriate objects and apprehend them" (Sinha, Vol. I, p. 25). They look upon all the five sense organs as being *prapyakari*. They can appprehend objects only by coming into contact with them. However, there is a difference of opinion between Nyay-Vaiseshika and Samkhya. According to Nyaya-Vaiseshika the sense organs are *bhautika*, material in nature. But, according to Samkhya view, being the products of *ahamkara* in its *sattvika* aspect, the sense organs are not *bhautika*. They are capable of expansion and so the visual and auditory organs can go out and establish direct contact with the abjects (Sinha, I, p. 27).

The great physician Charaka even put forth the view that the organ of touch pervades all sense organs and that they are all more modifications of the sense of touch (*Charaka Samhita*, Sutrasthan XI, 32). However, many argued against this view because it contradicts the facts of experience. "If the factual organ were the only sense organ, it would be able to apprehend all objects, so that colour would be perceived by the blind, sound by the deaf and so on" (Sinha I, p. 29). Another argument put forth against touch being the only single organ is the impossibility of simultaneous percep-

tion of colour, sound, etc. Finally, it is pointed out that skin being a *prapyakari*, it can apprehend only those objects which can come into contact with it. On the contrary, colour and sound can be perceived from a distance. This is probably one of the instances of lively debate in the ancient times.

Manas as a Sense Organ

Another matter of controversy was about *manas* being a sense-organ, an *indriya*.

According to Nyaya-Vaiseshika, *manas* should be regarded as a sense-organ because it perceives pleasure and pain. It holds the dictum that perception is always a sensuous origin. The Vedantians point out that according to the Vedas, "the objects are greater than the sense-organs, and the *manas* is greater than the senses." The Jainas also disagree with this position. According to them *manas* is an *anindriya*. It is not a sense organ (Jain, p. 68).

As noted above, Samkhya also speaks of eleven *indriyas*, including *manas*.

Sense Organs and Evolution

According to the Jaina thinkers, at the lowest level of evolution are the "one-sensed" organisms, the *ekendriyas*, at the plant level and at the level of single and multicalled organisms. The possess only the sense of touch. At the next stage are the *dvendriyas*, the "two-sensed" organisms, with the sense of touch and the sense of taste, like the molluscan species. At the next level, the sense of smell is added to the sense of touch and taste, like the ants, for example. Higher still are the bees which have four senses, touch, taste, smell and vision. Finally, these are the organisms like the fish, the vertebrates and human beings with all the five senses.

Those possessing five senses are grouped into two classes: those possessing mind, the samjninah and those which do not posses mind, the asamjninah (Kalghatgi, pp. 63-65).

Stimulus Strength and Sensation

According to the Vaiseshika thinkers, the sense organ can perceive only that stimulus which has a certain intensity. We can never perceive an infra-sensible, *anudbhuta* stimulus. Sensation can arise only when it reaches an appreciable degree of strength, *vidbhuta*. This is a general feature of all the various sense organs. This is a basic assumption of Kanada's *Vaiseshika Sutra*. Atoms are imperceptible because they do not have an appreciable magni-

tude. Only the stimuli with *mahattva*, extensive magnitude that can give rise to sensations. Such magnitude is the general condition. It is pointed out that neither atomic magnitude nor the infinite magnitude of space is perceivable. Some magnitude between the two is necessary, to give rise to sense perception (Sinha, I, 73).

The Sense Organ and the Objects

According to Nyaya thinkers, perception depends upon *sannikarsha*, some sort of an intercourse or dynamic communion between the object and a particular sense organ. They describe six kinds of *sannikarsha*. But they appear to be more logical than psychological. It is sufficient to note the nature of the first two kinds. When there is a visual perception of a jar, there is *samyoga*, union between the substance, the *dravya* and the sense organ. That is, *samyoga* is a direct relation between the sense organ and the object. Secondly, there is *samyukta samavaya* or united inherence which gives rise to the perception of the quality which inheres in the object. That is, this differentiates between the perception of the object as such and the perception of the quality of the object, the quality which inheres in the object (Sinha, I, 76)

Summary

There is thus clear evidence of analysis of sensation and perception in the Upanishads themselves. Also, it is clear that many problems which roused considerable debate between the various systems of philosophy regarding sensation and perception had their origin in the Upanishads.

The Jaina, the Buddhist and the Mimamsaka analysts were aware that distance perception arises on the basis of air waves in audition or ether waves in vision.

Another interesting feature is the relationship the ancient thinkers tried to establish between the five elements (*pancha mahabhutas*), the five sense-organs and the five sensations.

The *Vaiseshika* thinkers also anticipated the relation between the magnitude of the stimulus and the sense perception.

CHAPTER 6

Perception and Illusion

Stages of Perception

It was recognised that two distinct stages of perception take place, viz., *nirvikalpa*, indeterminate stage and *savikalpa*, determinate stages. In the first there is a mere apprehension of "being". The properties of the object are not perceived. However, the Buddhists rejected this view. According to them, perception is always indeterminate. Perception, as such, they held, does not give the name, the quality and other features of the stimulus object. The so-called determinate perception, it is argued, is based on memory, recognition, and such other non-perceptual processes.

This was a matter for very keen controversy for several centuries between the various schools of thought. Sinha (Vol. I) devotes a whole chapter to this problem and describes the various viewpoints and the differences between them. Here a very brief outline is given indicating the problem.

The main problem is the definition of the term 'perception'. According to the Buddhists, perception gives us the truth since it is free from any imagination or *kalpana*. That is, they do not agree with the views that differentiate between indeterminate and determinate perception for, by definition, determinate perception involves the operation of imagination or *kalpana*.

By contrast, Gautama, in his *Nyaya Sutra* defines perception as that cognition which (*a*) is produced by the contact of the object with sense-organ, (*b*) which is not expressible inwords, (*c*) which is not erroneous, and (*d*) which is well-defined (I, 1.4).

It is clear that the difference between the two schools, one which holds that perception involves only *one step* and the other which holds that it involves *two steps*, is with respect to the resulting cognition. The one step, school look upon perception as being a mere simple apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, class, etc. (Sinha, I, p. 38). But according to those who believe that perception involves two steps, the cognition generated by perception is "well-defined", that is, that perception gives us knowledge

of the qualities, its generic character and also its specific character.

Jayanta Bhatta, the author of *Nyaya Manjari*, distinguishes four views on perception: (*a*) Buddhists and others who hold the view that perception gives rise to a knowledge of the specific object, *svalakshana*, as distinct from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous elements; (*b*) some like Samkara hold that the object of indeterminate perception is mere 'being'; (*c*) some hold that the object of indeterminate perception is the word denoting the object; and (*d*) some who hold that it gives different qualities, genus, etc.

According to Jayanta Bhatta, the object of indeterminate perception is essentially the senses that of determinate percention; the only difference between them lies in the fact that the former is devoid of all reference to a name and hence free from verbal images, while the latter apprehends the name of its objects and is thus mixed up with verbal images" (Sinha, I, p. 43).

Thus, the essential difference between the two steps or two forms of perception lies in the fact that indeterminate perception gives rise to mere awareness or simple apprehension while determinate perception leads to the apprehension of the name also and thus the cognition of some qualities and characteristics.

Most of the thinkers belonging to the Samkhya and the Mimamsa Schools accept the definition of Gautama, that all perceptual knowledge is determinate. When one is in doubt about as, for example, whether the object at a distance is a man or a post, it cannot be said that there is a perception. That is according to Gautama's definition, perception gives us 'well-defined' knowledge.

The *savikalpa* perception, that is determinate perception, involves a knowledge of the genus to which the perceived object belongs and its specific qualities which distinguish it from the other objects of the same class.

By contrast in *nirvikalpa* or indeterminate perception, there is merely simple apprehension. The object apprehended is not perceived as a member of a group, nor is there the awareness of its difference from the other members of the group.

The Jaina thinkers hold that in inderminate perception, there is merely the apprehension of the existence of an object and not its other attributes. It is free from all associations of name, class and the like. It is purely presentative in character. In this they agree with Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers (Mehta, p. 46). Also they distinguish between *mati*, non-verbal cognition and *sruta*, verbal cognition. Indeterminate perception is at the *mati*, non-verbal level and determinate perception is at the *sruta*, verbal level

(Mehta, p. 73).

As Radhakrishnan points out, "this analysis of determinate perception brings out the elements of conception and Judgement involved in the act of perception. The fallacy of the psychical staircase theory, that we have first percepting then conception and then judgement is avoided" (Vol. I, p. 59).

But the Buddhist thinker Dharamakirti says, "the object of perception is *svalakshana*, while that of mediate knowledge is *samanya lakshna*."

This is the essential difference between the Buddhist thinkers and others. Perception, according to Buddhists gives us a mere apprehension of the object as it is. To know the class to which the object belongs involves *kalpana*, imagination.

The difference in the views of the Buddhist thinkers and the Nyaya thinkers regarding the perceptual process is due to the difference in the metaphysical assumptions. The Buddhists assume that the *real* is the simple *this*, the momentary individual not out of perception but all relations, arise, out of imagination. According to the Nyaya thinkers, what exists is not momentary. It endures for a longer or shorter duration. So it is possible to get definite knowledge even by the process of perception.

The Concept of Acquired Perception

One of the questions of perception that led to serious thinking was regarding the ' visual perception" of fragrant sandal. The Jaina and the Vedantic thinkers look upon this as complex made up of presentation (perceptual, and representation (memory) processes. They called it a "compound perception". When the sandal wood is seen, the visual organ by itself cannot give rise to the perception of fragrance. The olfactory perception, they said, is due to the recollection of fragrance on seeing the sandalwood. But according to Nyaya thinkers, every process is simple. There cannot be a compound of perception and recollection. So they look upon it as a succession of two simple processes. That is the process is mental. It is not mere sensory process (Sinha, Vol I, p. 93).

Theories of Perception

A brief description of some of the theories of perception may now be undertaken.

(*i*) Buddhist Theory

Perception is defined as a cognition that is free from *kalpana*. It is free from concepts such as name, class, etc. Perception is purely sensory. Perception is also described as non-erroneous. It is direct and immediate knowledge. According to Dharmakirti's *Nyaya-bindu*, perception is that which is an indeterminate nameless, inarticulate process. Names are artificial verbal sings which are assigned to the objects of perception and naming involves an awareness of class. Naming processes also involves recollection of past experiences. So all these processes are not sensory. When the sense organs comes into contact with its appropriate object, there is simple apprehension. Names of objects are not presented by the sensory stimulus. Dharmakirti differentiates between *indriya-jnana*, sense perception and *manovijnana*, mental or conceptual experience. Thus, by definition, perception is primarily a product of sense experince. Also by definition perception is non-erroneous and this precludes illusion. Further, all perceptions are momentary. There is no continuous or uniform preception. It is only a series of discrete sensations, each being momentary. They appear to be continuous. This is why all perceptions are indeterminate perceptions.

(*ii*) The Jaina Theory

The Jainas distinguish between *darsana* and *jnana*. *Darsana* is the simple apprehension of an object. The stimulation of the sense organ leads to simple apprehension of the general features, *sattamatra* and not to the apprehension of its peculiar features. By contrast *jnana* is the apprehension of the special features of the object. *Darsana* is called *nirvikalpa jnana* by the other systems. It is the *avagraha* stage of perception. Umasvati defines *avagraha* as "implicit awareness of the object of sense . . . It is indeterminate. The object presented through sense stimulation is an undefined and indeterminate way. In this stage, we are merely aware of the presence of the object without any association, without cognizing the specific features and in fact without even being aware of its association and name" (Kalghatgi, p. 82). However, Kalghatgi points out that the definition of the term *avagraha* varies. Some Jaina thinkers look upon *avagraha* as determinate cognition, while *darsana* is the term that is used for indeterminate cognition. According to Hemachandra, for example, *darsana* is "indeterminate". It does not grasp the specific characteristics of the object. This *darsana* transforms itself into a determinate cognition which is *avagraha* (82-83). The next stage in perception is designated *iha*, the stage in which

there is the associative integration of the sensory elements. "It is a striving for determinate and specific cognition" (p. 91). The next stage is *avaya*, the stage of "interpretation". "The Jainas said that this stage of perceptual judgement is *avaya*, although it is still at the non-verbal stage. *Avaya* follows in the wake of *iha* associative integration. In this stage, we reach a determinate experience. The striving for a cognition of the specific nature of the object results in the definite perception of the object" (p. 92) Finally, there is the stage of *dharana*, the stage in retention of the perceptual experience. It is this retention which helps in recognition later on.

This careful analysis of perception by the Jaina thinkers shows the concern they had to identify analytically the various stages. It must be borne in mind that all these four or five stages are at the non-verbal level.

(*iii*) The Nyaya-Vaiseshika Theory

By the definition of perception formulated by Gautama, perception is that cognition which is produced by the intercourse of sense organs with the objects (*Nyaya Sutra*, I, 1.4). Nyaya also takes it for granted that perception is possible only when the *manas* and the self are involved, though the primary source of knowledge in perception is the sense-organ. Vatsyayana in his famous *Nyayabhashya* asserts that the sense-object contact is the principle factor in perception while the mind-self contact is only secondary (I, 30).

Perception according to Nyaya also, is not verbal. The name of the object is not there at the time of apprehension. Name is operative and useful only for communication of the experience to others not for mere apprehension.

Further, as noted above, according to Gautama, perception always gives true knowledge. If the knowledge is erroneous or illusory, it is not perceptual.

Finally, perception should be well-defined. Perception precludes doubts.

According to the system, perception involves the functioning of five entities, viz., (*i*) the object of perception, (*ii*) the medium like light, etc., (*iii*) the sense-organ, (*iv*) the manas, and (*v*) the self. It any one of these is not operating, there cannot be any perception whatever.

As noted above, the theory divides perception into two stages, namely, indeterminate and determinate. At the indeterminate stage, there is the process of mere apprehension and at the determinate

stage, there is the awareness of the attributes and characteristics of the object.

(*iv*) The Samkhya-Yoga Theory

The Samkhya theory, like the Vedantic theory, assumes the cooperation of the sense organs and the *manas* in perception. But, it assumes that the *buddhi* is also involved. *Buddhi* is not only involved in perception, it also assumes the form of the object. This is another instance of the influence of metaphysics in the analysis of mental processes. As Hiriyanna writes, "the *buddhi* itself assumes the form of the object, when a suitable stimulus is received from outside. The modification of the evolvement *buddhi*, viz., *vritti*, is a characteristic not only of perception but also of all firms of consciousness, and when it is inspired by spirit, experience results. The psychic apparatus as a whole mediates between the *purusha* and the outside world thereby securing for the former the experiences of life (*bhoga*) or, if the time for it is ripe, final freedom (*apavarga*) through right knowledge (*viveka*) (p. 285).

Kapila, in his *Ankhya Pravachana Sutra*, defines perception as a cognition which takes the form of an object, being related to it (I, 89). Vijnanabhikshu in his commentary *Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya*, clarifies that perception is the *buddhi vritti*, the mental function which goes out to the object and is modified by the particular form of that object to which it is related. Vachaspati Mishra, in his commentary *Samkhya Tattva Kaumudi*, clarifies this further by stating that the object of perception must be real, and that it involves the operation of *buddhi* which produces a definite and determinate cognition of the object. Thus, according to Samkhya system, perception system involves the cooperation of the internal organs, *antahkarna*, with the sense organs.

As regards Mimamsa and Vedanta, in a broad way, it may be said that Mimamsa accepts the Nyaya-Vaiseshika theory of perception and Vedanta accepts the Samkhya-Yoga theory, with minor variations.

Perception of Space, Time and Movement

The Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers state that the spatial characteristics of position, direction and distance can be perceived directly through vision and touch. The Mimamsa thinkers add that direction and distance can be perceived through the auditory organ also. But the Samkhya-Yoga systems hold that space and time are categories of the *buddhi*.

With respect to auditory perception of space, the Mimamsaka thinkers hold that sound is always perceived as having its locus in some point of space. Whenever sounds are perceived, they are perceived as coming from different directions. That is there is not only the perception of sound but also of the direction from which it comes. But the Naiyayikas differ in this. According to them directions are perceived on the basis of our knowledge of space. That is auditory localisation is a judgement rather than perception.

With respect to the auditory perception of distance, the Mimamsakas assert that it is based on the intensity of the sound. The feebler sound is perceived as coming from a greater distance. It is, however, agreed that distance is perceived more accurately than direction through sound.

As regards visual and tactical perception of space, there is general agreement that spatial perception arises on the basis of proximity and remoteness.

But according to Samkhya-Yoga systems, time and space are categories of understanding. They do not arise on the basis of perceptible processes.

As regards time perception, it is stated that it involves the perception of succession and the perception of duration. Perception of succession arises from the perception of changes and the perception of duration arises from the 'spacious present', which is the nucleus of all time-consciousness. However, the Buddhists do not believe in the 'spacious present' nor in duration. They believe only in succession. They identify perception of time with the perception of succession, which is based on the perception of changes. According to Vatsyayana (***Nyayabhashya***), "time is perceived in terms of action. An action is perceived as occurring in time." When an action is no more, it is perceived as *past;* when it is not yet begun, it is perceived as *future;* and when it is going on, it is perceived as *present* (Sinha, I, p. 153). But the Buddhists hold that there is no 'spacious present', that the present has no duration, that it is instantaneous or momentary. By definition, a perception is nothing but a presentation and a presentation is only of a single moment, according to Buddhists. However, according to Jayanta Bhatta, (*Nyaya Manjari*), sometimes the present is perceived as extended over a duration as in the action of looking, reading, etc. That is, the sensible present has a certain duration, *vartamanakshana dirghah.* It is not a single moment. It is composed of a number of movements. According to Naiyayikas any action occurs over an extended time. It is not momentary. Thus, the difference of opinion regarding

the 'spacious present' is based on differences in metaphysical opinions.

As regards perception of movement, there is a discussion on it among the Mimamsa thinkers. Those belonging to Prabhakara School hold that movement is not an object of perception. They assert that movement is only an inference from disjunction and conjunction. "When an object moves, what we actually perceive is not its movement, but only its disjunction and conjunction with certain points in space, from which we infer the existence of movement" (Sinha, I, p. 145). But according to Bhatta School of Thought, Mimamsa, movement is an object of perception. "When a snake moves on the ground, both the snake and the ground have conjunctions and disjunctions, but we apprehend only that the snake is moving and not that the ground is moving" (Sinha, I, p. 146). So, it is argued, Movement is not an inference but an object of perception. Another illustration is given. When we perceive a flash of lightning in a dark night, we perceive its movement and not its conjunctions and disjunctions with points of space.

Illusions

The different schools of Indian philosophy have advanced different theories of illusion.

Jayanti Bhatta in his commentary *Naya Manjari* on *Nyaya Sutra* asserts that illusory perceptions arise as a result of: (*a*) some *dosha*, defect in the sense organ such as jaundiced eye, or in the conditions of perception, or (*b*) *asamprayoga* or presentation of a part or an aspect instead of the whole object, or (*c*) *samskara* or the disturbing influence of habit or prejudice which may lead to irrelevant recollections, as in the case of rope-snake illusion.

1. Illusions may arise because of similarity of movement or because of distance, as in the case of mistaking for a piece of silver or a rope for a snake. The rapid movement of a fire-brand produces the illusion of a circle. The sun and moon appear small because of distance. When we sail in a boat, the trees, etc., also appear to be moving. Illusions may arise because the light is dim, as it may be due to some defect in the eye. All objects look yellow to a person suffering from jaundice, as it may be due to some pressure on the sense organ as in the case of two moons being perceived when the eye-ball is pressed with the finger.

2. Perception depends on some real object giving rise to sense-contact. Illusions arise when there is no real object as in the case

of dreams and hallucinations as it may be due to the mistaking of nacre to be a piece of silver. While one object is present to be a sense-organ, a wrong recollection leads to error in perception.

3. Illusions may arise as a result of *samskaras*, sub-conscious impressions. The rope in darkness may be perceived as a snake due to fear. An infatuated lover may mistake another woman being his beloved

The most common example of illusion that is taken for examination is that of nacre, a piece of broken conch-shell, which is taken to be silver—*suktarajita*. The Nyaya-Vaiseshika and Yoga theorists assert that in this illusion, there is malobsservation. This is called the *anyathakhyati* theory (also called *Viparitakhyati* theory). The object is seen as something shining. However, it is not grasped as a mere conch-shell. It is grasped as "something shining". On the basis of memory, the shining piece is perceived as silver. So there is a confusion here of some object that is seen, with some object that is remembered.

The Mimamsa and the Samkhya Schools explain illusion as *akhyati*, non-grasping of the properties of the object seen. That is, the conch-shell is not organised at all. Dasgupta writes, "what happens here is simply this, that only the features common to conch-shell and silver being noticed, the perceiver fails to apprehend the difference between the two things, and this gives rise to the cognition of silver" (I, p. 386). That is, according to the *akhyati* view, illusion arises as a result of the non-apprehension of the difference between the remembered silver and the perceived object. It is further stated that the illusory judgement is valid at the time the cognition or rather, the illusion, takes place. It is only on the basis of subsequent experience that the error is realised and rejected.

Thus, both the *anyathakhyati* view and the *khyati* view agree that at the time of cognition: (*a*) there is lack of apprehension of the qualities of the object seen and (*b*) there is no apprehension that what is remembered has no relevance to what is being perceived. As a result of these two non-apprehensions, illusions arise. The theorists proceed further and assert, on the basis of their respective metaphysical views, that the element of apprehension in perception as well as in illusion is valid. The knowledge that the latter is an illusion arises only with further experience.

According to the Advaita Vedantis, illusion is neither real nor non-real. "In the illusory perception of silver, it is silver that appears in consciousness, so silver must be the object of this illusion. . . But this silver is neither real (*sat*) nor unreal (*asat*), nor

both real and unreal (*sadsat*), but is undefinable (*anirvachaniya*)' (Sinha, I, p. 292). So theory is called *anivachaniyakhyati*.

There is another view, *asatkhyati*, held by one school of Buddhists. Here there is no objective basis at all. It is *niralambana*. This appears to be a statement with reference to delusion and hallucination rather than to illusion. In illusion there is an error in perception. The object is there. But it is wrongly perceived. In delusion and in hallucination there is no object whatever, as, for example, in dream experience. But the thinkers generally reject this theory as it based on the *sunyam*, void, hypothesis, viz., that our perceptions have no basis on the analysis of delusion rather than of illusions.

It is thus clear that the ancient Indian thinkers analysed carefully the experience of perception, illusion and hallucination.

Abhava, the Concept of Negation

The Vaiseshika thinkers have the concept of '*padartha*' as the basis. As Radhakrishnan puts it, "*Padartha* means literally the meaning of a word. A *padartha* is an object which can be thought (*artha*) and named (*pada*). All things which exist, which can be cognised and named, in short, all objects of experience and not merely things of the physical world are *padarthas*" (II, 183f).

The Vaiseshikas have adopted a sevenfold classification, *saptapadartha*, which include not only substance, quality, activity, generality, particularity, inherence, but also non-existence, *abhava*. The first three, viz., substance, quality and action have objective existence. The next three, viz., generality, particularity and inherence are products of intellectual discrimination. These six categories were accepted by Kanada, the author of the *Vaiseshika Sutras*. Later on, the concept of negation, *abhava*, was included by the system to account for experience as a whole. To quote Radhakrishnan again, "we see that the whole views of *abhava* is based on the metaphysical conception of the Vaiseshika. If things simply exist, and do not become, i.e., non-exist, then all things would be eternal" (II, p. 221).

The psychological problem is this. When we say "there is no jar, in this place", how do we cognise the absence of the jar? It is clear that *abhava*, absence, is not the result of perception. We perceive vacant space. But how do we perceive the absence of the jar in that vacant space?

The Mimamsa thinker, Kumarila, asserts that when we perceive the vacant space, we remember that the jar is not there. This gives rise to the cognition of the absence of the jar, though it has no

reference to the active perception. Apprehension of non-existence is through *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) one of the *pramanas*, means, of knowledge accepted by Kumarila.

However, Prabhakar, the other great Mimamsa thinker rejects this view and merely looks upon non-apprehension as a case of inference.

This concept of negation is one of the interesting concepts in ancient Indian thought involving logical and psychological analysis.

As Hiriyanna (1932) points out, the category *abhava* is relative in its conception. It refers to the absence of some particular object in some particular place at a given time (p. 237). It is not perception for there is no contact between the sense and the object. Only the vacant ground is perceived. The ground is perceived as vacant because, on a former occasion, the jug was there and it is not there now.

In modern terminology, *abhava* arises when there is an expectation. As Dasgupta puts it, "A man may be sitting in a place where there were no tigers, since he did not think of them. But later on, when he asked in the evening, if there were any tigers at the place where he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks (recalls) and becomes aware of the non-existence of the tigers there in the morning" (Vol. I, p. 356).

The Jaina Concept of Upayoga

Nemichandra, in his *Dravyasamgraha*, says that the individual is characterised by *upayoga*. The self, though formless is the enjoyer of the fruits of his actions. As Kalaghatgs puts its, "the first characteristic of the soul is *upayoga*. The word is difficult to define. It is the source of experience. The cognitive conative and affective aspects spring from it. It is a differentia of the living organism. . . It is the vital impulse or urge to action" (p. 4). Elsewhere he writes, "*Upayoga* is that by which a function is served—*upayujyateanena iti upayogah*" (p.30). It is the drive that leads to apprehension of objects. *Jnana* and *darsana* are stated to be the two forms of *upayoga*. Another classification of *upayoga* is *anakara*, formless and *sakara*, with form, *Anakara upayoga* is *darsana*, indeterminate, general cognition. *Sakara upayoga* is *jnana*, determinate, specific cognition, including the qualities of the object (p. 31). Thus the Jaina concept of *upayoga* denotes the urge in the organism to perceive its environment.

SUMMARY

It is clear from this brief survey that the ancient Indian thinkers devoted considerable time to analyse the processes involved in perception and in error. It is also clear that a good deal of controversy arose with respect to such analysis.

One of the most controversial issues was regarding the stages of perception, whether it involves just one step or two steps, whether perception leads to simple apprehension or a cognition of the various qualities of the object perceived and the class to which object belongs. There is also the problem whether perceptual cognition is just non-verbal or is verbal. Another controversy concerns *svalakshna* or *samanya lakshana*. That is, whether perception leads to a mere awareness of the characteristics of the object as such or to a cognition of the characteristics of the object in relation to the characteristics of other objects of similar kind.

It is inevitable that these controversies should lead to various theories of perception and theories of error. Basically, most of these controversies can be traced to differences in the metaphysical position of the various schools. However, it must be recognised that many valuable insights have been generated regarding the processes involved in perception and error by these metaphysical controversies.

This is particularly evident in the analysis of perception of space, time and movement. This may be due to the fact that the participation in the controversies always appealed to facts of experience to refute the analysis of the opponents and to establish their own analysis. The discussion regarding the problem of spacious present is very illuminating.

Another remarkable feature is the recognition of the difference between illusion and delusion or hallucination. It is shown clearly that illusion is a misapprehension of sense perception, while in delusion or hallucination, there is no reference to any sense-experience.

It is remarkable that so much of attention was paid by some ancient Indian thinkers regarding the perception of *abhava*, the non-existence of an object. One may not agree with the views regarding this problem but it must be conceded that whatever problem was taken up by these thinkers, they made a keen analysis of the problem, however trivial it may appear to us now.

CHAPTER 7

Attention and Distraction

The Upanishads, as noted above, speak of *dhyana*, concentration of attention as the only means for self-realisation (Mundaka Upanishad III, 1.8).

As indicated earlier (Chapter 5), in *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, it is pointed out that man says "my mind was elsewhere, I did not see it, my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear. It is with the mind truly, that one sees. It is with the mind that one hears" (I, 5.3). Thus, attention is being considered necessary for perception and not the mere stimulation of the sense organ.

In the Katha Upanishad, it is asserted, *atma indriya manah tath yuktam bhoktah atma iti ahuh manishinah* (i, 3.4). The wise call the self the enjoyer when the self is united with the body, the senses and mind. That is, experience arises when all these four, the self, the body, the senses and the mind, are united. In other words, attention arises when all these four aspects cooperate. The stimuli are received by the sense organs in the body. However, when there is no attention, when the mind does not function, the stimuli go unnoticed. The stimulation of the sense-organ by itself does not lead to *bhogah*, experience. The individual becomes a *bhoktru*, an enjoyer or an experiencer only when attention is paid to the object that is stimulating the sense organ.

Arjuna points out, *chanchalam hi manah*, the mind is restless and fickle. He asserts that he sees no way of making the mind stable and concentrated. He points out that it is as difficult to control the mind as it is to control the wind. Krishna agrees with the difficulty of curbing the restless mind, but he points out that the mind can be controlled by constant practice, *abhyasa* and by non-attachment, *vairagya* (Gita VI, 33-35).

Commenting on the first sutra of Patanjali, Vyasa shows that to restrict the mind, *nirudda*, and to make it one-pointed, *ekagra*, is difficult because, the mind is generally *kshipta*, restless, *mudha*, infatuated and *vikshipta*, distracted (*Vyasa Bhashya* I, 1). Patanjali describes that there are nine causes for distraction of mind, viz., illness, mental lethargy, doubt, heedlessness, inertia, worldliness, illusion, instability and restlessness (*Yoga Sutra* I, 30).

To secure attention, one must overcome the restlessness of mind and distraction. The *Gita* as well as *Yoga Sutra* prescribes several techiques to control the restlessness of mind and to overcome distraction. One method is the control of bodily movements, speech and mental activities. *Pranayama*, control of breath is one important method to control the restlessness of mind. Another important method is *asana*, learning to sit in one posture in a relaxed way. Unagitated mind and motionless body are looked upon as two very important negative conditions which promote attention.

Attention is defined as *ekagrata*, one-pointedness of mind. That is, attention implies the focusing of the mind on one object to the exclusion of all other objects. It involves thus, the twin processes of selection and rejection; the selection of one object to concentrate on and the rejection of all other objects. One is inattentive when one concentrates on an object, that is not relevant to the task and when one allows one's mind to wander on various objects one after another. As the *Gita* puts it, "making his mind one-pointed, controlling his thought and sense, let him practise Yoga" (VI,12).

The *Gita* also shows that *rajo guna* takes the mind to the path of attachment and craving and *tamav guna* deludes the mind and makes one negligent, indolent and sleepy (*Gita* XIV, 7-8). So to develop the habit of attention, one must overcome *rajasa*, passion and *tamasa* dullness. That is, it is the *sattva guna* which enables one to control the mind and to develop the habit of attention and concentration.

According to the *Gita*, attention is possible when one "abandons without exception all selfish desires" and when one "sustains his senses" (VI, 24). Tranquillity of mind is another important condition (VI, 25). "Whatever makes the mind to waver and become unsteady, must be restrained" (VI, 26).

Buddhaghosha describes the following characteristics of attention, in his *Visuddhimagga:* (*a*) the range of consciousness becomes narrow when there is attention; (*b*) it makes the object of attention distinct; (*c*) attention leads to scrutiny of mind (Sinha, II, p. 477).

As regards the relation between attention and emotion, the ancient Indian thinkers describe the dual role of emotion. On the one hand emotions like love, hatred, fear, etc., agitate the mind and thus lower attention. Attention requires an undisturbed and unagitated mind. But, it is pointed out, emotions can also promote attention. "Love impels a person to attend to a beloved person. Hate prompts a person to attend to a hated enemy. Anger moves a person to attend to a person who thwarts his desires. Fear actuatates a

person to attend to a terrifying animal" (Sinha, II, p. 480). That is, while generally emotions disturb and retard attention, emotions can also make a person to be very attentive and vigilant to the object that provokes an emotion.

Mention is also made of involuntary attention. When there is a thunder or any loud noise, one abandons, for the moment, the project on hand and attends to the intense stimulus. As Sinha puts it, "the intensity of a stimulus is a determinant of sensory attention" (*ibid.*, p. 478). This is why, the technique of Yoga prescribes that one should practise concentration of attention in a quiet place free from all sudden noises, etc.

Both the *Gita* (VI, 35) and the *Yoga Sutra* (I, 12) prescribe practice and detachment as the twin methods which help one to develop concentration of attention. Attention requires constant practice. That is, attention depends on habit-formation. It is clear that one has to develop the habit of attending to one's lessons as a student. Secondly, attention is possible when one gives up the attachment to objects which are irrelevant to the task on hand. Detachment also involves abandoning preoccupation with the outcomes of one's endeavour. When success leads to elation and failure to depression, attention to the task on hand becomes difficult.

Another very important contribution of ancient Indian thinkers is the assertion that every action should involve attention. That is, no action should be automatic either due to innate tendencies or due to one's *vasanas*, predispositions and prejudices. When attention is focussed on the task on hand, there is reduction in the possibility of unconscious tendencies being strengthened. Attention to the task one is doing facilitates clear, distinct and discriminant consciousness.

Distraction and How to Overcome It

Distraction arises when the mind is under the control of *rajo guna* or *tamo guna*. Restlessness arises as a result of the dominance of *rajo guna*. Listlessness arises as a result of the dominance of *tamo guna*. Both restlessness and listlessness distract attention. *Ekagrata*, concentration and one-pointedness are possible only when the mind is under the influence of *sattva guna*.

Distraction can be overcome by the adoption of different methods. One method suggested is by reflecting on the faults of the objects which distract the mind. When one thinks of the faults, it is stated that one can gradually overcome the strength of the object to attract one's attention. The second method suggested, as noted above, is the cultivation of detachment, *vairagya*, that is, by over-

overcoming the aspects which attract the mind. Another method suggested is the development of the habit of attention. It is realised that attention as well as inattention (or distraction) arise as a result of habit-formation—*abhyasa*. Yet another method suggested is *pranayama*, control of breathing or rather the control of vital forces, indicating a close relationship between *prana*, *manas* and *chitta*, the vital forces, mind and consciousness. Finally, emphasis is laid on the effort of will. As Sinha writes, "an effort of will consists of the following: (1) energy to restrain the mind which is naturally inclined to turn outward to different objects; (2) quick action without wasting time over its feasibility or unfeasibility; and (3) patience and perseverance in fixing the mind on a proper object with conviction in its success" (*ibid.*, p. 484). According to the *Yoga Sutra*, one-pointedness of the mind can be achieved by concentrating on an agreeable object without any interruption for a certain duration daily (I, 39), or by repeating the *pranava*, *aum* and meditating on its meaning (I, 28). Thus, the author of *Yoga Sutra* clearly recognises that distraction of attention and restless moving of attention from object to object is impulsive and spontaneous and paying attention to an object or an activity is a habit to be cultivated.

Holding the mind or attention on one object is called by the technical name *dharana* in the *Yoga Sutra*. When there is an unbroken flow of attention, it is called *dhyana* (III, 1-2). Thus, one-pointed attention leads to meditation. As Sinha writes, "Attention is a precondition of clear, distinct, discriminative consciousness. When the self does not focus the *manas* on an object through a sense-organ, it has an indistinct impression of it. But when it fixes the *manas* on the object through an appropriate sense-organ, it has a distinct impression of it. The more it attends to the object, the more distinct its impression becomes" (*ibid.*, p. 490). When the attention is focussed on one object or thought, one becomes oblivious to all other sensations and impressions.

Another source leading to inattention and distraction is *vasana*, predisposition arising out of previous impressions. The means to overcome the influence of such predisposition is by the development of *vairagya*, dispassion, which destroys the potency of the predispositions.

Pratyahara

Commenting on the *pratyahara*, the 54th sutra of Section II of *Yoga Sutra*, Taimni writes, "Now, it is a matter of common experience that the corresponding vibration may be striking against

any particular sense-organ, but if the mind is not joined, as it were to that sense-organ, the vibration remains unperceived" (p. 269). The sense-organs, are being constantly stimulated, but perception can arise only when attention is paid to them. In *pratyahara*, the task of the individual is to shut out completey all the various sensations that may arise when the sense-organ is stimulated. Secondly, he has also to shut out all the various ideas which may arise as a result of revivals in memory, that is, past experiences, or as a result of the operation of imagination, that is anticipation of the future.

Thus, the process of attention depends on the elimination of sense-stimuli and also by prevailing the memory images and imagination from operating. It is only then that it is possible to concentrate one's attention on the task on hand.

Ashtavadhana and Satavadhana

Before concluding the chapter reference may be made to techniques of developing concentration to a number of objects, which is generally referred to as *ashtavadhana* and *satavadhana*.

It is a familiar fact that some persons have developed the great ability to attend to a number of ongoing activities and react appropriately to them. It is indeed an astonishing fact of the mind. Different persons in the audience may set different tasks to the practitioner. He will attend to each one of them and later on answer them, one after the other, as a result of attention and memory. Some tasks may even involve composing a poem or a song on some problem or completing a verse or song recited. It may be an arithmetical problem or a historical problem.

Division of Attention

Does *asthavadhana* imply that there is division of attention? The Nyaya thinkers refute this implication. As Safaya (1975) puts it, according to Nyaya, "mind attends to one thing at a time. To us it may appear that mind attends to many objects simultaneously, but actually the attention is non-simultaneous. (*Nyaya Sutra* I, 1.16 and III, 2.56). This teacher reads, walks, holds the water-pot, looks at the path, hears the sound proceeding from the forest, becomes frightened, keeps on the lookout for signs of serpents or tigers, remembers the place of destination" (*Nyaya Bhashya* III, 2.57, p.131f).

The above case cited by the author of *Nyaya Bhashya*, indicates his keenness of observation. It is pointed out that the simultaneity of these varied acts is only a presumption. Actually, it is stated,

the various cognitions take place in rapid succession leading to the appearance of simultaneity.

Some analogies are generally given to refute the possibility of division of attention. One is the famous illustration of the fire circle. When a fire-brand is rotated swiftly one sees a continuous circle of fire. Though it is a sequence of perceptions, the perception of a ring, it is explained, is due to extreme rapidity of the motion. Another example given is that of taking a pile of leaves and running a needle into them. It appears as if the holes in the various leaves are made simultaneously. But there is really a succession. If the hole in the first leaf is not made, the needle could not pierce the second. A third illustration is given from cognition of language. The author of *Nyaya Bhashya* (III, 2.58) writes, "Even though there are many cognitions involved in the process of our comprehension of the meaning of a sentence, yet by reason of the quickness by which they appear, their sequence fails to be perceived" (Safaya, 1975, p. 132). The Nyaya thinkers also recognised that attention may be paid not only to a single object at one time but also to a group of objects at one time (Hiriyanna, 1932 p. 231).

Summary

Though no thinker in the ancient times appeared to have dealt with the problem of *avadhana* or *pranidhana*, namely, attention, in a systematic manner, reflections on this problem and its analysis apper to have been made when the necessity arose when they were dealing with the problems of perception and meditation.

In his second volume, Sinha has written a whole chapter on this problem.

The chapter starts with extracts regarding attention from the *Upanishads*. These thinkers relised that mere stimulation of sense organs does not lead to perception unless attention is paid to it, extracts from the *Gita* also show that the problem of distraction and fickleness of mind was clearly recognised. The ancient thinkers associated restlessness of mind with the operation of *rajo guna* and listlessness of mind with *tamo guna*. *Ekagrata*, one-pointedness or concentration of mind was associated with *sattva guna*. They had also recognised that concentration of attention and distraction arise out of habit-formation.

The Buddhist thinkers described the characteristics of attention.

The complicated relation between attention and emotion was also described by the ancient thinkers. Emotional states may cloud

the attention. But on occasions they may make for keenness of observation.

There is also mention of involuntary attention and several methods are indicated to overcome distraction. Much thought has been given to this problem because concentration of attention is necessary for success in meditation.

Finally, there is a short description of the astonishing feats of attention and memory involved in *ashtavadhana* and *satavadhana* and about the problem of division of attention.

Important

CHAPTER 8

Learning

The Vedas are not only the earliest literary records in history, they are very unique in having been handed down from mouth to mouth over the last 5000 years or more. It is true that all folk literature has been handed down in the same manner. But the unique feature of the Vedic recitation is that the Vedas have been handed down through thousands of years in each part of the country without any variation whatever. As Lannoy (1971) puts it, "the resilience of oral Brahman culture may be judged from the fact that the four Vedas took roughly a thousand years to compose and *were not written down* until centuries after their composition" (p. 274). However, even after writing came into use, oral tradition continued as a basic feature in Indian education. In fact, even today at home and in the traditional schools Sanskrit is taught by the oral method—the parent or the teacher pronounces a line of the verse and the child or the pupil repeats it. The most astonishing feature of this method of learning is that the Sanskrit scholars can repeat verbatim many books without any aid. They can recall any verse from any book that they have mastered through the oral method. As Mookerji (1969) writes "every literary man of ancient India was himself a literary. Thus the storage and preservation of the learning of the country were effected by means of what were practically immaterial and immortal agencies" (p. 216). It may be added that even today there are many Vedic recitors and Vedic scholars who can repeat entire books or even recall any verse or section with utmost facility or and correctness.

What is the method by which such learning takes place? Efforts to get a description of the method failed, so an attempt was made to obtain some information by interviewing the scholars who have learnt the Vedas and Sanskrit literature by the oral method. A brief description is given below:

1. The teacher recites the verse or a part of the verse and the pupil repeats it after him *twice*.
2. The teacher uses this method, taking up one unit of 15 or 20 verses or more as the case may be, in one sitting.

3. This method is followed day after day till the pupil is able to repeat the unit without committing a single error.
4. Even after such learning, the repetition goes on daily.

The bulk of Sanskrit literature, whether Vedic, epic, classical, is in verse form. This helps memorisation. Secondly, memorising was facilitated by considerable repetitions in the text itself. There is a good deal of repetition of words and phrases in the hymns as well as in the Upanishads. The third aspect which promoted easy learning and retention of the Vedas is due to the form of accentuation. As Raghavan (1956) writes, "The recital of the Veda, especially in a congregation as in the sacrifices and rituals, produced a heightening of the spirit. This exaltation is aided by the threefold musical accent (the *udatta*, raised or acute, the *anudatta*, the unraised or grave and the *svarita*, the sounded or circumflex) which characterises Vedic Sanskrit and whose enunciation is insisted upon" (p. XXIX). Finally the belief that the Veda is absolutely sacrosanct and imperishable, helped in keeping the text from being changed or altered, though it has been handed down over thousands of years.

Attention may be drawn to another aspect in Vedic learning which has helped in the accurate retention over millenia. There are eight forms of Vedic learning of which Ghanapatha is one. A line in a verse is repeated several times with different combination of words in it forwards and backwards. This technique has helped in preserving the verses accurately in every part of the country.

As Mookherji (1969) writes, "in (i) *pada patha*, word-text, each single word in the samhita is shown in its independent and phonetically unmodified form and compounds are separated into their elements. To make assurance doubly sure, a second device was resorted to in what is called *Kramapatha*, step-text, where every word of the *pada patha* appeared to be pronounced twice, both after the preceding and before the following ones. Thus, a, b, c, d, as representing the first four words, would be read as ab, bc, cd. . . The *ghana patha* combines the features of both *jatha* and *danda* as in ab, ba; abc, cba abc" (p. 21).

Yet another feature of the traditional form of learning in India is that the learning takes place by repetition in the presence of the teacher. Often the book, even when it is available is forbidden. This is probably to ensure that errors in learning do not arise, since accuracy in reproduction is absolutely essential and there has been a belief that catastrophe will arise when there is even a slight error in repetition and recitation.

A stray verse (*subhashita*) asserts, "He who sings merely the musical way (without adhering to the Vedic *svara*), he who shakes his head, also he who uses a written (or printed book), he who does not comprehend the meaning, he whose voice is low—these six persons are the worst learners."

It is obvious that Vedic learning is a matter of rote learning—learning by mere repetition. Often the persons who recite the Vedas do not know the meanings of the verses. They are not Sanskrit scholars. Their task is just to recite. Another aspect of Vedic learning is over-learning, that is, learning in which repetition has proceeded beyond the point necessary for retention or recall. In this, as well as in other features there is considerable resemblance between learning of the Vedas and learning of music. In learning music also there is daily repetition, for the first few months or even a couple of years, of all the lessons from the first, till the teacher is satisfied that singing has become a completely habitual response.

Similarly rules are followed to teach dancing which is combined with music. Day after day, the student has to repeat the movement from the beginning.

Retention of the text is ensured by frequent and constant repetition. For instance, *Amarakosha*, a lexicon contains fifteen hundred verses, giving synonyms of versions terms, is memorised by the boy even at the age of six or seven, even though he does not know the meanings of the terms memorized. Later on, when he grows up he understands the terms and uses them in composing verses on his own. In fact, most of the persons who recite the Vedas do not know the meaning. This is so even with respect to pujaris in the temple and the purohits who come to the house to conduct the rituals, memorisation is facilitated by versification. There are verified textbooks not only in lexicons but also in grammar, medicine, mathematics, etc.

The requisites of learning according to Kautilya's *Arthasastra* 4th century B.C.) are (*a*) desire to learn, (*b*) receiving the lessons daily, (*c*) understanding them, (*d*) retaining them in memory, (*e*) reflection upon them, (*f*) exercise of judgement or discrimation, and (*g*) love of truth (Mookerji, *ibid*., p. 246)

Another, *subhashita* puts this in a nutshell thus, "the student learns a fourth from the teacher, a fourth by his own study a fourth from his fellow-pupils and the remaining fourth in course of time, by experience.")

Brief description may now be given to the views of some Upanishads with respect to learning process.

When the disciples eager to learn, go to the master, he says, "live again a year more in presence (*tapasa*), abstinence (*brahmacharya*) and faith (*sraddha*), then you may ask questions, according to your desires; if I know them, assuredly, I shall tell everything to you" (Prasana Upanishad 1, 2). Thus, discipline through austerity, celibacy and faith, are the three requisites necessary to learn. Secondly, the pupil has to wait. The teacher must be satisfied that the pupil is in earnest before the teaching is imparted, *Kana Upanishad* says, "Austerity (*tapah*), restraint (*daman*) and dedicated work (*karma*)—these are foundations of (acquiring) knowledge" (IV, 8). In the Taittiriya Upanishad, there is the prayer, *medhaya sprinoth* "may he invigorate us with intelligence" (I, 4). Swami Sharvananda comments on this, "*Medha* means intelligence and mental power, especially tenacious memory. The learner must be able to concentrate his thought on a given object and keep it uninterruptedly in a field of attention. In fact this power of attention is the essence of all education. The mind should be gripped by a single aim and it should once for all cease to wander among manifold and endless thoughts" (Taittiriya Upanishad, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras).

According to Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, there are three processes involved in learning, viz., *sravana*, hearing from the teacher, *manana* reflecting on what is taught through reasoning and *nidhyasana*, steadfastly meditating on it (II, 4.5). Thus the need for reflection and reasoning is stressed in this Upanishad. *Manana*, reflecting on the idea heard (or read) involves testing its significance both logically and empirically. When doubts arise, reference has to be made to the teacher to get him dissolved. This is clearly brought out in the story of Prajapati, Indra and Virochana (Chandogya Upanishad, VIII, 72 ff). As noted in Chapter 1 when Prajapati declares that *atman*, the self is that which is seen in the eye, who is reflected in the mirror and in the water, Virochana does not reflect on this teaching. He straightaway accounts that the body is the self. But Indra continuously reflects on the teaching and goes back to the teacher again and again till he understands the full significance of the teaching. Thus learning depends on questioning, entertaining doubts and getting these doubts clarified. In the *Gita*, the master asserts, "Learn that by humble service (*pranipata*), by inquiry (*parIprasna*) and by service (*seva*)" (IV, 34). Radhakrishnan (1960) commenting on this verse writes, "We must combine devotion to the teacher with the most unrestricted right of free examination and inquiry. Blind obedience to external authority is

repudiated ... Hindu tradition insists on *jignasa* or inquiry, *manana* or reflection or *paripprasna* in the words of the *Gita*" (p. 169).

The significance and usefulness of the demonstration method in learning is exemplified in two sections of two other Upanishads. It has been already noted that Ajatasatru taught Gargya about the states of consciousness by rousing the sleeping man, who was absolutely insensitive to sounds (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad II, 1.15 ff). The method of demonstration is also used by Uddalaka Aruni when he teaches him on Svetaketu, by asking him to break open the fruit of the banyan tree, take the seed and break that also open. On being asked what he sees in it, Svetaketu replies that he could see nothing. The father teaches, "Thus subtle essence which you do not perceive, growing from this subtle essence the large banyan tree thus stands" (Chandogya Upanishad VI, 12.1-2).

The Taittiriya Upanishad also emphasises the need for *svadhyaya*, study by oneself and *pravachana*, teaching what one knows to others (I, 9). In this connection, Radhakrishnan (1953) quotes a famous verse from the *Mahathashya* of Patanjali, who describes four steps or stages by means of which knowledge becomes fruitful, viz., *agama*; acquisition from the teacher, *svadhyaya*, personal study, *pravachana*, teaching to others and finally, *vyavahara kala*, by applying knowledge to practical affairs (p. 529).

Thus, in Vedic times, it is clear that the ancient Indian thinkers had a very broad and comprehensive notion of the learning process. It was by no means a blind following or acceptance of the Vedas, or subservience to the guru, the master. Initiative and independence of outlook was emphasised. The very fact that there were no many schools of thought in India even in ancient times is proof positive to the existence of intellectual freedom.

Formal institutions for learning the Vedas, music and dancing have come into being in the recent decades. Even at the beginning of the 20th century, the Gurukula system was in vogue. The pupils stayed in the master's house. They lived with him and learnt. The pupils were treated as members of the family of the guru. Manu declares, "the vow of studying the three Vedas under a teacher must be kept for thirty-six years, or for half that time, or for a quarter, or until the student has perfectly learnt them" (III, 1). The pupils thus lived in the guru's house for several years.

Both verbal learning and skill learning were from father to son or from teacher to pupil. Because of the caste system, a pupil is accepted by the teacher, whether it is for transmission of verbal knowledge or a skill, only if he belongs to the caste to which he

himself belongs. To pursue the occupation which is hereditary and to teach it only to those who belong to his own group are both the requisites of the caste system. That marriage as well as occupation are linked with the caste system is the observation made 2300 years ago by Megasthenes, the Greek envoy in the Court of Chandragupta Maurya. He observed, "none is allowed to marry outside his own caste or exercise any calling or art except his own."

A boy learns the craft skill either from his father or from the master. The master, whether he teaches the Veda or some other sastra or some skill, keeps the pupils in his house. While the law-giver Manu describes the principles regarding the transmission of knowledge, the law giver Narada describes the principles regarding the transmission of skills. In both, the emphasis is on the student or the apprentice living and working under the master's eye. In both, the constant contact and intimate relationship between the master and the pupils helps in the transmission of knowledge or skills (Mookerji, p. 349 ff).

Reference may now be made to the two basic principles in learning enunciated by the *Gita* (VI, 35) and *Yoga Sutra* (I, 12) viz., *abhyasa*, persistent practice, and *vairagya*, non-attachment. The first principle is the enunciation of law of exercise, constant and persistent practice or constant and persistent repetition of the verbal material or the bodily movement in the case of skill learning. According to Patanjali, *abhyasa* is the effort to firmly establish the verbal material or the skill (I, 13). It is also pointed out that the material or skill becomes firmly grounded on being continued for a long time without interruption and with reverent devotion (I, 14). The learner is called the *sadhaka* and the process, the *sadhana*. Though the context refers to meditation both in the *Gita* and in *Yoga Sutra*, *abhyasa* refers to all kinds of learning.

Secondly, *vairagya*, non-attachment, means absence of any attraction to objects which give pleasure. It is a familiar fact that fear of failure and keen desire for success are both detrimental to learning and to achievement. Fear of failure as well as keen desire for success lead to preoccupation and to that extent prevent concentration on the task on hand. A third principle enunciated in self-control, *samyatatma* (*Gita*, VI, 36). These three principles, *abhyasa*, *vairagya* and *samyatatma* are very important principles which enable one to learn the task whether verbal or non-verbal.

Another basic principle to which the ancient Indian thinkers refer to is that of attitude, attitude towards the teacher and attitude

towards the task to be learnt. As Prabhu (1963) points out, "Along with knowledge and skills, education also transmits the particular system of moral, social and cultural values of the group, and thus undertakes the indoctrination of both rational and emotional elements which make up the adult individual" (p. 103 f). One of the most famous and oft-repeated verses is that from the Taittiriya Upanishad, which is recited by the pupils and the teachers—"May He (*brahman*) protect us both together; may He nourish us both together; may we work conjointly with great energy; may our study be vigorous and effective; may we not dispute or hate. Let there be peace" (II, 1). The people should look upon the teacher as a father and the teacher should regard the pupil with all affection due to a son (Prasna Upanishad VI, 8). According to Manu, the first task of the teacher is to instruct his new pupil the rules of personal cleanliness and good conduct (II, 69) and to befriend all haman beings and all living beings (II, 87). To quote Manu again "(All persons) must be instructed in what concerns their welfare without giving them pain. Sweet and gentle speech must be used by the teacher" (II, 159). On completion of studies, the preceptor advises the disciple "Speak the truth, follow *dharma*, never swerve from your studies" (Taittiriya Upanishad I, 11). The Satapeta Brahmana asserts in praise of learning, "Learning and teaching are a source of pleasure to man. He becomes *yuktamanah*, mentally well equipped and independent of others and acquires prosperity. He sleeps peacefully. He is the best physician for himself" (XI, 5.7.1).

The *Gita* asserts *Sraddhavan labhate to jnanam tatparah*—he obtains knowledge who is full of faith and who is devoted to it (IV, 39). Faith and devotion are necessary to learn. That is, one should pursue the task to be learnt with wholehearted zeal. However, as Radhakrishnan (1960) remarks, "Faith is necessary for gaining wisdom. Faith is not blind belief" (p. 171). As noted earlier, along with *sraddha*, there must also be *pariprasana*. Faith and inquiry must go hand in hand. Faith should not degenerate into unquestioned acceptance of the teaching or the person who teaches. The Prasana Upanishad also specified the need for *sraddha* along with austerity and abstinence (I, 2).

Commenting on the term *sraddha* in Chandogya Upanishad (VII, 19.1) Swami Swahananda writes, "The word *sraddha*, according to Yaska, consists of the two elements, *srat* and *dha*. The former means truth. This may mean firmness or firm attachment to what is accepted as truth" (Chandogya Upanishad, Ramakrishna Mission, Madras, 1975, p. 530).

SUMMARY

As indicated above, there is no systematic treatment of psychological issues or problems in the ancient Indian literature. This is particularly so with reference to the problem of learning. An attempt has been made in this chapter to briefly indicate the methods adopted in learning verbal materials, motor skills and attitudes.

One of the unique features of Indian tradition is not only the oral transmission of folk literature, but also of the Vedas, the philosophical and literary works. Even today when printed books are available, the traditional institutions use the oral method to enable the students to learn Vedas, etc. Even the scholars who use books, learn the religions, philosophical and literary works by rote. An attempt has been made to describe the processes involved in such learning. The verse is first recited by the teacher or the father. The pupils repeat it twice. This process goes on hour after hour, day after day till the whole text is learnt. Secondly, there is the principle of over-learning so that the material learnt becomes a part of the 'mental structure' of the individual, as it were. This process is adopted in every field including music. This is why the Indian musician does not have before him the notations of any song.

In every kind of learning, whether it is the Veda, or philosophy, or music, or motor skill, the traditional method is the gurukula system. The pupils stay in the house of the teacher and learn whatever they have to learn. The teacher not only teaches, but he also provides them with boarding and lodging. This enables the students not only to learn the verbal material and motor skills but also the attitudes.

Many references have been made to principles of learning enunciated in the Upanishads, the *Gita* and the *Yoga-Sutra*. The emphasis is on austere living, faith, devotion, self-control, regular and persistent practice, non-attachment, etc. There is also emphasis on reflection, and on inquiry. Learning from the teacher, *avadhyana*, personal study, *pravachana* teaching others and application of knowledge to conditions of living are the four stages through which learning becomes useful and fruitful according to Patanjali, the great grammarian. Personal study and teaching others are emphasized by the Taittiriya Upanishad.

CHAPTER 9

Memory and Imagination

Memory and Self

One of the problems discussed by the ancient Indian thinkers was whether memory presupposes a permanent self. According to the Buddhist thinkers, one idea recalls another idea. There is no need to presuppose the existence of a permanent self which endures. Nagasena argues that it is memory which enables one to recollect what is past (*Questions of King Milinda*). If a self or a mind is assumed as the basis of memory, Nagasena argues, then one should not forget what has been experienced. Forgetting would be impossible.

Gautama, on the contrary, maintains that the self is a permanent substance and is the basis for the recall of past experiences (*Nyaya Sutra* III, 2.43). Commenting on this Vatsyayana defines recollection as the recalling and recognising an object perceived in the past by the same self. Sinha writes, "This definition implies the following characteristics of recollection : (*a*) Recollection presupposes a past apprehension of an object by the self. (*b*) It presupposes an impression (*samskara*) produced by the past apprehension in the same self. (*c*) It presupposes the awakening (*udbodha*) of the impression by excitants (*udbodhaka*), e.g., the perception of a similar object and the like. (*d*) It implies recognition of the recalled object as perceived in the past by the same self. A complete recollection involves an element of recognition. (*e*) Recollection implies temporal localisation in the past. The object recalled and recognised is referred to a particular time in the past. (*f*) Recollection presupposes the identity of the self. The self that recalls an object is the same as that which it perceived in the past. If there were no identity of the self, there would be no recollection" (Vol. 1, p. 376 f).

Thus, along with the analysis of the processes involved in retention (*dharana*) and recall (*smiriti*) on the basis of enduring impression (*samskara*), there is the controversy regarding the necessity of otherwise to presuppose the existence of the self in order to explain memory. The materialists (Charvakas or Lokayatas) as well as Buddhists, belonging to the 6th Century B.C. and

dates, denied the existence of the self and asserted that the existence of the self cannot account for memory. According to the Buddhists what exists is a series of cognitions in successions. Memory and recognition constitute a composition of the presentative (perceptual) and representative (memory) processes. The senses represent the present and impression (*samskaras*) represent the past. This is why they assert that memory is both presentative and representative.

With respect to memory, the Buddhist "holds that each phase of experience, as appears and disappears, is wrought up into the next so that every successive phase has within it all the potentialities of its predecessors' which manifest themselves when conditions are favourable." With respect to the process of recognition, the Buddhist asserts "that the two things in the two moments of our cognition are only *similar* and that we mistake them to be the *same*" (Hiriyanna 1932, p. 143).

Memory and Past Experience

Memory is recognised as a representative cognition process in contrast to perception which is a presentative cognitive process. This is clear from the definition given by Vijnanabhikshu in his commentary *Samkhya pravachanabhasya*, viz., *smirIth samskara-janyam jnanam*, that memory is a cognition produced by an impression, *samskara*. That is, any experience leads not only to its awareness at the time, but also leaves a trace or an impression on the mind which endures and which may be recalled later on. There could be no recall later on, if there had not been an impression which endures in the mind or the self. Patanjali also expresses the same view. He defines memory as *anubhutavishayasampramoshah smritih*, a mental mode which cognises an object which was apprehended in the past (I, 11). That is, memory is defined as the retention of the past experiences in the mind, that memory is the process which does not allow an object experienced in the past to escape. The past experience is retained in the mind as *samskara*, an impression. The definition also implies that mere impression by itself is not memory. It is not only a potential. As Taimni (1968) puts it, "It is not only when the potential impressions are converted into their active state in the form of mental images, that they can properly be considered as *chitta-vritti*" (p. 20). In *Yogabhashya*, Vyasa in his commentary on this sutra, raises the problem whether what is remembered is the cognition or the object cognised. He puts forth the view that recollection involves both

the cognition and its object cognised, since a cognition is colored by its object. He asserts that it is possible to recall any kind of experience whether it is perceptual or illusory or even imaginary, as in the case of dreams, etc.

Recall and Retention

Retention, *dharana*, as noted above, is due to the persistence of the *samskara*, the impression. If retention is not there, recall is impossible. However, it is recognised that retention by itself does not guarantee recall. This is where the ancient Indian analysis anticipated the modern theory of the unconscious. The *samskara*, the impression, may be there. It may influence mental processes, and even behaviour, but it *may not* be available for recall.

According to Jaina thinkers *dharana*, retention is not the same as *smriti*, recollection. The important function of *dharana*, retention, is not recollection but prevention from lapse, *avichyuti*. Retention, it is held, is only a condition of memory. In retention, the past experience is retained in the form of *samskara*. "Retention, then, is not memory itself, although it is a necessary condition of memory, because recollection would not be possible without recollection. Formation of a mental trace is an important factor in retention . . . . Retention, then, can be described as the mental trace or *samskara*, by which experiences cognised in a definite forms are retained in the mind and do not lapse" (Kalghatgi, 1961, p. 98 f).

Memory and Feelings

We can not recall not only objects and ideas experienced in the past, but also feelings of pleasure and pain and emotion of fear, anger, etc. The writers on aesthetics, *alankara sastra*, describe these processes. This will be referred to in Chapter 19.

Passive memory and active memory. Madhavacharya Vidyaranya, in his *Vivaranaprameya Sangraha* differentiates between memory which may arise spontaneously, which he terms *samskaraodbodhadinam* and that which involves active recall, *purusha prayatnadhinam*. In the latter case, it depends on the effort of the individual. In the former, the memory arises effortlessly, merely on the basis of the impression enduring in the mind. He even points out the compulsive characteristics of these spontaneous memories. Even if one does not want to recall some painful experience, it occurs spontaneously and leads to any amount of suffering. The painful experience may be recalled when some object is

perceived, as in the case of memories of the dead person arising on the perception of some object associated with that person. By contrast, inactive memory, the recall is due to the effort of the individual as in the case of the student taking an examination. It may be pointed out in passing that most of the conversations are based on spontaneous, passive memory rather than active memory which involves personal effort.

On Samskara and Vasana

Sinha writes, "The Buddhist idealists regard impressions (*samskaras*) as residua (*vasana*) of momentary cognitions modifying the succeeding cognitions, which do not abide in a permanent self. The Nyaya-Vaiseshika regards an impression as a quality of self produced by a cognition and subsisting in it. The Samkhya-Yoga and the Vedantists regard it as a modification of the mind (*antahkarana*) which is retained in it" (Vol. I, p. 385).

Thus, all the schools of ancient Indian thought accept the concept of *samskara*. It is agreed that an experience leaves an impression or trace which enables one to recall it later on.

The difference of opinion is with respect to the 'substance' on which the impression is made. According to the Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers, the traces are left on the *atman*, the self. The Samkhya-Yoga theorists and Vedantists assert that the impressions are left on the *manas*, because, by definition, according to these thinkers, the self is pure without any substance whatever and which is unmodifiable. According to them, the *manas* is the *antahkarana*, the inner organ or instrument, which is responsible for both perception and memory. By contrast, the Buddhists find no reason to postulate the *manas* or the *atman* to account for retention and recall. The preceding cognitions modify the succeeding cognitions.

All the various theorists also agree that *samskaras* or impressions are left by any kind of experience, whether it is perceptual or illusory, whether it is cognitive or affective. They also agree that recollections also produce impressions, in their turn. That is every kind of experience leaves an impression behind.

As for the *samskaras*, the impressions, themselves are concerned, it is agreed that they are imperceptible. They have to be postulated in order to account for the two processes of recollection, *smriti* and recognition, *pratyabhijna*. It was even argued that if such an assumption is not made, then it follows that all perceptions and other mental processes will always be remembered, which

is not valid. Perceptions, etc., arise and are lost. This is why, the *samskar* or impression is looked upon as the effect of a mental process and the cause of recollection. Another evidence advanced for the postulation of *samskara* is the fact that the persons who lose their sense of sight or hearing can recall the objects perceived by them earlier. Though the sense organ is not there, the impression is there and is available for recollection later on.

The Buddhist view, as noted above, is that the *vasanas*, the impressions are the residua of the momentary cognitions which abide in *alayavijnana*, the *alaya* or abode of the series of momentary self-cognitions. It is the 'repository consciousness'. It is the potentiality of all thought. As Zimmer (1957) puts it, "every beheld or discoverable thing, every so-called individual, all traits of the phenomenal world, are production of the continuous flow of the imaginings (*parikalpas*, creation from within) which arises like waves from the ocean, only to vanish again immediately in its infinity. The individual ceases to exist upon contact with this 'repository consciousness'; for the rippling mental states that constitute the self-awareness of the ego dissolves in it. The term is practically synonymous, therefore with *nirvana*, as well as with *sunya*—yet it suggests always, a positive state. *Alyavijnana* is a kind of *brahman*, which is to be realised by pure mental yoga—absolutely pure consciousness. Indeed, pure consciousness is itself identical with the *alayavijnana*" (p. 526 f).

Thinkers of other schools of thought severely criticise the Buddhistic view which accepts the hypothesis that impressions of experiences, continue to exist without accepting a repository for these impressions, except the *alayavijnana*, the abode of a series of cognitions. The cognitions, as well as the repository in which the impressions abide, are both momentary. If the *alayavijnana* is prior to the impression, it cannot constitute the substratum or the bed for the subsistence, the impression. The experience as well as the impression are both momentary by hypothesis. Hence the impression cannot endure to serve as the basis for recall later on. If *vasana* is the residuum of a momentary cognition, when the cognition is destroyed, the residua are also destroyed. If it is assumed that they persist then they may contradict the doctrine of momentariness. Thus, the thinkers of other schools show the self-contradiction involved in the Buddhistic doctrine of *samskara* and *vasana*.

The Conditions of Retention

Prasastapada, in his commentary on *Vaiseshika Sutras*, mentions of experiences to be retained in the mind, viz., intensity, repetition and interest.

1. *Adarahpratyaya.* An object which produces a deep and excessive impression on the mind is likely to be retained. The illustration of a South Indian seeing a camel in the North is given. The impression is so intense that it will be recalled later on and described.

2. *Abhyasapratyaya.* Similarly the experience that occur frequently produce a deep impression. The illustration repetition in verbal learning is given. When a chapter in the Veda is read over and over again, it is fixed in the mind. Similarly, frequency is very important in learning a motor skill, whether it is dancing or swimming. A controversy arose about the influence of frequency and the influence of intensity. Is the retention due to frequency or is it due to the intensity of the last repetition? It was pointed out that if intensity was the cause of the enduring impression, repetition would have been unnecessary. That is, the impression produced is due to the cumulative effect of repetition and not due to the intensity of experience of any single repetition.

3. *Asaktapratyaya.* Finally there is the factor of interest. An object which evokes our interest is more likely to be retained than one in which we have no interest. Even a single experience may leave a lasting impression when the factor of interest is operating. Thus, it is clear that the Indian thinkers were able to arrive at the law of intensity of experience, law of repetition or frequency and the law of interest as the determinants of retention. Such experiences leave a strong *samskara*, impression, which enables us to recall them later on.

Conditions of Recall—Laws of Association

Sixteen conditions of recall are enumerated in the Buddhist work *Milindapanha.* However, none of them is based more on imagination and legends than on a critical analysis of experience. Also there is considerable repetition. Only those conditions which appear to be derived from an analysis of experience are mentioned below, omitting repetitions.

1. An outward aid reminds us of the connected past experience. It may serve as a sign and enable us to recall the object signified. The illustration of prompting is given, though it is specified as a distinct condition. A word enables us to recall either the connected words in the verse memorised or may recall a past experience of

which the word is a sign. Other illustrations given are the numbers in a series or in the multiplication tables, etc.

2. Vivid experiences are recalled. The illustrations given are the king's coronation or the ceremony connected with one's conversion to the new religion, viz., Buddhism.

3. Similarity is mentioned as another condition of recall. The sight of a person who bears some resemblance to one's father, mother or brother or sister recalls to one memories of the person.

4. Painful or sorrowful experiences are recalled. Thus the influence of feelings and emotions on recall is specified.

One of the unique conditions given here is that of meditation. Sinha informs that meditation is given as a condition of recall also by Gautama in his *Nyaya Sutra.*

Gautama gives a list of 25 conditions of recall in his *Nyaya Sutra* (iii, 2.44). Among these conditions the following describe the laws of association:

1. **Intensity and vividness**. Illustrations given are the sacred thread ceremony, marriage ceremony, death ceremony, etc. Also the attainments like success, getting prizes and gifts, etc.

2. **Similarity and contrast** The picture reminds us of the person portrayed. The serpent reminds us of the mongoose which is hostile to the snake.

3. **Contiguity.** Many of the conditions detailed in the sutra involve contiguity. The contents of a book are contiguous. So one section reminds us of other sections. Smoke reminds us of fire. Horns remind us of the cow or the deer. Hands reminds us of feet Flag reminds us of the nation. Ownership, supporter-supported, pupil-teacher, fellow-students, reminds us of the educational institution, sheath-sword, etc.

4. **Affective-experiences.** Pleasant experiences remind us of similar pleasant experiences in the past. In the same way the painful experiences bring to mind the painful experiences in the past. Similarly desire or affection and aversion reminds us of the past experiences. Emotions like fear also helps us to recall similar situations which evoked fear in the past.

It is clear that the ancient thinkers were aware of the primary and secondary laws of association.

One author, Vachaspati Miora even asserted that insanity is due to the revival of intense, but in most, impressions of past experiences (Sinha, Vol. I, 399).

Recognition

Analysis of the process of recognition occupied an important place among the ancient Indian thinkers. Recognition involves presentative or perceptual as well as representative or recall processes. The present perception revives past experiences. There were considerable differences of opinion whether recognition is a unitary or a multiple process. As Sinha puts it, "the Buddhist holds that recognition is not a single unitary psychosis, but a mechanical composition of two psychoses, presentative and representative. The Nyaya-Vaiseshika, the Mimamsaka and the Vedantist hold that recognition is a single psychosis, but it is not a kind of perception. It is a *unique* psychosis. It is neither presentative nor representative, nor both, but *sui generis*. It is a chemical compound as it were, of presentation and representation, different from both" (Vol. I, p. 95).

Thus, it is clear that the literature presents a very active controversy regarding the processes invoved in recognition.

When we see a pot and recognise it as the pot seen before and conclude, '*this is that pot*', what are the processes involved? This is the problem. According to the Buddhists, the sense organ cannot be the cause of recognition. It can never come into contact with the pot seen long back. Nor can the *samskaras*, the impressions left by the previous perception be the cause of recognition, because the recognition is about the pot one is now seeing. The sense organ produces a direct apprehension while the *samskara* can only revive a memory. How can the two different processes combine to give one experience, viz., recognition? This is why the Buddhist and the Jaina thinkers held that recognition is not a single psychological process. They asserted that it involves a combination of the presentative or perceptual and representative or reproductive processes. Jayanta Bhatta summarises this position as follows in his *Nyaya Manjari*, "We have no psychosis to apprehend the identity of an object in the past and the present. Even if we concede that recognition is a single psychosis, what is the nature of its object? If it apprehends a past object, it does not differ from recollection; if it apprehends a future object, it does not differ from constructive imagination; if it apprehends only what exists at the present moment, then it does not recognise the identity of its object in the past and the present; and it is self-contradictory to hold that it can apprehend an object as existing in the past, the present and the future" (Sinha, Vol. I, p. 95). Bhatta, however, proceeds to show that this analysis of recognition is not correct. He concedes that

neither the sense organs nor the *samskaras* by themeselves can account for the recognition process. According to him, the *indriya* (sense organs) and the *samskara* (impression) cooperate with each other to produce recognition. He looks upon it as a qualified perception. It apprehends both the past and the present character of the object.

In fact, this controversy between the Buddhist and the Nyaya-Vaiseshika is due to the difference in their respective metaphysical position. According to the Buddhist, the object perceived as well as the process of perception are both momentary. So there can be no basis whatever for the process of recognition. But according to the realistic position of Nyaya-Vaiseshika, the object which existed in the past, continues to exist even now and so recognition is possible. Recognition is certainly produced by the present stimulation of the sense organ. But the *samskara*, impression, is left on the mind by the past perception and hence the recognition, "This is what I saw before", etc. This is why Jayanta Bhatta described the process of recognition as the perception of a present object qualified by the impression of a past perception. The Nyaya-Vaiseshika theorist does not agree with the Buddhist and Jaina views that recognition is a combination of the presentative and representative processes, because according to his metaphysical position, there can never be the simultaneous action of two mental processes. The *manas* is atomic in nature. So there can be only one mental process at a time. In general, the Mimamsaka and Vedanta theorists agree with the Nyaya-Vaiseshika view in this regard.

The Jaina theorists reject both the Nyaya-Vaiseshika and the Buddhist views. They reject the Nyaya view that it is a kind of perception. They also reject the Buddhist view that it is a combination of both the perception and recollection. According to the Jaina thinkers, recognition is a single unitary process produced by perception and recollection and leads to the apprehension of the identity of an object in the past and the present.

It is, however, clear that all the three sets of theorists agree that recognition involves both the perceptual and recollective processes. The differences arise merely on the basis of their metaphysical views rather than on the basis of any difference in the analysis of the psychological processes as such.

Analysis of Forgetfulness

According to the *Gita*, forgetfulness, *smritt vibhramah*, is due to delusion, *moha* and that forgetfulness leads to *buddhinasah*, impair-

ment of intellect (II, 63). Delusion thus causes both lack of memory and lack of discrimination. What is *moha*, delusion, which brings about the loss of memory? It arises out of infatuation. It is also asserted later on "*nashtho mohah smritir labdha*" (XVIII, 73). When *moha*, delusion, is destroyed, *smriti*, memory is regained. It is also asserted "from Me are memory, *smrit* and knowledge, *jnanam* and also their loss, *apohanam*" (XV, 15). According to some commentators, the reference here is to consciousness being the source of memory as well as knowledge and to the fact that forgetting of experiences and information, which serve no purpose or which may even lead to disastrous consequences to the individual, is also due to consciousness itself. In other words, there is reference here to the selective process of consciousness.

According to Nyaya thinkers delusion arises when the mind is in the grip of *raga*, attachment and *dvesha*, aversion. Thus one important reason for forgetfulness is the prevalence of feelings and emotions, their dominance.

Another reason for forgetfulness is the weakening or even the destruction of the *samskaras*, impressions. Impressions are weakened by lapse of time, if they are not reinforced by repetition. This is why, as noted in the last chapter, overlearning is prescribed to overcome forgetfulness. It is also said that loss of memory arises out of lack of good health. A Nyaya thinker has stated *pratipaksha jnanana samskaro vinasyate*, contrary cognitions efface impressions. That is new experiences lead to the process of obliviousness. Mention is also made of obliteration of memory by intoxication, *madanivartyah*.

Thus, there is a listing of cases of forgetfulness on the basis of observation. The main reason for forgetfulness or loss of memory is the weakness or destruction of the *samskaras*, impressions left by previous experiences or previous learning.

Imagination

According to Patanjali imagination, *vikalpa*, is an image conjured up by words without any substance—*Vasth-sunya* (*Yoga Sutra* I, 9).

As noted earlier, Patanjali distinguishes between perception and illusion on the one hand and imagination and memory on the other. In perception and illusion there is an object, a word and a cognition. In perception, all the factors, the cognition, the word the object agree. In illusion, the word and cognition agree but the object is not there as in the rope-snake illusion. The cognition and

the word indicate the snake, but the object on testing happens to be only a rope and not a snake. In perception, there is the cognition, viz., the rope, there is the object rope and the word rope.

In memory and imagination, on the other hand, there is cognition and word but no object. Neither memory nor imagination involve an object. But there is a word and a cognition. While memory does not involve an object, the past experiences are retained as *samskaras* and revived. Memory merely reproduces a past experience. In imagination there is no revival of any past experience as such. It is a creation of the mind. It is not based on any actual experience in the past, as is true of memory. Nor is there any object corresponding to it as in perception. For example, there is the horse with a human head or a man with a lion's head or elephant's head. In these cases of imagination, *vikalpa*, it will be noticed that the head and the body have been perceived separately and so belong to the realm of memory, but the combination of the two does not correspond to any previous experience. This is the difference between memory and imagination. While memory corresponds to the past experience, imagination has no such correspondence.

What then is the difference between the imagination and illusion? In both there is cognition of an object, but there is no corresponding object. An illusion is contradicted by a later cognition. But in imagination, there is no such sublation. According to the ancient theorists when an illusion is sublated, it ceases to produce any action. But in *vikalpa*, though it is known to be a mere fancy, though it is known to be produced by a mere word, it continues to produce actions. The most recent experience of solar eclipse is known to be the result of the moon casting its shadow on the sun, millions of Indians observed it as a pollution and cleansed themselves by bathing in sacred rivers and ponds. Often imagination may be more powerful than actual perception, in producing actions. As Vyasa puts it in his commentary on Patanjali's sutra, even when it is known to be *vastusunya*, without any corresponding object, because of *sabdajanana mahatmya*, because of the force of the world, it continues to be believed and it continues to generate action.

Thus, by definition, *vikalpa*, imagination is the cognition of a non-existent object that is spoken of by a word (Sinha, Vol. I, p. 408). There is correspondence between the word and the cognition in the absence of an object. Sinha summarises the position by observing "imagination cognise real or unreal attributes of perceived or unperceived objects. It is in revere, fantasy or day

dream. A person is free in imagination and not tied to the order of past experience. It does not depend upon any other condition than the mind and free volition—"*sueecha manobhyam vina sadha nantarana pekshanat*" (*ibid.*, p. 407).

What is the difference between *vikalpa*, imagination and *manasa Vibhrama*, hallucination? According to Jayanta Bhatta, hallucination is due to *manodosha*, some defect in the mind. He asserts that in hallucination, impression of past perception are revived by *chinta*, constant brooding or by strong passions of lust, grief, etc. Though they do not correspond to reality, the images are so vivid that they appear to be real objects. He says that persons overpowered by lust, grief or insanity perceive non-existent objects as being present before them (*Nyaya-Manjari*, Sinha, p. 410).

Summary

Memory, *smriti*, is one of the most important psychological problems discussed very thoroughly by the ancient Indian thinkers. The Buddhist thinkers did not find it necessary to postulate the self, the mind, etc. If there is no enduring entity like mind or self, how can we account for retention, recollection, recognition and such other processes? This was the important problem which gave rise to a variety of views. However, all the various schools assume that *samskaras*, impressions, must endure so that it is possible to recall the past experience.

Gautama, the author of *Nyaya Sutra* has discussed the problem of memory with great clarity. It is the self which is the subject of experience and the impressions formed on the self. These impressions constitutes *dharana*, the basis for recall and recognition. It is recognised that *samskara* is a postulate. The experiences are retained in the self through the *samskara*. But all the impressions retained may not be available for recall. Thus the ancient Indian thinkers anticipated the need to postulate the unconscious. The conditions of retention, *dharana*, were also stated. Further, the conditions of recall have been listed. Among the 23 conditions of recall listed by Gautama, in his *Nyaya Sutra* (III, 2.44), the laws of association may be identified. He has mentioned the laws of vividness, similarity and contrast, contiguity and affective tone.

The problem of recognition lead to severe controversy, because of various metaphysical positions of the different schools of thought.

The problem of forgetfulness has also been dealt with in some detail.

Patanjali, in his *Yoga Sutra*, has dealt with the problem of imagination. Clear distinction is drawn between the processes of imagination and memory, imagination and illusion and imagination and hallucination.

CHAPTER 10

Thought and Language

1. Vak and Artha in Rig Veda

The 125th hymn of the tenth book of Rig Veda is by a Rishika, a lady Rishi, on *vak*, word or speech. It is a personification of speech. It is stated that it is through word that one gets relief from sorrow and suffering. It is asserted that *vak* travels in the abode of gods and provides God and man with the spiritual and material goods. He who sees, he who understands the word, enjoys the fruit of his efforts. *Vak* is the means of communication between human beings and between men and gods and so is welcomed by all. Also she rouses the people for battle (Rig Veda X, 125. 1 and 4).

The 71st hymn of the tenth book of Rig Veda is devoted to *jnana*, knowledge. It is said that in the first and earliest utterance of *vak*, the word, names are given to objects. It is said that it is speech which helps man to see and recognise the marks of friendship. *Vak*, it is said, shows meaning in the way in which "a fond and well-dressed woman shows herself to her husband." However, he who does not understand the meaning of the word is like a wanderer in profitless illusion Though he hears the word, it yields to him "neither point nor blossom". He who does not understand hears in vain. "He steps not back nor does he move forward." It is the man who understands speech that can accomplish what he undertakes in life (Rig Veda X, 71-1-10).

Yet another hymn describes the consequences of understanding and the consequences of lack of understanding. When there is understanding of the meaning of the words, there is wealth, knowledge and achievement. But when a person has no understanding of the word uttered, the word becomes useless. The poet asks, "whither hath her noblest portion vanished?" (Rig Veda X, 89, 10).

There is one very famous mantra in the 164th hymn of the first book of Rig Veda,

Chatvari vak parimita padani tani
vidbrahmana ye manishinah
guha trini nihita nengayanti turiyan
vacho manushyah vadanti (Rig Veda I, 164.45.)

Those who know *Brahman* and those who can inspire the minds of others know that there are four steps in speech, the first three being hidden inside, only the fourth do men speak.

As Chakravarthi observes, this rik "speaks of four different kinds or stages of *vak*, though it does not definitely mention their names. And it distinctly lays down that it is the last and fourth form of speech which is spoken by men, the other forms lying latent, i.e., too subtle to be uttered by our vocal organs (p. 48). Patanjali explained that the four categories referred to are nouns, verbs, prepositions and particles (Mahabhashya, 1.1.1). The grammarian Bhartrihari and the philosopher Gandapada looked upon this as a clear reference to the four well-known divisions of speech, viz., *para, pasyanti, madhayana* and *vaikhari* (Chakravarti, p. 48).

On being asked by the present writer, the great Vedic scholar Pandit Sudhakar Chaturvedi, explained that the four steps of *vak* referred to by the rik are (*a*) consciousness—*desire* to speak, (*b*) *chitta—memory* of what has already passed, (*c*) *manas—samkalpa—vikalpa*—vacillation, and (*d*) *buddhi*—final decision to speak out. The first three are mental states which occur and only the fourth, the final decision, is expressed as speech. According to him, the import of this mantra is that only he who speaks after giving due thought to the matter on hand is truly a human being. The first three stages are *guhayam nihita*, concealed, because they do not cause any vibration that is perceptible by others. Probably, this interpretation clearly indicates the implication of the mantra.

The term *artha* in Sanskrit indicates 'meaning', 'wealth', 'object aimed at' and so on.

Thus, the Rig Vedic seers were aware of the functions and potentialities of the word and its meaning, that the understanding of the meaning of words is very essential to accomplish what one aims at, that behind the uttered speech there are other stages which are very important.

Reference may be made here to the very famous verse of Kalidasa, the great Sanskrit poet of 4th century A.D. He described the relation between the word and its meaning in his own inimitable way in the invocatory verse to his Mahakavya *Raghuvamsa* as follows :

Vagarthaviva sampriktau vagatha pratipattaya
jagatah pitarau vandi Parvati Parmesvarau

The relation between word and its meaning is an eternal relationship like the relation between the Goddess Parvati and God

Paramesvara who are the progenitors of the Universe. There cannot be a word without meaning. Meaning without a word is not productive of anything In order to achieve something there is the word with its meaning (*artha pratipattaya vak*).

2. The Meaning of Meaning

Kunjunni Raja (1963) has written "The meaning of 'meaning' has attracted the attention of philosophers throughout the ages; reflection on the epistemological problem as to 'what is the relation subsisting between thoughts, words or sentences and that which they refer to or mean' have occupied the human mind in the East as well as in the West" (p. 3). In Indian thought two main approaches to the study of problem of meaning may be identified. One is the *khandapaksha*, the analytical standpoint which looks upon the word as an autonomous unit of thought and language. It looks upon the sentence as a concatenation of words. A thing is called *padartha*, literally the meaning of a word. The famous term *namarupa* also suggests that objects can be comprehended by means of their names, *nama* and their visible forms, *rupa*. Gautama's *Nyaya Sutra* as well as grammarians Panini and Patanjali were mainly concerned with the nature of the individual words and the derivation of correct forms of words, respectively. As Kunjunni Raja observes, "It is the Mimamsa School that started a detailed study of sentences. They showed that it is the verb which is the significant part and which gives meaning to the utterance. They looked upon the sentence as the unit of thought. This view is called the *akhandapaksha* and is analogous to the Gestalt theory in recent decades. The *sphota* doctrine of the grammarian Bhartrihari gave this approach a more penetrating analysis of the speech situation" (*ibid.*, p. 14).

3. Concept

In the chapter on perception, it was observed that there was a great controversy regarding the stages of perception and the relation between what is perceived at the moment and the influence of what is recalled from past experience with respect to such percepts. The Buddhist thinkers looked upon determinate perception as mediate knowledge since it involves *kalpana*. In indeterminate perception, the Buddhist thinkers held, there is just apprehension of the object without any qualificationl ike generality, quality, action, name, etc. The Buddhist thinker Dharmakirti, the author of *Nyayabindu*, asserts that *kalpana* is the activity of

thought by which a name is given to an object. It is knowledge which has connection with words.

But the Nyaya thinker, Jayanta asserts in his *Nyaya Manjari*, that *kalpana* signifies the connection of an object with its adjuncts such as *gunas* (*jati*), quality (*guna*), action (*krtya*), name (*nama*) and substances (*dravya*). This is a controversy between the two schools regarding the problem of concept-formation.

According to Nyaya-Vaiseshika *samanya* generality is one of the seven categories. 'Gotva', cowness exists in individual cows. The general notion of *jati*, genus, arises on the basis of assimilative knowledge (*anurvitta*-buddhist). Individuals are known by discriminative knowledge. (*Vyavritta*-buddhist). The system asserts that both the general features and the distinguishing features of an object are perceived. *Satta*, being, is the highest concept, common to all objects. Below it are the concepts of substance (*dravyatva*), quality (*gunatva*) and activity (*karmatva*). Thus the system postulates a hierarchy of concepts. A concept is formed by assimilating the common features of individual objects. Higher level concepts are formed by assimilating the common features of a group of concepts and so on up to the three concepts of substance, quality and action and in all, we arrive at the concept of living or existence, the highest of all.

By contrast the distinguishing features are unique to individuals. They cannot be grouped or assimilated. Consequently, the Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers assert that ideas are of two kinds, particular and general. In his *Nyaya Sutra*, Gautama asserts "A genus (*jati*) is the cause of a common notion" (ii, 2.71). Vatsyayana calls it *anuvritti pratyaya*. It is the general feature which exists in many individuals and holds them together as belonging to one class. The concept is *samanya pratyaya* that which leads to the notion of cowness among cows. That is, general notions, the concepts, are produced by the general features in many individual objects while the particular notions are produced by a particular object.

Kanada, the author of *Vaiseshika Sutra*, defines universality (*samanyam*) and particularity (*visesha*) as concepts, *buddhayapaksham* (1, 2, 3). Universality exists as the common qualities in individual objects. Particularity is a mark vs. quality by which we differentiate one object from the other. The Nyaya thinkers also recognise the existence of the universal as distinct from the individual. There is one universal in the various individuals belonging to one class.

The Buddhists do not agree with this notion of *samanya pratyaya*,

common notion or quality which is in a number of particular objects. The given is the unique, the particular and the momentary. Our perception at the given moment gives rise to *svalakshana*, the object as it is and not to *samanya-lakshana*, the class of objects. The general notion is an invention of the intellect. It is not something which exists in objects. Only objects are perceived. Relations between individuals are forms imposed by our mind on the individuals. They contend that generality is a mere *kalpana*, a conceptual construct.

They do not agree with the definition of *samanya* as *nityamekamanekanugatam*. By this definition, three characteristics of generality are mentioned, viz., that is eternal (*nityam*), that it is one (*ekam*) and that it resides in many (*anekanugatam*).

It is obvious from the above that the two sets of theorists agree, as far as the psychological analysis goes, but disagree on the basis of the metaphysical implications. Being realists, the Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers look upon generality as an existent which is eternal. But the Buddhist thinkers contend that a concept is only a mental product, a psychological process. It is clear that the realists also agree that generality is a product of *anuvritta buddhi*, a knowledge followed step by step, that is, assimilative knowledge.

According to Dharmakirti, *kalpana* is a cognition associated with a significant word. It is an *abhilapa*, a word which denotes an object. It is a significant word. This is indeed a very important contribution of Buddhist thought. A concept cannot endure and become useful in clear thinking unless it is associated with a term, a word or a name. When the generality is named, it endures and clarifies perception. It enables the production of uniform experience.

4. The Nature of Definition

In order that thought can proceed in a systematic manner, the nyaya thinkers realised, that definition of terms is necessary. The purpose of definition is to state the essential nature of a thing, its *svarupa*, so that it can be differentiated from other things. This is called *lakshana*. The definition should not be too broad, *ativyapti*. Then it will include objects beyond the class defined. Nor should it be too narrow, *avyapti*. Then it will include only some of the members of the class. The third fallacy is called *asambhava* in which the definition states our attribute which may not be found among the members in the class defined. A good definition is that which states a characteristic mark which applies to all the things denoted by the term, neither more nor less—*lakshyatvaavaccheda-kasamanitya-*

tatvam. Thus a good definition starts with the genus and narrows its scope by excluding other objects. As Gurumurti (1932) writes, "The main function of definition is to differentiate an object from other objects, according to Nyaya-Vaiseshika. The *Vyavartaka* dharma, or differentiating function, is discharged by a liberal use of terms like *itara* (other than) and *bhinna* (separate from) marking off the boundary rather than exhibiting the nature of the contents" (p. 1, IV). However, this attempt to merely mark off one class of objects from another "has given rise to a barren mannerism which has narrowed down the function of definition and prevented it from being an active aid in discrimination" (*ibid.*, p. iv). This tendency did not promote the discovery of the essential features of the class. As a result the definitions given by Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers, according to Gurumurti, tend to be purely or merely verbal (*ibid.*, p. 55).

5. Reasoning or Inference

Inference (*anumana*) is described as thought which follows from perceptions. In fact Vatsyayana holds that no inference can follow in the absence of perception. While perception is confined to objects of the present time and within reach of the sense, inference relates to the past, present and future. However, inference requires the remembrance of a *vyapti*, an universal *nyayabhashya* that "inference operates neither with regard to things unknown, nor with regard to those known definitely for certain; it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful" (i, 1.1). What is perceived, points to something which is not perceived. An inference is possible only when there is an inseparable connection between what is perceived and what is inferred. As Radhakrishnan described, "In inference we pass from the perceived to the unperceived with which it is related. This relation may be of three kinds, accordingly the element to be inferred is either the cause of the element perceived or its effect or as the two are joint effects of something else, when we see the clouds and expect rain, we have a case of *purvavat* inference, where we perceive the antecedent and infer the consequent. When we see a river in flood and infer that there was rain, we have the case of *sehsavat* inference, where we perceive the consequent and infer the antecedent . . . when we see an animal and i' .r that it has a tail, we have the case of *samanyatodrtshtha* inference. It is based, not so much on causation, as on uniformity of experience" (Vol. II, p. 73 f). Similarly, on perceiving aversion, affection, etc., we infer the existence of the self which we do not perceive. Thus inference is possi-

ble only when there is *vyapti* necessary universal connection between an object and its property.

Sivaditya states in his *saptapadarthi* that inference is of two kinds: (1) inference for oneself *svarthatvan*; and (2) for another *pararthatvan*. The former is of the nature of understanding the meaning, *artharupatvam*. When the inference is for another, it is in the form of words, *sabdarupatvam*. That is, the inference for another has to be explicit, formulated in words (Gurumurti, p. 114).

Visvanatha, in his *Bhasha-parlccheda*, asserts that inference is based on recall of the invariable concomitance (Madhavananda, p. 105). The knowledge of invariable concomitance arises out of *bhuyodarsana*, repeated observation.

Thus, the psychological processes involved in inference, according to Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers are, perception, knowledge, of invariable concomitance on the basis of repeated observations, recall of this connection (*vyapti-smarana*).

6. Doubt and Error

Sivaditya defines doubt, *samasya*, as cognition which is not certain (*anavadharanm jnanam*) and error, *viparyaya*, as cognition which is false but carries with it certitude. According to him, all right knowledge is characterised by certainty. If there is uncertainty, it is due to incorrect apprehension. In the case of doubt (*samasya*), there are two or more alternatives which are predictable. When an object is seen from a distance there is a doubt whether it is a post or a man. In the case of error (*viparyaya*), there is certitude, but it is wrong certitude as in the case of mistaking a rope for a snake. The knower is certain that it is a snake but the cognition is erroneous as subsequent perceptions show. Thus *viparyaya* is a case of illusion, wrong perception (Gurumurti, p. 102). Sivaditya also speaks of *uha*, conjecture. This is a case of doubtful knowledge where one alternative looks more probable. This is also a case of *anavadharana jnanam*, indefinite cognition. Only here it is a case of vague knowledge lacking in ascertainment of details.

Thus, according to Sivaditya, there is lack of certainty both in the case of doubt and conjecture. Conjecture (*uha*) differs from doubt (*samasya*) in that it definitely learns one of the two alternatives. However, there is here a lack of knowledge of details (Gurumurti, p. 127).

7. Denotative and Connotative Function of the Word

Visvanatha discusses the problem of verbal comprehension in his

Bhasha Paricheda and the commentary on it, viz., *Siddhanta Muktavali*, *Padajnanam*, the knowledge of words. This is the means by which *padarthadhih sakti*, the denotative function of the word and *lakshna*, the connotative function or the implication of the word signifies the relation between the sound and the object. When a villager sees for the first time a *gavaya*, a wild animal which resembles the cow, he recalls that it is like the cow. It is the previous knowledge of the word that helps us recall its meaning on hearing it. The denotative and the connotative functions of the word are due to usage, the dictionary, grammar, etc. In Sanskrit grammar, some of the seven cases (*vibhakti*) are denotative, like the nominative and accusative cases, while the instrumental and other cases indicate the connotative function.

Usage is a very important means of learning words. When the parent tells the child, 'bring the jar', the child is able to learn that the word 'jar' stands for the object he is supposed to fetch. This process of verbal learning is facilitated by using the same term in different contexts. For example, when the parent says 'remove the jar' and 'shut the door', the child understands the difference between the two words 'jar' and 'door' by a process of inclusion and exclusion and thus the denotative function of the two words is fixed in his mind. Later on, with the usage, the particular 'connection with acts' is discarded and the word is understood as denoting the class of objects.

Visvanatha asserts that the meaning of the word is also understood by inference from the facial expressions of the person who uses the word, as, for instance, the joy on the face of the person who says that a son has been born or the sadness of the person who says that his unmarried daughter is carrying. So verbal comprehension is not exclusively connected with certain acts. It is also connected with emotional expressions.

There is a controversy between the Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers and those of Mimamsa School. The latter look upon denotative function as a generic attribute and that it does not refer to the individual. It is pointed out that if the denotation indicates the individuals then they will be infinite. It is pointed out that it is the apprehension of cowness, *gotva*, which is significant to identify the individuals which have that characteristic (Madhavananda, pp 146 ff).

According to Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers a word is a combination of letters signifying an object, either by way of denotation, *abhidhd* or by way of implication, *lakshana*. The meaning of the word is the relation between the word and the object it signifies.

8. Word and its Meaning

What is the relationship between the sound and its sense? The Brihadaranayaka Upanishad says, *sa manasa vacham mithunam samabhavat* (I, 2.4). He made the union of speech with the mind. That is, thought and speech are interchangeable. Mind expresses itself in speech and speech has its seat in mind. The Aitareya Upanishad says *vang me manasi pratishthita mano me vachipratishthitam*—May my speech rest on mind; may my mind rest on speech (4.1).

According to the great grammarian, Patanjali, the author of *Mahabhashya*, expression of thought is the sole purpose of the word.

In fact, an object is called *padartha*, as noted earlier. Literally, the object is the meaning of a word or that which a word means. This familiar usage of the term indicates not only the close relationship between the word and its meaning or object, but also indicates the priority of the word. It is not that the object has a name, but that the object is what the word denotes. To quote Chakravarti (1933), "What Bhartrihari really implies by the statement *Sabdanam yatasakttitvam* is that the words by their very nature have the power of denoting the ideas of which they are treated as symbols, and that this potency of words is never exhausted or worn out, but remains practically inherent in them" (p. 338). Words and meaning are also closely connected with each other that it is impossible to conceive of one without the other.

According to Bhartrihari, when a word is uttered, three things, viz., the particular word (sound) the intention of the speaker and the object that is denoted, are all comprehended (*vakyapadiya*, 3.1). If a sound does not fulfil this threefold task, it is indeed meaningless.

The Mimamsakas and the grammarians are so convinced of the intimate relation between the word and its meaning that they hold that this relationship is permanent. As Kunjunni Raja (1963), puts it, "According to the Mimamsakas the significative power is inherent in the words themselves .... To them it was impossible to conceive of a society without language" (p. 20). He explains that "what the Mimamsakas meant by the eternality of words and their meaning was that it is not possible to trace the origin of the relationship to a person" (*ibid.*, p. 20).

However, the Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers rejected this view. They look upon the relation between the word and its meaning as conventional. According to Gautama, the author of *Nyaya Sutra*, *samayal katvach sabdarthasampratyayasya* (II, 1.55). In the same

way Kanada, the author of *Vaiseshika Sutra* asserts, *samayikas sabdad arthapratyayah* (VII. 2.20). They question how a sound can have conjunction (*samyoga*) with the object denoted by it. They pointed out that if there was a natural relationship between the word and its meaning, then the same word should denote the same object in all languages.

The problem is, then, how the relationship between the word and its meaning arises and continues from generation to generation. It is obvious that if there were absolutely so connection between the sign and the object signified, all communication and thinking itself will become impossible.

All the theorists agree that in life there is what is called, *vriddha-vyavahara*, use of words by elders. The close relationship between the word and its meaning is due to social transmission. As the grammarian put it, the use of sentences in the imperative mood helps us to observe the action of the child who brings the object specified by the word. It is agreed by the grammarians, Mimamsakas and Nyaya-Vaiseshikas that the first and foremost method of learning the meaning of words is not of observing the use of language in actual life. This is the way in which the child picks up a language. It is through *avapa*, using the word in a given context and *udvapa*, using the word in a different context, by the process of assimilation and elimination that meanings of words are picked up. Words and their meanings thus, are primarily picked up in actual usage. Secondarily, they are picked up through kosas or lexicons

Reference may be made to another keen controversy in this regard. What is the primary meaning of a word? According to the great ancient grammarians, Panini and Patanjali, the meaning of a word is both universal and particular. However, as this was not specifically stated by them, controversy arose. According to Naiyayikas of the old school, a word means the *vyakti* or the particular, the *akriti* or the generic shape or form and the *jati* or the universal (*Nyaya Sutra* II, 2.65). But according to some Samkhyas, the primary meaning of a word is the percept of the particular. But the Jaina thinkers hold that the word 'cow' does not mean a particular cow. It applies to all cows. The Mimamsakas also look upon the primary meaning of a word as being universal. While admitting that in practical activity the word pertains to a particular, they show that unless the universal signifies it is there, it cannot be used in the particular case. Describing the view of Bhartrihari, in this respect, Kunjunni Raja writes, "Thus the word first gives the idea of its form and then of its referent" (p. 77).

9. The Buddhist Doctrine of Apoha

A word, according to the Buddhists, denotes the negation of contradictories—*apoha*. The word cow, for example, denotes the negation of 'non-cow'. This is based on the assumption that the relation between a word and its object is unreal. It is neither an internal cognition nor an external object. It is a mere attributed form. The cognition of the object arises by perception. The word merely differentiates one object from other objects. What is perceived is the individual cow. The word 'cow' merely differentiates what is perceived from other objects. As Jayanta Bhatta puts it in his *Nyaya Manjari*, "Words produce verbal cognitions (*vikalpa*) which cognise negations of contradictories (*apoha*)". That is, *apoha* is merely an attributed form. The verbal cognition takes the form this is indeed a cow and not a horse'. Thus negation of other objects is an important function of a word. The word differentiates the perceived object from other objects. By itself, the word does not help in apprehension of the object. So it is called *apoha*. It helps only in differentiation and negation. What happens when one hears the world 'cow' ? The word gives rise to the cognition that it is not 'non-cow'. That is, both the 'cow' and the negation 'non-cow' are known together when the word 'cow' is heard.

Here again the problem, the solution and the controversy is really not psychological. It is based on the differences in metaphysical assumptions.

The Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* is really based on the view that everything is a flux and that everything is an aggregate, both views arising out of the doctrine of momentariness. Buddhism believes that change is total as well as perpetual, rejecting the view that there is something which endures through change. The seed becomes the shoot and the shoot becomes the plant, a series of total changes. As a result the concept of generality is rejected. As Hiriyanna puts it, "The Buddhist does not believe the proposition, 'All animals with cloven hoofs have horns', although the concomitance of the two, so far as our knowledge goes, is invariable; for its truth cannot, as in the cases mentioned, be referred back to any general principle whose validity is questioned. There is no clinching argument to meet the question 'why should the cloven hoof be associated with horns?' and any doubt that may be entertained about the matter will, therefore, remain unremoved. In other words, the Buddhist admits the principle of the uniformity of nature only in the two spheres of causal sequence and necessary co-existence, thus restricting the scope of *vyapti*" (Hiriyanna, 1932, p. 201). Thus,

logically, the Buddhist is bound to reject the function of word as indicating some enduring relationships. Words do not represent positive objects. They simply exclude others which are recalled to the mind by error.

It is obvious that Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers refute the *apoha* doctrine because they assume as realists that objects endure and that words indicate the concepts, the general characteristics of a class of objects. They assert that when a word is heard, the hearer recalls an individual that belongs to a genus and is able to act upon it.

The Mimamsakas reject the doctrine because according to them the Vedas are eternal and the words with which the Vedas are composed are also eternal. The relationship between the word and its meaning is also eternal. The relationship between the word and its meaning and that between the word and the object is not something created by convention or by usage. That is, words and the objects denoted by them are both eternal. They assert that some names have been applied to the same objects from time immemorial. They reject the Buddhistic doctrine of *apoha*, because words denote classes and not individuals. Even when it is said, 'bring the cow', what is meant, they assert, is not the particular cow, but rather the animal which possesses the characteristic feature of a cow.

10. The Sphota Theory of Meaning

The *sphota* theory of meaning is a contribution of the ancient grammarians. The father of Indian grammar, the great Panini (7th century B.C.) mentions *sphotayana* (vi, 1.123), indicating that this theory prevailed even in his times.

Radhakrishnan expesses the theory clearly. He writes, "the fact of meaning is explained by the grammarians on the theory of the *sphota*. According to it, any single letter C, O, W, or all the letters, 'cow', cannot produce the knowledge of a thing corresponding to the word, since each letter perishes as soon as it is produced. Even if the last letter is aided by the impressions left by the preceding ones, a number of letters cannot explain the cognition of a thing. There must be something over and above the letters by which the knowledge is produced, and that is the *sphota*, or the essence of sound revealed by the letter, word or sentence. This sound-essence produces the cognition of the thing. A single letter, unless it is a complete word, cannot signify anything. The advocates of *padasphota* argue that only a *pada*, or a word, can signify a mean-

ing, while those of *vakyasphota* hold that only a *vakya*, or a sentence, can signify a complete meaning" (Vol. II, p 106).

Patanjali (2nd century B.C.) in his commentary on Pāṇini discussed the problem of noise and word. The word is manifested by sounds. The ear perceives the sound and it is the mind which apprehends the meaning of the sound.

Vyasa (A.D. 400) in his *Yogabhashya*, the commentary on Patanjali's *Yoga Sutra*, expounds the doctrine of *padasphota*, word-form, and *vakyasphota*, sentence form. In the 17th sutra of Chapter III, Patanjali, the author of *Yoga Sutra*, asserts that there are three components, viz., the *sabda*, word, *artha*, meaning and *pratyaya*, the idea. Commenting on this, Vyasa states that the function of *sabda* is the uttering of the sound and the task of the ear is to grasp the sound. It is the *buddhi* that grasps the meaning by seizing the letter-sounds and binding them together to form one whole. The *varnas*, alphabets or letter-sounds come one after the other. They cannot co-exist. So, it is obvious that each letter-sound by itself cannot convey the meaning of the word. That is, neither speech (sound produced) nor hearing (the sound heard), constitutes a word with its meaning, signifying a definite object. It is the single thought from which it is comprehended. Secondly, it is because of *vasana*, past impressions which endure that the meaning and the object signified are grasped. The sound (*sabda*), the cognition (*jnana*) and the object (*artha*) are erroneously identified with one another, because of convention, *lokabuddhya* and past impression, *vasana*.

The great grammarian and philosopher Bhartrihari (seventh century A.D.) recognises the reality of the letter-form (*varnasphota*) word-form (*padasphota*) and sentence-form (*vakyasphota*). A word is not a combination of letters. It is a whole which is grasped in one act of thought. Similarly, the comprehension of a sentence is based on one act of thought. In his famous work, *Vakyapadiya*, Bhartrihari developed the *sphota* theory in great detail.

Ramachandra Rao (1962) shows that the *sphota* theory bears 'a remarkable affinity to the Gestalt theory'. He writes, "While the Gestalt theory has drawn much of its material from visual form in perception, the *sphota* theorists have concentrated on the audible structure in language. The two alike argue against analysis of the experimental datum into discrete bits and emphasize its indivisible character. Both doctrines recognise phenomenal 'wholes' in cognition, and explain meaning in terms of organization" (p. 157).

The word *sphota* comes from the root which means 'splitting' or

'bursting'. Thus it indicates the suddenness in the emergence of meaning on hearing the sound.

Does the sound generate the meaning? According to Bhartrihari the sound is transformed (*vivartate*) into meaning. The word and the meaning are two aspects of one process. On hearing the word the meaning bursts into view, as it were. In other words, the *sphota* is subjective. It is a psychological process.

However, this theory raised a hot controversy. The Mimamsakas questioned the need to posit a word-form over and above the sounds of letters which compose a word. What is perceived is only the sound, not the *padasphota*. They raise the question as to when the word-form arises: Is it on hearing the first letter of the word or the last letter of the word or in between? It is asserted that the theory violates the parsimony of hypotheses. The word-form is not an entity over and above its component letters. According to the Mimamsakas the letters being remembered signify the object denoted by the word. Cognition of the word is complex involving the perception of the letters and the recall of the impressions and memory images That is, meaning does not arise suddenly as a flash, but is gradually built up in parts. So the assumption of *sphota* is rejected.

The Nyaya-Vaiseshika theorists also question the *sphota* theory. As realists they ask how the word-form is perceived. We perceive only the letters and sounds. It is the letters and the impressions produced by them that produce the meaning. Though the letters are momentary, the impressions produced by them are continuous. The last letter, aided by the impression or the recollection of the preceding letter produces the meaning. Further, the object is cognised by means of the conventional association between the word and the object. Jayanta Bhatta asserts that a word is really a collection of syllables and the sentence a collection of words. He admits that there is a unitary apprehension of the meaning. He attributes it to the synthesising activity of the mind.

Bhartrihari, however, asserts that in actual speech situation, there are no letters in the word, and no words in the sentence (Vakyapadoya, I, 73). It is the grammarians who analyse the sentence into words and show the significance of the letters in the word which indicate the exact meaning (Kunjunni Raja, p. 140).

11. Sentence Cognition

According to Annambhatta, the author of *Tarakasamgraha*, a sentence is a collection of words—*vakyam padasamuhah*. Howeve

it is not a mere group of words, (Section 59). A sentence is a group of words which possess *akanksha* (expectancy), *yogyata* (compatibility) and *samnidhi* (juxtaposition). Expectancy is the inability of a word to convey the meaning of a sentence on account of the absence of some other word. For example, if one hears the word jar, a desire is at once created to know something about the jar. This expectancy is satisfied only when some other words are added to it, like, for example, bring. The two words *ghatam anaya*, bring the jar, complete the sense. This desire to know something is *akanksha*, expectancy. The second requisite is *yogyata*, compatibility. The two or more words can convey a meaning only when they are not inconsistent with each other or one another. A word such as fire and sprinkling of water and burning will not convey any sense. So, for the words to form a sentence and give rise to some meaning, they should be compatible with each other. The third requisite is juxtaposition. The utterance of the words should be consecutive without any interval between them. When the words are uttered at intervals, they cannot make an impression on the mind. If the interval is long, we may forget the first word when we hear the second. Visvanatha, the author of *Bhasha Paricheda*, adds a fourth requisite, viz., knowledge of the intention of the speaker. The favourite illustration given is the sentence *saindhavam anaya*. This sentence has two meanings, 'bring salt and 'bring a horse'. It is true that the sentence has all the three requisites. Still it is the knowledge of the intention of the speaker, *vaktru tatparya*, that enables one to understand whether it is the salt or the horse that has to be brought.

The Mimamsakas and the grammarians, on the other hand, hold that the principal word in a sentence is the verb, since it is the verb which connects as well as limits the subject and the predicate. All the words of a sentence are interdependent. When the verb is stated, the meaning of the sentence becomes clear (Athalya and Bodas, 1974, pp. 330 ff).

As Kunjunni Raja writes, "The Mimamsaka School brought forward the concept of *akanksha* to explain, from the analytical and associationist standpoint, how synthetic unity is effected among the various isolated words which comprise the sentence . . . . The Mimamsakas first enunciated, and the other schools of thought later accepted with slight modification, the three factors of phonetic contiguity or *samnidhi*, logical consistency or *yogyata* and syntactic expectancy or *akanksha*, among the parts of a sentence as constituting the bases of syntactic unity" (p. 151).

Sadananda, the author of *Vedantasara* (15th century A.D.), describes three kinds of relations of the words in a sentence, viz., (1) *Samanadhikaranya*, relation between two words having the same meaning; (2) *viseshana-viseshyabhava*, relation between two words which qualify each other, signifying a common object; and (3) *lakshya-lakshana bhava*, relation implying identity. He further enumerates three kinds of *lakshana* implications (Nikhilananda, 1974, p. 84 ff).

Another controversial issue was with respect to the import of words in a sentence. According to Nyaya thinkers the words of a sentence denote their separate meanings—*abhihitanvaya*. The Mimamsaka thinker Prabhakara criticises this view and puts forward the view called *anvitabhidhana*, that is, the words of a sentence denote their meanings, as related to one another. If the words are unrelated, they do not denote a unitary meaning, How do we learn the meanings of words in a sentence? Do we learn the meanings of independent words and then the meaning of the sentence? What do we learn from usage—do we learn the meanings of words or the meaning of a sentence? Prabhakara asserts that we learn the meanings of sentences from the elders by their behaviour *vriddha vyavahara*. Ordinary speech, he asserts, consists of sentences and not words. A person speaks in order to communicate something. So he speaks sentences and not words. He criticizes the *Nyaya-Vaiseshika* view of expectancy, etc. Words do not expect other words or meanings. What is expected is the import of the sentence as a whole and not the meanings of each word constituting the sentence. It must be noted that Prabhakara rejects the *sphota* theory which looks upon meaning of the sentence as being independent of the meanings of the component words. He, however, admits that the words in the sentence collectively produce the meaning.

The Nyaya thinker Jayanta Bhatta questions whether we have to learn the meaning of each sentence separately. He points out that if we learn the meanings of words then we can understand and speak different sentences formed out of the different words. He questions how the meaning of a sentence can be known, if the meanings of the component words are not known.

With respect to the problem of cognition of a sentence, there is difference of opinion between the two great Mimamsa thinkers Kumarila and Prabhakara. Summarising Kumarila's views, Sinha writes, "The words denote their separate meanings from which the meaning of a sentence is known. They never denote the related meaning of a sentence. They do not lose their meanings in the

meaning of a sentence, which is known from them due to the power of the intention of the speaker. The knowledge of the meanings of words is verbal (*sabda*), since it is produced by words. But the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not directly produced by them. . . . The words are indirectly the cause of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence" (Vol. I, p. 473).

The critical question in this controversy is whether the words in a sentence denote their meanings separately as Nyaya theorists hold or do they denote their meanings in relation to one another. That is whether the unitary sense, the meaning of the sentence, arises directly from the collection of words, or indirectly through recollection of the meanings of individual words that comprise it.

To summarise the problem, it may be noted that there are four views regarding the way in which the meaning of a sentence arises:

1. Sentence is a construction of the intellect. There is the view of Vyasa which he states in *Yogabhashya*, while commenting on the 17th sutra of the third part of Patanjali's *Yoga Sutra*. He asserts that sentence comprehension is an intellectual act It is the *buddhi* that cognises the successive letters and words in a single grasp (Sinha, II, p. 467 f).

2. The words of a sentence denote their meanings separately. This is the view of Nyaya thinkers and the Mimamsa thinker Kumarila. It is known as *abhihitanvaya vada*. The meanings of the words in the sentence are known separately and the meaning of the sentence as a whole is known after cognising the words separately.

3. The words of a sentence denote their meaning as related. This is the view of the Mimamsa thinker Prabhakara. The meaning of the sentence arises as a result of the related meaning of the words. The child learns the meanings of sentences from the elders, not meanings of separate words. The child hears sentences being spoken by the elders. The sentence has a unitary meaning of its own. The constituent words possess meaning only as related to this unitary sentence-meaning (Kunjunni Raja, p. 200).

4. Vakyasphota vada. According to Bhartrihari. the sentence is one, indivisible and partless whole, *vakyasphota*. Both the sentence and the meaning of the sentence are partless. It is one whole.

It is clear that the problem of meaning, or as it is called currently, the meaning of meaning, was a problem which raised heated controversy for several centuries, right from 7th century B.C., the time of Panini.

It will be recognized that the views expressed about the meaning of sentences are of great practical import. They are very important

in the teaching and learning of languages. The traditional method used in the learning of Sanskrit, English, and other languages follows the word method sponsored by the Nyaya thinkers and the Mimamsaka Kumarila. The sentence unit view advocated by Prabhakara and the members of the Sphota school is in conformity with the actual method followed by the child in learning the mother tongue and the direct method followed by the recent innovators to teach English as a foreign language. It will also be appreciated that parents send their three and four year old children to the nursery schools run by convents and other private organisations where the direct method is used to teach English to Indian children. There is no doubt that the child hears sentences from the parents and starts speaking in sentences of one or two words. When the child says 'milk' though it uses one word, it signifies the full sentence, 'I want milk' or 'give me milk'.

It is true that each method has its own advantage. A judicious combination of starting with sentences and going on to the words later may be more fruitful.

12. Four Kinds of Vak (Words)

Finally, brief references may be made to the view that *sabda*, the sound, has four states in the body, viz., *para*, *pasyanti*, *madhyama* and *vaikhari*. *Para* is the seed state of the sound, as it were, in the Kundalini in the *muladhara* centre (See Appendix to Part 1). In this state, it is motionless. It is only potential. Next starts motion. This state of the beginning of the movement or sound vibration in its initial stage is called *pasyanti*. It is termed as *samanya*. It is *samanya*, generalized, non-particularised *spanda*, motion. This stage consists of the movement of the sound from the *muladhara chakra* to the *manipura chakra*. In this stage there is association of the sound with *manas*. As it moves up, being associated with *buddhi*, the sound has an inner meaning. This stage is designated *madhyama*. This stage occurs, it is said, in the *sukshma sarira*, the subtle body. When the individual perceives an object, there is this stage in which the mind, as it were, differentiates itself into two parts, both subtle, viz., *sabda*, word and *artha*, object or meaning. This view is based on the assumption that in cognition, the mind has a dual function. The mind is at once the perceiver and the perceived when an object, *artha*, is presented. It is assumed as noted above that the mind takes the form of the object. This is the *chitta vritti*. The mind as a *vritti*, modification, represents the outer object. The mind is also the perceiver of this object. That is, the mind is both

the cogniser (*grahaka*) and the cognised (*grahya*), the denoter (*vachya*) and the denoted (*vachya*) (Woodroffe, 1973, p. 87f). In the final stage, viz., *vaikhari*, there occurs the uttered speech. This is at the gross stage. In this stage, the object, the *artha* is the physical object. According to this view, at the *madhyama* stage, the sound as well as the object are at the subtle mental level. At the *vaikhari* stage the sound and the object are at the gross, physical level.

At the *para* level there is pure consciousness—undifferentiated consciousness. At the *pasyanti* level there is the beginning of differentiation which becomes the subtle sound and mental object at the *madhyama* stage, from the subtle it attains the gross level in the *vaikhari* stage.

According to the Tantric literature, in the *pasyanti* state, there is the *icche sakti*, the non-differentiated desire. At the *madhyama* state arises the *jnan sakti*, the knowledge. Finally, at the *vaikhari* state, there is the *kriya sakti*, the state of achieving physically the object of desire through knowledge, as it were.

Thus, according to this view, the undifferentiated consciousness at the *para* level, gradually becomes subtle and finally gross. From another point of view the development is from non-desire, through the stages of desire, knowledge and action, that is, from the *manas* to *buddhi* and finally to achievement, through action.

It may be pointed out that this is a conceptual scheme to indicate that uttered sentence is based on the undifferentiated pure consciousness

Summary

A few of the mantras in Rig Veda dealing with *vak*, speech, are given at the beginning. They show that the Vedic hymns have laid the foundations for later thinking on the problem of thought and its relation to language. This is shown clearly by the famous invocation of Kalidasa in which he identifies the close relation between speech and thought to the close relation between Parvati and Parameshwara. This shows how from the most ancient times the thinkers in India were concerned with the problem of 'meaning of meaning'.

It is next shown that there was a keen controversy about the nature of concept, the relation between universality and particularity and how concepts are formed. Their reflectiom on the problem of definition, inference, doubt and error are next indicated.

The problem of denotation and connotation of terms is taken up next and this leads us to a consideration of word and its meaning. The very acute observations are made regarding the problem of language learning.

Finally, the various views regarding the cognition of sentences are given. While some looked upon sentence as being made up of the meanings of a series of words in it, some grammarians as well as philosophers declared that sentence is the unit of thought and not the word. The implication of these views with respect to language learning is briefly indicated.

In the last section a brief description of the four stages of speech from the non-verbal to the verbal level is given.

Part III

EMOTION AND ACTION

CHAPTER II

Motivation

Gita on Motives

The author of the Gita asserts that "no one can remain ever for a moment without doing some action, *karma*. Every one is made to act helplessly by the impulses born of nature, *prakriti*" (III, 5). Every living being has to move about and behave in order to satisfy the basic needs of the body. As noted above, the ancient Indian thinkers divided the *indriyas* into three groups: (*a*) the *jnanendriyas*, the sense organs which are stimulated; (*b*) the *karmendriyas*, the motor organs which execute actions to satisfy the needs of the organism and to respond to the stimuli; and (*c*) the *manas*, the central organ which receives, coordinates the actions of the organism on the basis of the internal needs and the external stimuli.

The basic needs of the body are categorised as *kama*, desires. The basic need is food. To eat one must live. One can live by breathing and eating. "All kinds of action arise from the *gunas* of *prakriti*, the modes of nature" (III, 27). Elsewhere, it is stated, *bhutani prakritim yanti*—all living beings follow their nature (III, 33). The same verse points out "Even the man of knowledge acts in accordance with *prakriti*, nature. Another significant assertion is "Each *indriya* has its own object towards which there is either attachment (*raga*) or aversion (*dvesha*)" (III, 34). This indicates that the basic needs and the senses give rise to likes and dislikes, appetitions and aversions. These are of the form of *kama*, craving or *krodha* (wrath) which arise out of *rajo guna*, the active mode of *prakriti*. It is also pointed out that intense desire or craving and intense aggressiveness are the *vairinam*, the destructive enemies of the living being (III, 37). They cover wisdom. Because insatiable desires to procure and acquire or to destroy cover wisdom, they constitute the constant foes of man (III, 38, 39). When lust seizes the senses and the mind there is delusion and disaster. So man has to control the senses and the mind through *buddhi*, discrimination (III, 40, 41).

The same ideas are expressed even more vividly in the second

chapter. "When a man dwells in his mind or the objects of sense, attachment to them is produced. From attachment springs desire. When desire is frustrated, anger arises. When one is overpowered by anger, there is *moha*, delusion. As a result there is loss of memory. When there is loss of memory there is destruction of discrimination—*buddhi nasa*. Ultimately man perishes (II, 62-63). Consequently, man is enjoined to realise that *kama* (and *krodha*), are extremely difficult to conquer. He can conquer the lower self, only with the help of the higher self which is higher than *buddhi*, discrimination" (III, 43).

Thus, in these few verses, the author of the *Gita*, has described the basic needs which motivate all organisms and how man who is a prey to intense, unrestrained desires to acquire and desire to destroy, has to conquer himself by subduing the lower nature in him by means of the higher aspects of his self.

Attention may be drawn to the four famous verses in the *Gita* which contains the essential principle of disinterestedness. "To action alone hast thou a right and never at all to its fruits. Let not be fruits of action by the motive . . . Abandoning attachment, do thy work with a mind even in success and failure" (II, 47-48). "He whose undertakings are free from desire, whose works are burned up in the fire of wisdom, him the wise call a man of learning. Having abandoned attachment to the fruit of works, ever content, without any kind of dependence, he does nothing, though he is ever engaged in work" (IV, 19-20).

The *Gita* theory of motivation appears to be paradoxical. Earlier, it was asserted that all actions are impelled by *prakriti*, that actions arise out of bodily needs (III, 27, 33 and 34). Even a man of knowledge, it is said, is moved by the bodily needs. In these verses, what is pointed out is the power of these bodily needs which the human beings share with the animals. The five *jnanendriyas*, the five *karmendriyas* and the *manas*, all these eleven *indriyas* are common to animals and human beings. This is why they are looked upon as the constituents of the lower self. It was further pointed out that constant preoccupation with the objects of sense leads to insatiable craving which finally results in the clouding of reason and memory and lands man in disaster (II, 62, 63). The implication of the four verses noted above (II, 47-48 and IV, 19-20), is to caution man against excessive preoccupation with intense craving for success and intense anxiety with respect to possible failure.

Anasakti, non-attachment to objects of senses, *karma-phala-*

tyaja, abandoning keen interest in fruits of actions and cultivating *samatva*, equanimity, towards success and failure are enjoined. Motives are always there. They are generated by bodily needs. It is not their suppression that is suggested, because it is recognised that such a course is impossible (III, 33). What is recommended is that desires should be under the control of reason. The *Gita* recognises that there are two aspects to the self of man, one lower actuated by desires and the other higher, guided by reason and the well-being of the society as a whole. Let man's actions be guided by the desire for *lokasamgraha*, the well-being of the society (III, 20). It is also recognised that persons with knowledge and ideals serve as models for the rest in society. "Whatsoever a great man does, will be the standard for others to follow" (III, 21). The enlightened man is asked to pursue his goals with the same zeal as the unenlightened pursue their goals, but by being *asaktah*, without attachment, the aim being *lokasamgraham*, the well-being of the society and not the well-being of the one's self, one's family, etc. (III, 25).

Distinction Between Non-voluntary and Voluntary Actions

Prasastapada in his commentary on Vaiseshika Sutra, divides *prayatna*, effort, into two groups: (*a*) *jivanapurvaka*, having the life of the organism, survival, as its antecedent condition and (*b*) *icchadveshapurvaka*, having desire and aversion as the antecedent condition. The first category refers to the activities which are motivated by biological needs, the reflex activities and activities based on tissue needs. They are non-voluntary. By contrast, the second category refers to the voluntary actions based on desires and aversions, choice and foresight.

The non-voluntary activities are *kamartha kriya*, they serve the needs of the organism.

Dinakara, in his *Dinakari*, commentary on Visvanatha's *Siddhantamuktavali*, distinguishes between *jivanayonipreyatna*, activities arising from the organic needs and *kriti*, the voluntary activities which he classifies as (*a*) *pravritti*, conscious selection of activities which are helpful in the survival of the individual and the survival of the group and, (*b*) *nivritti* the rejection of anti-social activities or evil. Both these, the selection of the good and rejection of the evil are *vecchadhina*, dependent on freedom of will (Maitra, 1963, pp. 27-28).

In his *Vivekachudamani*, Sankara (A.D. 788-820) has stated "inhalation and exhalation, yawning, sneezing, secretion, etc., are

functions of prana while hunger and thirst are characteristics of prana proper" (102). All these are reflex actions based on bodily needs. As Sinha puts it, "They carry on the life of the organism, and are not actuated by volition. They are different from voluntary actions, which are prompted by desire and aversion, and which are consciously adapted to the attainment of desired objects or to the avoidance of undesired objects" (Vol. II, p. 495).

The New-born Infant's Behaviour

Gautama, in his *Nyaya Sutra*, ascribes the new-born child's desire for mother's breast. He looks upon this unlearnt behaviour as being due to the recollection of the habit of satisfying hunger in his previous birth (iii, 1.19). It must be borne in mind, that not only ancient Indian thinkers, but even modern Indians, explain biological bodily needs as being based on experiences of the individual in a past life. Vatsyayana, in his *Nyayabhasya* argues that no action can be produced without a cause. What is the cause of this behaviour of the new-born infant? The cause, he says, is the recollection of a similar experience acquired in his previous birth. A new-born infant, he says, feels attachment to those objects which gave him pleasure in his past birth. He even goes to the extent of asserting that the attachment is evoked by the thought of the object which afforded him pleasure in the past birth—*Jatasyapi purvanubhutartha dhintana krito ragah* (iii, 1.27). This is a clear indication of the way in which an observed behaviour is explained on the basis of an assumption of past birth which is supposed, not only to lead to attachment, but even to thinking and recollection by the new-born infant!

Sankara Misra, in his *Kanadarahasya*, goes to the extent of stating that the emotions of the new-born infant (*jatamatrasya balakasya*), viz., joy, fear and grief, inferred from his smile, trembling and crying, are due to the recollection of similar emotions in his past birth and that such recollection is based on impressions (*anterevanupapettah*). Sinha remarks, "Thus, Vatsyayana and Sankaramista credit a new-born child with the powers of remembering thinking and reasoning which are denied by modern psychology" (Vol. II, p. 502).

However, in sutra 3.1, 22, objection is raised by the different who asserts that the behaviour of the child is like the iron moving towards magnet, even without any repeated experience in the past. So the activity of the new-born child does not necessarily prove past experience or past birth (Jha, p. 281).

Thus, there was a difference of opinion about the cause for the behaviour of the new-born infant. While some thinkers attributed it to recollection of activities and the unsatisfaction in a past life, there were others who looked upon it as a natural phenomenon.

Nature and Kinds of Motives

Gautama defines a *prayojana*, motive, as that which induces the self to act—*yam adhikritya pravartate tat prayojanam* (*Nyaya Sutra* i, 4. 24). Motion is the end which moves the self to act. Vatsyayana, commenting on the sutra asserts that the cause of voluntary action is the attainment of some goal or the avoidance of something. Motives for action are the final causes. The efficient causes for action are some *dosha* (fault), *raga* (attachment), *dvesha* (aversion) and *moha* (delusion) (*Nyaya Sutra* and *Nyayabhashya*, iv, 1, 2-3).

Visvanatha mentions four motives: pursuit of pleasure, avoidance of pain, pursuit of the means to pleasure and finally, the avoidance of the means to pain. The first two are the principal motives and the second two are the subordinate motives.

Thus, the main aim of all voluntary action, according to these theorists is hedonistic, the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain.

A motive for an action is voluntary, chosen by the individual.

Objection to this theory was raised. It is objected that a pleasure which is not yet attained cannot be the motive for action. To this the reply is that the self infers the future pleasure on the basis of memory and imagination. That is, it is asserted that the motive has an intellectual content. It is stated that it is a desire which takes the form, "May this pleasure be mine".

The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad speaks of three kinds of desire, *ishanatraya*, viz.. *putraishana*, desire for sons, *vittaishana*, desire for wealth and *lokaishana*, desire for the world and its experiences (III, 5).

Sinha observes, "A future pleasure which is not represented by the self cannot excite a desire in it. Wealth, sons and the like become objects of desire when they are known by the self as the means to the attainment of pleasure. They become indirectly related to the self when they are represented by it" (Vol. II, p. 552).

But, such representation can arise only on the basis of observation of what other persons in the society are seeking. They are voluntary desires generated by experience here and now.

Three Kinds of Actions

Gautama also mentions three kinds of actions, viz., physical, verbal and mental *pravrittir vag buddhi sarirarambhah* (*Nyaya Sutra* i, 1.17). Even the representation of an action in the mind is very important, This finds expression in speech and/or action. This is why the ancient Indians placed a very great importance on the purity of motives, purity of speech and purity of action and enjoined that the three should go together. The three should be interrelated. The significant aspect here is the way in which thoughts and intentions themselves are regarded as activities—mental activities.

Voluntary Action

According to Visvanatha, *chikirsha*, the desire for voluntary action, is based on the cognition that it can be accomplished through one's effort and that is conducive to what is desirable (*Bhashaparicheda*, 147). However, the cognition that an action may lead to undesirable consequences may become an obstacle to *chikirsha*, the desire for action. That which is painful leads to aversion (*ibid.*, p. 149). Thus, the main motives for action are pleasure and pain. Anticipation of pleasure leads to voluntary action and anticipation of pain leads to aversion and becomes an obstacle to action. As Sinha summarises, "Visvanatha analyses a positive volition (*pravritti*) to realise a good into the following elements: (*a*) a desire to act (*chikirsha*) or perform a voluntary action; (*b*) the cognition that it can be done by one's volition (*krititsadhyatajnana*); (*c*) cognition that it is means to one's good (*ishthasadhanatajnanam*); (*d*) the absence of the cognition that it is productive of a stronger evil (*balavadanishthanaubandhitva jnanabhana;*); and (*e*) the perception of the materials of action (*upadana pratyaksha*) (Vol. II, p. 505).

According to Visvanatha *nivritti*, a negative volition on the other hand, is aimed at avoidance or rejection. It springs from aversion and from the notion that something is repugnant or harmful (*ibid.*, p. 151).

According to Prabhakara, the Mimamsaka thinker, voluntary action involves *karyatajnana*, that an action ought to be done or *krititsadhyatajnana*, that an action could be accomplished by oneself, *pravritti*, the volition, *cheshtra*, an organic reaction or motor impulse and *kriya*, the bodily action. Thus it involves not only the desire to do an action but also the cognition that it can be accomplished (Maitra, pp. 29-30).

Visvanatha, the Nyaya thinker maintains that the cognition of an action being conducive to one's good, the cognition of its being

capable of being accomplished by one's volition, and the cognition of its not producing a strong evil, at the present time, are the causes of positive action. Thus, according to Nyaya analysis there is not only the positive aspect of chikirsha, the desire for the good but also the negative aspect of *dvesha*, aversion, the avoidance of the harmful (Maitra, p. 38). That is, voluntary action arises after a consideration of the balance, whether the benefits arising are more than the harms arising out of the action. Action is undertaken when the benefits are definitely more than the costs, the harms that may arise.

If a voluntary action is based on the judgement that it is desirable and that it is not harmful, then how does one yield to such temptations such as sexual indulgence (*asamyaagamana*), the destruction of the enemy (*satruvadha*), which known to lead to penalties? "The answer is: under the influence of strong passion there is a temporary suspension of the consciousness of the penalty. Thus the reduction of the pleasure sometimes succeeds in driving out the consciousness of punishment and volition takes place in spite of the presence of the counteracting motives as a rule" (Maitra, p. 45).

According to the Prabhakara view there are two distinct processes involved in voluntary action, viz., (a) consciousness of the good (*ishthasadhanajnana*); and (b) the consciousness of duty (*karyatajnana*). But according to the Nyaya view the cognition of the good and the cognition of duty are held together in one whole involving them both. This is the essential difference between the two views (Maitra, p. 61).

It must be noted that both sets of thinkers agree that voluntary action is a deliberate action. It arises after the consideration of consequences. It is opposed to action based on bodily needs, on the one hand, and the impulsive actions which are blind to consequences, on the other.

Ishtha, the Object of Desire

What constitutes (*ishtha*)? What makes one desire an object? This is not a problem for the Prabhakaras since *ishtha* is not an essential ingredient in the volitional process.

According to Charvakas, the object of desire is that which produces pleasure, *sukha*, or that in which there is *dukha abhava*, freedom from suffering. The aim of voluntary action is to secure maximum pleasure with minimum pain. So, for the Charvakas, actions are the resultants of the two forces of attraction of pleasure and

repulsion of pain.

According to the Nyaya view *sukha prapti*, attainment of happiness and *dukhaparihara*, avoidance of suffering, are really not voluntary actions, since they are actuated by the attraction of pleasure, *raga* or repulsion of pain, *dvesha*. Secondly, all actions are constituted by a mixture of pleasure and pain. So, according to Nyaya, neither the pursuit, *sukha* and avoidance of *dukha*, on the one hand, nor the attraction of *raga*, and the repulsion of *dvesha* on the other, constitutes the basis for genuine voluntary action that is really free. In other words, they assert that all empirical actions are not absolutely voluntary since they are linked up with pleasure and pain or attraction and repulsion. They lead to bondage, *bandhana* and not to liberation, *moksha*.

As Maitra concludes, "It follows therefore that there are two kinds of objects of desire or *ishtha*: (*a*) those that are relative and empirical implying attraction (*raga*) and aversion (*dvesha*) in the agent; and (*b*) that which is absolute and non-empirical and the desire for which is pure" (*ibid.*, p. 79).

Thus, according to the Nyaya only thinkers of those actions are really voluntary which are undertaken for the ultimate benefit of the individual as well as the society as a whole.

Motives in the Reasoning Process

Motive (*prayajana*) is one of the sixteen categories mentioned by Gautama in *Nyaya Sutra* (1.11). The Commentator Vatsyayana explains that motive is that which urges a man to have recourse to activity, viz., *pravritti*, which consists of the operation of mind, speech and body (Sutra, 1.1. 17). Motive leads a person to either a desire to obtain or to reject something. As such, he asserts, motives refer to actions of all living beings. It is also stated that motive is the very basis of all reasoning or investigations.

In reasoning there are three kinds of motives: (*a*) discussion *nirnayavada*) with the aim of getting at the truth; (*b*) disputation (*jalpah*), whose aim is to vanquish the opponent; and (*c*) wrangling (*vitanda*) in which the aim is just to argue and confuse without taking any definite stand-point (Jha, 1939, p. 6).

Thus the ancient Nyaya thinkers differentiated between four kinds of motives, viz., those which are based on tissue needs, and which are common to all living beings, the social motives for the acquisition of wealth and the welfare of the family in order to enhance one's social prestige, the intellectual motives and which are common to all living beings, the social motives, intellectual motives, the

aim of which is to ascertain truth or to defeat the opponent or merely to confuse and confound, and the transcendental motives which lead to the emancipation of the individual.

Springs of Action (Pravartana)

Ancient Indian thinkers have attempted to analyse the various forms of desire and the activities they lead to. As noted above Brihadaranyaka Upanishad distinguished between three kinds of desires, viz., desire for sons, desire for wealth and desire for enjoyment in the world (III, 5.1). Clearly this passage differentiates between sex desire, desire for wealth and power and the desire for other forms of pleasure. It is also asserted in the same passage that each desire is a means to satisfy another desire; in other words, we desire means which satisfy the ends desired. The passage also enumerates the primary needs of hunger and thirst (*assanaua-pipase*) and the elimination of greed (*soka*), delusion (*moha*), decay (*jara*) and death (*mrityu*). Thus this passage is very significant as it identifies the primary needs and the secondary needs on the one hand and the appetitions and the aversions on the other.

Gautama's Nyaya Sutra

Gautama, the author of *Nyaya Sutra* asserts that the ultimate springs of action are attachment (*raga*), aversion (*dvesha*), and delusion (*moha*) (4.1.3). These (*dosa*) constitute the moving forces *pravartana* from which all actions spring (1.1.18).

In his *Nayabhasya*, Vatsyayana explains that attachment is the desire to appropriate an object that gave pleasure in the past and that aversion is the desire to avoid an object that caused pain on a previous occasion, while delusion arises out of false knowledge.

1. Attachment (Raga)

Vatsyayana has included under attachment (*raga*) the following as the springs of action: sex love (*kama*); covetousness (*matsara*) the desire for what belongs to others; desire for acquisition (*sprha*); will-to-live (*trishna*), the hankering for continuation of life; and greed (*lobha*), insatiate longing for food, wealth, etc.

Visvanatha, another commentator on Gautama's *Nyaya Sutra*, in his *Nyayasutravritti*, adds two more to Vatsyayana's five, viz., fraudulence (*maya*), the desire to deceive other and boastfulness (*dambha*), the desire to display one's superiority in possessions, etc.

Even more elaborate is the classification of the needs that come under attachment in the commentaries on Vaiseshika Sutras of

Kanada. Prasastapada in his *bhasya* mentions eight kinds of attachment. He enumerates sex, food, desire to realise a remote end (*samkalpa*), compassion (*karuna*), dispassion (*vairagya*), desire to deceive others (*upadha*) and concealed desire (*bhava*), that is not manifest in organic expression or speech, besides attachment (*raga*), itself. Another commentator Sankar Misra adds three more to Prasastapada's list of eight, viz., desire for acquisition (*sprha*), greed (*lobha*) and miserliness (*karpanya*) and unwillingness to part with one's possessions.

Thus several needs have been classified under attachment (*raga*). We may now group them as arising at three levels. These are food, sex (*kama*) and will-to-live (*trana*) as the three basic needs. At a second level may be included compassion (*karuna*), on the one side, and greed (*lobha*), acquisition (*sprha*) and desire to realise a remote object (*samkalpa*) on the other, as secondary needs. Then, there are what may be termed as the tertiary needs of display (*dambha*), concealed desire (*bhava*), miserliness (*karpanya*), covetousness (*matsara*) and deception (*upadha*). In this manner we can conceive of attachment leading to action at these three levels—three at the first level, four at the second level and five at the third level, twelve on the whole. It must be recognised that Prasatapada's inclusion of dispassion (*vairagya*) as an action arising out of attachment appears to be a contradiction in terms.

It must be recognised further that the ancient Indian thinkers were looking upon attachment (*raga*) as a defect (*dosa*). This is why we have in the above list only five activities which are neutral or good, viz., food, sex, will-to-live, compassion and the desire to realise a remote object (*samkalpa*). All the remaining seven springs of action grouped under attachment by the various thinkers are clearly selfish or anti-social.

II. Aversion (Dvesa)

As regards the second spring of action, viz., aversion (*dvesa*), Vatsyayana includes under it anger (*krodha*); envy (*irsya*); jealousy (*asuya*); malice (*droha*) and intolerance (*amarsa*). Visvanatha adds two more, viz., cruelty (*himsa*) and self-reproach (*abhimana*) arising out of inability to harm the malefactor.

According to Prasastapada, aversion includes anger, malice, impotent rage (*manny*), intolerance (*aksama*) and humiliation (*amarsa*). Sankar Misra adds envy (*irsya*) and vindictiveness (*abhiyasuya*), the aversion of a powerless person which does not find expression in action, but is expressed more in thought.

The various aversive tendencies identified by these analysts may be grouped under two heads: (*a*) the out-going group which includes anger (*krodha*), envy (*Irsya*), jealousy (*asuya*), malice (*droha*) and cruelty (*himsa*) and (*b*) the retroflexive group referring back to the self, viz., self-reproach (*abhimana*) and humiliation (*amarsa*). The other aversive tendencies come under one or the other of these seven tendencies.

III. Delusion (Moha)

Finally with respect to delusion (*moha*), Vatsyayana mentions error (*mithya jnana*); doubt (*vicikitsa*); pride (*mana*); and negligence (*pramada*). Thus under delusion are included not only error, which may arise out of the false knowledge or misapprehension and doubt, which are both cognitive, but also pride or self-conceit, a sense of false superiority, exaggeration of one's importance and negligence, a failure to perform one's duties Visvanatha adds three more to Vatsyayana's four, viz., hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*), fear (*bhaya*), the apprehension that he may not be able to meet the situations that may arise in life, and grief (*soka*), one's inability to regain the cherished objects lost. Thus, according to Visvanatha, fear and grief are forms of false knowledge. All these seven tendencies identified by Vatsyayana and Visvanatha under delusion are cognitive as well as emotional. While, error, doubt and hypothetical reasoning are predominantly emotional. All of them are intellectual; they influence action which leads to maladjustment.

According to Vatsyayana, when right knowledge is attained wrong knowledge ceases and with its cessation the whole series of attachments and aversions drop off. Thus, overcoming delusion by right knowledge is at the basis of efficient and purposeful life (4.1.6.).

Summary

The chapter begins with a consideration of the treatment of the problem in the *Gita*. This work recognizes that human actions, like the animal action, are based on physiological needs. They are designated as actions which arise from the *gunas* of *prakriti*. It is shown that actions which are not governed by memory and reasoning lead to disaster. Attention is also drawn to the *Gita* view by which actions hould not be swayed by attachment to the consequences of one's action, viz., that action should be free from desire and hatred, success and failure. It is shown that the *Gita* theory of motivation assumes that action based on mere desires and hatreds,

likes and dislikes, belong to the lower level of personality and that principles should govern actions. Attention is also drawn to the concept of *lokasangraha*, that human action should be conducive to the well-being of society.

Analysis of writings regarding motives for action show that a clear distinction is made between reflex actions and actions based on tissue needs like hunger, thirst, sex, etc., and actions based on thought and deliberation.

Next a brief description is given regarding the behaviour of the new-born infant. There were two schools of thought, one basing such actions on the assumption that they are recollections of past life and the other trying to establish that they do not involve much assumptions. It is clear, however, that in general the assumption of past life has been favoured more than a positivistic explanation, because of the general acceptance of *karma* theory. Belief rather than reasoning pervades thinking on this matter.

A brief description is given about the differences of opinion between the Nyaya and the Mimamsaka thinkers regarding the problems of motives and the characteristics of voluntary action. In general, voluntary action, it is held, must be based on due deliberation.

The thinking regarding the springs of action is described next. They indicate that non-voluntary actions are based on the vital (needs of *prana*). Voluntary actions, on the other hand, are aimed at attainment of objects which promote well-being and the avoidance of actions which are harmful. One of the significant features of such thinking is that action guided by *moha*, delusion, leads to maladjustments and harmful consequences. There is a clear recognition that *moha*, delusion, is a peculiar continuation of cognitive, and emotional processes.

Finally, it is shown that according to Nyaya thinkers, the truly voluntary actions are those which lead to emancipation of the individual from the inferior desires to gain wealth, prestige, etc.

CHAPTER 12

Feelings and Emotions

A. Feelings

1. The Gita on Feelings

In his depression, Arjuna says that he wants neither the kingdom nor its pleasures (*sukhani*) and joys (*bhogah*) (I, 32-33). He asks how can they be happy (*sukhinah*) after killing the relatives (I, 37). He declares it a sin to slay the relatives because of *rajyasukhalobhana*, greed for the pleasures of the kingdom (I, 45). It is said that pleasures and pains arise through contact with objects and so, it is said one should be the same in pain and pleasure (II. 14-15) and must treat pleasure and pain alike (II, 38). The man of steady wisdom is one whose mind is untroubled in the midst of sorrows, who is free from eager desire amid pleasures, who does not rejoice when pleasures arise nor look at pain with loathsomeness. He draws away the senses from the objects which give rise to pleasure (II, 56-58). He who neither loathes nor rejoices is *nirdvandvo*, free from dualities (V, 3). One should not rejoice on obtaining what is pleasant nor feel miserable on obtaining what is unpleasant, because pleasures and pains have a beginning and an end, being generated by contact with objects (V, 20, 22). Pleasures and pains, like desires and hatreds, arise only in the field, the *kshetra*, and not in the self (XIII, 6). This is why the causes of pleasures and pains lie in *prakriti*, nature and not the *purusha*, the self (XIII, 20).

Finally, the *Gita* describes the three kinds of *sukha* as follows: (*a*) the *sattva*, that which springs from clear understanding and is like poison at first and like nectar at the end; (*b*) the *rajasa*, that which arises from the contact of senses and their objects and like nectar at first, but like poison at the end; and (*c*) the *tamasa*, which deludes the self both at the beginning and at the end, arising at it does from sleep, sloth and negligence (XVIII, 36-39).

The above quotations show that the author of the *Gita* looked upon two sources as giving rise to pleasures and pains, viz., (*a*) sense experiences and (*b*) success or failure of actions undertaken to satisfy desires. Both of them are looked upon as pleasures of a

lower order which are transitory. Further it is asserted that one must learn to endure these *dvandvas*, dualities, with equanimity. One should neither feel elevated when pleasures occur nor feel depressed when pains arise. It is also pointed out that pleasures and pains do not really affect the self, the *kshetrajna*. They affect only the *kshetra*, the psycho-physical complex. It is said that the *tamasik* pleasures delude one both at the beginning and the end, while the *rajastk* pleasures are like nectar to start with and end up as poison. On the other hand, the *sattvik* pleasures are beneficial. Though they appear to be painful in the beginning, ultimately they turn out to be like nectar. It is stated that the control over the desire for sense pleasure and for instant success appears to be painful in the beginning, but turn out to be very beneficial and salutary in the end. Disciplined life is not pleasant at the beginning, but gives rich dividends later on when it becomes habitual. It is pointed out that disciplined life needs constant effort.

2. The Buddhist Theory of Feeling

As noted above, according to Buddhism a human personality involves five *skandhas*, five constituent parts, viz., *rupa* (body); *vijnana* (self-consciousness); *vidana* (feeling); *samjna* (perception); and *samskara* (mental disposition).

Buddha Ghosha in his work *Visuddhimagga* recognises three kinds of feelings: pleasure, pain and mental feeling (*upeksha*). Pleasure is agreeable, pain is disagreeable and the mental feeling is neither pleasant nor painful. It is not mere absence of pleasure or absence of pain. It is a feeling that is opposed to these two. It is a positive feeling. Pleasure leads to the prolongation or intensification since it is enjoyed. Pain leads to hindering or withering of the state, since it is suffering. The function of *upeksha* is neither to intensify nor to weaken the associated state. While pleasure leads to acceptance of the object and pain to its rejection, the neutral feeling leads to neither. Feelings arise with *sparsa*, contact with sense-object intercourse. There are six kinds of contact, five connected with the five sense organs and the sixth is connected with the mind. According to Buddha Ghosha, pain is gross because it is disturbing and overpowering. But pleasure and neutral feeling are more subtle, being satisfying or quietening, respectively. However, the neutral feeling is the most subtle. Both pleasure and pain lead to intervention with the state of affairs, either to prolong or intensify or to hinder or wither it. By contrast, neutral feeling is peaceful and quiet. It is a

bodily feeling of indifference and a mental feeling of equanimity. It is possible to develop this feeling even when one is faced with pleasant or with painful situations. It quietens both attraction (*rati*) and aversion (*arati*). As a result when one cultivates the neutral feeling, one will gradually become free from both attractions and aversions.

Buddha Ghosha also classifies (*dukha*) sufferings: (*a*) intrinsic suffering (*dukha-dukha*); (*b*) suffering in change (*viparinama-dukha*); (*c*) suffering due to attitudes and habits (*samskara dukha*). Intrinsic pains arise from bodily pains and mental pain. They are essentially painful. Bodily pleasures and mental pleasures are called *viparinama dukha*, because, when they change or cease, they give rise to pain. The *samskara dukha* arise out of the attitudes and habits already formed.

3. **Nyaya-Vaiseshika View**

Gautama states in his *Nyaya Sutra* that fruition, *phalam*, pleasure and pain are objects of cognition (1.1.9). Commenting on this Vatsyayana states that pleasure is also a form of pain because every pleasure ends up as pain in the long run, that no pleasure is entirely free from pain, and that when one contemplates on the pleasures in life, he becomes disgusted. Because of these reasons, he becomes free from attachment to pleasures. In the next sutra, Gautama asserts that pleasure and pain, along with cognition, etc., are indicative of the *atman*, the self (1.1.10). Commenting on the sutra, Vatsyayana asserts that whatever is pleasant leads to the desire to have such pleasures in the future. Thus, pleasure is not only enjoyable when it lasts, it also generates the desire to obtain such experiences later on. Similarly painful experiences are not only disagreeable while they last, they also generate an aversion to those experiences later on. Pleasures and pains, thus, are responsible for three events; (*a*) experiencing them at the moment, (*b*) recalling them later on, and (*c*) making efforts to experience the same or similar pleasure later on or to aviod recurrence of pains later.

Pain, *dukham*, is defined as that which leads to *badhana*, annoyance (1.1.21). Vatsyayana asserts that annoyance means suffering, injury. Later on Gautama asserts that birth is associated with only pain because it is beset with annoyances (4.1.55). Then what about pleasure? In the next sutra, it is asserted that pleasure arises in intervals (4.1 56), and that the man who experiences pleasure is oppressed with the feeling that there is no cessation of annoyance for him (4.1.57). Vatsyayana comments that when a man is experi-

encing pleasure, he desires that this should continue. This desire is either not fulfilled or is only partially fulfilled. Even when there is fulfilment of the desire, a new desire besets him. Thus, he is very annoyed that his further desires are not satisfied. As a result there is no cessation of annoyance. Further, according to Gautama, often pains are regarded as pleasures (4.1.58). It is a familiar fact that many so-called pleasures of life like smoking, drinking, etc., are really painful. Vatsyayana also points out that disease and old age always face a human being, besides separation from agreeable things', contact of disagreeable things', non-fulfilment of desires' and so on. That is pleasures are there, but they are evanescent or they are mixed with pain. Pain, in the shape of cessation of pleasures, or in the shape of disagreeable things to come, will always be there.

Kanada, the author of *Vaiseshika Sutra* asserts that "pleasure and pain (*sukha-dukha*) are different from each other, since they arise from the cognition of a desirable object and an undesirable object, and are hostile to each other" (X, 1.1). Prasastapada, the commentator on *Vaiseshika Sutra*, defines pleasure as an agreeable feeling (*anugraha lakshnam sukham*). There is a sense of satisfaction or gratification. It is a subjective feeling. Another commentator, Sridhara, enumerates the following conditions as leading to pleasure: (*a*) the proximity of desirable objects such as perfumes etc.; (*b*) the intercourse of the objects with the appropriate sense organs; (*c*) the conjunction of the self with *manas*; (*d*) the perception of the desirable objects (*ishthopa-labdhi*) and; (*e*) health of the organism (*svasthata*), etc. The important point here is that attention is a condition of feeling. If one is preoccupied with somethings else, the objects may be there, but the feelings will not be there. Secondly Kanada regards pleasure and pain as two distinct feelings which are opposed to each other. Pleasure is produced by undesired (*anishtha*) objects. Further, the two are opposite. While pleasure is agreeable, pain is disagreeable. Also the two cannot coexist. Pleasure is accompanied by behavioural features like beaming face, bright eyes, etc. while pain is accompanied by pallor, drooping, etc. Thus, they have different mental effects and bodily expressions.

Thus, with respect to analysis of feelings Vaiseshika system differs a great deal from the Nyaya system.

4. Samkhya-Yoga View

According to Samkhya-Yoga, the three gunas produce the feel-

ings, pleasure, pain and dejection. Feelings are experienced by the *antahkarana* and not the self. This is the difference, while the Nyaya-Vaiseshika systems attribute feelings to the self, the Samkhya-Yoga systems attribute them to the mind. According to Vyasa, the commentator on Patanjali's *Yoga Sutra*, pleasure and pain are the modifications of *buddhi* and are attributed to the self (*purusha*) owing to non-discrimination (ii, 18). *Avidya*, false knowledge, is the cause of the self's experience of *bhoga*, pleasure and pain (ii, 24). It is the recollection of pleasure experienced on a former occasion that leads to attachment towards objects.

According to Samkhya systems there are three kinds of pains—*dukhatrayam*; (*a*) *adhyatmika dukha*—bodily and mental pains. While bodily pains arise from illness, etc., the mental pains arise from emotions and passions; (*b*) *adhibhavtika* pains caused by beasts, reptiles, human beings, etc. These pains arising from social reasons like torture exploitation, etc., are *adhibhavtika*; and (*c*) *adhidaivika*, pains caused by natural events like floods, famines, earthquakes, etc., all of which are unforeseen (*Tattbakaumudi* of Vachaspati Misra).

Patanjali mentions three kinds of pain, viz , (*a*) *parinama dukha*, pains arising from change; (*b*) *tapa dukha*, pains arising from anxiety; and (*c*) *samskara dukha*, pains arising from past impressions. Life is governed by change which is all-pervasive, and applies to all things at all times. People are afraid of such changes because they want things to continue as they are. They are terrified when vast changes either in nature or in society or in their family conditions take place. However those with *viveka*, discrimination, are realistic that changes are inevitable. Secondly, all pleasures are associated with anxiety. There is the fear of losing objects which give us pleasure, whether they are persons, things or money. Our sense of security is threatened. Thirdly, on the basis of our experiences, we develop attitudes and habits. We get used to particular kinds of environment, modes of living and pleasures. Any change which goes against these attitudes and habits give rise to pain in us (Taimni, p. 163 ff).

5. View of the Later Thinkers

Udayana (A.D. 1050) mentions four kinds of pleasures: (*a*) habitual pleasures (*abhyasika*) like pleasure derived from exercise, hunting, etc.; (*c*) pleasures of self-conceit (*abhimanika*), like the pleasure derived from the use of luxurious articles; (*c*) sentient pleasures (*vaisheyika*) derived from sweet taste, fragrant smells,

music, etc.; and (*d*) anticipatory pleasures (*manorathika*), anticipation of birthday festivities, etc. The physical pleasures are either based on recollection of a past pleasure or the anticipation of a future pleasure. Pleasures of self-conceit are based on pride of wealth, or power, or learning, etc.

Vijnanabhikshu, in his commentary *Yogavartika* or *Vyasa Bhashya*, distinguishes between sentient pleasures and rational happiness. Sentient pleasures are due to the gratification of desires. But happiness is due to the eradication of desires. When the mind is purified, that is, when the mind becomes free from desires for *vishaya*, objects, it become *sattnik*, and experiences happiness, as a result of contentment (ii, 42).

Prasastapada, in his commentary on *Vaisestrika Sutra*, mentions three kinds of pains: (*a*) sensory pain as a result of pain sensations; (*b*) *smritaja*, retrospective pain arising from recollection of past experiences; and (*c*) *sankalpaja*, prospective pains, as a result of anticipating undesirable objects in the future. While the first is based on sensory experiences, the latter two are mental.

According to Vidyaranya, the author of *Panchadasi*, besides pleasures and pains, there is *udasina*, the mental feeling, which is between pleasure and pain. At one end is pleasure, at the other end there is pain. Right in the middle is the mental feeling. He asserts that this mental feeling is the normal feeling. It is the phenomenal appearance of intrinsic bliss of the self (XI, 93-95). Pleasure leads to approach. Pain leads to avoidance. When an object causes neither pleasure nor pain, there is neither the approach response nor the avoidance response. This is why Vidyaranya calls it the normal state of the self.

As noted above, the Buddhist thinker Buddha Ghosha spoke of *upeksha* as the mental feeling. Vidyaranya speaks of mental feeling as *udasina*. Both of them agree that it is feeling which characterises the mature human beings. This is the state mentioned often in the *Gita*.

B. Emotions

1. The Gita on Emotions

The description of Arjuna's distress and sorrow gives a vivid picture of a person who is overwhelmed by compassion and grief. He says that his limbs quail, his mouth goes dry, his body shakes, his hair stands on end, his bow drops from his hand, his skin is burning, he is not able to stand with steadiness, his mind is reeling (I, 28-30). These verses describe the bodily and the mental changes

brought about by great sorrow. He says that his mind is bewildered and he does not know what he has to do and what his duty is (II, 7). Describing *sthitaprajna*, a man of steady wisdom, Krishna asserts that he is characterised by a mind that is untroubled in the midst of sorrows, free from eager desires amid pleasures, from which passion (*raga*) fear (*bhaya*) and rage (*krodha*) have passed away. Further on is a description of the consequences of frustration. Fram dwelling on objects of sense, attachment arises. Desire springs from attachment When there is frustration aggressiveness arises. With aggresiveness there is bewilderment (*moha*) and loss of memory (*smrittivibhraman*). With the loss of memory there is destruction of intelligence (*buddhinasa*), with the loss of intelligence, the man perishes because his intense anger makes him lose all values of life (II, 62-63). When a person is swayed by attachment (*raga*) and aversion (*dvesha*), there is no limit to follies committed. Craving (*kama*) and wrath (*krodha*) are born out of *rajo guna*, and they are all devouring (III, 34-37). Man who is free from passion fear and anger (*vitragabhayakrodha*), will have wisdom (IV, 10). He, who is able to resist the rush of *kama* and *krodha* is a happy man. He, who casts away *iccha*, *bhaya* and *krodha*, desire, fear and anger is a free man (V, 23-28). Fearless, a man will be serene (VI, 14). When a man is overpowered by passion, *rajo guna*, he is a victim of craving and attachment. He is restless and greedy (XIV, 7 and 13). Such a man is full of arrogance and harshness. He gives himself up to insatiable desiresand adopts any means to gratify his desires. There is no limit to what he does to satisfy his craving for power and wealth (XVI, 4, 10, 12). It is declared in conclusion that lust, anger and greed, *kama*, *krodha* and *lobha*, constitute the gateway to hell. So a man should abandon them (XVI, 21).

These verses show the intense power of emotions on man's behaviour and how they destroy all discretion and make him commit various crimes. They show that *raga*, attachment, is an effect of *rajas* (energy) of mind and that it generates clinging (*aasanga*) and yearning (*trishna*). This is why, the *Gita* asks man to develop *asanga* (detachment), so that he can be free from the sway of emotions and desires.

2. Patanjali on Emotions

Patanjali asserts that the great afflictions of emotions are *avidya* (ignorance), *asmita* (I-am-ness), *raga* (attraction), *dvesha* (repulsion) and *abhinivesa* (clinging to life) (*Yoga Sutra*, II, 3). As Taimni writes "The philosophy of klesas is an analysis of the underlying

and fundamental cause of human misery and sufferings and the way in which this cause can be removed effectively" (p. 135). In the next sutra, Patanjali asserts that *avidya* is the source of the remaining four afflictions (II, 4). *Avidya* is stated to be the mistaking of the non-eternal for the eternal (II, 5). Emotions are generated because some trifling incident or insult is magnified. Emotions arise because there is no clear notion of the *atman*, the self. Patanjali thus finds the root cause of afflictions of man in his ignorance. In other words, emotions which give rise to afflictions are traced to delusion regarding the fundamental problem of self. This becomes clear in the next sutra. *Asmita*, the feeling of the self arises when the *purusha*, the *drikshakti*, the pure consciousness, is identified with *buddhi*, the power of cognition (II, 6). This is a wrong identification. The enduring self is identified with the transitory cognitions, feeling, emotions, etc. That is, there is a loss of awareness of the true nature of the self. This is how, the feeling of self, *asmita*, is based on *avidya*, ignorance. The next sutra defines the third affliction, namely, *raga*, attraction. It is stated that attraction (*raga*) is based on *sukha* (pleasure) (VII, 7). Any object or person that gives rise to pleasure generates attraction in us. The opposite, namely, *dvesha* (repulsion or aversion) arises from pain, *dukha* (II, 8). These two, namely, attraction and repulsion form a pair which bind us to the various persons and objects. All our efforts are directed to the attainment of objects which give pleasure and avoidance of objects which give pain. The efforts are intensified by *asmita*, the feeling of self. Finally, *abhinivesa*, the strong decision for life, and the great fear of death, is said to afflict all persons including those who are learned *vidushah* (II, 9). *Abhinivesa* is will-to-live and is universal in all living beings. The sutra emphasises that mere learning will not enable us to overcome the will-to-live. This is an affliction, a source of misery which has to be destroyed.

These five *klesas* generate violence, *himsa* in thought, word and deed and is abetted by *lobha* (greed), *krodha* (anger) and *moha* (delusion). They result is endless pain to self and to others. They can be reduced if not eliminated by dwelling in the mind on their opposites (II, 34). The sutra shows the need to transform the thoughts and tendencies by dwelling on the opposites. One must be firmly established in *ahimsa*, non-violence by abandoning hostility, *vaira* (II, 35), what is recommended as *vaira-tyaga*, complete abandonment of all ideas and emotions of anger and hostility. It is hostility that is at the root of all violence, *himsa*. Secondly, one should be firmly

established in ***satya***, truthfulness (II, 36). This helps in avoidance of deceit and fraud which may be adopted to destroy the enemy.

It is needless to recall here how Gandhiji made these twin ideals of *satya* and *ahimsa* as the basis of ***satyagraha*** to win independence in India.

Next, Patanjali asks us to be firmly established in ***asteya***, non-stealing, non-misappropriation, ***brahmacharya***, sexual continence and ***aparigraha***, non-possessiveness (II, 37-39).

It is anger and hostility that make people come under the sway of violence, falsehood, stealing, sexual offences and the desire to take away and possess as much as possible. Controlling hostility and greed is possible when there is contentment, ***santosha*** (II, 42 and 43).

Patanjali describes that ***dukha***, pain, despair, nervousness and hard breathing, are the symptoms of the distracted condition of the mind (I, 31). These are the mental and physical symptoms of emotional condition. For removing these obstacles, there should be constant practice of ***ekatatva***, one principle (I, 32). Secondly, the mind becomes clarified by cultivating the attitude of ***maitri***, friendliness towards those who are happy, ***karuna***, compassion towards those who are in misery, ***mudosa***, gladness towards those who are helpful to others and ***upadeshanam*** to those who harm or cheat others (II,33). These are different ways in which the emotions are controlled and guided by reason and by compassion. The one defect is that one is asked to be indifferent towards those who harm and deceive others. Taimni, in exonerating Patanjali asserts, "The aspirant for yoga cannot frown upon the wicked because that would tend to arouse hatred and have undesirable repercussions on his own mind" (p. 87) It may be pointed out in passing that Gandhiji adopted satyagraha when he found that the Government or industry or some other agency was harming the citizens. He was certainly not indifferent to vice.

Another technique recommended by Patanjali to control passions is ***pratipaksha bhavanam***, focussing attention on thoughts which are opposite (II, 33 and 34). As Vyasa puts it, when thoughts of harming others or killing them or telling lies to escape or desire to appropriate the property of others, or to commit adultery occur, they should be inhibited by cultivating deliberately the opposites of such thoughts. As Taimni puts it, "The rationale of this technique for overcoming bad health and tendencies, whether they relate to action, feeling or thinking lies in the fact that all evil tendencies are rooted in wrong habits of thought and attitudes and, therefore, the only effective means of repressing them completely and permanently is

to attack the trouble at its source and alter the thoughts and attitudes which underlie the undesirable manifestation" (p. 231).

3. Buddhist Views

Early Buddhism enunciated the doctrine of *pratitya-samutpada*, the doctrine of casual connection. Phenomena happen in a series. The outstanding feature of human condition, according to Buddha, is suffering, misery. How does this arise? What being there, does suffering arise? The obvious answer, according to Buddha, was birth, that is, a passion is harm. On what does birth depend? It is also obvious that life arises out of existence of life, *bhava*. It is shown that existence would not prevail unless there is *upadana*, holding past on what does upadana depend? It depends on *trishna*, desire. On what does desire depend? It depends on *vedana*, feelings and emotions. It is not necessary here to go further with respect to this doctrine. What is important is the recognition by Buddha that *trishna*, desire and *vedana*, feelings and emotions are responsible for suffering. As noted earlier, *vedana* forms one of the firm skandles of the self. Thus in Buddhist thought desires, feelings and emotions play a significant role in the causation of sufferings and its control in preventing suffering.

According to *Samyutta Nikaya*, (III, 101) feelings (and emotion) arise not only on account of the sense contact but also on account of *samjna* (perception) and *samskara* (disposition) arising out of past impression). The *Dhammasanjini* classified *aasavas*, depravities, into *kamaasana*, desire, attachment, pleasure and thirst for sense-objects, *bhavasana*, desire attachment will be for existence, *ditthasana*, holding wrong notion but the self and body are one, that the transient is eternal, etc., *avidyasana*, ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its extinction and its means of extinction.

The Buddhist thinkers also describe *klesas*, afflictions. As Dasgupta writes, "the afflictions (*klesas*) do not differ much from the *aasavas* for they are but specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar to us, much as covetousness (*lobha*) anger or hatred (*dvesha*), infatuation (*moha*), arrogance, pride or vanity (*mana*), boastfulness (shamelessness), hardness of heart, doubt and uncertainty. These *klesas* proceed directly from aasavas" (Vol. I, p. 100). Generally the afflictions are counted as being threefold, namely *lobha*, *dvesha* and *moha*, greed, anger and delusion.

It is said that the human being in this thought, speech and action in intertwined by *tanhajata*, the tangles of desire. So the main task of man is to loosen these tangles. The means to do so are

the practice of right discipline (*sila*), concentration (*samadhi*) and wisdom (*prajna*). To quote Dasgupta again, "*Sila* briefly means the desisting form committing all sinful deeds. With *sila* therefore the first start has to be made, for by it one ceases to do all action prompted by bad desires and thereby removes the inrush of dangers and disturbances" (Vol. I,100).

Thus, according to Buddhist analysis, man's suffering is based on desires, feelings and emotions which cloud the intellect and lead him to thought, speech and action which ultimately harm others and harm himself. This can be overcome through self-control and vigilance. One should not allow oneself to be swayed by emotions and feelings. One should be conscious of them and thus control them.

4. The Jaina View

According to the Jaina thinkers, the self as such is all perfect. However, with the exception of *mukta jinas*, all others have their purity and power covered by a thin veil of *karma* matter and thus produce pleasure and pain, called *vedaniya* and obscure right faith and called, *mohaniya*. All suffering is due to these veilngs. As Dasgupta puts it, "The influence of these *karma* pesticides into the soul is called *aasana* in Jainism. These *karmas* are produced by body, mind and speech. They distinguish two kinds of *aasanas*: *bhavasana* and *karmasana*. *Bhavasana* means the thought activities of the soul through which the *karma* particles enter the soul. *Karmasana* means the actual entrance of the *karma* matter into the soul. *Bhavasanas* are in general of five kinds, namely, delusion, want of control, inadvertence, activities of body, mind and speech and passions, *kashyas* (Vol. I, p. 192 f). Five kinds of harmful activities which arise as a result of want of control, *avirati*, are given, namely, *himsa*, injury, falsehood, stealing, incontinence and desire to have things which one does not possess. Two kinds of control opposing the onrush of these *karma* particles are called respectively *bhavasamhara*, and *dravysamhara*. The *bhavasamhara* are the five vows of noninjury, truthfulness, abstinence from stealing, sex-control and nonacceptance of objects of desire, which correspond to the five *yamas* of Yoga Sutra. Thus by right conduct, that is, control of feelings and emotions in thought, speech, and action, the *karma* particles, are destroyed. When they are destroyed, the individual is liberated, that is, he exists in the pure state.

The Jaina thinkers divide emotions into two main classes, the first group of emotions include anger, which springs from thrusted

desire, pride, which consists of self-glorification, deceitful means adopted to attain desired objects and greed, craving for objects not yet attained. All these are called passions, the second group of emotions include mirth, attraction, repulsion, sorrow, fear, disgust, sex-feelings. These are four degrees of emotion, mild, strong, overpowering and irresistible. Anger, pride, deceit and greed are gross emotions or passions which stain the purity of the self. They throw the self into a state of agitation and interfere with the calmness of thought.

It is also believed that the karmic matter communicates colours, *lesya*, to the *jiva*. Six types of human beings are described. As Zimmer (1956) puts it, "Black is the characteristic colour of merciless, cruel, raw people, who harm and torture other beings. Dark-blue characters are roguish and venal, covetous, greedy, sexual and fickle. Dove-gray typifies the reckless, thoughtfulness, uncontrolled and irresistible, whereas the prudent, honest, magnanimous, and devout are fiery red. Yellow shows compassion, consideration, unselfishness, non-violence and self-control, while the white souls are dispassionate, absolutely disinterested and impartial" (p. 230). As Zimmer points out, the first two correspond to the *tamasa guna* group, the second two to the *rajasa guna* and the last two to the *sattva guna* (*Ibid.*, p. 229).

The four passions of anger, pride, deceit and greed are impediments to self-knowledge (Sinha, II, p. 162).

Summary

A. Feelings

The first section gives a brief description of the verses in the *Gita* on the feelings of pleasure and pain. Feelings are attributed to two sources, namely, the stimulation of the sense organs and to the success or failure to achieve one's goal. The feelings which arise from these two sources are looked upon as evanescent. So man is asked to initiate a state of mind which looks at pleasure and pain with equanimity. One should neither be elated by pleasure nor depressed by pain. Using the theory of gunas, the *Gita* looks upon the pleasure which arises from *sattva* as unwelcome to start with but relaxing at the end. The pleasure which arises from *rajas* is very welcome in the beginning but leaves one in depression at the end. The pleasure arising from *tamas* is delusive both at the beginning and at the end.

According to Buddhism, *vedana*, feeling, constitutes one of the

five skandles of human personality. Apart from pleasure and pain, there is a third feeling, namely, *upeksha*, neutral feeling. Though it is neither pleasant nor painful, it is a positive feeling. While pleasure leads to the prolongation of the conditions which gives rise to it and pain leads to efforts to avoid or extinguish it, the neutral feeling is peaceful. It is a feeling of equanimity. It quietens both attraction and aversion. This is the feeling that should be developed. Buddha Ghosha also draws attention to feelings which arise out of attitudes and habits, and what he calls the *samskara dukkha*.

According to Gautama, the author of *Nyaya Sutra*, pain is the only feeling. He recognizes that pleasure arises, but he shows that it arises only intermittently and that it inevitably leads to pain every time it arises.

But Kanada, the author of *Vaisertika Sutra* looks at feelings as being pleasant or painful. Pleasure arises when one is in contact with desired objects. Pain arises when one is in contact with undesirable objects.

The Samkhya theorists attribute feeling to the operation of the three *gunas*. Another well-known view of the system is the classification of pains into three categories, those which arise from social contacts (including pains caused by animals, insects, etc.) and the pains which arise from natural conditions like floods, famines, etc. Patanjali mentions three classes of pains, those arising from change in conditions and circumstances, those arising from anxieties and those arising from past impressions, *samskara*.

Thus, it will be observed that there is close resemblance between the classification of Buddha Ghosha and Patanjali. Both emphasise that pains arise from changes in external conditions, on the one hand and the pains which arise from *samskaras*, past impressions, on the other.

A brief description is next given of the views of some of the later thinkers. Vidyaranya also argues for the existence and the importance of the neutral feeling. He looks upon it as the normal feeling and that it is akin to the feeling which obtains with liberation.

Though there are many controversies, all the theorists agree that one should not be governed in one's thoughts and actions by feelings. Secondly, it is recognised that there are two sources which give rise to feelings. Secondly, it is recognized that there are two sources which give rise to feelings, one purely sensory and the other which arises as a result of success or failure of one's endeavour. A third source is recognised by some, namely, *samskara*, *dukha*, pains

arising from past impressions. Another important contribution is that pleasure leads to efforts to prolong it and pain leads to efforts to avoid or extinguish it. Finally, attention may be drawn to the view that the aim of man should be to develop equanimity.

B. Emotions

The section on emotions also starts with a brief consideration of the views of the author of the *Gita*. Attention is drawn to the behavioral study of effects of depression on Arjuna. Secondly, it is shown that the *Gita* has developed the frustration-aggression hypothesis. Thirdly, it is recognised that emotions can completely overpower one's destruction. Only that man is wise who is free from the grip of passion, intense emotion. Lust, anger and greed are declared to be the gateways for the distruction of man. Emotions, it is said, lead to *asanga*, clinging and *trishna*, yearing. So one is asked to cultivate *asanga*, detachment.

The views of Yoga theorists Patanjali and Vyasa are given next. The great afflictions of man are said to be ignorance, egoism, attraction, repulsion and clinging to life. All these afflictions arise ande motions dominate a man's behaviour, it is said because out of ignorance, he is unable to differentiate between what is trivial and trifling and what is enduring; fear, anger, and other emotions arise because the trivial events are takeni n a serious manner. Delusions, thus, are shown to be important in giving rise to emotional experiences. It is shown that these five afflictions generate violence in thought, word and deed. So the cultivation of *ahimsa* by abandoning hostility is recommended. It is further recommended that one should cultivate friendliness, compassion and other traits which will counter hostility. Finally man is asked to control his passion by focusing his thoughts and attention on the opposite, *pratipaksha bhavanam.*

Buddhist thinkers also show the important part played by emotions in producing misery. They lead to *aasavas*, depravities. They also point out the important part played by *lobha*, covetousness, *dvesha*, hatred and *moha*, infatuation. They are looked upon as tangles which enmesh a man. So one should not allow oneself to be swayed by emotions and feelings. One should be conscious of them and control them.

The chapter ends with a brief description of the views of Jaina thinkers on emotion. Man is pure and free. But his emotions and actions envelop him with particles which further cloud his thinking and actions. Anger, which arises from thwarted desires, pride and

greed are shown to be the passions which stain the purity of life. The sixfold classification of human beings on the basis of their emotional reactions is similar to the threefold classification of the influence of ***gunas***.

CHAPTER 13

Samskara, Vasana and Attitude

1. Introduction

The two terms *samskara* and *vasana* have been used in a technical way in ancient and medieval thought. Both these terms are of great psychological value. However, there are two difficulties. First of all neither of these two terms has been defined and their scope delimited by the ancient Indian thinkers as far as my knowledge goes. Secondly, the same term *samskara* is used both with respect to reflections on mental processes and also with respect to the traditional rituals connected with incidents right from the conception to the death of an individual. In ordinary conversation, the term *samskara* is used both in the psychological and in the ritualistic sense. Added to this confusion, therei s a third difficulty, viz., there is the assumption of the doctrine of *punarjanma*, that thoughts, speech and actions are conditioned not only by one's upbringing and experiences, but also by the impressions left on the enduring *sukshma* or *linga sarira*, which goes on from birth to birth. Scholars as well as the illiterate rural folk firmly believe that the impressions, or *samskaras*, left on the mind by the experiences of a series of past lives influence one's thoughts and behaviour. They also believe that they determine the conditions of one's birth in a given family, *varna*, country, etc.

Thus, the understanding and utilisation of these two terms, viz., *samskara* and *vasana* in delineating the ancient Indian reflections on mind and behaviour pose a number of difficulties. Being fully aware of these difficulties, an attempt is made here to disentangle the concepts from the loose thinking as well as from superstition and to indicate the value of these ancient Indian thoughts for the understanding of human behaviour.

2. Samskara in Buddhist Thought

Reference to the *Concordance of the Upanishads and the Gita* by Jolly confirmed the presumption that the two terms *samskara* and *vasana* have not been used in them.

On the contrary, the study of the Buddhist literature clearly

shows that Buddha himself used the concept of *samskara* in a very effective, though rather confusing manner. It is interesting to note that the term *samskara* is used both with respect to the concept of *pratitya samutpada* and the concept of *pancha skandhas*. Dahlke (1927) in his book *Buddhism*, writes "Let us, for example, take the word in which the character of Buddhism is best mirrored, the word in which the *anatta* doctrine most truly is represented, namely, the word *sankhara*. I do not know how many years I have lain on watch to find the correct translation of this word. All my trouble was in vain; and my first step forward was this, that it became clear to me that its correct translation would remain impossible so long as I had not myself fully understood, what is meant by *sankharas*; and that my incapacity for an adequate translation, clearly proved by the necessity for making different translations, was caused only by a lack of understanding of the meaning of the word" (p. 13).

The term *samskara* is used to designate the second link in *pratitya samutpada*, the first being *avidya* and the third being *vijnana* (consciousness). *Samskara*, tendencies, are said to arise from *avidya* and lead to the rise of *vijnana* (consciousness), which in turn leads to *nama-rupa*, the body-mind complex. Thus, the term *samskara* is very important in Buddhist analysis of personality as being one of the main links, what is termed as conditioned co-production by Bhikshu Sangharakshta in his book *Survey of Buddhism*. So the tendencies in the individual are traced to *avidya* (ignorance) and are said to lead to consciousness.

Secondly, as is well known, the term *samskara* is also used as one of the constituents of personality, viz., the *pancha skandah* along with *rupa* (body), *vedana* (feeling), *samjna* (perception) and *vijnana* (consciousness). In this totality, *samskara* is said to follow feeling and perception.

Thus, a great deal of confusion has arisen by the use of the same concept, *samskara* to indicate the tendencies (*vasana*) arising out of *avidya* and also as one of the constituents of the mind-body complex.

Personally, I feel that the term *samskaras* is used in the context of *pratitya samutpada*, to stand for the biological urges and that in the context of *pancha skandhas*, it is used to indicate the impressions of experiences which influence subsequent experiences in the individual's life. Thus it is possiole to understand the term *samskara* as indicating both the biological urges and also the traces left on the mind which are responsible for memory and development

of personality. Subsequently, as will be shown below, the Buddhist thinkers used the term ***vasana*** for the residual impression instead of the word *samskara* which assumes an enduring self.

Though the Buddhist thinkers lay very great emphasis on the terms *samskara* and *vasana* in their analysis of mental processes, they do not accept the role of *samskara* in perception, recognition etc. For example, with respect to the process of recognition the Buddhist analysers assert that it cannot be attributed to sense perception, because it produces only direct apprehension. Nor can it be attributed to *samskara*, the impressions left by previous experience, since they refer only to the past and not to the present experience. It is argued that recognition is not a unitary process which apprehends both the present and the past at the same time. So it is asserted that recognition consists of two distinct processes, presentative and representative (Sinha I, pp. 95-96).

Prabhakara, the Mimamsaka thinker, asserts that in the consciousness *aham idam janami*', 'I know this,' there is simultaneous presentation of the object, the knower and the relation between the two. But the Buddhists, on the basis of their basic assumption of momentariness of experiences and *anatma*, the absence of any enduring self, hold that these three elements are not simultaneous. They are discrete processes, nor is there any relation between them. These three processes of the known object, the knowing subject and the relation of knowing flow in succession. They posit that when the first process occurs and vanishes, it leaves a *vasana*, a residuum which colours and modifies the second process and so on. They call this succession of impressions, *vasana samkrama*, the residue of the former colouring or modifying the later. As Sinha observes, "Thus, the Buddists invented the hypotheses of residua (*vasanas*), transference of residua (*vasana-samkrama*) and modification of impressions by residua (*upaplava*) to explain away the fact of continuity" (Vol. I, p. 157).

3. Nyaya

The Nyaya thinkers use the term *samskara* to explain memory (*smriti*). Annam Bhatta in his *Tarka Sangraha* defines memory as *samskara matra janyam jnanam smritih* (*Tarka Sangraha*, p. 57).

Bijalwan (1979) has given a classification of knowledge which is very useful. He shows that Gautama uses the term '*jnana*', '*buddhi*' and '*upalabdhi*' as synonyms (*Nyaya Sutra*, 1.1.15). He also points out that Prasasthapada adds a fourth term, viz., '*pratyaya*' to innate knowledge. According to this classification, knowledge

consists of *anubhava*, experience on the one hand, and *smriti* (memory) on the other. However, Nyaya thinkers as well as other ancient thinkers normally recognise that the knowledge arising from memory may or may not be true depending upon how faithful the memory re-production is to the original experiences. As indicated above, the Nyaya thinkers as well as others explain memory in terms of *samskara*, i.e., traces and the impressions left on the mind by the experiences. Thus, when an individual lives through experience, there arises not only valid knowledge like perception, inference etc., but the experience also leaves an impression on the mind which may be available for later reproduction and which may be true (*yathartha*) or false (*ayathartha*).

4. Analysis of Perception and Illusion

As noted above (Chapter 6), Prabhakara, the Mimamsa thinker, asserts that in determinate perception there is the apprehension of the generic character as well as the specific character of the object. When the objection is raised that in one act of perception there is only one object, so there is no possibility of apprehending such characteristics, it is argued that the *samskaras*,' the impressions of the previous perceptions are revived and the self is aware of the object as belonging to a particular class (Sinha, I, p. 36).

The Jaina thinkers also look upon *samskara* as the cause of determinate perception. Memichandra, in his *Dravyasamgraha* writes, "*Dharana* consists of the lasting impression which results after the object, with its particulars, is definitely ascertained. It is this *samskara* which enables us to remember the object afterwards" (Sinha, I, 109). Thus according to this Jaina thinker *samskara* plays an important part both in perception and in retention.

The Nyaya thinkers assert that *samskaras* may also produce illusions. For example, when the nacre is seen, its brightness may lead to the illusion that it is silver since the brightness of silver occurs as a result of the previous experience. Similarly they explain hallucinations on the basis of *samskaras* (Sinha, Vol. I, p. 280).

5. Memory and Recognition

Vatsyayana, in his *Nyayabhasya*, asserts that it is the self that recalls and thus refutes the Buddhist position that memory is due merely to a stream of cognitions (iii, 2.43). That is, recollection presupposes, not only the past apprehensions by the self, but also the *samskara*, impressions, which are retained and now recalled. The *samskaras* are excited to arise by the perception of a similar

object (Sinha, Vol. I, p. 376). Thus retention and recall, according to Nyaya thinkers, presupposes the retention of *samskaras* and their revival or awakening.

The Jaina thinker, Manikyanandi, the author of *Pariksha-mukhasutra*, defines memory as *samskarodbodhanibanadhava tadityakara smritih* (iii, 3). Recollection is the cognition in the form of 'that' which is produced by the revival of a *samskara* (Sinha, Vol. I, p. 377).

The Samkhya theorists also define memory in terms of *samskara*, Vijnanabhikshu defines memory in his *Sankhya Pravachanabhashya* as *smritih samskara janyam jnanam*, that memory is a cognition produced by *samskaras* (ii, 33).

Similarly, Salikanatha Misra, a Prabhakara Mimamsaka defines memoryi n his *Prakaranapanchika* as *smritih punah purvavijnana—samskaranaatrajam jnanam*, that it is represented cognition which is produced by the *samskara* of a past cognition (Sinha I, p. 379).

In his *Vivaranaprameyas samgraha*, Vidyaranya, the medieval Vedantin also looks upon "recollection as a reproduction of an object exactly as it was apprehended in the past, which depends upon the mere revival of the *samskaras* of the past apprehension. It cannot transcend the limits of the past apprehension. It cannot be created, destroyed or altered at will (Sinha, Vol. I, p. 379).

Prasastapada, in his *bhashya* on *Vaiseshika Sutra*, mentions three causes for *samskara* formation, viz., intense cognition, repeated cognition aud interesting cognition. *Patvabhyasadhara pratyayajah* (Sinha I, p. 390).

6. Yoga View

As already noted, Patanjali in his *Yoga Sutra* and Vyasa in his commentary on the *Yoga Sutra*, have used the terms *samskara* and *vasana*. Patanjali asserts that control of mind become steady as a result of repeated *samskaras* (III, 10). He also asserts that by perceiving the *samskaras*, knowledge of the past arises (III, 18). In *Yoga Sutra*, the *samskara* stands for the latent impressions which remain unconscious. According to Patanjali and Vyasa, *samskaras*, impressions made on the mind by experience may not be available to the consciousness though they certainly influence the character, feelings and desires. Thus the same term *samskara* is utilised in *Yoga Sutra* to postulate the concept of the unconscious also.

In other words, *samskaras* available to consciousness influence memory. But they may not be available to consciousness though they influence thoughts, desires and so on.

7. Now as regards the term *vasana*, which may be broadly translated as tendencies, we find that this term is used occasionally by Patanjali, but very frequently by Vasishtha in the ancient times and by Vidyaranya in the medieval times. As already noted, according to Dasgupta, the word *vasana* is a later term not used either in the earlier Upanishads or in the Buddhist Pali texts Dasgupta also asserts that the term *vasana* refers to tendencies which lie dormant in the mind.

What then is the difference between *vasana* and *samskara*? According to Dasgupta, *samskaras* are states which are constantly generated by experiences, but *vasana* does not depend upon the experience of an individual. In other words, *vasana* refers to the biological tendencies which are not the result of personal experience.

However, the use of the term *vasana* by Vasishtha as well as Vidyaranya seems to indicate that the term refers not only to the biological tendencies which are inherited but also to the tendencies developed by the individual in the course of his life and which influence his behaviour.

If we take the term *vasana* in the latter usage, it appears to be very near to the modern concept of attitude. A brief description of the way in which the term *vasana* is used by Vasishtha and Vidyaranya may now be attempted.

Vasishtha (6th century A.D.), in his book *Yoga Vasishtha*, has used the term *vasana* very often. In one verse, he explains that *vasana* is so called when the mind is fixed on the objects of enjoyment to the neglect of everything else (III, 96.20).

The ninth chapter of the second book is devoted to an inquiry into the effects of *vasana*, tendencies, and predilections on man's thoughts and actions. He says that people look upon that as action which is merely the *manovasana*, the tendencies arising out of the past experiences.

He also uses the term *vasana* to stand for the impressions of past activities, which may be good or bad. He says that they may be reinforced if they are good and inhibited if they are bad. He says that *vasanas* are established through practice, and so they are quite powerful. In this context, the term *vasana* appears to be close to the modern technical term attitude.

In another context, he asserts that it is *vasana* which makes poison into ambrosia and untruth into truth and goes on to conclude *chideva vasana*, *chit* (mind) itself *vasana* (III, 56, 34).

In another context, he says that persons who are free from *vasana*, do what has to be done without any sense of *kartritva*, sense of

agency (iv, 34.18). Here, he appears to use it in the sense of attitude, that is free from both favourable or unfavourable attitudes towards the person or the action.

He goes on to posit that the aim of the mature individual is *vasana kshaya*, the dissolution of all tendencies, favourable and unfavourable (IV, 35.69). Continuing, he asserts that it is *vasana* which leads to *samsara*, involvement in mundane affairs. Therefore, liberation consists in *vasana kshaya*, the dissolution of all tendencies and desires which make a man particularistic and parochial in his outlook and social dealings. It is *vasana* which ties down a person to his upbringing and generates a narrow outlook towards himself, his family, his status, his enjoyments and his sorrows. This is bondage. Being free from them is liberation. This is possible through *vasan kshaya* (IV, 57.19-20). Describing the *jivanmukta*, the liberated man, he asserts that he is one who is free from all *vasanas* and that he does whatever he has to do with dispassion. He looks upon all human beings in the same way (V,18.2-4) Since by definition, consciousness, *chit*, is pure, the *vasanas*, tendencies and predispositions are imaginary. The *chit* is *alepa*, free from the smearing of *vasanas* (V, 53.1-4). The man who is free from *vasana* becomes a *samadarsi*, equiminded towards all persons (V, 60.7). Later on he defines *ajnani*, a man of wisdom as one who is free from *vasanas*, whose actions are free from predispositions (VIb, 22.2).

As the present writer has noted (Kuppuswamy, 1981), "Vasishtha uses the concept of *vasana* very frequently. However, it is only in the sixth chapter of the second *prakarna*, he gives some analysis of the concept" (p. 247). He describes *vasanas* as the residues of the past thoughts and actions which persist and influence the present thoughts and actions. He recognises that the man of discrimination could strengthen the good tendencies and weaken the bad tendencies, since *vasanas* are under one's control. What is the criterion to decide whether the *vasana* is good and beneficial or bad and injurious? According to Vasishtha, the injurious *vasanas* are those which cause misery and perplexity to the individuals They induce a state of concept. For Vasishtha, the final aim is to attain the *jivanmuktha* state. To attain this, means is *vasana kshaya*, the dissolution of all *vasanas*, to be free from their influence in one's behaviour. In conclusion, the present writer has stated "Vasishtha's concept of *vasana* corresponds to what is called 'attitude' in modern psychology' (p. 25).

In his *Jivanmuktiviveka*, Vidyaranya (14th century A.D.), has used the *vasana* concept. He calls *vasana* as the taint of the mind, freedom

from *vasana* is attained by one in whom there are no *vrittis*, transformation of mind (p 206).*

He declares that the means to achieve liberation consists of the following: (1) *tattvajnan*, (2) *manonasa*, and (3) *vasana kshaya*, viz., knowledge, dissolution of mind and obliteration of *vasanas*, tendencies (p. 232).

The whole of the second chapter of the work is devoted to the problem of *vasanas*, how they arise, their function and their obliteration. In this he follows closely *Yoga Vasishtha*.

He also uses the concept of *chitta vritti*, the modifications of mind, developed by Patanjali in his *Yoga Sutras*. He states that dissolution of the mind means giving up all connection with these transformations (p. 234). As regards *vasana*, he describes it as *samskaras* which generate anger and other emotions, which rise up all of a sudden and leads to action without any thought of a past or future (*purvapara-parmarasam*). That is, *vasanas* arise on the basis of previous experience.

It is something that saturates the mind like smell or fragrance. The obliteration of *vasana*, he says, means the absence of scope for the rise of anger andt he like, even in the presence of appropriate external causes. He also shows that the two, namely, dissolution of *manas* and the obliteration of *vasana*, are closely linked (p. 235). He also points out that the study of Upanishads leads to *jnana*, the practice of Yoga leads to dissolution of the mind and the setting up of an opposite current (*vasana kshayasya pratikula vasanotpadam*) leads to the obliteration of *vasana* (p. 238).

As regards the method of obliterary *vasana* by personal effort, Vidyaranya quotes Vasishtha, "*vasana* may be described as that hankering after things, which gains mastery over the mind, as to preclude even inquiring into their antecedents and consequents. He at once becomes that with which he identifies himself, by force of strong and deep attachment and loses memory of every other thing in the act. The man thus subdued by *vasana*, fixing his eye on anything whatever is deluded into believing it as the real thing; owing to loss of control due to the powerful influence of *vasana*, the object thus perceived gives up its real form. Thus one does with beclouded eye perceive everything quite in this deluded fashion, like one under the

*The page reference is to the work of *Jivanmuktiviveka* edited with English Translation by Subrahmanya Sastri and Srinivasa Iyengar, Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1978.

influence of a strong intoxicant" (*Laghu*, 28, 48-51, p. 256).

Thus Vasishtha as well as Vidyaranya look upon behaviour governed by *vasana* as being equivalent to the behaviour under the influence of a strong intoxicant. That is, being in the grip of *vasana*, an individual loses all sense of reality and propriety.

Vidyaranya elaborates this by pointing out how people under the influence of traditional customs *desachara*, *kuladharma*, *bhasha-bheda* (mother-tongue)—blindly follow them. He quotes Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (4.5.4) which asserts, "He shapes his ideas in accordance with his desires, he does such acts to fulfil his ideas, he becomes that which he does" (p. 256). He also quotes the *Gita* and says that the life of the person under the influence of *asuri sampat* (16.7-12) is really a description of the person under the control of *vasana* (p. 257). He concludes by asserting that *vasana* precludes rational inquiry into the antecedents and consequences of things, that is, reflection about the objects and events. He who is under the control of *vasana* is under the control of *ahamkara*, egoism, *mama-kara*, mineness *kama*, desire and *krodha*, anger (p. 260).

Vidyaranya differentiates between what he calls pure *vasana* and impure *vasana*. He proceeds to describe three kinds of impure *vasana*, viz , (1) *loka vasana*, covering the opinion of the world, (2) *sastra vasana*, related to learning, and (3) *deha vasana*, related to the body.

Loka vasana consists in the strong desire for conformity so as to avoid social censure and obtain social approval. He points out how the great Rama and Sita, the characters in the epic *Ramayana* were victims of public opinion, in spite of their exalted character and behaviour. He also refers to the way in which the Southern Brahmans upbraid the Northern Brahmans who are condemned as *mam-sabhakshina*, meat-eaters, even though they are well-versed in the Vedas. And how the Northern Brahmans retaliate by finding fault with the Southern custom of *matula sutodvahinah*, marrying the daughter of a maternal uncle. This is why, he asserts, the books dealing with liberation advise that one must learn to treat censure and praise alike (p. 261-62).

As regards *sastra vasana*, pride of learning, Vidyaranya says that it takes three forms, *pathyavyasanam*, addiction of study, *bahusastra vyasanam*, addiction to many subjects and *anushthanavyasanam*, addiction to observance and injunction of the scriptures. He quotes the case of Bharadvaja, with his unquenched pursuit of studies, as related in *Taittiriya Brahmana*, the case of Durvasa, who had knowledge of all sastras except knowledge of the self, and the way

in which Mundaka Upanishad ridicules ritualistic observances (p. 262 ff).

Deha vasana, relating to the body is also described as being threefold: false identification of the self with the body, false dequisition of grace through the use of perfumes, etc., and seeking relief from disease and death through medicines or through rituals (p. 266 ff).

He adds a fourth *vasana*, namely. *manasa vasana*, consisting of hypocrisy, vanity and the like, which make up the life of the lower self. He calls all these four as *vasana chatushtaya*. All these four, he asserts, have to be destroyed by some means or other (p. 270). He asserts that the influence of *vasanas* is due to the *tamasa* and *rajasa gunas*. However, when *sattva* gains mastery, the life of the higher self is established and *jnana*, wisdom, prevails (p. 273).

When the objection is raised, whether it is possible to be free from these four *vasanas*, he shows how the mind is generally muddled by love and hate, *chittam hi raaga-dvesha kalushikriyate*. He quotes the definition of Patanjali that love is that which dwells on pleasure and hate is that which dwells on pain, (*Yoga Sutra*, 2.7-8). He also refers to the remedy prescribed by Patanjali to overcome the dominance of love-hate over the mind through the practice of friendship, *maitri*, compassion, *karuna*, etc. (*ibid.*, 1.33, p. 277). He shows that these sentiments help in *chitta suddhi*, cleansing or clarifying the mind (p. 281).

Thus, in this work, Vidyaranya follows up Vasishtha and deals with the concept of *vasana* in a way which appears to be close to the concept of attitude in modern psychological work.

8. Samskara vs. Vasana

It is clear from the literature available that Buddha and the Buddhist thinkers postulated *samskara* as a very important principle in *pratitya samutpada* and that *samaskara* is one of the five *skandhas*.

But they do not agree with the view that *samskaras* are responsible for memory and recognition. They use the concept of *vasana*, as noted above to explain these processes.

On the other hand, the Nyaya-Vaiseshika, Samkhya-Yoga, Mimamsa and Vedanta thinkers repudiated the Buddhist theory of *anatam* and contended that the postulation of an enduring *atman* is necessary to explain perceptual as well as retentive processes. They used the concept of *samskara* to explain the characteristics of determinate perception as well as retention.

But the Buddhist thinkers appear to have rejected this hypothesis

of *samskara* because it assumed an enduring self. However, they recognised the fact that perception in its later stages as well as memory require the assumption that the residues left by past experiences is necessary in order to explain them. So, it appears as if they used the concept of *vasana* to get out of this situation. Just as the smell endures in an object, the impressions endure. As Sinha puts it, they looked upon "*vasana* as the residua of the momentary cognitions which modify the succeeding cognitions, which do not abide in a permanent self" (Vol. I, p. 385).

It looks as if Vasishtha and later on Vidyaranya used the concept of *vasana* to indicate the biological urges on the one hand, and the tendencies built up in the individual as a result of his experience.

It is interesting to note that Safaye observes in passing that Vasanas are innate tendencies while the *samskaras* are generated by experience (p. 111). Similarly Ramachandra Rao observes that *samskaras* are impressions of past experiences while *vasanas* are tendencies or predispositions (p. 45). Rao also gives the etymological roots of the two terms. The term *samskara*, he points out, signifies improvising something already 'existing', while the term *vasana* is derived from the root *vas* 'to stay' indicating that the tendencies and predispositions persist. He proceeds to observe, "The impressions and predispositions together constitute the motivational dynamics; they are the springs of our thought and action" (p. 48 ff).

Such, appears to be the history of the two concepts in ancient Indian thought. It is the varied use of the concept by the different schools of thought which is responsible for the confusion.

9. Conclusion

1. The term *samskara* as used by the Buddhist thinkers refers to (*a*) the biological tendencies and (*b*) the impressions of experience which influence thoughts, desires and so on.

2. The term *samskara* as used by the Nyaya thinkers refers to the traces left on the mind by experiences which help us to recall the past experiences.

3. The term *samskara* as used by Patanjali and elaborated by Vyasa, refer not only to memory but also to the unconscious formations which may influence our daily conduct. Therefore, according to them the aim of a man is to observe his behaviour and mental processes through constant reflection so that he is not influenced by the unconscious in his behaviour.

4. The term *vasana* as used by Vasishtha and Vidyaranya seems to

indicate that it stands not only for the biological urges, but also for the attitude developed by the individuals on the basis of his experiences of which he may or may not be aware. The aim of an individual according to them is to be free from the influence of *vasana* or attitudes in our behaviour particularly in social behaviour.

Thus the term *samskara*, appears to have three connotations. First, it connotes the impressions left on the mind by experiences, which help us to recall the past experiences. Secondly, it indicates that our past experiences enrich us so that the later perceptions are influenced by the past assets, as it were. Thirdly, some of the past experiences, particularly, the highly emotional experiences, become latent, unconscious, that is not available to the consciousness, which nevertheless influence our behaviour.

The term *vasana* appears to have two connotations. First, it stands for the biological urges like the need for food, sex, rest, etc., which mankind shares with the animals. Secondly, it connotes the way in which our life experiences influence our attitudes, our likes and dislikes, etc., though we may not be aware of their influence on our behaviour, feelings and thoughts.

SUMMARY

An attempt has been made in this chapter to determine the meanings of the two terms, *samskara* and *vasana*, used often in ancient Indian books.

It is shown that both the terms were used first by Buddhistic thinkers. Buddha himself appears to have used the term *samskara*. However, the term was adopted by the Hindu thinkers to indicate the processes by which memory arises. They showed that these impressions are formed in a self or mind; that they persist through time so that remembering and recognition are possible.

When the term *samskara* was thus utilized by the orthodox schools, it looks as if the later Buddhist thinkers used the concept of *vasana* to explain how impressions persist, though there is no enduring self or enduring mind.

Later thinkers like Vasishtha and Vidyaranya used the term like *vasana*.

The chapter seeks to show that it is possible to limit the term *samskara* to the impressions left on the mind by the various experiences, which help to understand the processes of retention, recall and recognition. It is also shown that Patanjali as well as Vyasa use

the concept to postulate the unconscious. The impressions left by the past experiences may not be available to consciousness, though they influence behaviour.

It is shown that the term *vasana* is close to the modern concept of attitude, particularly as it is developed by Vasishtha and Vidyaranya. An effort has also been made to show how the assumption of a previous life is not necessary to account for the influence of *samskaras* and *vasanas* on our behaviour, thoughts and feelings.

CHAPTER 14

Self and Personality

1. The Upanishadic View

The Upanishadic thinkers, as noted above, looked upon the *atman*, the self, as the basic concept and as being equivalent to the concept of *brahman*, the universal. In the Bhrigavathi of the Taittiriya Upanishad, reflection on the self from the lowest to the highest has been described (III, 1-6). Food, *annam*, is looked upon as the essence of life, self and personality. With further thought Bhriger realizes that *prana* Vitality is the essence. Food cannot be taken unless the organism is alive. Further reflection enables him to realise that *manas* is the essence. Life without appetition and aversion cannot lead to search for and consumption of food in order to maintain life. Further reflection, however, shows to Bhriger, that as far as human beings are concerned *vijnana*, the self-conscious principle, is the essence since *manas* is merely an instrument that is controlled by self-consciousness. Finally Bhriger arrives at *ananda*, bliss, as the ultimate essence. Commenting on this ascent in reflection Swami Sharvananda writes, "Through observation and reasoning, Bhrigu found out that food is perishable, *prana* is unconscious, mind is changeable, and intelligent action is limited and exposed to pleasure and pain and that therefore none of these can satisfy the definition of *brahman* as that from which beings are born" (p. 151). Brihadaranayaka Upanishad also identifies the self with *vijnana* (II, 1.17). Katha Upanishad looks upon the *atman* as that by which man cognizes, *avijneyam* (IV, 3). The highest expression was in Aitareya Upanishad, "All that is guided by *prajana*, consciousness. The whole world is founded on *prajnana*. Therefore, *prajanana* is *brahman*" (III, 1.4). If consciousness, *prajnana* or *vijnana* or *chit* is the highest, how can one know the knower? Self-consciousness is based on a duality of subject and object. This led to the realization that the *atman* can be described only negatively. Yajnavalkya says, "They say *brahman* is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long . . . It has neither instrument of vision nor organs of hearing. It is neither speech nor mind . . ." (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad

III. 8.8). This self is that which has been described as *neti*, not this. This self is not perceivable, being beyond the attributes of effects. This self not being a differeniated object is never perceived by the *indriyas* (organs)" (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad III, 7.26).

Thus, according to the Upanishads, the *atman* has no attributes. It is devoid of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell (Katha Upanishad III, 15). So it cannot be perceived by the sense organs. Nor can it be perceived by *manas*, the internal organ, because it is devoid of pleasure, pain, etc (Kana Upanishad I, 50). The *atman* is beyond the categories of time, space and causality, since it is the ultimate reality. These categories refer only to phenomenal reality. Since the *atman* is the knower, it cannot be known. As the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad puts it, *vijnataram* are *kena vijantyat*—how can the knower be known? (II, 4.14). The *atman* is the *abhichakasiti*, the witness (Mundaka Upanishad, 3.1.1-2 and Svetasvatara Upanishad, 4.6-7). However, according to the Upanishadic thinkers the *atman* can be realised through meditation (Katha Upanishad, ii, 24).

Attention may be drawn to another notable feature, referred to above, viz., the concept of two birds or two selves. The same pair of verses occurs in Mundaka (3.1.1-2) and Svetasvatara (4.6-7) Upanishads. "Two birds, bound one to the other in close friendship, perch on the self-same tree, one eating the fruits of the tree with relish while the other looks on without eating. The two birds refer symbolically to the lower self and to the higher self. The two are said to be inseparable, bound by the same body, sense organs, mind and *buddhi*. Both are limited by attachment and action, while the lower self is fully involved in attachments and actions, it is possible for the individual to gradually disengage himself from the attachments and actions, and be a mere onlooker in a detached way. This is the basis for the development of the later concepts of *sthitaprajna* and *jivanmukta*.

Commenting on this development in Upanishadic thought about self, Upadhayaya (1971) remarks, "Now it is easy to see that the highest point reached in the Upanishadic conception of the soul was verging towards what was developed into the *annata* (*anatman*) theory in Buddhism. The ineffable *atman* often described negatively and paradoxically was identified with the universal impersonal spirit called *brahman*" (p. 83).

2. The Gita on Self

The Gita accepts the Upanishadic view that the self of the indivi-

dual is identical with the Absolute, the *Brahman*. It also agrees with the Buddhistic view that the ego, the empirical self is impermanent. As Radhakrishnan (1960) commenting on the 8th and 9th verses of the fifth chapter of the *Gita* puts it, "The constituents of the ego are impermanent, a flux which changes from moment to moment. There is no changeless centre or immortal nucleus in these pretenders of selfhood" (p. 177).

According to the *Gita*, the man who is a *tattvavit*, who knows the truth, realises that he does nothing at all, that in seeing, hearing, touching smelling, tasting walking, sleeping, breathing, in speaking, emmiting, grasping, opening and closing the eyes, only the senses are occupied with the objects of sense (*Gita* V, 8-9). He realizes that in all these activities, he is really not involved, that they are all reflex and bodily reactions. It is further asserted that when the individual is no longer attached to the objects in the environment, he finds happiness in the self—*sukham akshayam asnute* (V, 21). Freed from dualities, having a disciplined mind, he ever rejoices in doing good to everyone, *sarvabhuta hite ratah* (V, 25). Radhakrishnan comments on this verse that he who has acquired wisdom and peace is also one who has love and compassion for all (p. 184).

Thus, the *Gita* recognises two levels of operation in the self, the lower and the higher. Let a man lift himself by himself. Let him not degrade himself. The (higher) self is one's friend and the (lower) self is one's enemy. For him who has conquered the (lower) self by the (higher) self, the self is a friend. But he who has not gained the higher self, is indeed an enemy of himself (*Gita* VI, 5-6). The self of reflexes and bodily needs is described as the lower self and the part of the self which has a control over them, free from the dualities of heat and cold, pleasure and pain (II, 14), gain and loss, victory and defeat (II, 38), which is beyond the three *gunas* and firmly fixed in purity, *nitya sattva* (II, 45), is the higher self, the true self. One can actualise this higher self when one is free from passion, fear and rage *vitaragabhaya krodhah* (II, 56). Thus, according to the *Gita*, the lower self consists of reflexes, bodily needs, feelings and emotions and the higher self manifests itself when the individual has gained full awareness of his needs and limitations. When he actualizes this higher self, he will be equiminded among friends, companions and foes, among those who are neutral and impartial or those who are hateful (VI, 9).

That man is essentially composed of two natures is asserted in another verse. Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, *buddhi* and *ahamkara*, this is the eightfold divison of man's *prakriti* (VIII, 4).

Two other verses state that this is the lower nature, the *kshetra*, the field, the higher nature is the pure self, the *kshetrajna*, the knower of the field (XIII, 1-2).

3. Buddha's Doctrine of Anatma

According to the Upanishadic thinkers, the self, the *atman*, is the real core of human personality and that it is eternal and blissful.

"But *buddhi*, after a thorough analysis of the different constituent of the human personality, shows that nothing permanent and blissful is to be found in any or all of these various constituents which we hold as our true 'I' or the 'self' saying 'this is mine, I am this or this is myself'. It is only on account of our clinging to or grasping of the five constituents that we develop his erroneous notion of 'I' or the 'self' " (Upadhyaya, p. 296).

Analysing the total personality of man, Buddha arrived at the *skandhas* or five constituents, viz., *rupa* (corporality), *vedana* (feeling), *samjna* (perception), *samskara* (dispositions) and *vijnana* (consciousness). So he declared that there is nothing permanent and blissful in any of them or in all of them together. He further declared that it is wrong to cling to anything or to have the conceit of 2 with respect to any or all of these five. According to *Majjhima Nikaya*, Buddha said, "I (self) and mine (anything belonging to the self) not being truly and really discovered, it is not a perfectly foolish doctrine to hold the point of view, 'this is the world,' this is the self, permanent, abiding, eternal, immutable, shall I be after death, in eternal identity shall I persist" (I, 138). Elsewhere, in *Samyutta Nikaya*, Buddha declared, "Any ascetic or Brahmin who variously conceives of the self, all of them conceive of the five groups of grasping or any one of of them (as the self)" (III, 46). In another context Buddha said, 'whatever is seen, heard, reflected upon, known, attained, inquired into and mentally contemplated that also is to be viewed as, 'this is not mine, this is not I, this is not myself" (*Majjhima Nikaya*, I, 136). Similarly in another passage he says, "There is no corporality whatever, no feeling, no perception, no disposition, no consciousness whatever that is permanent, everlasting, eternal, changeless and identically abiding for ever" (*Samyutta Nikaya*, III, 144).

The Upanishads and the *Gita* look upon consciousness, *vijnana* or *prajnana* as the eternal and immutable aspect of personality. But according to Buddha, even consciousness is not a basis for holding the concept of self as permanent. The analogy of the

banana stem is used. Peeling the stem part after part, one discovers nothing right inside. This analogy, it may be recalled, is very does to the *nyagrodha* fruit in Chandogya Upanishad (VI, 12.1-12). The only difference is in the conclusions drawn. While Buddha establishes that there is nothing within the banana stem, the Upanishadic thinker establishes, 'this subtle essence, which you do not perceive, growing from this subtle essence the large banyan tree thus stands."

It may be pointed out that Buddha as well as the Upanishadic thinkers are dealing with the *concept of self*. It is impossible to discover any *substance* which is self The modern physicists look upon matter, light and sound as waves of energy. The Upanishadic thinkers had anticipated this. The ultimate reality was compared to the motionless ocean. Manifestation arises when there is *spanda*, vibration, a series of movements in the water. Waves are observed. The five *skandhas* of Buddhism are the manifestation which arises. But at the basis of these manifestations there is nothing perceivable, nothing which is an object of perception.

4. The Nyaya-Vaiseshika Views

According to Nyaya, personality consists of the self, the *atman*, the *manas*, mind and the body. Gautama states that the self is a unique substance to which all cognitions, feelings and actions belong as its qualities. Desire (*iccha*), aversion (*dvesha*), effort (*prayetna*), pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*dukha*) and cognition (*jnana*) are the indicators of the self. *Nyaya Sutra* I, 1.10). Consciousness is an attribute of the self. All these qualities belong to the self and not to the body. The system posits that the self is eternal ((*nltya*) and so is indestructible. Also it is all-pervading (*vibhu*), unlimited by time and space. Thus, Nyaya agrees in all this with the Upanishadic view. The self is neither the mind nor the body. The self controls and synthesises activities of the mind and the body. It is the self that is responsible for the unity of all the various cognitions and actions. Apprehension is not a function of either the sense organ or the *manas*. Apprehensions or ideas remain even when the sense organs and the objects which give rise to the sensations are destroyed. So apprehension does not subsist either in the sense organs or in the objects. Nor is the *manas* the cause. Because, by definition, the *manas* can apprehend only one idea at time. But experience shows that the self can apprehend many objects at the same time. It is the self that cognises through the media of *manas* and body. Further, according to the system, each

individual has his own self. It is pluralistic. Gautama also asserts that the self is eternal. This is why, the new-born-infant experiences joy, fear and sorrow. This is due to the remembrance of the experiences in a previous existence. It is due to the enduring *samskaras*, the enduring impressions in a previous life. (*Naya Sutra* III, 18 ff). Thus Gautama traces the bodily needs to be found in the new-born infant to *samskaras*.

As regards perception, the view put forth is that in external perception, the sense organs come into contact with the object and convey this to the *manas* and the *manas* in its turn conveys it to the self. But in the case of internal perception, that is, feelings, etc., the sense organs are not necessary. The self perceives the changes in the *manas*.

Consciousness arises when the self is in contact with the *manas* and the body. Thus, according to the system, conscious is not an essential property of the self. This is indeed an unique feature of the Nyaya system. In this it differs from all the other systems. According to Nyaya, the stream of consciousness is separate from the self. The self is the witness. It is not involved in the stream.

According to Gautama's *Nyaya Sutra*, desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition are the indicators (*lingas*) of the *atman*, the self (1.1.10). Thus, according to Gautama, the self is known by way of inference on the basis of efforts, feelings and knowledge. It is pointed out that the self is different from the body and sense organs on the one hand (3.1.4) and from the *manas*, on the other (3.1.15-16). It is declared that like the body and the sense organs, *manas* is also only an instrument of the self.

As noted earlier (Chapter 11), the self is looked upon as being eternal in contrast to the body, etc., which are perishable, because of remembrance. The new-born infant smiles and cries, indicating that it remembers situations in past life which led to joy and sorrow (3.1.18). The infant seeks milk from the mother's breast just after birth which can, it is explained only be due to repeated feeding in the past (3.1.21) However, as noted earlier sutra 3.1.22 registers an objection by the opponent who asserts that this is akin to the iron filings being attracted to the magnet and does not necessarily imply any effect of past experience or past life. The presence of *raga*, longing and *dvesha*, aversion in all living beings is attributed not only to the influence of experience in past life, but also to longing on the basis of anticipation. *Nyaya Sutra* attributes longing and aversion to anticipation (3.1.26). The Commentator Vatsyayana explains that longing and aversion are not merely

due to the qualities of the substance. In life, longing is found to arise from anticipation or conviction that some object is a source of pleasure or pain. An anticipation arises from recalling to mind some previous experience.

Thus, the biological needs are sought to be explained on the basis of intellectual processes of recall and anticipation, among lower organisms as well as among new-born infants. The personal experiences of an adult based on recall and anticipation are projected to a past life in order to explain the biological needs.

The materialist contention that consciousness is due to the bodily substances is refuted by Gautama who asserts that desire, aversion and effort do not arise from qualities of substances (3.2, 34, 37). Desire, aversion and effort are due to the self, the agent and not due either to the body and sense organs or the *manas*, which is only atomic in character (3.2.56-59).

Gautama defines activities, *pravrittih*, as the operation of the mind, speech and body (1.1.17). Behaviour is also incited by defect (*doshah*) (1.1.18). Defects are divided into three groups, viz., *iccha*, desire, *dvesha*, hatred and *moha*, delusion (4.1.3). Vatsyayana gives details of the three groups. Under desires are grouped sex love, selfishnesss, longing for acquiring in a lawful manner, greed for acquiring in an unlawful manner. Under hatred are given anger, jealousy, envy, media and resentment. Under delusion are given error, suspicion, pride and negligence (Jha, 1939, p. 410). Of these three, the defects arising from *moha*, delusion are declared to be the worst (4.1.6). Vatsyayana explains that the defects or desire and hatred arise when one is under the influence of delusion. Thus, he declares that the defects of desire and hatred have their source in delusion (*ibid.*, p. 412).

Thus, according to the Nyaya thinkers man's behaviour and personality are governed by the defects which arise out of delusion. So the remedy is to overcome false knowledge and acquire true knowledge (4.2.1). According to Vatsyayana, wrong notions and misapprehensions arise because of *ahamkara*, the notion of 'I', egoism. It consists in regarding the body, sense organs, mind, feelings and cognitions as the self. All these, according to the system are *anatma*, non-self. True knowledge consists in realizing the self as eternal and in looking upon the rest as non-eternal, transitory (*ibid.*, p. 68). From true knowledge, says Gautama, the main cause of defects will be known and there will be the cessation of the notion of 'I' (4.2.1).

As noted earlier, according to Gautama self is inferred from the

experiences of desire, aversion, etc. (1.1.10). According to Jayanta Bhatta, the self is not an object of perception. Self-consciousness has the body as its object and not the self. The self is really established through inference. (Sinha, Vol. I, p. 225).

Kanada, the author of *Vaiseshika Sutras* also agrees that the self is a substance and that it is eternal (III, 2.5) and that is not an object of perception (VIII, 1.2). The Vaiseshika concept of *manas* is more inclusive than that of Nyaya. It is like the *antahkarana* of Samkhya and is responsible for sensations and perceptions, feelings and emotions, higher intellectual duties. *Manas* is the instrument through which thoughts enter and affect the self. Perception cannot arise unless the *manas*, through the process of attention, makes the information available to the self. *Manas* is the mediator and co-ordinator. But it is only an instrument and not the cognizer. According to *Daspadarthasastra* of Chandra, the *samskaras* are of two kinds, those which cause reminiscence and those which cause actions (Safaya, p. 172). Body is the third factor of personality, besides *manas* and the self.

While agreeing with the Nyaya view that the self is an object of inference that it is not an object of normal perception. Kanada also looks upon the feeling of *atman*, I, as a direct awareness of the self which supports the inference (III, 2.10-18). It is also said that the Yogi, through concentration of mind can have *atmapratyaksham*, direct cognition of the self. That is, while the self is not an object of direct perception under normal conditions, it could be an object of yogic perception on the basis of meditation (Sinha, Vol. I, p. 231).

5. Samkhya-Yoga View

According to Samkhya system, the individual has thirteen instruments, *trayodasa karana*. There are three internal, constituting the *antahkarana*, viz., the *buddhi*, *ahamkara* and *manas*. Secondly, the ten *bahyakarana*, the five *jnanendriyas* and five *karmendriyas* (*Samkhya Karika*, 32-33). The five sensory organs are the gateways of knowledge, while the five motor organs help in reacting and ascertaining. The knowledge obtained by them is checked by *manas*, appreciated by *ahamkara* and the decision is arrived at by *buddhi*. The *purusha* is the self who has these thirteen instruments and the physical body made up of the five elements. The physical body is called the *sthula sarira*, while the *sukshma sarira*, the subtle body is made up of thirteen constituents, viz , the *antahkarana* (3) and the *bahyakarana* (10). Thus the mental apparatus consists of

the subtle body, but it cannot function without the physical body (*Samkhya Karika*, 41). The subtle body contains the *samskaras*, the impressions from the past experiences. Every experience leaves an impression behind and becomes a *samskara*. Every cognition takes the form of the modification of *buddhi*. The *purusha*, the self, receives knowledge through modification of the *buddhi*, itself being unaffected. Thus there are two events taking place. First, there is the modification of *buddhi* because of the new cognition. Secondly, the modification is reflected in *purusha*, so that he experiences the same. The two events take place simultaneously and knowledge is the result. The relation between the *buddhi* and the self is depicted on the basis of the analogy of a rose reflected in a crystal. By hypothesis, *purusha* is more sentient which is changeless, eternal and omnipresent. But it is entirely passive. All activity is restricted to *prakriti* which, however, is *jada*, non-sentient. This is why, neither the *purusha*, nor the *buddhi* can be called the subject of experience. As Hiriyanna writes, "Though neither by itself can serve as the subject, it is stated, they do so together, the *buddhi* contributing all the activity involved in it and the *purusha* the element of awareness (*chaitanya*). The *purusha* illumines or is reflected in the *buddhi*, which though physical is fine enough to receive the reflection; and thus, illumined, it serves as the conscious subject" (p. 283 f). Thus, according to Samkhya, the *purusha* is the enjoyer or experient (*bhokta*) without being a doer or agent (*karta*). The object first stimulates one or the other of the five sense organs. This results in *alochana-matra*, bare awareness that is quite vague and general. It is the *manas* which transforms these sense date and arranges them in a definite pattern. According to Isvarakrishna, the main function of manas is reflection or discrimination (*Samkhya Karika*, 27). It determines the character of the object by relating it to its properties. The function of *manas* is discrimination as well as determination or ascertainment. When the indeterminate sense date are defined, the ego, *ahamkara*, appropriates it and transforms the experience. Isvarakrishna, identifies egoism (*ahamkara*) with self-appropriation *abhimana* (*Samkhya Karika*, 24). Vachaspati Misra explains the function of *ahamkara* thus, "I alone preside over the object that is vaguely perceived by the sense organ and definitely perceived by the *manas*. I have the power over all that it perceived and known and all those objects are for my use. There is no other supreme except 'I', 'I am'. This self-appropriation is called *ahamkara*" (*Samkhya Tattvakaumudi*, 23). After *ahamkara* comes the function of *buddhi* It decides what is to

be done regarding the object perceived.

6. **The Mimamsa View**

The Mimamsa thinkers are also realists. They accept the existence of the self and that it is entirely distinct from the body. The self is the experiences of pleasure and pain. Knowledge is the property of the self. The self is also the experiencer of all the fruits of the action. Thus the self, according to this system, is the cogniser, the doer and the enjoyer of the fruits of the actions done. The self is the substratum of consciousness, since consciousness cannot reside either in the senses or in the body. The self is self-luminous, *svayamprakasha*. The process of cognition according to the system, as seen above, has three bases—the knower, the object known and the knowledge, forming the *tripti* of cognition. Out of the three, it is knowledge, the *samvid*, that reveals the knower and the object. As Sinha points out, according to the Mimamsa thinkers, "There is always a direct and immediate knowledge of the self in every act of cognition, presentative, representative or inferential; but there is not always a direct and immediate knowledge of an object" (Vol. I, p. 242).

7. **Types of Personality**

(*a*) **The Gita typologies**. The author of the *Gita* describes three different typologies, viz., typology based on the three *gunas*, the typology based on mortality and the typology based on social classification.

The author of the *Gita*, like Samkhya theorist, accepts that nature, including human nature, is composed of the three elements called *gunas*, threads, or strands, or qualities, viz., *sattva rajas* and *tamas* The three *gunas* are mingled in varying quantities which bring about differences in qualities. But the self is above and beyond these three qualities. The empirical ego manifests the operation of these three *gunas*. Shri Aurobindo (1976) describes these as "three qualitative modes of nature which are inextricably interwined in all cosmic existence. *Tamas*, the principle of inertia, is a passive and inert nescience which suffers all shocks and contacts without any effort of mastering response and by itself would lead to a disintegration of the whole action of the energy and a radical dispersion of substance. But it is driven by the kinetic power of *rajas* and even in nescience of matter is met and embranced by an innate though impossessed preserving principle of harmony and balance and knowledge, the *sattva*" (p. 413). He writes, "the *Gita*

applies this generalised analysis of the universal energy to the psychological nature of man in relation to this bondage to *prakriti* and realization of spiritual freedom" (*Ibid.*, p. 414).

The man dominated by *tamasa* develops a personality which is prone to confusion and delusion. That is, he has neither the energy or zest of the man dominated by *rajasa*, nor the enlightenment of one in whom *sattva* is predominant. This type is characterised by inattention, lack of understanding, indolence and languor.

By contrast, the person in whom *rajasa* is predominant is given to attachment to the objects of desire. He is full of unrest. He is lustful and greedy. He is a creature of impulses and emotions. Lust for action inevitably leads to grief and pain because either his ability or the opportunity available, may not help him to achieve what he desires to achieve or his very success may lead him to further and endless exertion to get more and thus may generate intense hostility among the others with whom or for which he works.

The man dominated by *sattva guna* is characterised by intelligence and clarity of vision. His desires and emotions are under his control. He is free from lust, anger and greed. His actions in society are motivated, not by personal gain at the cost of others in society, but by *lokasamgraha*, the well-being of the whole society. His speech is truthful, pleasant and beneficial and gives no offence to others. He is scheming of mind, gentle, silent and full of self control. He works and fulfils his obligations without the expectation of reward (XVII, 15-17). He is characterised by *sadbhava*, sense of reality and by *sadhubhava*, sense of goodness and morality, (XVII, 26).

In another chapter, human beings are classified into two groups, 'divine' and 'demoniac', the good and the bad. The whole of the 16th chapter of the *Gita* is devoted to this problem. The good persons are characterised by fearlessness self-control, uprightness, truthfulness, freedom from anger and malice, non-violent, gentle and compassionate towards all the members of the society, being entirely devoid of pride (XVI, 1-3) By contrast, the bad persons are characterised by egoism, violence, arrogance, lustfulness and wrath (XVI, 4, 18). Bound by ties of desire and given over to lust and anger, they strive to amass wealth by unjust means to gratify their desires (XVI, 12). Their actions are prompted by impulses and desires, *kamkaratah* (XVI, 23).

Finally, brief mention may be made to the doctrine of varna classification of human beings. It is declared that *chaturvanyam*,

the fourfold order was created on the basis of *gunakarmavibhagasah*, according to the divisions of quality and work (IV, 13). The qualities and the work are described in the last chapter. The qualities and the work are declared to be *svabhavaprabhavair gunais*, qualities born of their own nature. Shri Aurobindo remarks "The ancient system of the four orders had a triple aspect; it took a social and economic, a cultural and a spiritual appearance. On the economic side, it recognised four functions of the social man in the community, the religion and intellectual, the political and the economic and the service functions" (p. 494). From this point of view, it may be taken as the recognition of differences in aptitude among the four groups, viz, intellectual, political, economic and non-classifiable service. As Radhakrishna observes, "The *Gita* cannot be used to support the existing social order with its rigidity and confusion" (p. 364).

(*b*) **The medical typologies.** According to Charaka (3rd century, B.C), the mind, being beyond the senses is designated "*sattva*" and is the cause of the activity of sense organs. He writes, "On account of the multiplicity of mental objects, sense-objects and impulses, as also the combination of the qualities of *rajasa*, *tamasa* and *sattva*, the mind appears as multifaceted in one and the same person" (p. 48). According to Charaka the *manas*, the *atma* and the body are connected together like a tripod on which life rests (1.1.45). Though the *atman*, the self is ever defectless, and the same in all living beings, it appears to be different because of differences in mind and body (p. 394). The three vitiating elements of the body are *vata* (air), *pitta* (bile), and *kapha* (phlegm), and the two elements of the mind are *tamasa* (ignorance) and *rajasa* (passion).

Charaka divides human beings into three classes on the basis of the three *gunas*. He describes seven types in the *sattvic* group.

The Brahman type of man is pure, devoted to truth, self-controlled, with good memory and understanding, free from desire, anger, greed, conceit, infatuation, envy and equally well-disposed to all.

The Rishi type is one who is devoted to study, *yajnas*, celibacy. The third *sattvic* type is designated the *Indra* type who is endowed with lordship and is authoritative in speech, who is brave and energetic. The fourth is the Yama type whose conduct is governed by considerations of prosperity. The Varuna type is valiant, courageous and fond of aquatic sports. The Kubera type commands status, honour and luxuries. The Gandharva type is fond of danc-

ing, music, legends, etc. He is an addict to perfumes, garlands, fine clothes and recreation.

He describes six varieties of the *rajasa* type. The Asura type is valiant but despotic, pitiless in his dealings with others. The Rakshasa type is cruel and gluttonous. The Pisacha type hates cleanliness and is a bully. The Sarpa type is very touchy and rouses fear in others. The Preta type is covetous. The Sakuna type is fickle and intolerant.

There are three groups in the *tamasa* type. The Animal type is unintellectual and disgusting. The Fish type is greedy for food with itinerant habits. Finally the Plant type is lazy and devoid of mental ability (pp. 395-397).

It is clear that these seven *sattvic* types, the six *rajasic* types and the three *tamasic* types of Charaka appears to be more based on the stereotype pictures of puranas rather than on his own observation of the behaviour of human beings.

The other great Ayurvedic thinker, Sushruta, also around 3rd century B.C., has classified people according to the preponderance of the three *doshas*, morbidities, viz., *vata*, *pitta* and *kapha*. The *vataja* temperament is wakeful, averse to bathing, vain, dishonest and fond of music. He is hot-tempered and impulsive. He is unsteady in friendship and ungrateful. The *pittaja* temperament is bald with gray hair. He eats a lot. He is irritable in temperament though he cools down quickly. He is intelligent and possesses good memory. He loves to monopolize conversation. The *kaphaja* temperament is comely in appearance, grateful, self-controlled, forbearing and unselfish. He is low in forming opinions, but fast in enmity. His voice resembles the rumblings of a rain cloud or the roar of a lion. He is a *sattvika*, capable of enduring pain and fatigue.

Sushruta also gives seven *sattvika* types, six *rajasa* types and three *tamasa* types like Charaka (II, pp. 154-158).

The three temperamental types described by Sushruta appear to be based on personal observation, though he has also given the sixteen *guna* types based on stereotypes.

Visvanatha, the author of *Sahitya Darapana* (14th century A.D.), has described four kinds of heroes in literature, viz., Dhirodatta, dhiroddhata, Dhiralalita and Dhiraprasanta. Yamunacharya (1948) asserts that the word *dhira* indicates a certain stability and consistency in the character, While Dhirodatta is characterized as 'high-spirited and temperate', the second type is characterized as being 'firm and haughty'. The third type is gay and thoughtless. The fourth type is firm, but mild. The first type is great self-esteem and

self-command. By contrast the second type is egotistic and arrogant, showy, fond of praising himself. The Dhiralalita is carefree. He is more or less an aesthete. The fourth type is mild, unostenstatious, with a retiring indisposition. The heroines are also classified as having corresponding feminine graces.

The authors of kama sastra erotics, divide women into four classes, viz., Padmini, Chitrini, Sankhini and Hastini. A Sanskrit work *Rati-Manjari* describes Padmini as lotus-eyed with narrow nostrils, full and compact breasts, slim with a soft voice. Chitrini type of woman is said to be of medium height. Sankhini has an outline of a conch, with drooping eyelids, she is langorous and amorous. But Hastini is a coarse type of woman both in appearance and in tastes.

The medical thinkers as well as the rhetoricians, base their classifications on the doctrine of three *gunas*. The *Sattvika*, as the *Gita* puts it, is one whose *buddhi* is not clouded by passion, who is free from prejudice and is essentially good. His is an integrated personality, because he has a clear purpose in life, He is a man of film resolve, *dhriti*, steadfast and courageous who can endure trials and tribulations of life because he has a set before himself a definite goal to achieve. He is earnest in fulfilling his duties while being detached and disinterested. The *sattvika* type of personality can emerge only by the control of the *rajasic* and *tamasic* elements in him (XIV, 6). The *rajasic* type of man is ever active eager to conquer and consolidate his position. He may adopt any means to achieve his goal. His actions are guided by desires and passions. He is ever ready to undertake new projects because of his restlessness. As the author of the *Gita* puts it, the man of *rajasa* is goaded by *trishna*, the thirst for things not yet acquired and *samga*, attachment for things already acquired. As fuel feeds fire, the man of *rajasa* desires for more, with each acquisition (XIV, 7). He is greedy and restless (XIV, 12). The man dominated by *tamas* is indolent and negligent. He postpones action (XIV, 8). He lacks initiative. He is indifferent to progress and prosperity in life. He mistakes stagnation for self-sufficiency (XIV, 13). The 18th verse of the fourteenth chapter gives a comparative statement of the three types of personality. Those of the *sattvika* type go upwards. The *rajasika* remains in the middle and the *tamasika* go downwards. Obviously this verse deals with the 'spiritual' progress rather than the 'material' progress, if such terms could be used. Equanimity and discrimination guide the *sattvika* man to become a better human being. By contrast the *tamasika* individual will steadily become worse instead of improv-

ing himself. Probably, it is in this sense that the author of the *Gita* states that the *rajasika* remains in the middle, that is, he neither improves his personality, nor does he deteriorate. As Sri Aurobindo observes, *rajasa* leads to lust for action and so he will be a victim to all kinds of grief, pain and suffering. "All ignorant and passionate seeking of life belongs to the *rajasic* mode of nature." While comparing the three types, he states that the *tamasa* type is the opposite of the *sattva* type not only in lack of clarity and knowledge but also in incapacity, negligence, inattention and non-understanding or misunderstanding. It is also the opposite of the *rajasa* type because of inertia, inaction (p. 415).

Summary

Though the Upanishadic thinkers looked upon the *atman* as being equivalent to *brahman*, the Absolute, the doctrine of the *koshas* in the Taittriya Upanishad shows a very insightful analysis of the self as being physical, vital, mental, intellectual and blissful. Consciousness is the important characteristic that is emphasized in several passages. But the final conclusion is time, space, etc., which refer only to phenomenal reality. It is hardly possible to develop a theory of personality with such an outlook. However, the Upanishads laid the basis for the differentiation between the self as an ultimate entity and the self as the empirical ego, using the analogy of two birds, one enjoying the fruits of the tree while the other, sitting above on the self-same tree, just looking on.

A brief survey of the thoughts on the self in the *Gita* shows that the author assumes that the empirical self is transient while the other, the superior self, is permanent. The empirical self is associated with the bodily needs and the emotions and the task of man is to realise this twofold nature of the self so that the lower self is under the control of the higher self. The *Gita* also propounds typology.

The third section summarises the Buddhist view which frankly denies the existence of an enduring self-behind flux that is available to introspection. Buddha uses the analogy of the banana stem to show that when layer after layer is peeled off, there is nothing left inside.

Thus, the basic question in ancient Indian thought was whether there was the *atman*, the self, as an enduring entity. The Upanishadic thinkers said that the self is pure consciousness, the *sakshin*, the witness. As such it is not the object of the knowledge. The self can be realised, they said, only through meditation, *dhyana*. The

Charvaka's and the Buddhists asserted that there is no enduring *atman* apart from the ever-changing stream of consciousness.

Being realists, the Nyaya and Vaiseshika thinkers asserted that the self is a substance, though it cannot be perceived through the senses. According to Gautama the author of *Nyaya Sutra*, the self is an unique substance to which cognitions, feelings and action belong. Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition are the indicators of the self. All these belong to the self and not to the body. It is because there is a enduring self. the *samskaras*, impressions endure and there is memory and recognition, which are very important for survival as well as understanding. Consciousness however, they pointed out, is not an esssential property of the self This is a very unique features of the Nyaya system in which it differs from the other systems.

Kanada, the author of *Vaiseshika Sutras*, also agrees that the self is a substance, that it is eternal. but that it is not an object of perception.

According to the Samkhya system, the individual has 13 constitutions, viz , the three internal constituents. the *buddhi*, *ahamkara*, and the *manas*, which constitute the internal organ, the *antahkarana*, and the five sense organs and the five organs of actions. *Purusha* is the self who uses these thirteen instruments, and the body made up of the five elements. It is the *purusha* who is the enjoyer without being the doer or the agent.

The Samkhya theorists and the Vedanta theorists look upon the self as the pure consciousness and differentiate it from the empirical ego, which is the agent and the experiences. But Nyaya and Mimamsa thinkers look upon the self as the cognizer, the doer and the experiencer of the fruits of action.

It must be emphasised that all the various schools agree that the self, whether the pure self or the empirical self, cannot be perceived. The realists agree that it is only an inference from the facts of cognition, feeling, action, experience, etc. All agree that the self is realisable as an experiencer through meditation.

Here again we find that the metaphysical presuppositions make the theorists to accept or reject the views that the self is empirical or is absolutely of the nature of pure consciousness.

In the final section brief reference is made to the views regarding types of personality, according to the *Gita* and the medical thinkers Charaka and Sushrata and the rhetoriciards. It must be recognized that the several typologies are based on the theortical assumptions rather than on any careful objective study.

Part IV

APPLICATIONS

CHAPTER 15

Meditation

1. The Upanishads

Dhyana, meditation, is one of the unique methods devised by the Upanishadic sages to attain self-integration and liberation from the constant trials, tribulations and worries which are inevitable in life.

As noted above, the Chandogya Upanishad describes the way in which Prajapati leads Indra, the earnest seeker of knowledge, step by step, from the object that is seen to the seer who sees (8.7 and 8). As Radhakrishnan puts it, "it is not the bundle of quality called the 'me' but the 'I' which remains beyond and behind inspecting all these qualities. It is the subject in the truest sense, and it can never become the object as much of the content of the self as ordinarily used can become an object. The argument assumes that whatever becomes an object belongs to the not self. We must strip away everything of our actual self alian to or different from the self" (Vol. 1, p. 152). The ultimate aim asserted is "to withdraw all the senses into the *atman* and practise non-injury to all beings" (Chandogya Upanishad, 8, 15.1).

What is the means by which this self, which is only the subject is to be reached. In the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Yagna Valkaya asserts that "the self should be the object of realization, *drashtavyah*. For that purpose, the self should be heard of, *srotavyah*, reflected on through reasoning, *meatavyah*, and steadfastly meditated upon, *nididhyantavyah*" (2.4.5). Thus, the means for self realization, *atmasakshatkara*, is knowing, reflecting and meditating. The Taittiriya Upanishad puts it thus: *yat vai tat sukham raso vai saha rasam hyevayam labdhvanandi bhavati*—that one who is self-made is varily the joy. Having attained this joy, man becomes blessed (II, 7).

The Katha Upanishad, asserts, the wise man relinquishes both joy and sorrow having realised, by means of meditation on the inner self—*adhyatmayogadhigamena*—that ancient one, hard to be seen, subtle, imminent, seated in the heart and residing within the body (III, 12). This *atman* cannot be attained by the study of the Vedas,

nor by intellect, nor even by much learning; by him it is attained whom it chooses—this, his own *atman*, reveals its own real form (*ibid.*, II, 23). Further, it is said that one who is always of unrestrained mind—*ayuktenamanasa*—and devoid of right understanding—*avijna navan*—his senses are uncontrollable (Katha Upanishad III, 6). The technique of meditation is described as the merging of the speech in the mind the merging of the mind in intellect—*jnane atmani* and merging the *jnanam* in the *mahati atmani*—the great self and that great self in the *sante atmani*—in the self of peace (III, 13). It is further stated that when the five senses of perception lie still with the mind in the self and when the intellect does not work, that is the supreme state (VI, 10). The firm control of senses is known as Yoga (VI, 11). Having said this, the sage asks the seeker to arise, *uttishtha*, awake, *jagrata* and walk on the sharp edge of a razor that is difficult to tread (III, 14). What is the consequence of this? The Upanishad asserts, the wise man who has realized the self in this manner grieves not, though he perceives all objects in dream as well as in the waking state (IV, 4). When all the desires that dwell in the heart are destroyed, then he attains *brahman* even here *atra brahma samsuute* (VI, 14). Thus the Katha Upanishad gives a very clear description of the technique of meditation and the consequences that would be reaped through it here and now. There is nothing mystical or mysterious about it. Perfect control over thought and speech, perfect control over desires, are the means to achieve a state of integrated self. Joys and sorrows are there, they cannot be abolished. Restraint of senses, desires, thoughts and speech will enable one to retain his equanimity.

The Svetasvatara Upanishad also gives valuable details regarding the meditation process. The students of *brahman* discuss among themselves about the origin and goal of the individuals and the reality as a whole. Discussing, they come to the conclusion that neither time nor chance, nor matter nor energy, nor *purusha*, intelligence, consciousness, is the cause of their own birth, identity and existance. They realize that the self is also not a free agent being under the sway of *sukha* and *dukha*, joy and sorrow. Practising method of meditation—*dhyanayoganngatah*, they discover the *devatmasakti*, the self-conscious energy in themselves, which is one without a second (I, 1-3). They exclaim, this which is eternally in the self is to be known. There is nothing else to be known beyond the self. Meditation shows that the enjoyer, the *bhokta*, that which is enjoyed, the *bhogyam* and the *preritaram*, that which brings about the enjoyment, all three are aspects of the

brahman (I, 12). By meditating on *Aum*, the *pranava*, the *atman* is perceived, manifestly in the body (I, 13). The self in us is like the oil in sesame seeds, like the butter in the curds, like the water in the underground spring, like the fire in the wood. Through meditation this can be realised (I, 16). Controlling the senses with the help of the mind and the mind with the help of the intellect, the all-pervading can be known. Only those rare few who undergo the necessary discipline can know (II, 3-4). Placing the body in a straight, posture, holding the chest, throat and head erect and drawing the senses and the mind into the heart, he who practices meditation on *Aum* can cross the fearful tendencies of the mind (II, 8). Controlling the senses and regulating the breath, one should keep his hold on the mind as on the reins attached to the restive horses (II, 9), various forms like snow, smoke, light, wind, fire, lightning may occur in the practice of Yoga (II, 11)."

Thus, while passages in the Chandogya and Brihadaranyaka Upanishad lay, the foundations for meditation on the means for self realization and self-integration, the Katha and the Svetasvatara Upanishads give the details of the meditation process and also describe the results which could be attained through the practise of meditation.

2. The Gita

The sixth chapter of the *Gita* describes the *dhyana* Yoga. When one does not get attached to the objects of sense or to activities and has renounced all selfish purposes, he is said to have attained Yoga (VI, 4). Let him constantly concentrate his mind on the self, remaining alone, self-controlled, free from desires and longings for possessions (VI, 10) Having sat in a clean place, the seat being neither too high nor too low, let him make his mind one-pointed, control thought and sense for the participaticion of the self—*atma-vishuddhaya* (VI, 11-12) Holding the body, head and neck erect, looking fixedly at the tip of his nose, so that the eyes do not wander around, tranquil in mind, free from fear, steadfast in *brahmacharya*, let him concentrate on the self (VI, 13-14). The yogi of subdued mind, attains peace which culminates in *nirvana* (VI, 15).

The author of the *Gita* cautions that Yoga is not for him who eats too much, nor for him who fasts too much, neither for him who sleeps too long, nor for him who keeps long vigils (VI, 16-17). Thus the practise of meditation implies a disciplined and well-regulated life.

His mind should be like a lamp in the windless place which does not flicker (VI, 19). He should be unmoved by gains and unshaken by any calamity that might occur (VI, 22). Supreme happiness comes to him whose mind is calm and whose passions are stilled (VI, 27). He whose self is harmonise by Yoga sees the self abiding in all—*sarvatra samadarsinah* (VI, 29).

As noted earlier, Arjuna asks how the mind which is ever restless can be made to become steady. The mind is compared to the wind. The answer is that with long and steady practice and with non-attachment, it is possible to attain steadiness (VI, 34-36).

The relation between control of breath and control of mind is pointed out (IV, 29 and XVIII, 33).

The method as well as the results which accrue from meditation are summarized in a few verses in the last chapter. Endowed with pure understanding, turning away from all objects of sense, casting aside attraction and aversion, dwelling in solitude, hearning but little, controlling speech, body and mind, ever engaged in *dhyana*, taking refuge in detachment, casting aside all *ahamkara*, arrogance and anger, he becomes one with the Absolute (XVIII, 51-53).

3. The Buddhist Practice

According to Buddhist theorists, the coming into being of the depravities (*asavas*), *avidya* comes into existence. So it is through the destruction of the depravities that *avidya* is destroyed. The *dhammasangini* classifies the depravities into *kamasava*, *bhavasava ditthasava* and *avidyasava*. As Dasgupta describes, '*Kamasava* means desire, attachment, pleasure and thirst after the qualities associated with the senses; *bhavasava* means desire, attachme t and will for existence, *ditthasava* means holding views such as the world is eternal or non-eternal or that the world will come to an end or will not come to an end, or that the body or the soul are one or are different; *avidyasava* means ignorance of sorrow, its cause, its extinction and the means of its extinction" (Vol. I p. 99). He further points out "The afflictions (*klesas*) do not differ much from *asavas* for they are but the specific passions in forms ordinarily familiar to us, such as covetousness (*lobha*), anger or hatred (*dvesha*), infatuation (*moha*), arrogance, pride or vanity (*mana*), heresy (*dittha*), doubt or uncertainty (*vichikitsa*), idleness . . . these *klesas* proceed directly as a result of *asavas* and are counted as three (*lobha*, *dvesha* and *moha*)" (*ibid.*, p. 100).

Man is intertwined with all these desires, etc. They can be loosened by the practice of right discipline (*sila*), concentration (*samadhi*)

and wisdom (*prajna*). *Sila* means desisting from committing all anti social deeds. Samadhi is a more advanced effort by which the roots of all the *klesas* are destroyed. These two efforts, viz., *sila* and *samadhi* directly bring true wisdom, *prajna*.

The Buddhist texts describe five 'faculties', viz., faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom (Conze, 1954, pp. 51-65). Faith involves the knowing and getting rid of the defilements of mind such as greed, anger, malice, hypocrisy, etc. (*Majjhima Nikaya*, I, 36). Vigor involves the striving to prevent the arousal of evil and unwholesome mental states and the arousal, maintenance and development of wholesome mental states (*Digha Nikaya*, III, 221). The man of stirred up vigor attains the unattained, masters the unmastered and realizes the unrealized (*Samyutta Nikaya*, II, 29). Mindfulness involves four applications with respect to body, feelings, mind and mental states. Mindfulness of the body involves sitting crosslegged with the back erect and drawing in the breath and breathing out thinking of the breath. Similarly, he should be fully aware of all the various activities like walking, standing, sitting, etc. Mindfulness of feeling involves the awareness of passions such as hatred, etc. Finally, mindfulness of the mental states involves the awareness of desires for sense-pleasures, ill will towards others, etc., and getting rid of them (*Majjhima Nikaya* I, 55ff).

Concentration (*samadhi*) involves keeping the body in a steady posture and the mind calm, concentrated and one-pointed. In the first *dhyana* stage, one keeps himself aloof from pleasures of the senses and aloof from emotions. This, however, accompanied by initial thought and discursive, the mind becomes tranquil. There will be rapture and joy. In the 3rd stage, even this rapture fades out while consciousness is clear. "By getting joy, by getting rid of suffering, by the dying down of my former pleasures and sorrows, I enter into and abide in the fourth *dhyana*, which has neither suffering nor joy, and is entirely purified by even-mindedness and mindfulness" (*Vinaya-trithaka*, III, 3-6).

Finally, wisdom (*jnana*) consists of close investigation of the mental states, discernment, discrimination, clear understanding and comprehension (*Dhammasangivi*, 16).

"Next to this we come to Brahmvihara, the fourfold meditation of *maitri* (universal friendship), *karuna* (universal compassion), *mudifa* (happiness at the prosperity of all) and *upeksha* (non-preferment of oneself, one's friend or enemy)" (Dasgupta, I, p. 103).

4. Patanjali's Yoga Sutra

As noted above, Patanjali uses the term *chitta* to indicate the conscious as well as the unconscious mental processes. The unconscious mental processes arise as a result of the *samskaras*, impressions of past experiences, which do not rise to awareness, which nevertheless influence the conscious mental and behaviour processes. The term used to indicate the mental processes is *vritti*. Patanjali designates the mental processes which lead to desires and the efforts to satisfy them as *klishtha* (afflicted) the mental processes which lead us towards liberation and freedom as *aklishtha* (unafflicted). Thus Patanjali recognizes that mental processes serve both purposes, to help us to give mental health and lead an integrated life, as well as to make us victims to a life of sorrow and suffering. The aim of Yoga methodology is to help us to gain mental health and achieve an integrated personality.

The main and only step towards this is *chitta vritti nirodh* (*Yoga Sutra*, I, 2), that is, the restriction of the fluctuations of the mind. The commentator Vyasa, in his commentary on the very first sutra declares *yogah samadhih*, that yoga is concentration. It must, however, be noted that, as Dasgupta observes, the term "*samadhi*" cannot be properly translated either by 'concentration' or by 'meditation'. It means that peculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which the mind becomes one with its object and there is no movement of the mind into its passing states" (Vol. I, p. 272 n). Vyasa describes that the *chitta* may be restless (*kshipta*) or infatuated (*mudha*) or distracted (*vikshipta*) or one-pointed (*ekagra*), or restricted (*niruddha*). Violent passion may lead to concentration, as in the case of one fighting a mortal enemy. Similarly in daily life, we concentrate for some time on one object and turn to another before long. But the aim of Yoga is to achieve one-pointedness which is continuous.

In order to achieve such one-pointedness, Patanjali, as noted above, prescribes 8 steps. The first two are ethical, viz, *yama*, abstentions and *niyama*, observances. The next three, viz., *asana*, posture, *pranayama*, control and regulation of breath and *pratyahara*, withdrawal of senses from their objects, aim at restraining the mind from the physical side, through the bodily processes. The remaining three steps, viz., *dharana*, fixing the mind on a particular object, *dhyana*, meditation, sustained attention on one thought, and *samadhi*, where the sense of identity is lost and there is no distinction between the knower and the known, aim directly at controlling all the mental processes. That is, they aim at the cessa-

tion, *nirodha*, of the *chitta*

Meditation, thus, is a state in which the mind ceases to operate at the ordinary, routine level. But this state can be achieved only as a culmination of the ethical perfection, control of the body, particularly control and regulation of breathing and control of the sense organs, cognitive as well as executive and, finally, the control of thoughts.

Patanjali describes four states of deliberations (*vitarka*), reflection (*vichara*), joy (*ānanda*), and sense of personality (*asmita*). As Radhakrishnan observes, "These are forms of concentration which have definite objects on which they rest. Different names are assigned to the various shades which form *samprajnatasamadhi* assume, such as *savitarka, savichara, sananda* and *sasmita*.... When the feeling of joy passes away and is lost in a higher equanimity, there occurs the state called *dharmamegha* in which the isolation of the self and its complete distinction from matter are realized" (Vol. II, p. 359). In this final state of *asampra jnatasamadhi* there is no *chitta vritti* whatever. At this stage, according to the system, the *chitta* or *buddhi* becomes as pure as the *purusha*. There is no consciousness of subject, object or thinking. The mind becomes steady.

5. Effects of Meditation

What is achieved by this long and arduous process? Patanjali himself states, in the case of one whose *chitta vrittis* have been almost annihilated, fusion of the cognizer, cognition and cognized is brought about as in the case of a transparent jewel resting on a coloured surface (I, 41). This sutra clearly brings out the nature of *samadhi*. The three aspects of the perceiver, perception and the perceived become one. The analogy of the jewel resting on a coloured surface is given to help us understand. Taimni explains in these words: "If we place a small piece of ordinary stone on a sheet of coloured paper, the stone is not at all affected by the coloured light coming from the paper. If we place a colourless crystal on the same paper, we immediately see a difference. It absorbs the light. The degree of absorption depends on the transparency of the crystal and the freedom from defects in its substance. The more perfect the crystal, the more completely will it transmit the light. The relation between the mind and the object it contemplates is similar (p. 97).

The *chitta* or *buddhi* becomes pure and is able to reflect *purusha*, like the colourless crystal which reflects the colour of the paper on

which it is placed. The *chitta* is able to reflect the *purusha* only when it is free from all the *vrittis*. This is possible only when the *chitta* is free from the various *samskaras*, unconscious impressions and from the conscious mental activities.

The various tendencies based on bodily needs impart strong biases to the mind. Similarly the various attachments and repulsions affect the mind. The practice of *yama*, *niyama* and *vairagya* seeks to eliminate the influence of these impressions on the mind. The influence of various unconscious tendencies, the *samskaras*, will also be minimized, if not eliminated, through the processes of *dharana* and *dhyana*. The individual becomes aware of the various instinctive, emotional and sensuous tendencies on his throughts. He looks at them in a detached way. He does not identify himself with them. Nor will the unconscious impression be able to affect him. All conflicts are dissolved and the self becomes fully integrated.

When the individual is free from emotional conflicts and is fully integrated he has at his disposal all his abilities and energies. He is able to think clearly on the problems confronting him being free from all prejudices and predispositions. The *Gita* defines Yoga as skill in action, *yogah karmaru kausalam*.

Secondly, steady practice of *asana* and *pranayama* brings relaxation to the body and steady practice of concentration brings relaxation to the mind. He will be free from anxieties and restlessness. Meditation helps one to gain mental stability and tranquillity. As noted above, the *Gita* describes the characteristics of the *sthitaprajna*, the person with steady wisdom. Though all desires enter as waters into the sea, which is ever motionless, he attains peace undisturbed by them. He is free from all sense of egoism (*ahamkara*) and all sense of mineness (*mamakara*) (II, 70-71). He has *samatva*, equanimity which is undisturbed by various dualities described in the *Gita* and will be a *samadarsivah*, equiminded towards all human beings. No one is afraid of him and he is afraid of no one (XII, 15). As a consequence he becomes friendly and compassionate towards all persons. Freedom from fear and anxiety helps in the achievement of inner harmony and peace which in turn promotes harmonious social relations.

As regards thinking, the effect of meditation are three-fold. The tninking of the ordinary man is of the confused variety. He does not differentiate between perception, memory and imagination. He relies more on what he remembers than on what he perceives. His remembrance again is confused with what he imagines. On several

occasions, it may be observed that when facts are shown to be different from what a person asserts, he persists in stating, "but I thought it was. . . ." One of the important effects of the various steps in the meditation process, is that it enables him to distinguish between facts, memories and his own fancies. The second important effect on thinking is the promotion of deliberate speech and action. Instead of repetition and automatic speech and action, the training in meditation promotes awareness at every moment. In the place of habitual thoughts, speech and action, there will arise awareness. He is aware of what he thinks, what he speaks and what he does. He will become creative in his activites and thoughts. Routinization of life and its activities will be prevented. The third, and most important effect is the awareness of one's prejudices and predispositions and freedom from the influence of unconscious desires and emotions. When the area of awareness increases, the area of thoughts and motives based on latent impressions, will decrease. This is due to the practice of detachment, *vairagya*. Detachment loosens tensions and anxiety states, as a result of non-identification of one's self with one's experiences and the desires. It helps one to realize that one is playing one's role in society. There will be an awareness of the extent to which one's thought's and feelings are influenced by the members of the group to which one belongs.

Thus, meditation promotes a total transformation of the self. Instead of being a person whose desires and thoughts are based on bodily needs, the present perceptions and the social norms of the limited group to which he belongs, the practitioner becomes a free individual, who takes into account the limitations engendered by the bodily needs, the sense stimuli and the limited social norms and becomes more universalistic in his outlook. New insights, as it were, generate new outlooks and in turn, the new outlook leads to new insights. Thus the individul becomes creative in the real sense of the term and not a mere creature of needs, habits and social norms.

There are two verses in the *Gita* which help us to understand the relation between disciplined mental life, which is necessary to succeed in the practice of meditation and mental peace and happiness. The *ayuktah*, the undisciplined man, has neither *buddhi* nor *bhavana*, neither discrimination nor perseverance and concentration; he who has no peace, how can there be happiness? When the mind runs after the roving senses, it sweeps away his understanding, as the wind carries away a ship on the waters (II, 66-67). Meditation

is possible only when the mind is restrained from the roving senses and passions. Mental peace arises only when the mind is free from restlessness. Thus freedom from mental conflicts generate a restful state of mind. A restful state of mind is possible only when one frankly recognizes his limitations and accepts them, that is, when he is free from delusions. This promotes integration of personality. There is integration of personality when the mind is unified and harmonized, when it is free from conflicts and emotional disturbances and longings. With mental coflicts, concentration on any task is impossible whatever the nature of the task may be. Restlessness and anxiety, anticipations and expectations, inhibit concentration. This is how practice in meditation promotes a peaceful state of mind. *Samatavam Yoga uchyate*—evenness of mind is called Yoga (*Gita*, II, 48).

Meditation promotes introspection and constant and continuous awareness of one's desires, motives, feelings and thoughts. In this manner it helps one to become really oneself perceiving reality as it is without being distorted by prepossessions and prejudices, without being a mere copy of one's ingroup.

In the recent decades considerable empirical work has been done to determine the bodily effects of meditation. But this is not the place to describe them.

Summary

The Upanishadic sages were fully aware of meditation as a technique which helps clear thinking, promotes freedom from prepossessions and which leads to equanimity and stability. Many passages in Katha Upanishad and from Svetasvatara Upanishad show how the basic techniques have been clearly described in the Upanishads.

In the next section, various verses from the *Gita* have been gathered, particularly from the sixth chapter, which lay down the techniques as well as consequent benefits of practising them. It is clearly laid down that the very nature of the mental processes is restlessness and that constant practise and *vairagya*, detachment, are necessary to calm the mind and to bring about both *samata*, equanimity and *samadarsinah*, equimindedness towards all human beings.

The third section briefly describes the contribution of Buddhist thinkers with respect to meditation and how it promotes wisdom. Man, it is recognized, is entwined by desires and emotions and the practice of meditation is the means to become free from them.

Mindfulness is stressed. Man should not be impelled either by biological needs or by habits. Every thought, feeling and action should be mindful, charged with awareness. It is clearly laid down that *jnana,* wisdom consists in close investigation of mental states and in clear understanding and control over the mental processes.

Next a brief description of the great work of Patanjali which, for thousands of years has been the textbook, as it were, to gain mental stability, is given.

Finally a section is devoted to the effects of meditation on personality and social relations, on the basis of the ancient texts.

Right from the Upanishadic times, great stress has been laid on ethical preparation and on bodily well-being. All the various texts show that control of breathing, that is being fully aware of the biological process of breathing, is absolutely necessary to promote physical and mental relaxation. Meditation helps one to overcome both impulsiveness and mental automatisms by insisting on awareness at every moment of walking life. Deliberate conscious action is the goal and the means is freeing oneself from all unconscious as well as conscious tendencies

CHAPTER 16

Psychopathology and Psychotherapy

ATHARVA VEDA AND AYURVEDA

Macdonnell, comparing the Rig Veda with Atharva Veda wrote, "while the Rig Veda deals almost exclusively with higher conceived by a comparatively advanced and refined sacredful class, the Atharva Veda is, in the main, a book of spells and incantations appealing to the demon world and teems with notions about witchcraft current among the lower grades of the population, and derived from an immemorial antiquity" (p. 31). Not only natural catastrophes, but even illnesses were attributed to evil spirits. However, as Radhakrishnan has noted a footnote "such a view persisted because it had an element of truth. Modern psychology has come to recognize the power of suggestion as a remedy for the ills of flesh, specially nervous disorders" (Vol. I, 120). The most prominent feature of Atharva Veda is the innumerable incantations. When a man falls ill, the magician's help is sought who tries to drive away the evil spirits responsible for the illness. Radhakrishnan observes, "The old title of the Atharva Veda, the *Atharvangrasah*, shows that there were two different strata in it, one of the Atharvan and the other of Angiras. The former refers to the auspicious practices used for healing purposes. The hostile practices belong to Angiras. The first is medicine and the second is witchcraft and the two are mixed up" (I, p. 122).

The great ancient Indian medical man, Charaka and Susruta (Circ. 600 B.C.), looked upon Ayurveda (the Science of Life) as an *Upanga*, a part of Atharva Veda. Charaka (Sut. 30.20-21) says that a physician must be attached to Atharva Veda because it deals with therapeutics.

Susruta also holds the same view (1.1.5). In a broad way, Ayurveda, like Atharva Veda, may be looked upon as having two aspects, one dealing with physical or bodily diseases and the other dealing with mental diseases. The former is called *Kaya chikitsa*, dealing with the diseases of the body and the latter *bhutavidya* dealing with abnormalities of behaviour. As Dasgupta writes, the

association between Atharva Veda and Ayure Veda, "consisted in the fact that both of them dealt with the curing of diseased and the attainment of long life; the one principally by incantations and charms, and the other by medicines" (Vol. II, p. 275). While bodily diseases were produced by unwholesome diet and could be cured by medicines, the behavioural disorders were looked upon as having been caused by "sins and transgressions" and they could be cured by *mantras, prayaschitta*, etc. Charaka looked upon penance (*prayaschitta*) as a name of medicine, *bheshaja*. A commentary on this view of Charaka, asserted according to Dasgupta, "as *prayaschitta* removes the diseases produced by sins, so medicines also remove diseases and thus *prayaschitta* is synonymous with *bheshaja* (medicine)" (p. 475).

A. Atharva Veda Samhita

Griffith (1976), in his preface to the *Hymns of the Atharva Veda*, wrote. "They are principally of prayers, formulas, and charms for protection against evil spirits of all sorts and kinds, against sorcerers and sorceresses, diseases, snakes and other noxious creatures, of benediction and imprecations, invocation of magical herbs, prayers for children and long life, for general and special protection and prosperity, success in love, trade and gambling, together with formulas to be employed in all kinds of domestic occurrences" (p. VII).

Singh (1977) asserts that the subject matter of Atharva Veda is *manas*, mind (p. 13). It aims at the welfare of humanity through the energy of *manas*.

There is reference to 'nine portals', the nine orifices of the human body in X, 3.31 and to "the triple lands and bonds" in X, 8.43. According to Muir, this is possibly the first reference to the three *gunas*: *sattva*, *rajasa* and *tamasa* (Griffith, Vol. II, p. 41).

There has been a long controversy about the authenticity and authoritativeness of Atharva Veda. The concept of *Trayi* or *Trayi-vidya*, the threefold lore refers to the first three Vedas: *Rik*, *Yujus* and *Saman*. "In a sacrifice, *yajna*, the *Hotr* priest recited the hymns of the Rig Veda, the *Adhvaryu* priest recited the *Yajus* text and performed the various acts according to the formulae therein and the *udgatra* priest sang the *Saman* chants" (Raghavan, 1956, p. XXX). But the *Brahma* priest, the master of Atharva Veda, presides over the whole sacrifice. While the hymns of the Rig Veda are addressed to divinities, the hymns of the Atharva Veda are more secular, used at home and in society. "They are of twofold charac-

ter; (*a*) wholesome (*baishyajyani*), intended to expiate sins or appease evil forces (*shanti*) and augment one's happiness and welfare (*pushti*); and (*b*) harmful (*ghora* and *angirasa*) for use against enemies (*abhichara*)" (*ibid*, p. XXXI).

Thus, while the hymns of the first three Vedas represent prayers and rituals, the hymns of the Atharva Veda consist of spells or charms directed against hostile powers and involve magical practices.

However, long back, the great Vedic Commentator, Sayana of 14th century, advanced a number of arguments to show that Atharva Veda is a sacred document. One of the important points to be borne in mind is that, "a few hymns of social character are already seen towards the end of the Rig Veda but soon they formed into a whole separate collection called the Atharvan, which came to be recognized as the fourth Veda. Some of the charms here really go back to the Indo-European times and have their parallels in German and Russian" (Raghavan, p. XXXI).

As Parab (1952) has pointed out, many hymns in Atharva Veda "are intended to appease, bless, cure or curse" (p. 153). The Atharvan priest is also a physician and a magician.

As Kane points out magic spells are to be found even in Rig Veda. For example, the 145th hymn of Book X of Rig Veda uses a herb to quell the rival wife and make the husband "her own", The 55th hymn of Book VII of Rig Veda is to kill diseases and to induce sleep. Also VII, 104 and X, 87 clearly show that the Rig Vedic people were afraid of black magic. They refer to *yatudhana*, one who employs black magic. The 133rd hymn of Book I refers to *pisachi*, the fiery-weaponed friend (V, 2, p. 1035).

Since ancient times, Atharva Veda has been recognized as the first book of ancient Hindu medicine. The basic belief of the seers of Atharva Veda is that bodily as well as mental diseases are caused by evil spirits like *gandharvas* and *pisachas* or by the magic spells employed by the sorcerer, the *yatudhana*. Alongside there is also the belief that physical diseases arise from the consumption of wrong food or because of *krimi*, worms, etc. They attributed mental diseases to either one's own sinful actions, necessitating *prayaschitta*, expiation, or to evil spirits or to black magic.

Thus, it is clear that many of the spells and charms of Atharva Veda arose out of psychological factors like fear, revenge, hope, etc. The very first verse of the Atharva Veda shows the belief in the evil spirits. "Now may Vachaspati assign to me the strength and powers of those who, wearing every shape and form, are

wandering around" (Atharva Veda I, 1.1).

Generally, the hymns in Atharva Veda are classified as follows: (1) *bhaishajyani*—prayers and spells for the cure of bodily diseases; (2) *ayushyani*—prayer and charms for health and long life; (3) *panshtikani*—for prosperity, success and happiness; (4) *abhicharakani*—spells against demons, evil spirits, sorcerers, etc.; (5) *prayaschittani*—charms in expiation of sins committed and defilement; (6) *strikarmani*—charms pertaining to secure the love of a woman or a man, to allay jealousy, directed against a co-wife, etc.; (7) *rajakarmani*—spells to secure success in wars and in state-craft.

Bloomfield (1897), has classified the hymns he has selected from Atharva Veda. In the first section, he has given a number of hymns which are charms to cure diseases and possession by demons. For example, VI, 20 asks 'fever' to go away, search and attack another person. There is prayer in V, 4 to the plant which is a "destroyer of fever". It is asked "to drive out fever from here". Even when a medicinal plant is used, the fever as well as the plant are personified and addressed. There is prayer and request along with the medicine. There are also charms against worms as in II, 31. The physician calls out, "I have crushed the visible and the invisible worm." He says, "we grind the worms to pieces with our charms." Thus the declaration of crushing and grinding is assumed to bring about the destruction of the disease causing worms. He declares, "Those that are left and those that are not left do I destroy with my song, so that not one of the worms be left." There are also charms against worms in cattle as in II, 32 and charms against poisons. The priest calls out "I proclaim this charm that destroys poison" in IV, 6. He takes water from a particular river and tells the patient. "The water from Varanavati is *amrita* (ambrosia). It wards off poison from thee" (IV, 7). There are charms against snake poison. It is well known that similar charms are widely in use even today all over the country. The priest calls out to the snake, "with my eye do I slay thy eye. With poison do I slay thy poison. O Serpant, die. Do not live. Back upon thee shall thy poison turn" (V, 13). Charms are also used against scorpions and other insects (VII, 56). There are charms to promote the growth of hair (VI, 21). There are also charms to promote virility. The priest administers some medicine and calls out, "This herb shall make them so very full of lusty strength, that those shall, when those are excited, exhale heat as a thing on fire" (IV, 4).

There are also charms to drive out Rakshasas, Apsaras and

Gandharvas. "With thee, O herb, do me scatter the Apsaras, Gandharvas and Rakshasas." "All the Pisachas that devour the reeds, that burn and spread their little light in the waters, do thou, O herb, crush and overcome. One is like a dog, one like an ape. As a youth, with luxurious locks, pleasant to look upon, the Gandharva hands about the women. Him do we drive out from here with our powerful charm" (IV, 37). It is obvious that all these are based on suggestion and that they restore confidence in the patients who are frightened.

There are also hymns which use amulets, made of herbs, plants, animals, mud, etc., as for instance, in VI, 85.

Charms are also used to secure perfect health. The priest calls out that he is tearing every kind of disease from every part of the body as II, 32. Charms are also used to secure long life and prosperity for the patient (II, 29).

Many hymns pray for long life and health—*a gushyani*. According to the Vedas, one should live a hundred autumns. The prayers are to rescue life from *nirriti*, the goddess of destruction. There are prayers for a happy, healthy old age (III, 11). Another prayer is to see that "the other hundred kinds of death shall not harm him" (II, 28). He, who has been a victim of sorcery by a kinsman or stranger, is freed from it. He is assured, 'fear not. Thou shall not die. I shall cause thee to live unto old age. I have charmed away from thy limbs the disease that wastes the limbs. That disease has flown as an eagle to a far distance, overcome by my charm" (V, 30).

The *abhicharikani* hymns counteract the effects of sorcerers. Agni is asked to drag the sorcerers so that Indra with his thunderbolt could cut off their heads (I, 7). Agni is requested to protect him and give him courage from the devouring demons who arise in throngs on full-moon nights (I, 16).

Amulets were given to the wife so that she could conceive and produce a son (VI, 81). Charms are there to drive away the evil spirits responsible for miscarriage and the young lady is assured, "Into thy womb shall enter a male germ, as an arrow into a quiver. May a man be born there, a son ten monthly old" (III, 23). Charms were also made use of to ensure easy parturition (I, 11).

A charm with a plant born of honey is used to secure the love of the women one loves (I, 34). A prayer is sent up to Asvins to "unite and bring together the loving pair" (II, 30).

There are charms to secure harmony (III, 30) to allay discord (VI, 73) against strife and bloodshed (VII, 52), to appease anger

(VI, 42) against the opponent in a debate (II, 27), to secure influence in the assembly (VII, 42) and to ensure the submission of another to one's will (VI, 94).

Finally, reference may be drawn to charms in expiation of sin and defilement (VI, 51). "Sin of mind, begone. Why sayest thou what mine should say? Go away. I love thee not . . . . whatever wrong we have committed sleeping or waking, by illwish, dislike or slander, all these offences, may Agni take from us and keep them distant" (VI, 45).

All these spells and charms make it clear that the Atharvan sage personified the benevolent as well as the malevolent powers in the universe. There is the firm belief that prayers can ensure good and that spells can obtain protection from the bed. Hopes are to be fulfilled through prayer and fears warded off through spells. Mantra stands for prayers in the Rig Veda and for spells in the Atharva Veda. The mantra is looked upon as a power which can avert danger and destroy the evil spirit or the sorcerer. It is believed that the power of the mantra is unlimited and that it can lead to miracles when it is uttered. Mysterious powers are also attributed to herbal medicines, administered and to the amulets tied to the neck or armor waist.

It is clear that the help of the *Yatudhana*, the sorcerer, is sought at the time when the individual is confronted by disease or danger or when he desires the fulfilment of some intense wish or when he wishes to ensure health and prosperity. It is also clear that the incantations and amulets gives one the courage to face the struggle, overcome the danger and attain the objective desired—to attain the *aihikaphalas* here and now.

According to Singh (1977) the mental diseases referred to in Atharva Veda could be classified into (*a*) severe mental disorders like *unmada*, insanity; and (*b*) mild deviation generated by *krodha* (rage), *moha* (sexual and other delusion), *soka* (depression), *irsya* (jealousy) and evil dreams (p. 17). It is pointed out that while the hymns of Atharva Veda are rich in therapy, they are poor in terms of description of symptoms.

There is a reference to insanity in 111th hymn of Book VI, "Unbind and loose for me this man, O Agni, who bound and well-restrained is chattering folly. Afterward he will offer these portions when he hath been delivered from his madness. Let Agni gently soothe thy mind when fierce excitements trouble it. Well-skilled I make a medicine that thou no longer mayest be mad." Appa recently stated that the symptoms described here are inco-

herent and irrelevant talking, violence, excitement and crying out loudly. As is well known, the language of Atharva Veda is symbolic and was personification. The God, the devil, the medicine and the disease are all personified and spoken to. According to Singh, two causes are given in Atharva Veda for insanity, viz., *devansat*, sin against Gods, the overthrowing of the authority of superego and *Rakshaspari*, influenced by a demon, that is, coming under the influence of uncontrollable *id** drives (p. 21).

Another term used in Atharva Veda is *grahi* for epileptic or hysterical seizure. "Free this man from the demon, from *grahi*, who hath seized his joints and members and raise him up again into the world of man" (II, 9). Thus *grahi* is not an evil spirit but a fit, a convulsion.

It is also pointed out that the term Gandharva is used to indicate the man who is highly sexual and the term Apsara to the woman who is highly sexual. The behaviour of such persons is deluded. But the traditional interpretation is that they are a class of spiritual beings. The view that the two terms stand for excessive sexual urge in men and women, respectively is supported by some commentaries cited by Singh (p. 23). He concludes, "the Gandharvas and Apsaras are neither physical beings nor microscopic germs, but they are psychic phenomenas (urges) functioning in the mind. Secondly, they are erotic" (p. 24).

Some hymns refer to *bhaya*, phobia. For example, the 15th hymn of Book II, "As Heavan and Earth are not afraid, and never suffer loss or harm, even so, my spirit, fear not those . . . As what hath been and what shall be, fear not, nor suffer loss or harm." This mantra obviously gives assurance to the frightened person. Singh points out, "to remove fears and phobias of different kinds, the Atharva Veda prescribes many therapies in the form of *manibhandan*, suggestion, autosuggestion, prayer, *Havan* and *Kavach*" (p. 29).

As pointed out earlier, the 45th hymn of Book VI refers to *manaspap*, sin of the mind and calls out, "Why sayest thou, what none should say ? Go away. I love thee not . . . Whatever wrong we have committed, sleeping or waking, by wishing ill of others by disliking them or by slander, may Agni take them away from us and keep them far off. May provident Angirasa preserve us from the sin and suffering." It is clearly an expression of sense of

* *Id* means the distinctive impulses of the individual (psychology) ; *Supta Vasana*.

guilt. Also there is the feeling that evil thoughts arise in this mind over which he has no control. It is paranoid. But the individual is conscious that such thoughts are forbidden by his superego and that, by effort and through the help of benevolent Gods, he can succeed in driving them away, that is, in overcoming them. Singh points out that the word *papa* is used in Atharva Veda in three senses—sin, guilt and inferiority feeling (p. 31). He further points out, "by going more in detail, we find that *papa bhavana* can be removed by (*a*) prayer and sacrifice; (*b*) auto-suggestions; (*c*) suggestion of the priest; (*d*) *prayaschitta* in the form of public confession; (*e*) hydro therapy—bathing and sprinkling water; (*f*) expiatory rites; (*g*) medicine; (*h*) amulet; and (*i*) transference" (p. 32).

There are many hymns in Atharva Veda dealing with dreams. There is concern about the evil dreams. "Sleep, guard us from the evil dream. As men discharge their debt, so we pay for it. Assign them to our foes" (VI, 46). According to Singh, evil dreams are caused by (*a*) *grahi*, complexes; (*b*) *nirriti*, destructive wages; (*c*) *abhuti*, unfulfilled wishes; (*d*) *nirbhuti*, loss or possession, social position; and (*e*) *parabhuti*. revengeful dreams against enemies (p. 36). The therapeutic procedures adopted are prayer, suggestion, *samkalpa*, making up one's mind to get good dreams, or by bathing in sacred rivers, etc.

As Singh remarks *samkalpa* is autotherapy. It is based on auto-suggestion. It brings about ego-strength. When the self is energetic and determined, there cannot be any disintegration of personality (p. 52).

In XI, 8.4, there is reference to *manas* and *vani*, consciousness and speech, which are essential for *samkalpa*, for auto-suggestion and suggestion.

The 6th and 7th verses of hyman 13 of Book IV make a clear reference to hypnosis. "This hand contains all healing balms and this makes whole with gentle touch. The tongue that leads the voice precedes . . . . With these two healers of disease, we stroke thee with a soft caress." The two healers thus are touch and speech, the two basic elements in the inducement of hypnosis.

Thus, there are references to Atharva Veda to the many mental depravities and disorders. The principle methods used to help the patient to get over them are prayer, amulets, hypnosis and auto-suggestion. That the psychological aspect is very important in the treatment of the various kinds of diseases, bodily and mental, is recognised by Atharva Veda when the value of the amulet is

praised. After trying the amulet and when the patient regains consciousness, the sage exclaims, "for hundred leeches are in this, and a thousand healing herbs" (II, 9.3).

B. Ayurveda

The great Indian medical sages Charaka and Sushruta (6th Century B.C.) trace Ayurveda, the science of life, to Atharva Veda.

(*i*) *Charaka.* As Dasgupta writes, "Life is divided by Charaka into four kinds, viz., *sukha* (happy), *dukha* (unhappy), *hita* (good) and *ahita* (bad). *Sukham ayuh*, is a life which is not affected by bodily or mental diseases, is endowed of all sorts of enjoyments and successes. The opposite of this is *asukham ayuh*. *Hitam ayuh* is the life of a person who is always willing to do good things to all beings, never steals other's property, is truthful, self-controlled, self-restrained and works with careful consideration, does not transgress the moral injunctions, takes to virtue and to enjoyment with equal zeal, honours revered persons, is cheritable and does what is beneficial to this world and to the others. The opposite of this is called *ahita*. The object of the science of life is to teach what is conducive to all these four kinds of life and also to determine the length of such life" (II, p. 277 f). Thus, according to Charaka the task of medicine is not only to cure ailments but also to enable the individual to lead a life which is not a prey to mental and moral conflicts.

Charaka describes eight branches of Ayurveda, of which bhuta vidya, psychopathology is one. In general his approach is psychosomatic. In one verse, he asserts, "Neither gods nor the gandharvas, neither the goblins nor the demons, nor ought else, torment the man who is not tormented by himself" (*Nidanstahana*, 7.19). Proceeding he asserts, "The wise man when afflicted with disease which arises from volitional transgression and is the result of one's own action, should not rail against the gods, the *manas* or the demons. He should regard his very self as the author of this pain and pleasure. He should search out what is good for himself and not allow himself to be fear-stricken" (*ibid.*, 21-22). While, bodily disease is due to the imbalance in the three *dhatus—vayu*, *pitta*, and *kapha*, mental disease is looked upon as a result of the imbalance in the three *gunas—sattva*, *rajasa* and *tamasa*. The aim of Ayurveda, according to Charaka, is to restore and maintain the equilibrium among the three bodily and the three mental constituents. However, Charaka looked upon mental diseases as being due to *grahabhutagrahas*. As Singh (1977) writes, "*Bhutagrahas* are

names of abnormal psychic symptoms groups (syndromes) personified like the personality types. No spirit enters the body of the patient, but symptoms similar to them in behaviour arise" (p. 90).

Body as well as the mind are responsible for disease and well-being. According to Charaka, disease may start either in the body or in the mind. But in the long run each affects the other (19.7).

Abnormality in behaviour is due to the undue predominance of *rajasa* and *tamasa* since the excess in *sattva guna* does not lead to any adverse consequences. When *sattva* is predominant, the person behaves in a godly manner, that is, he is pure, self-controlled, virtuous and free from desire, anger, hatred conceit, etc. When *rajasa* predominates, he is passionate, violent, erotic, intolerant pleasure-loving and brave. One who is greedy, dull, disgusting, keen on destruction, fond of inordinate eating, etc., is dominated by *tamasa.*

Charaka classified mental abnormalities into two groups: severe and mild. In the severe group are *unmada* (insanity), *apasmara* (epilepsy) and *durmana* (neurasthenia) including *madatya* (alcoholism). In the mild group are emotional disturbances resulting from anxiety, fear, jealousy, anger, greed, etc.

Charaka also classifies the various abnormalities as being due to (*a*) *buddhibhramsa*—derangement of understanding—ion of capacity to discriminate between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, good and evil, benefit and harmful, etc.; (*b*) *smritibhramsa* derangement in memory; (*c*) *dhritibhramsa*, derangement in will, lack of motivation, ego strength (including loss in *samkalpa shakti*) (Sha. I, 99-108).

Charaka defines *unmada* as the unsettled state of mind, intelligence, consciousness, perception, behaviour (Nidanstahana, 7.5).

As regards the eight types of *Grahas*, Singh shows that there is similarity between the terms and behaviour characteristics. "In the *devonmada* type there are symptoms of over-cleanliness, gentleness, purity, etc. The *guronmada* type is obsessive and directive like the teachers. The *pitronmada* is angry and authoritarian like the father. The *gandharvonmada* type is erotic, musical fragrance-loving. The yaksha, rakshasa, pisacha types show symptoms of meanness, destructiveness, etc." (p. 99).

Charaka's description of *apasmara* includes epilepsy and hysteria. There is sudden emotional excitement which leads to convulsive fits. It is indicated that in these cases the *sattva guna* is observed by *rajasa* and *tamasa*. There is loss of consciousness due to disturbances in memory. There may also be hallucinations.

Atatvabhinivesha has been translated as paramnesia, or falsification of memory. Literally the term means having faith in what is false, wrong or untrue. So delusion and perversion are also included here. It is attributed to suppression of urges.

Durmana (neurasthemia) involves timidity, anxiety, nervousness. It may be caused by great strain, anxiety, excessive grief, etc.

Madatya (alcoholism) is discussed by Charaka in detail in one whole chapter, (Chik., 24). Alcohol is *amrita*, ambrosia, if taken in small quantities. It promotes life and happiness. When consumed in excess, it causes physical and mental disorders.

As regards therapy, Charaka has described three kinds, viz., divine (*daivyavlparya*), medicinal (*yuktivlparya*) and mental control (*sattavavajaya*). The aim is to restore and maintain a balance in personality. The divine consists of mantras, amulets, propitiatory rites, offerings, prayer, fasting, etc Mental therapy consists in making *sattva guna* predominate over *rajasa* and *tamasa*, so that equilibrium is restored. Thus both the first and third therapies are based directly on mind, while the second is indirectly so leased. Charaka has recommended re-education as an important step. Mental disorders arise as a result of wrong understanding and memory. "So the conceptions, understanding and knowledge must be basically corrected by re-training and re-education" (Singh, p. 110). Charaka says that the patient must think intelligently on the problem with proper guidance and must get an insight into his condition, environment and ailment. He must reform his habits and actions through insight (Sut., 1.46). He also emphasizes the need for changing the environment. "*German* means going out of the present environment, may be for pilgrimage, holiday resort, sightseeing or to some relational group. Its theoretical basis is to cut off the effects of the physical environment" (Singh, p. 111). It may be added that a change in social environment is a very significant aspect of change in place.

Another very important technique recommended by Charaka is *virodha bhavana*. Excess of eros, grief, fear, rage, delight, envy and greed can be cured by neutralizing it with opposite emotions (Chik., 9.86). Reference may be made to what Patanjali called *pratipaksha bhavanam* (*Yoga Sutra*, II, 33-34).

(*ii*) *Sushruta*. Like Charaka, Sushruta also recognizes eight branches of Ayurveda of which *bhuta vidya* is one. He defines *bhuta vidya* as that branch of therapeutics which deals with *graha* (neuroses), *unmada* (psychoses) and *apasmara* (epilepsy) (Sut., 1.6-7). He also deals with alcoholism in a separate section. Over and

above (1) *mantra vidya*, including *sabda* or *vani*, that is, suggestion *shanti patha*, reading passages from scriptures which are quietening, and consoling; (2) religious practices including *puja* (worship), *prartana* (prayer), *japa* (repeating the name of God); (3) *Upadesha* (suggestions inculcating higher values); (4) *Gamana* (environmental change); and (5) *prayaschitta*, purificatory rituals, comfession, etc. Sushruta also recommends *Chittaprasadana* the recreational technique which will make the patient forget the problems worrying him.

(*iii*) *Vagbhatha* is the third great name in Ayurveda besides Charaka and Sushruta. His work is *Ashtanga Sangraha*. He belongs to 5th century A.D. about a thousand years after Charaka and Sushruta. Over and above the therapeutic procedures followed by Atharva Veda, Charaka and Sushruta, Vagbhatha prescribes *dhyana* and *samadhi*, the Yoga techniques.

C. Yoga

Patanjali's Yoga is a system of self-culture and union of the individual with the Supreme Self. The work is assigned to 200 B.C. The term Yoga is the union of the two, viz., the individual and the universal, which have been separated as a result of *avidya*, ignorance. It is a psychological technique to control abnormalities by *chitta vritti nirodha*, the restriction and control of modifications or fluctuations of the mind. Thus, the aim of Yoga is to control all mental processes, conscious as well as unconscious. Behaviour must be free from all kinds of conditionings. It must be affected by internal as well as external forces. Its whim, in other words, is to make behaviour spontaneous.

As Behanan pointed out "we may now summarize the first two stages (*yama* and *niyama*) as the ethical code of Yoga by which a moral transformation involving important psychological changes or redirection of mental set, is brought about, marking the beginning of a veritable uphill climb in mental training" (p. 94). Sitting in one posture is a very important precondition for mental health. A restless mind leads to restlessness in posture and bodily movements, hence, the need to develop the ability to sit in one position for a quarter to half-an-hour, if not longer. Work of any kind, skilled or unskilled, requires a comfortable posture in order to promote efficiency. As Jacobs (1961) has pointed out, "scientists have observed that animals breathe more quickly, the more excitable they are. Experience shows that deep and regular breathing over long, gradually extended periods, brings the whole organism into a harmonious condition, balancing disturbed rhythms and

stabilizing all vital processes" (p. 104). Mental processes and breathing processes are closely related. A simple and effective way of controlling mental process is by the control of the breathing process. As Singh (1977) puts it, *pratyahara*, the fifth step, is the complete mastery over the senses. It is done in two ways, i.e., neither the senses should be affected by the stimulus, nor should the senses disturb the mind by their sensations" (p. 165). This involves the breaking of the conditioned responses. To quote the *Gita* "He who draws away the senses from the objects of sense on every side as a tortoise draws in his limbs (into the shell), such a person's intelligence is firmly set in wisdom. The objects of sense turn away from the person who abstains from feeding on them" (II, 58-59). Deliberate practise of sense-control makes one analyse his reaction to stimuli. Instead of reacting automatically and habitually, he will react with full awareness. The final three steps of *dharana*, *dhyana* and *samadhi*, as noted above, refer to steadiness of mind, concentration, meditation. These three constitute *samyama*, one process. As Geraldine Coster (1957) puts it, "While analytical therapy in the West is very new and young experiment, Yoga in the east is a very ancient and mature technique. If however the whole matter of moral and social discipline, relaxation, breathing and control of thought by meditation were approached by psychotherapist in the non-religious and scientific attitude of the student of Yoga, it might well be that this would lead to the discovery of new and valuable psychotherapeutic methods" (p. 168). The main feature of Yoga system is the development of personality through strengthening the self and the control of bodily and mental processes.

Summary

Atharva Veda, one of the four Vedas, is mainly a book of spells and incantations. One group of hymns deal with auspicious and healing procedures and constitutes the beginnings of medicine. The other set, called *angiras* deals with spells to control human beings and imaginary and supernatural forces. Atharva Veda includes *kaya chikitsa*, remedies for the bodily diseases and *bhuta vidya* remedies for abnormalities in behaviour. The hymns dealing with harm towards enemies is called *abhichara*. It involves magical practices. Some selections from Atharva Veda are given to show the psychological techniques involved, including hypnotism, autosuggestion, etc.

The next section describes the work of Ayurvedic thinkers, who laid the foundation for medicine and psychotherapy. Charaka as well as Sushruta of 6th century B.C. who are regarded as the founders of Ayurveda, recognized *bhuta vidya*, psychopathology and psychotherapy, as an important branch. Charaka has classified abnormal behaviour into two groups, the severe group which included *unmada* (insanity) *apasmara* (epilepsy) and *madatya* (alcoholism) and the mild group which included emotional disturbances arising from fear, anxiety, etc.

Charaka also classified abnormalities of behaviour on the basis of derangement in understanding, memory and lack of motivation. Charaka as well as Sushruta deal at length with alcoholism. Among the therapies, Charaka includes, besides medicines, the use of amulets, etc., on the one hand and techniques to increase *sattva guna* in the individual on the other. Pilgrimage to secure change in physical and social environment also formed part of therapy.

Vagbhatha, a 5th century A.D. thinker, also prescribed Yoga as therapy. The third section of the chapter includes some further details about Yoga as psychotherapy. The important aim of Yoga is not only to control thoughts and emotions but also to prevent the unconscious tendencies from influencing behaviour. The main aim of Yoga is to make behaviour spontaneous and deliberate.

CHAPTER 17

Sex Behaviour

1. Introductory

(*a*) **Kama, one of the four ends of man.** The pursuit of *kama*, love and pleasure, is recognized by the ancient Indian thinkers as one of the important life drives. In the four purusharthas, or the four ends of man, pursuit of love and pleasure is given the third place—*dharma*, *artha*, *kama* and *moksha*. The expression of the sexual desire within the limits of *dharma*, righteousness, is recognized as legitimate. This is why marriage is considered to be one of the requirements of life. To marry and set up a home and be get and bring up children is considered the second *asrama*, the second stage in life, after *brahmacharya*. It is the *grthastasrama*. Sex was recognized as an individual and social necessity. Consequently *kama* was included as an ideal of life. As Ananda Coomaraswamy stated in his work *The Transformation of Nature in Art*, "the conditions of human love, from the first meeting of eyes to ultimate self-oblivion, have seemed spiritually significant and there has always been a free and direct use of sexual imagery in religious symbolism."

(*b*) **Kama and Rati.** Kama is represented as the God of Love in Indian mythology. He has a flower-how with five flower-arrows and with them he sends dseire quivering to the heart. Kama is also represented as carrying a noose, *pasa*, with which to catch and tie up the victim and a hook with which to drag the victim near. Thus, Kama has four instruments—the bow, the arrow, the noose and the hook. Kama's glamorous mate is *Rati*, lust and sexual delight.

(*c*) **Kamasastra, natyasastra and alankarasatra.** Just as there are dharmasastras, dealing with duty and righteousness, just as there are arthasastras dealing with wealth and power, there are also kamasastras, dealing with love. The principal surviving classic of kamasastra, the science of love, is Vatsyayana's celebrated *Kamasutra*, a handbook on love and lovers. Besides the kamasastras are the natyasastras and alankara sastras handbooks of poetics and acting, which delineate the feelings normally experienced in different standard situations. These two sets of books help us to understand the attitude of ancient Indians towards love.

2. In the Vedic Literature

As noted earlier, the earliest references to sex life are in Atharva Veda. There are charms and spells to attract the lover or the beloved to keep him or her under one's control. There are spells to secure virility and also spells to destroy the virility of the unwanted man.

The following hymn from Atharva Veda may be given as an illustration:

Let the Impeller good thee on. Rest not in peace upon thy bed. Terrible is the shaft of love. Therewith I pierce thee to the heart. That arrow winged with longing thought, its stem Desire. Its neck resolve, let kama, having aimed, shoot forth and pierce thee in the heart. The shaft of kama, pointed well, that withers and consumes the spleen, with hasty feathers, all aglow, therewith I pierce thee to the heart. Pierced through with fiercely—burning heart, steal to me with thy parching lips, gently and humble, all mine own, devoted with sweet words of love. Away from mother and from sire, I drive thee hither with a whip, that thou mayest, be at my command and yield to every wish of mine" (III, 25, Griffith's Translation).

Some passages from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad throw light on the views of the Vedic thinkers regarding sex. In the beginning, prior to manifestation, was Viraj, the first embodied being. Being alone, he was frightened. Seeing that there was none beside him, he realized that there was no need to be frightened. He felt no delight in being lonely. He longed for a second, a mate. *Sah dvitiyam icchet*. He became an enlarged body and divided it into two parts. From that division husband and wife came into being. Since the one half of man is a void without a wife, man indeed becomes full when he has a wife (I, 4.1-3). Thus, this passage shows that there are two emotions when one is alone, viz., fear and the longing for a companion. The *purusha* divided himself into two parts, one male and the other female so that he could delight in the company of his beloved.

In another passage, it is stated, "As a man fully united by his dear wife, knows nothing external nor internal, so the individual self fully unified with the Supreme self knows nothing outside or within himself. That is his highest state in which all desires, *kama*, are fulfilled and only the desire of the self, *atmakama*, remains. This state is beyond desires, *akamam*. It is also beyond grief, *sokantaram*" (IV, 3.21). This passage compares the state of orgasm with the union of the individual self with the Absolute. In both there is consciousness, without the subject-object relation being present. As Stella Kramrisch (*The Hindu Temple*, University of Calcutta,

1946) remarks, the name of this conjoint symbol of *purusha* and *prakriti* is *maithuna*, the state of being a couple and this symbol is carved in many forms in temples and in *rathas* (p. 346).

There are many references to sex in the sixth and final book of Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. "He who know the *retah*, semen, as the generative organ is indeed possessed of the attribute of generation" (VI, 1.6). In section four, it is stated that water is the essence of earth, plants are the essence of water, flowers are the essence of plants, fruits are the essence of flowers and *retah*, semen is the essence of man. Prajapati created the woman to receive the semen (VI, 4-1.2). The woman's organ should be meditated upon as the altar, the hairs round the organ as the *kusa* grass. He who performs the action without meditating thus, performs merely an animal action; similarly the man who discharges the semen while asleep (VI, 4.3-4). Thus, the sex act should be a deliberate and thoughtful act and not merely an impulsive animal act. He should recite the mantra, "May there be in me the semen that can give birth to a son having knowledge, manhood, reputation, wealth and merits." Further, it is stated that he should approach his wife on the fourth day, when she is free from the *malodvasasam*, polluted clothes, that is, after the menstrual period (VI, 4-6).

The 13th verse of the chapter clearly shows that the woman is polluted during the three days and that she should not eat from a metal cup or put on fresh clothes. She should bathe after three nights and then put on fresh clothes.

It may be observed that this is one of the current beliefs among the orthodox people even today, that it is the duty of the husband to have relation with the wife on the fourth day.

The Upanishad proceeds and asserts, "If she does not give in, he should press his wishes through desired objects. If she still does not give in, he should beat her as he likes with a stick or with the hand and overcome her and curse her so that she becomes barren" (VI, 4.7). Thus, the husband's right can be enforced through physical violence and if the wife resists, he can curse her so that she becomes barren.

If she receives him willingly, then she should complete the act reciting mantras (VI, 4.9).

But if he does not wish to impregnate her, he can withdraw the organ and retain the semen in himself so that she is *aretah*, seedless (VI 4.10).

This verse is probably the very first clear exposition of coitus—interruptions in human literature. This clearly indicates knowledge

of the physiology of impregnation.

The 12th passage in the section is almost like a spell from the Atharva Veda. The man whose wife has an illicit lover should perform a rite so that the enemy will leave the world deprived of his sense organs (VI, 4.12). Next are given the rituals to get a son with fair complexion or brown complexion or dark complexion and so on (VI, 4-14ff). These sections clearly indicate the belief that the sex, complexion and ability of the child are determined, not by the genes, but by the mantras uttered during union

Thus, many sections of the last part of the Brihadaranyaka constitute a curious mixture of knowledge of physiology and psychology of sex and blind faith in the efficacy of mantras.

3. In Manusmirti

By sacred tradition, Manu asserts, the woman is declared to be the soil, the man is declared to be the seed. It is through the union of the soil with seed that children are born. In some cases the seed is more distinguished and in some the womb of the female. It is the seed that is really important (IX, 33-36). Thus according to Manu, the characteristics of man are more important than those of the woman.

One of the important reasons for looking upon women as being inferior is that she has her monthly period. Even when a man is mad with desire, he should not approach his wife when her courses appear, nor should he sleep in the same bed The wisdom, energy strength and sight of the man who approaches a woman in her periods utterly perishes. But if he avoids her during that period his wisdom, etc., will increase (IV, 40-42). He should not even converse with a menstruating woman (IV, 57). A menstruating woman becomes pure after the menstrual secretion has ceased to flow (V, 66). The impurity of the woman in this period is clearly declared in another verse. A man becomes pure by bathing when he has touched a chandala, a menstruating woman, an outcaste, a corpse, etc. (V, 85). Thus, the menstruating woman is equated in pollution to an outcaste and a corpse.

Manu also declares that it is the nature of women to seduce men. So the wise should always be guarded in their company. Not only a fool, but even a learned man will be led astray by a woman and will be made a slave of desire and anger. This is why Manu recommends that one should not sit in a lonely place even with one's mother, sister or daughter! He, however, adds that this is because the senses are powerful. So he puts the blame on the man's

senses rather than on the wiles of the mother's life (II, 213-215).

The creator himself, it is asserted, made women to love their bed, their ornaments and hence impure desires, dishonesty, malice and bad conduct (IX, 17).

However, Manu declares that the mouth of a woman is always pure (V, 130). That is, a man can kiss and take to bed any woman provided she is not in her monthly period.

According to Manu, there are eight forms of marriage. The father may give his daughter in marriage to a learned man (Brahma rite). Or he may give her to a priest (Daiva rite). Or by Arsha rite, the father may give her in marriage after receiving from the bridegroom a cow or a pair of bullocks. Or, he may give her according to Prajapatya rite and address the couple "May both of you perform together your duties." By Asura rite, the bridegroom may receive the maiden after giving wealth to the kinsmen. By Gandharva rite the young man and the young woman may have a voluntary union, that is, love marriage. By Rakshasa rite the man may abduct the maid from her house by force. It is called marriage by pisacha rite when a man seduces a girl who is sleeping or is intoxicated or is disordered in mind (III, 21-34). Thus, all the various possibilities have been anticipated and named.

Prabhu (1963) writes that the law-givers Bandhayana and Narada and Vatsyayana, the author of *Kamasutra* recommend the Gandharva form of marriage as it is based on mutual love (p. 175).

But the prevailing form of marriage among all castes and classes of people even now is the first form of marriage, according to which the father gifts the daughter to the man approved by the members of the family—*kanyadana*.

According to Manu, neither the girl nor the woman should be given independence to do anything even in the house. She must be subject to the father in childhood, to her husband in her youth, and to her son after her husband's death. A woman must never be independent declares Manu (V, 147-148 and IX, 3). A man is given the right to beat his erring wife (VIII, 299).

Manu also declares that women must be honoured and adorned by fathers, brothers, husbands and by brothers-in-law. There is the most famous verses which asserts "where women are honoured, there the Gods are pleased. But where they are not honoured, no sacred rite yields rewards. Where the female relations live in grief, the family soon perishes. There is prosperity only where the women are not unhappy" (III, 55-57).

4. **In Vatsyayana Sutra**

It is now generally believed that Vatsyayana composed his *Kama-sutra* in 5th century A.D.

In a man's life span of one hundred years, the child and teenager should devote himself to acquiring knowledge, the youth should engage himself in worldly pleasures and devote his old age to secure salvation (I, 2.2-4).

Vatsyayana defines kama as the enjoyment of objects with the help of the five senses, according to the dictates of his mind in consonance with his self. In particular, kama is the special pleasure experienced through the sense of touch. Pleasure arises when in contact with the object (I, 2-11-13).

He next takes up the objection that kama is instinctive, that man has the sex desire in common with animals and so it is not necessary to have a special sastra, a special branch of knowledge in order to impart information regarding the technique of lovemaking. He points that while in animal life, sex is restricted to certain periods, in man there are no such restrictions based on the condition of the body. The restrictions are social and psychological rather than biological. He further points out that sex satisfaction is conductive to the welfare of the individual and the society (I, 2.21ff).

He recommends that young men as well as young women should study kama sastra before getting married. Also because man has to approach the woman only by getting her consent (I, 3.1-4). That is, he must learn how to get consent from her.

He describes the sex organs of men and women according to size (II, 1-1-2) and classifies people according to the intensity of their passion (II, 1.12-14), and according to the duration of passion (II, 1.17-18).

He points out some important differences between men and women. While the man is able to fulfil his passion by merely uniting with the woman, the woman gains satisfaction only through protracted unions (II, 1.19ff). The woman's passion is slow to start and slow to reach final culmination. He traces this difference both to the attitudes and feelings on the one hand and to nature's equipment. While the man is active, the woman is passive and so needs greater stimulation over a period of time (*Ibid.*, 37ff). He also shows that there are four kinds of love: (*a*) love born of mere habit; (*b*) love which arises from imagination; (*c*) love resulting from one's belief or those induced in one by others; and (*d*) love arising from the perception of external objects. He shows how merely

hearing the details of another's experience will lead to desire.

He describes various kinds of kissing in section three of the second book. He points out that every lover must reciprocate the beloved's gestures with equal intensity, kiss by kiss, embrace by embrace; when there is no reciprocity, there is dejection and frustration. Reciprocity is absolutely essential to keep the passion alive and inflamed (II, 3.34). He also points out that it is necessary ooth at the commen cement and at the end of the act that the lovers should fondle each other. This will dispel anger and fear and enhance love. Also the passion may be increased by recalling their first experiences (II, 10.23-27).

There is also a description of lover's quarrels and how the man should be patient and comfort her. On her part, the woman should continue to taunt only upto a point and then yield so that there is no annoyance and anger in him (II, 10.40-46).

The first section of the third book deals with the selection and acceptance of the bride. The maid should be at least three years younger, she should be from a well-to do family, whose parents are alive and whose way of life is praiseworthy. She must possess beauty and character, good health and proportionate limbs. The man also must possess the qualities which he expects in his bride. The parents and other relatives should actively help in the selection of the bride. He points out that marriage with a maiden who at first sight pleases the mind and delights the eye results in the fulfillment of the three *purusharthas—dharma, artha* and *kama* (III, 1.14).

The second chapter of the third part deals with the relationship between the two after the marriage ceremonies The newly wedded couple should sleep on the floor on the first three nights, observing celibacy. Even on the following seven days, they should observe celibacy, though they may move together. This is termed as the vow of ten nights. After this period, the bridegroom may commence his amorous advances in a delicate manner. He should induce confidence in the bride. Vatsyayana points out that women are like flowers and can bear only a delicate approach. Rashness in advance at this preliminary period may lead to disgust towards sex in the woman. He must behave in such a way that she grows more and more attached to him and becomes his trusted companion. It is pointed out that the man who approaches the maiden suddenly and precipitately without regard to her feelings will generate fear, disgust and detestation in her (III, 2.1-4).

Thus, Vatsyayana describes the way in which the couple sh ould behave in an arranged marriage in which they have hardly any

knowledge of each other. The man should help the bride to get adjusted to the new situation, and the new relationship.

In the fourth chapter of the third book, Vatsyayana describes the way in which a man should behave while courting a woman. He must carefully observe the various expressions and gestures of the maiden whose love he seeks. At the beginning, the advances should be tentative and superficial. He should sit beside her and observe carefully her reactions to his advances. If they are satisfactory, he may hold her hand. He should try and meet her as often as posible. When they are alone and if she is inclined, he should become bolder. If a woman is well-inclined towards a man and reveals this to him through her gestures, she may not resist his advances if they are properly timed and placed (III, 4.1 ff).

In the fifth chapter of the third book, Vatsyayana describes the characteristics of men and women who are in love. He says that the intensity of love increases with each of the following 10 stages: love at first sight, mental attachment, longering thoughts, loss of sleep physical emaciation, indifference to other affairs, absence of a sense of shame, unrequited love may lead to the last three stages of mental imbalance, physical disability and finally death (III, 5-1-5).

Vatsyayana points out that even a courtesan should not yield to man easily, since men have a dislike towards women when favours are obtained easily (IV, 1.21).

5. In Aesthetics

Visvanatha, in his *Sahityadarpana* describes the evolution of sex consciousness in a maiden.

With the dawn of sex-love, there is a change in the behaviour of the adolescent girl. She is called *mugdha*, the artless girl. She shrinks from caress and is extremely shy. She is averse to amorous dalliance. As Sinha writes, "At the first blush of youth, the girl changes in her appearance. Her waist becomes thin, her loins become bulky; her belly is depressed and her breasts are developed. Her glances fall into a side long habit. Her face beams and her eyes become bright. The pupils of her eyes become a little restless. She feels a desire to look at her admirer" (Vol, II, p. 341). However, she shrinks from the caress of her lover and casts down her eyes when he looks at her. She is silent. She will not reply when her lover speaks to her. She is extremely shy and does not know how to communicate her indignation (*The Mirror of Composition*, p. 68).

In her full bloom, the women becomes adept at caressings. She becomes somewhat bold in speech. In this youthful condition she is called *madhya*. Her passion and bashfulness are equal, as it were, she may be quite rough in her indignation. Her lust becomes full and well rounded. She has restless eyes with the flash of sidelong glances. She shakes off her maiden coyness. Love gets possession of her whole being. She is yet somewhat shy. When her lover looks at her, she conceals her smile and her eyes look down. But when he looks in another direction, she casts his eyes on him.

With further maturity, she becomes blind with passion. She is now mature and is called *pragalba* eager for sex-union. She is aggressive in amorous dalliance, bold in speech, harsh in her indignation. She is quite active and is no longer submissive. She commands him to satisfy her longings in all possible ways.

Visvanatha tries to divide the behaviour of the youthful and mature women into *dhira*, patient, *adhira*, impatient and *dhira-dhira*, partly patient and partly impatient, that is, into six classes. The patient woman possesses self-command. It is needless to pursue this classification as it appears more formal and verbal rather than behavioural.

Visvanatha also describes the changes in the feelings of youth with changes in age and bodily conditions. The first change is called *bhava*, stirring. It is the first sign of the dawn of youth As one poet puts it, the environment is the same, but the mind reacts with a difference because of the first stirrings of youth. "There is the same spring time; there is the same south wind and this is the same maiden—yet her mind is found not to be the same." The first parturition of the *sattva* of the mind with the advent of youth is called *bhava*, which resembles the germination of the seed. It is visible through bodily expression such as changes in the eyes, the eye-brows, etc. When the *bhava* is stronger, it is called *hava*, flutter. While *bhava* make the eyes slightly restless, *hava* makes the eyes and eye-brows expand and move more restlessly. With further intensification, it becomes *hela*, amorous flutter. It is expressed in the loosening of the garments, the heaving of the breasts side long glances, beaming checks, perspiration, etc. She is now interested in the adornment of the body, *sobha*, which adds to the personal attraction. She becomes more bold in responding to the advances of the lover—embracing, kissing, biting, etc. There is full reciprocation.

Visvanatha, also describes eight classes of heroines in a drama. The first is *svadhinabhartsika*, the woman who is attracted by the

amorous movements of the lover's limbs and her lover is under her control and does not leave her proximity. The second is *khandita,* the woman who burns with jealousy when her lover shows signs of having gone to another woman or when he does not turn up at the appointed time. She is indignant, sighs deeply and keeps silent. The next type is *abhisarka,* who is under the influence of intense sex-love and herself approaches her lover. The woman terms *kalahantarita,* repels the lover but reposits for it later. The 5th type is *vipralabdha* who feels great distress when her lover does not keep up the engagement. The woman who is afflicted with great anguish because her lover has gone to a distant land or business is named *proshitabhartrika.* She feels miserable. The woman who adorns herself expecting her lover is termed *vasaka-sajja.* She will be keenly watching the road for his arrival. The woman who is afflicted with sorrow, because her lover is unable to come on account of circumstances beyond his control, is called *Virahotkanthita.* She is greatly affected by separation from her lover.

6. Analysing Rati, Erotic Sentiment

Sex-love between young couple is reciprocal. It is evoked by *abhiyoga,* expression, *vishaya,* object, *sambandha,* relation and *abhimana,* sense of ownness.

Rati, nascent love is of three kinds, *sadharani,* ordinary *samanjasa,* becoming and *samartha,* powerful.

Enjoyment is of two kinds, gratification of one's sense organs by the beloved person and secondly, concentration of thought on gratifying the sense-organs of the beloved person. The first is *kama,* seeking mere sense gratification, while the second is *rati,* seeking the pleasure of the beloved person. While lust seeks egoistic gratification, love seeks to satisfy the other person. Further, lust is momentary in contrast to love which is abiding. Love, when developed, becomes *prema,* ardent love. It cannot bear separation from the lover or the beloved. It leads to *manodrava,* melting of the heart. There is intense yearning to be in the presence of the other person (Sinha II, pp. 322 ff).

The writers on aesthetics differentiate between *sambhoga* sex union, and *sringara,* the amorous love between the lovers, which is designated *rasa.* The love in birds and beasts and even among the rustics is not *rasa* but only *rasabhasa,* semblance of *rasa. Sringara* is possible only in men of cultivated taste and in sophisticated persons. That is why they called mere sex relationship as

constituting *sambhog*, a phase of the *rasa* (Ragharasa, 1940, p. 145).

Haripaladeva asserted that *sringara rasa* involves the two phases, *sambhoga*, sex union, and *vipralambha*, disappointed love. While both *sambhoga* and *sringara* are pleasurable, *vipralambha*, is essentially painful. *Autmkya*, longing is at the root of *vipralambha*. The ancient thinkers did not speak separately of this, since they considered *arati* to be one of the ten states of love (referred to in rec. 4) and not a state which is basic. But Haripaladeva draws the distinction (*ibid.*, p. 146).

7. Brahmacharya—Retention and Recirculation of Semen

Sexual love, while it is raised to the level of mystical ecstasy, is also looked upon as the most severe hindrance to the spiritual development. The pollution associated with menstruation are also an important factor in attitude towards sex and women.

Another important belief is that a man should, as far as possible, practise seminal thrift. Loss of semen is considered weakening. "The traditional dietery system is based on food categories which are 'heating' and 'cooling', foods which either influence passions or cool them. The schools of yoga and asceticism are much concerned with the problem of how to retain semen and to ensure its 'recirculation' in the psychophysiological system, whereby it is believed that greater spiritual vitality is assured. . . restrictions are imposed on the frequency of intercourse within marriage. The scriptures are full of mythical incidents in which women are the decoys of the Gods, distracting ascetics and deities from penance and meditation" (Lennoy, 1975, pp. 114-115).

As noted above one of the *yamas* is *brahmacharya*, continence and abstentience from sex (*Yoga Sutra*, II, 30). This stands not only for abstinence from sex but abstinence from sexual enjoyments. As Taimni observes, practice of Yoga involves the decision "to give up completely not only physical indulgence but even thoughts and emotions connected with the pleasures of sex" (p. 214). "No one who allows himself to be attracted by the 'objects of senses can hope to be free from the worries which characterizes the life of the worldly man. Besides being a source of constant mental disturbance, the pursuit of sensual enjoyment tends to undermine the will and to keep up an attitude of mind which militates against a whole-hearted pursuit of the yogic-ideal." However, Taimni points out, "as long as we are living in the world and moving among all kinds of objects which affect sense-organs, we cannot avoid feeling sensuous pleasures of various kinds. . . Has the

Yogi then to attempt the impossible task of shutting out all pleasurable sensations? No! Not at all. The trouble lies not in feeling the sensation, but in craving for the repetition of the experience which involve pleasurable sensations. It is that which has to be guarded against and rooted out because it is the desire, *kama*, which disturbs the mind and creates *samskaras*, and not the actual sensation" (p. 215).

Patanjali further asserts, "on being firmly established in brahmacharya, there is *virya labhah*, gain in vigor (II, 38). Taimni comments, "*Virya* is connected with our whole constitution and refers to that vitality which makes all its pasts vibrant so that all weakness, laxity and inadequacy disappear and are replaced by extraordinary resilience, strength and energy" (*ibid.*, p. 242).

It may be observed in passing that there is fundamental and unquestioning faith among many Indians regarding this. As Taimni continues, "The current of energy which had previously been kept directed to the sexual regions and was being exhausted in sexual indulgence can now be utilized for higher purposes" (*ibid.*, p. 242).

Summary

This chapter attempts to survey briefly some of the reflections on sex behaviour by the ancient Indian thinkers.

The introductory section points out that love and pleasure are recognized as constituting one of the *purusharthas* along with righteousness, wealth and liberation. The only condition laid down is that sex satisfaction should be governed by *dharma*, righteousness. This is one of the reasons why sexual imagery is freely used in religious symbolism. Kama is represented as the God of Love and is the son of Vishnu, the preserver in the trinity. It is pointed out that a special field of literature was developed in ancient times about the art of love in life and in literature and on the stage.

The second section summarizes the contents in the Vedas relating to sex life and sex behaviour. The Atharva Veda contains, as noted earlier, many spells to evoke love and to punish the illicit lover. Some passages from Brihadaranyaka are given which reflect the notions at that time regarding sex. It is pointed out how the ancient texts as well as the daily life of the orthodox section of the higher castes even today are strong taboos about the pollution of the menstrual period in the women. Another very important passage in this Upanishad compares the undifferentiated conscious state of culmination of sex experience to the sublimity of samadhi state.

Reflection of Manu are given in the next section. There is a curious mixture of exaltation of woman's status in society along with dread of woman, revealing the ambivalent attitude towards sex. The eight forms of marriage enumerated by Manu are also given.

The next section describes briefly the contribution of Vatsyayana. In many ways, his reflections are accurate being based on careful observation of sex behaviour.

The fifth section of the chapter gives the contribution of Visvanatha regarding the subjective and objective characteristics of woman's behaviour.

In the final section brief mention is made about the belief that sexual continence increases the vitality as well as the spirituality of an individual.

CHAPTER 18

On Religious Behaviour

1. Introductory

While it is not easy to define religion, particularly in the context of Indian systems of beliefs and practices, one important aspect of religion is the emphasis on personal commitment in which it differs from both science and philosophy. Secondly, there is the conviction that what one believes in is something certain and beyond the realm of doubt. Many arguments may be advanced to 'establish' and to 'prove' the truth of one's beliefs. The intellectual effort is simply to confirm what one already believes. Thirdly, there is the dominance of feelings and emotions in religious consciousness. Finally, religion involves a simple or a very complicated set of rituals. The traditional systems of Hindu thought may believe in one God or many gods or may reject altogether a personal God and have faith only in the *brahman*, the Absolute, the one unchanging reality, that transcends space, time, causality and everything particularly Buddha made a fundamental break with Hinduism in his rejection of not only the Veda as a scripture, but also of the very concepts of *brahman* and *atman*. Mahavira, the last Tirthankara, also rejected the Veda, and the concepts of *brahman* and *atman*. The phenomenal individual, he asserted, consists of the *jiva*, the 'life' closely enmeshed in matter. Thus, it is clear, that the various systems of Indian thought differed from one another in their beliefs about religious dogma, religious scriptures, etc But they all agreed about the importance of ethical discipline, renunciation and meditation. In all the systems may be discerned a close connection between theory and practice, doctrine and life, an approach to self-realization. As Radhakrishnan observes, "There has been no teaching, not even the Samkhya, which remained a mere word of mouth or dogma of schools. Every doctrine is turned into a passionate conviction, stirring the heart of man and quickening his breath" (Vol. I, p. 26f).

Every established religion sublimates and elevates the mind of man. It exerts a great influence on a man's impulses, habits, tastes and unreflective ways of life, through its rituals which are trans-

mitted from generation to generation. Alongside, there is the moral aspect, with moral discipline which teaches the path of virtue. Thirdly, there is the aspect of prayer and meditation which directs the feelings and aspiration. Finally, every religion has a philosophy which helps man to understand his position in the universe, his relations to the ultimate reality and to fellow-men.

In this chapter, our aim will be to outline briefly the reflections of the ancient Indian thinkers regarding religious consciousness, religious behaviour and the possibility of achieving self-realisation.

2. In Vedic Thought

The Vedic word for God is *deva* from the root 'to shine', indicating the relation between the conception of godhead and the luminous powers of nature. The spirit of veneration is indicated by the root *yaj*, 'to worship'. Some passages in the Vedic hymns classify the gods into three groups—gods of the sky like Mitra and Varuna, the gods of mid-air, like Indra and Maruti and the gods of earth like Agni and Soma (Hiriyanna, 1931, p. 32). These concepts clearly indicate that the Vedic conception of divinity lacks personification which probably promoted philosophic speculation. The Vedic Indian's "interest in speculation was not deep and his sense of the mystery hiding the ultimate was so keen that he kept before him unobscured until he arrived at a satisfying solution" (*ibid.*, p. 33). The Vedic gods were also looked upon as the maintainers of *rita*, cosmic as well as moral order. Varuna, representing the sky and light, is looked upon as being responsible for the laws of the physical universe, as well as the order in social life. There is clear evidence that the Vedic seer was not satisfied with the multiplicity of gods and occasionally looked upon one of them as the supreme on one occasion and another later on. Max Muller gave this tendency the name 'henotheism'. It is interesting to recall that this tendency is present even now in every home and in every temple in India. Rama is the chief God on Ramanavmi day and Krishna on the Janmasthami day. Another significant feature of the Vedic religion is the monistic tendency, which traces the whole existence to a single source. As Bose (1954) writes, "It is clearly stated that 'the one being the sages contemplate in many ways'—*ekam santam bahudha kalpayanti* (Rig Veda X, 114.5). Sometimes, it is said that all gods are one in Indra (Rig Veda III, 54.17) or in Agni (Rig Veda II, 1) and sometimes the one God is described as All-God (Vishva Deva). The following well-known verse sets down the Vedic monistic outlook in clear language : "They speak of Indra, Mitra,

Varuna, Agni; and there are the divine Suparna and Garutmat. The one being the wise call by many names (*ekam sad vipra, bahudha vadanti*) as Agni, Yama, Matarishvan" (Rig Veda I, 164 46, p. 28).

There is also evidence of agnosticism, the celebrated Nasadiya hymn asserts, "There was then neither what is, nor what is not. there was no sky nor the heaven which is beyond, what covered? where was it and in whose shelter?. . .Love overcame it in the beginning, which was the seed springing from mind, poets having searched in their heart found by wisdom the bond of what is in what is not. . . He from whom this creation arose, whether he made it or did not make it, the highest seer in the highest heaven, he forsooth knows, or does when he knot know? (Rig Veda X, 129, Max Muller). As Radhakrishnan observes "According to the hymn, desire constitutes the secret of the being of the world. Desire or *kama* is the sign of self-consciousness, the germ of the mine, *manaso retah*" (Vol. I, p. 102). Another poet wonders, "What indeed was the wood? What too was that tree from which they fashioned heaven and earth?" (Rig Veda V, 35.5). The famous Purusha Sukta hymn states that the material for the entire universe came out of the sacrifice of the cosmic man. 'The moon was born from his mind; from his eye, the sun, from his mouth, Indra and Agni and from his *vreeth* 'Vayu' (Rig Veda X, 90). Thus, the entire universe is made out of the body of cosmic *purusha*, man. The social division into four varunas is also mentioned in this hymn.

The *Brahmanas*, which form the second part of the Veda, are the ritual textbooks intended to guide the priests in performing the complicated sacrificial rites. The sacrifices enable man to get what he wants here and hereafter. Even the man would not rise if man did not perform the rites. Even Gods attained this position because they performed sacrifices. The Vedic sage was replaced by the sacrificing priest. The elaborate ceremonial required special training for the priestly office. Priesthood became a hereditary profession.

With extreme complexity of the sacrifices and the assertion of the priests that all power was in their hands, a revolt was inevitable. These revolts arose both within the priestly class and outside it. Thus arose new religion—the religion of the Upanishads, that of Buddha, that of Mahavira, the skepticism and materialism of the Charvaka.

Before going on to a consideration of Upanishadic thought, it will be useful to indicate briefly the outstanding features of the religious outlook of the Vedic hymns and Brahmanas. The Vedic sages looked upon religion as a human institution. The changes in

outlook regarding the classification of Gods, the monotheistic and monistic trends clearly indicate a rational outlook towards religion. But with ritualism becoming complicated, the priest asserted his magical outlook. The priest felt that with his rituals he is all powerful even capable of controlling natural phenomena and enthroning or dethroning the Gods.

However, as noted in earlier chapters, in many passages the sage prays for *dhi*, intelligence, *medha*, talent, *daksha*, efficiency and such other qualities. "Indra, give us wisdom as a father gives wisdom to his sons. May we live and have light" (Rig Veda VII, 32). As noted above, the famous *Gayatri* mantra implores "May He stimulate our intellect" (Rig Veda III, 62.10). "Send us a good and happy mind. Send us skill and wisdom" (Rig Veda X, 25.1). "Make us shine bright like fire produced by friction. Give us clear sight and make us better" (Rig Veda VIII, 48).

The Atharva Veda emphasizes the need for *brahmacharya*. There is to be found a fairly elaborate treatment of this topic.

When we turn to Upanishads, we find the difference between *apara vidya*, lower knowledge, and *para vidya*, higher knowledge, being emphasized. Even the knowledge of the Vedic Samhitas, etc. is declared as lower and the knowledge about the self as the higher (Mundaka Upanishad I, 1.4-5). Similar statements are made in Chandogya Upanishad (VII, 1.2-3). In Kana Upanishad (II, 5), it is said "for one who has realized it (the vedantic doctrine of liberation) here in this world, there is true life." Katha Upanishad declares, "If one is able to realize that *brahman* is here, before the fall of the body (one becomes free from the bondage of this world)" (II, 6.4). Thus, it is stated that the higher knowledge of the self helps one to liberate himself here and now. Knowledge of self is possible, as Katha Upanishad, declares when man looks into the inner self, with his eyes turned inward (II, 4.1). Similarly, Svetasvatara Upanishad, declares that self resides in the body which is a city of mine gates and he must stop sporting in the work outside (III, 18). Another important requisite is ethical. "Neither those who have not refrained from wickedness, nor the unrestrained, nor the unmeditative nor one with unpacified mind, can attain this even by knowledge (Katha Upanishad, 24).

The other requisite is having a guru. "Let him become a pupil under a preceptor who is both learned in the scripture and established in *brahman*" (Mundaka Upanishad I, 2.12). Similarly, Katha Upanishad says "This *atman* can never be well comprehended... unless it is taught by another. This knowledge is never attained by

mere argumentation. It becomes easy of comprehension, when taught by another" (II, 8-9). Arise, awake, realize the *atman* having approached the excellent teachers (*ibid.*, III. 14).

The means for religious endeavour is *bhakti*. Svetasvatara Upanishad asserts "These truths, when taught, shine forth only in that high-souled one who has supreme devotion, *para bhaktih*, in God and in teacher (VI, 23). The other means recommended is meditation on Aum. 'The goal which all the Vedas proclaim, which all declare, and in desiring which they lead the life of brahmacharya is Aum. This syllable is *brahman*. It is the highest" (Katha Upanishad, II, 15-16). Taking as bow the mighty weapon furnished by the Upanishads, fix on it the arrow rendered sharp by constant meditation. And having drawn it with the mind absorbed in His thought, penetrate that mark – the Imperishable *brahman*, Aum is the bow, the self within is the arrow and *brahman* the target. One should hit that mark with an undistracted mind, and like the arrow, become one with it" (Mundaka Upanishad, II, 2.3-4). As noted above, the Mandukya Upanishad exalts the significance of Aum. It is said to contain not merely the three letters *A* (representing the *vaisvanara* or waking self), *U* (representing the *taijasa* or dream self) and *M* (representing the *prajnna* or deep sleep self) but also a fourth parth, viz., the *atman* himself

According to the Svetasvatara Upanishad, the *atman* is imnanent in the body like the oil in the sesamum, or the ghee in curds or the water is hidden in the spring or the fire in the churning sticks (I, 15). That is, the Absolute or the God is within oneself and the task of one is to realize that.

However, the Manduka Upanishad also asserts that the *atman* cannot be realized except by one whom the *atman* himself chooses (III, 2.3).

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that the aim of Upanishads as a whole or predominently, is *adhyatma vidya* or *brahma vidya*, the meditation on the *atman*. The main emphasis is on *jnana* rather than on Vedic rituals or on bhakti or devotion to a personal God.

3. In the Gita

(*i*) *The human predicament*. Every individual is inducted into his religion during infancy and childhood. As he grows up in the family he grows up in the religion of his family. This is why for most people, if not for all religion is based on upbringing. He conforms to the religious practices of his family and accepts the

beliefs current in his family. However, in the course of life, situations may arise in the lives of some, which leads them to question the beliefs and practices accepted during infancy are childhood.

One of the unique features of the *Gita* is that it starts with, what the author calls, Arjuna *vishada*, the despondency of Arjuna. On the battlefield Arjuna sees the two sides—his relatives and friends, ready to kill each other to gain their own point. He is faced with intense conflict. He sees the enemies, not as wicked persons, but as kinsmen, fellow human beings. He is dejected. His limbs fail. He cries out, *me manah bhramtiva*, my mind is whirling as it were (I, 30).

The *Gita* has been a perennial source of inspiration because it starts with this human predicament. Arjuna, is bewildered about his duty in this situation. As Gandhi (1946) wrote,"Even in 1889-99, when I first became acquainted with the *Gita*, I felt that it was not a historical work, that under the guise of physical warfare, it described the dual perpetually that went on in the hearts of mankind, and that physical warfare was brought on merely to make the description of the internal duel more alluring" (p. 127).

While the ordinary individual in content to follow the beliefs, rituals and observances he has inherited from his parents, the truly religious behaviour starts with anguish and despondency. Religion, the author of the *Gita* shows, is not a mere habitual round rituals, feasts and festivals. Commenting on the verse noted above, Radhakrishnan (1949) observes "Arjuna's words make us think of the loneliness of man oppressed by doubt, dread and waste and emptiness. . . .This intolerable sadness is generally the experience of all those who aspire for the vision of reality" (p. 90).

(ii) Temperament and religious path. The greatest contribution of the *Gita* is the confident way in which it indicates that persons of different temperaments have to choose different paths to realize the goal of religion. The *Gita* was the word *Yoga* to indicate the endeavour. The term Yoga is derived from the root *yuj* which means to join, to yoke, to concentrate one's attention on, etc. The ultimate aim of religion is to make a person realize what he is, what the world is and to attach himself to the totality whether it is conceived as the personal God or as the impersonal *brahman*.

The author of the *Gita*, aware of differences in temperament among human beings, describes different ways open for the individual to seek unity with the personal God or the impersonal Absolute. Different roads to salvation are described thus: "By meditation some perceive the self in the self by the self: others

by the path of knowledge; and still others by the path of works; yet others by devotion" (XVIII, 14-25). In another famous verse, it is said "In this world a two fold-way of life is taught, the path of knowledge for men of contemplation and the path of work for men of action" (III, 3).

It is pointed out that the work one does in the society or for the society, becomes a means to self-realization if it is done free from attachment, *asaktah* (III, 19) The aim of one's action should be the well-being the society, *lokasamgraham* (III, 20). To quote Radhakrishnan, "The aim of religion is to spiritualize society, to establish brotherhood on earth . . . In a tired age, we adopt the gospel of renunciation and endurance. In an age of hope and energy we emphasize active service in the world and the saving of civilization" (p. 139f). The essence of Karma Yoga is described, "To action alone lest thou a right and never at all to its fruits; let no fruits of action be thy motive" (II, 47). This is why Gandhiji called the *Gita, anaskti yoga*, the Gospel of selfless action.

Describing the path of knowledge, the author of the *Gita* emphasizes the importance of what he calls *jnanayajna*, knowledge as a sacrifice, that it is greater than all the other material sacrifices. *Jnana* is wisdom, not mere book learning. It is *jnana* that gives us liberation. The means to attain wisdom is through *pariprasna*, by inquiry. This shows that religion consists in reverent inquiry and not in blind obedience to an external authority (IV, 33-34). It is declared: *na hi jnanena sadrisam pavitram iha vidyate*—There is nothing on earth equal in purity to wisdom (IV, 38). Verse 37 speaks of *jnanaquit*, the fire of wisdom. Verse 39 assures that supreme peace can be attained by gaining wisdom. The last verse calls on Arjuna to resort to Yoga and *uttishtha*, stand up, having cut as under doubts born of ignorance with the *jnanasina*, the sword of wisdom. Thus we find in this chapter high praise for wisdom as the means for self-realization.

According to the traditional review, the second six chapters of the *Gita*, namely, from seventh to twelfth deal with the way of *bhakti*, devotion to personal God. Two verses in the seventh chapter speak of different kinds of devotion. The man in distress, the seeker for wealth, the seeker for knowledge and the man of wisdom. Of these, the man of wisdom who is ever in constant union excels, *ekabhaktir visishyate*. "I am dear to him and he is dear to me" (VII, 16-17). While the first three seek the personal God for succour, wealth or knowledge, the last one is the true devotee and there is mutual love between him and God. The twelfth chapter describes the

characteristics of the *bhakta*, the devotee, the person who has an emotional relationship with God. Those who fix their minds on God, who are ever earnest and are possessed of surpeme faith, they are the best yogins (XII, 2). The term yogin here means the person who is united with God. The devotee is asked to fix his mind in God and let all his thoughts centre in God (XII, 8). The true devotee, it is declared, is he who has no ill-will to anyone, who is friendly and compassionate, who is free from egoism and self-sence (*nirmamo nirahankarah*), who is even-minded in pleasure and pain (*samaduhkhasukhah*) and who is *kshami*, ever forgiving (XII, 12). He, from whom the world does not shrink and who does not shrink from the world, who is free from joy, anger, fear and agitation—he is dear to me (XII, 15). Thus, the *bhakta*, the devotee, being fully emotionally attached to God, is completely transformed in his behaviour towards others. He does not harm anyone nor does he feel threatened by anyone. He is cheerful, warm and compassionate towards all human beings. He is not affected by the feelings in him, nor is he affected by social status of the persons with whom he comes into contact. Thus, in this chapter, the author of the *Gita* describes the way of *bhakti* and its concequences to the *bhakta* and to the people in the world.

The method of *dhyana yoga*, the path of meditation is described in the sixth chapter. The arch of this method is the dependence on self. "Let a man lift himself by himself; let him not degrade himself; for the self alone is the friend of the self and the self alone is the enemy of the self. For him who has conquered his (lower) self by the (higher) self, his self is a friend, but for him who has not subdued his lower self, his own self acts as an enemy (VI, 5-6). The self has two aspects, the aspect that is governed by bodily and social needs and is subject to feelings and emotions and the aspect that transcends them and is governed by reason and compassion. The aim of *dhyana*, meditation is to gain control over the lower self and becomes fully conscious and deliberate in one's behaviour and dealings with fellow-beings. For the person who has gained mastery over his senses, feelings and emotions, a lump of earth, a stone and gold are the same (VI, 8). His sense of values is transformed. He looks on all objects and all human beings alike. He, as it even, goes beyond the market values and the social values current in the society. A brief description of the techniques of meditation is given in verses ten to eighteen. When his thoughts are subdued, he is like the flame free from any flicker in a windless place (VI, 19). In the condition, nothing can upset

his equilibrium. Supreme happiness, *prasantamanasam*, comes to him whose mind is peaceful, whose passions are at rest (*santarajasam*) and who is stainless (*akalmasham*). He is *brahmabhutam*, one with *brahman* (XII, 27). It is in this chapter that the famous Golden Rule of behaviour is enunciated. He whose self is harmonized sees the self abiding in all beings and all beings in the self. *Savratra samadarsinah*, he sees the same everywhere. He sees me everywhere and sees all in me (VI, 29-30).

When Arjuna asks how the fickle mind can be controlled and concentration achieved, he is informed that the restless and impetuous mind can be controlled by the twin techniques of *abhyasa* and *vairagya*, constant practice and non-attachment (VI, 34-35). Non-attachment in this context means not eager to reap the gains.

Two features have to be borne in mind. Different techniques are prescribed because it is recognized that there are individual differences in temperaments. However, it is recognized, that the ultimate goal to be reached is the same, namely. self-realization or or God-realization, whatever the chosen path, may be. The final aim is the ultimate and irrevocable transformation of the frail, selfish, sense-dominated, emotion-ridden human individual into one with equanimity and equimindedness so that he is universalistic in outlook, rational and compassionate.

(*iii*) *Freedom to decide.* The *Gita* starts with the anxiety and dejection of man. It is a long disquisition on the nature of the *atman*, *brahman* and the world. Various paths are suggested to enable a man to become a *jivanmuktha*, fully liberated here and now. The finest note of rationalism and the freedom of the individual is struck at the conclusion *stat aseshena vimrisya yatha, icchasi tatha kuru*—reflect upon it fully that is reflect fully on what has been said, and do as you choose (XVIII, 63). Arjuna is finally exhorted to think fully and come to his own decision and do what he feels is the best in his opinion. Rational outlook and self-determination are the final criteria even in the religious field, according to the *Gita*. As Radhakrishnan observes, "Man is to be wooed not coerced into cooperation. He is to be drawn not driven, persuaded, not compelled. The Supreme does not impose His command. We are free at any moment to reject or accept the Divine Call. The integral surrender should be made with the fullest consent of the seeker" (*ibid.*, p. 375). Probably this is one of the finest passages in the religious literature of the world giving full freedom to the individual to make his choice without threatening him with any half-fire here and now or hereafter.

4. Bhakti (Devotion)

In *Narada Bhakti Sutra*, *bhakti* is defined as supreme love for God, which is single-minded and which is devoid of any desire for wealth, happiness, virtue and liberation. Devotion generates peace and tranquillity.

Bhagavata mentions nine characteristics of *bhakti*: (1) *sravana*, listening to God's glory; (2) *kirtana*, chanting God's name and His attributes; (3) *smarana*, thinking about God and recalling about Him; (4) *padasevana*, service to God; (5) *archana*, worship; (6) *vandana*, eulogizing Him; (7) *dasya*, servitude to Him; (8) *sakhya*, friendship for Him; and (9) *atmanivedana*, self-dedication to Him vii, 5.23-24).

Devotion is the religious consciousness in which knowledge of God as the *antaryamin*, the inner guide is the cognitive element, love of Him as the Master and friend is the element of feeling and all actions being dedicated to Him being the conative element. Thus, *bhakti* involves not only love of God, but also love for humanity and the sentiment creation and the dedication to serve Him and all beings. *Bhakti* leads to a complete transformation of life. It generates complete self-surrender.

According to *Sandilya Sutra*, *bhakti* can be inferred from its organic manifestation in the form of shedding tears, bristling of hair, etc., showing honour (*sammana*), excessive regard (*bahumana*), love (*priti*), pangs of separation (*viraha*), aversion to all other objects than God (*itaravichikits*), narration of His greatness (*mahimakhyati*), maintaining one's life for God (*tadarthapranasthana*), the sense of one's wife, sons and property belonging to God (*tadiyabhava*), the feeling that all are God's manifestation (*sarvatadbhava*), non-hostility towards Him (*apritikulya*) and constant recollection of him (II, 1.44).

Rupa Goswami, in his *Bhaktirasamritasindhu* recognizes five kinds of love (*rati*) for God: (1) quiet-love (*santirati*); (2) loving servitude (*dasyarati*); (3) friendly love (*sakhyarati*); (4) parental love (*vatsalyarati*); and (5) wifely love (*madhurarati*). Thus, God may be looked upon as a person and the devote enters into close relationship with Him as he does with a human being. This analysis of various kinds of *bhakti* also takes cognisance of the varying attitudes in individuals.

In *santirati*, "a man worships God without the fire of love in him, without its madness in his brain, when his love is just the calm, common place love, a little higher than mere forms and ceremonies and symbols, but not at all characterized by the madness of inten-

esely active love" (Swami Vivekananda, 1959, p. 105). In *dasya-rati*, the devotee looks upon himself as the servant of God and entertains loving regard for Him. The devotee who looks upon God as his friend, considers Him to be of the same age, endowed with similar qualities. There is mutual confidence, as a result of deep trust without any reserve. The devotee may have parental love for God, looking upon himself as the father or looking upon herself as the mother. The milkmaids of Vrindavana and Mirabai looked upon Krishna as the holy husband. Attention may be drawn to the various manifestations of *bhakti* in Shri Ramakrishna's life as depicted in the *Gospel of Shri Ramakrishna.*

As Narada puts it, *bhakti* is intense love for God. This involves attachment on one side and continuous remembrance on the other. The two are, as it were, the two sides of the same coin. *Bhakti* involves both close attachment and continuous remembrance. As Swami Vivekananda (1959) puts it, *bhakti* is "attachment which comes after the knowledge of the nature and glory of God; else a blind attachment to any one, e.g., to wife or children, would be *bhakti*. We plainly see, therefore, that *bhakti* is a series or successive of mental effort at religious realization beginning with ordinary worship and ending in a supreme intensity of love for *Isvara*" (p. 10).

Bhajan involves the rhythmic chanting of religious hymns. It may also include dancing These sessions of group singing and group dancing may increase the emotionality to such an extent that some of the participants may go into ecstasy. In *bhajan*, members of all castes participate. As Lennoy (1975) remarks with perspicacity, "Hindu society ascribes religious significance both to separation of groups into castes and to the interdependence among those castes. This is a universal phenomenon of all religiously oriented societies. The seasonal festival dramatises these two facts through religious rapture, ecstatic orgiasticism, trance dancing and art. The festival restores the sense of unity which specialization endangers; this is generally accomplished by a reversal of the customary regulation of daily social interplay and work" (p. 193).

Thus, the essential characteristic of *bhakti* is love to the divine presonality. God is represented as a person, so that the devotee can have intense love for Him and experience the longing to become one with the divine. It involves complete surrender to God and looking upon all human beings and all living beings as the manifestation of the Divine person. This is depicted well by Swami Ramdas in his *World is God* (1967).

5. The Concept of Ishthadevata

As noted above one of the finest expressions of monism is human literature in the passage in Rig Veda affirming, *Ekam sad vipra bahudavadanti*-- The Real is one, the learned call it by various names, Agni, Yama and Matarisvan (Rig Veda, I, 164.46). Similarly, Varuna is the one supreme God declared by some Rishis of Rig Veda. But in actual practice, the large majority of the hymns praise many Gods. Monistic thought, monotheistic faith and polytheistic practice are the features of the Vedic as well as modern time, making it difficult to describe Hinduism. What are the psychological factors which have resulted in this situation right from the Vedic times. Long ago, Max Muller referred to this tendency as Henotheism, the worshipping of each divinity in turn, as if it were the greatest of the only God.

Probably, the concept of *ishthadevata* may help in understanding this religious faith and practice. As Sarma (1971) points out, "out of the numerous forms of God conceived in the past by the heart of man and recorded in the scriptures, the worshipper is taught to choose one which satisfies his spiritual longing, and make that the object of his adoration and love. This is said to be *ishthadevata*, It may be Siva or Vishnu or one of the *avatars* or one of the many forms of *sakti*, the personification of the power of God. . . , for Hinduism freely encourages the use of images in worship, so that there may be something concrete round which man's devotion may centre" (p. 64).

These problems have been raised in the *Gita*. Arjuna asks, "those devotees who worship Thee (with form) and those who worship the imperishable and unmanifested (without form), which of these are better versed in Yoga?" Krishna replies, "Those who, fixing their minds on Me, worship Me, them do I consider most perfect in Yoga. But those who worship the Imperishable, the undependable, the unmanifested, they also came to Me indeed. The difficulty of those whose thoughts are set on the unmanifested is greater, for the God of the unmanifested is hard to reach" (XII, 1-5).

Thus, in these five verses, there is the statement that the Divine may be worshipped either as God with form or as the Absolute without any form. But it is recognised that worshipping the formless divine, the *nirguna brahman*, is more difficult.

Why is it more difficult to worship the unmanifest, the formless? In the *Avadbutagita*, Dattaraya asks, "How can I bow to Him who is formless?" Commenting on this verse, Radhakrishnan (1960)

observes, "the Immutable does not offer an easy hold to the mind and the path is more arduous. We reach the same goal more easily and naturally bv the path of devotion to the personal God" (1.293).

However, this gives rise to the next problem. If it is easier and more satisfying to worship the personal God, what is the form to be chosen?

The author of the *Gita* offers the solution. "In whatever way men approach Me, even so do I reward them. My path do men follow" (IV, 11). The same idea is reinforced in another verse "Whatever form one desires to worship in faith and devotion, in that very form I make that faith of his secure" (VII, 21).

Thus, two verses, as it were, constitute the charter of *ishthadevata*, let the devotee choose any form that helps him to concentrate his attention and to pour out his devotion. This is the liberty offered to man by the *Gita*.

In the *Yoga Sutras*. Patanjali, prescribes a number of exercises to remove the obstacles which hinder concentration of mind (I, 32-39). In order to overcome *vikshepa*, distractions, which are the foes of concentration, Patanjali prescribes constant practice of one principle (I, 32). Secondly, he suggests the cultivation of friendliness, compassion, etc. (I, 33), because one of the greatest obstacles to tranquillity of mind is the reaction to the human beings with whom one is closely associated. Friendliness, etc. are not only virtues, but the important means to quieten the mind and promote concentration. The third method suggested is *pranayama*, the control of breathing (I, 34). Breath control, as noted above calms the mental processes. The fourth method (I, 35) suggested is concentration on the tip of the nose so that there is the experince of smelling a pleasant order or on the tip of the tongue so that there is the experience of tasting something very pleasant. That is, imagining that one is sensing some extraordinary smell or taste, etc. Or, fifthly, contemplating on some serene and luminous experience (I, 36). Or to obtain steadiness of mind by contemplating on persons who are free from attachment, hatred (*raga-dvesha*) and other passions (I, 37). Or, by contemplating on the states of dream and deep sleep, that is, on other states of consciousness (I, 38). Finally, he asks us: *yatha abhimata dhyanadva*—meditate on whatever (image) one desires (I, 39).

Here again (Sutra I, 39) there is a charter for worshipping the *ishthadevata*.

The main problem is the psychological problem of

over all kinds of thoughts and feelings which continually obtrude on the mind. Patanjali prescribes a number of exercises to help us to overcome these distractions. After suggesting a number of alternatives, he finally declares that one may contemplate on any form that is helpful.

Thus, the unique religious fact of Hinduism, viz., having the images and pictures of many forms in the puja room in the house, or in the temple, can be understood as the choice allowed to the devotee to help him to concentrate and control his restless mind, which is a prey to many thoughts, feelings and emotions.

6. Guru-Sishya Relationship

One of the unique features of Indian religious systems is the guru-sishya relationship, the relationship between the master and the disciple. Mention has already been made of this in the first chapter when the problem of methods was discussed. From the ancient time there has been the tradition in India that enlightenment can arise only through a master. Mere study will not lead to enlightenment. It can arise only through personal contact with a master. As Swami Vivekananda observes, "In studying books we are sometimes deluded into thinking that thereby we are being spiritually helped: but if we analyse the effect of the study of books on ourselves, we shall find that, at the utmost, it is only our intellect that derives profit from such studies, and not our inner spirit. This inadequacy of books to quicken spiritual growth is the reason why, although almost everyone of us can *speak* most wonderfully on spiritual matters, when it comes to action and the living of a truly spiritual life, we find ourselves so awfully deficient. To quicken the spirit, the impulse *must* come from another soul" (*Bhakti Yoga*, p. 25). The guru is one who possesses the ability and power to transmit and the sishya is one who has the ability and fitness to receive the teaching. The seed must be the living seed, and the field must be readily ploughed; and when both these conditions are fulfilled, a wonderful growth of genuine religion takes place" (*ibid*., p. 25). Katha Upanishad, as already noted, exhorts, "Arise, awake, o man, Realise that *atman* having approached, *varan*, the excellent teachers" (III, 14). The Mundaka Upanishad warns, "Steeped in ignorance, wise in their own conceit go round and round, staggering to and fro, like a blind man led by the blind" (I, 2.8). As regards qualification of the teacher, it is said that he must not only be well-read in the scriptures, but also live the life that the books teach. That is mere knowledge is not sufficient. What he *is*, is more important than

what he *knows*. As for the disciple, he must have a real thirst to transform himself. He must be perseverant. He must have faith in the master and veneration for him. As Sankara has put it in his work *Vivekachudamani* "Success depends essentially on a qualified aspirant: time, place and other such means are but auxiliaries in this regard. Hence the seeker after the Reality of the *atman* should take to reasoning, after duly approaching the guru who should be the best of the knowers of *brahman*, an ocean of mercy" (14-15). The term *adhikara* is used to indicate the qualification of the disciple, the seeker. The fit disciple is one who has the ability as well as the keen eagerness to learn. The master has to satisfy for himself that the seeker is fit to receive the instruction. It is only then that he must impart the instruction. As Sarma (1971) writes, "The doctrine of *adhikara* means that the religious teaching that is imparted to a man should vary with his spiritual competence. It is worse than useless to teach abstract philosophy to a man whose mind hungers for concrete Gods. So the ideal that has to be placed before a man and the doctrine that has to be taught to him will depend upon his *adhikara* or spiritual fitness" (p. 64f). However, the serious error was made to link up the doctrine of *adhikara* with caste. Indeed, *adhikara* merely recognises the individual differences which exist with respect to taste and temperament in the field of religion as in music, medicine, etc., linked with the master-disciple relationship in the problem of initiation. The pupil has to be initiated into the practice that is appropriate for his level. It is a solemn ritual, which includes the necessary directions.

7. Pollution

One of the unique features of the religious and social system in the Hindus, is pollution, ritualistic purity and impurity. As Lannoy (1975) writes, "for example, the priest who actually killed the sacrificial beast was lower in ritual status than the providing priest. It was in the extension of this Vedic principle of graded ritual states to the entire range of social life that caste classification—division of *jati*—originated. Not, be it noted, that the acquisition of purity or impurity was the cause of caste distinctions but on the contrary, the form of them" (p. 143f).

The behaviour of the Hindu, at home and outside the home, is governed by the magico-religious ideas of purity and pollution. Taboos regarding food, menstruation, compulsive washing habits, untouchability, are all based on this notion of purity-pollution. The most extraordinary consequence is the fact that social distinc-

tions are based on the idea of purity-impurity. The notion of pollution is the intervening link between religion and society in India.

The concept of pollution, it must be remembered, is based neither on hygiene nor on aesthetics, but on magico-religious notions. The clean and well dressed woman in the office, who is having her periods, is accepted at being normal, not so the wife or sister at home. Similarly the clean and well-dressed highly educated and high-status member of the Scheduled Caste in looked upon as an 'untouchable'. Repulsion and taboo is based on the notion, not on the facts of the case. Caste pollution, for instance, is collective and hereditary. The members of the lower castes are impure by birth as a group. The dhobi, the barber, the shoe-maker and the sweeper are impure by birth and by profession. Even if they change their profession, they continue to be 'impure by birth', which is permanent and beyond change. Other forms of impurity are temporary and can be overcome by bath or by sprinkling water. A person is impure on waking because he has to wash and bathe. After bathing he is pure. But he becomes impure while eating. So he must purify himself after he completes the meal. He cannot go to the puja room till he takes his bath and wears clothes untouched by others. In that condition any touch even by his wife and children at home is polluting. It is only after he completes the puja ritual and changes his clothes that he becomes a 'touchable' at home. Thus, everyday, at home, the higher caste man becomes impure and not fit to be touched or is so pure that he cannot be touched even by his wife and children. As a result, he cannot understand why so much fuss is made about all this in social relations outside the home. His very wife, sister and mother is an untouchable at home on occasions. So he cannot see anything morally wrong in the practice of untouchability in society.

The whole of the fifth chapter of *Manusmriti* consisting of 169 verses deals with the problem of impurity and pollution. Birth and death in the house leads to the pollution of the house as well as the members of the family in the house and outside the house. The birth as well as the death of a child makes all the relatives, the *sapindas*, impure. The impurity lasts for ten days or for three days or for one day according to the degree of relationship. The pollution of *sapinda*—relationship ceases with the seventh person in the ascending and descending lines! While the impurity caused by death is common to all relatives by birth, the pollution caused by birth falls only on the parents (V, 58-62). Those who have touched a corpse

are purified after a bath (V, 64). He, Manu declares, who has touched a chandala, a menstruating woman, a woman in child bed, a corpse or one who has touched a corpse, becomes purified by bathing (V, 85).

The gods declared three things to be pure—that on which no taint is visible, that which has been washed by water, and which has been commended as pure by the word of a Brahmana (V, 127). Small quantities of grain and cloth have to be purified by washing them. But large quantities may be purified by sprinkling water on them (V. 118).

Thus, religious notions of purity and pollution have played a dominant role in the life of the individual as well as the society.

It must be remembered that these notions do not belong to bygone days. They are alive and active even today Secondly, it must be remembered that these ideas of purity have nothing to do with rules of hygiene. They have nothing to do with personal or social hygiene. They are taboos and so are strictly observed. But they are given a religious complexion.

SUMMARY

An attempt has been made in this chapter to briefly describe the psychological aspects of religious behaviour that can be gathered from the ancient Indian philosophic and religious books.

In the introductory section, some broad features of religious behaviour are described. The essence of religious behaviour is personal commitment to the dogmas and practices transmitted by the previous generation to the succeeding generation.

The second section attempts to describe the characteristic features of the Vedic religion as depicted in the Samhitas and Brahmanas. It is shown how the Vedic seer was not a wholly committed man as the later practioners. He freely expressed his doubts and disbeliefs as they arose in his mind. This is the reason for the bold affirmation in the last part of the Veda, viz., the Upanishada. The Upanishadia thinkers frankly assert that *jenana* refers to the knowledge of *brahman* and *Atman* and not to the rituals of the Brahmanas, the *karma kanda*, as it is designated. Also there is a greater emphasis on ethical preparation in the Upanishads than on performing rituals. Meditation becomes the means and self-realisation of God-realisation becomes the goal rather than mere ritualistic observances.

In the third section, an attempt has been made to describe the

psychological principles underlying religious behaviour as delineated in the *Gita*. It starts with the predicament of a man who has lost faith in the religious practices and the moral principles based on them, when he is confronted by an agonising situation in life. This is the source of religious quest. Otherwise, religious life is mere social conformity. Another unique feature of the *Gita* is that it clearly describes how the religious path to be pursued by an individual should be based on his temperament. Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism are not procrustean, tending to produce uniformity in religious behaviour like the semetic religious. However, it must also be recognised that this is responsible for the persistance of many outworn beliefs, customs and practices. Characteristic of this freedom is the teaching of the *Gita* leaving it to the disciple to make his own decision on the basis of the teaching provided—*yathecchesi thatha kuru*, with which the *Gita* ends.

An attempt is made in the fourth section to describe the psychological features of *bhakti*, devotion to God. One of the important features here also is the recognition of the differences in temperament. The devotee may take up one or the other social relation towards God in order to achieve unity with Him. While the path of meditation lays emphasis on the impersonal feature of the divine, the path of *bhakti* lays emphasis on the personal aspect of the divine.

Next an attempt has been made to analyse the pyschological roots of many Gods and idols in Hindu religious practice, though the *Upanishads* emphasize the impersonal *brahma* while the *Gita* emphasises the personal Bhagavan. A careful study of the *Gita* as well as the *Yoga Sutra* show how the concept of *Ishthadevata* has been described in them and how they promote individual taste and temperament with respect to the form of the divine.

An analysis is made next of another unique feature of Hinduism and other Indian religions, viz., the emphasis on gurusishya relationship and the concept of *adhikara*.

In the final section of the chapter, analysis of another characteristic feature of Hindu religious and social behaviour, is attempted, viz., the purity-pollution complex. Some of the worst features of Indian social system can be traced to this obsession with respect to purity-pollution practiced at home and extended to the socity at large in the name of religion.

CHAPTER 19

Psycholinguistics

1. Introduction

Psycholinguistics studies the mental process underlying the acquisition and use of language. If deals with the various aspects of meaning. Philosophers, grammarians and aesthicians were concerned with the problem of meaning from the most ancient times. Some aspects of this problem have been considered in the chapter on thought and language (Chapter 10). A more detailed study of the contributions of ancient Indian thinkers is attempted in this chapter.

Right from the early times, thinkers have been dealing with the problems of words and their meanings, sentences and their meanings, how language is learnt by children and later on. This tendency may be traced to their eagerness to grapple with abstract problems and creative outlook.

While this chapter deals with the linguistic aspects, the next chapter will deal with the aesthetic aspects. This branch of study was called Alankara Sastra and Sahitya Sastra.

The two schools of philosophic thought, viz., Nyaya and Mimamsa were concerned with linguistic problems. Nyaya system was concerned with "argument" and "conclusion" with respect to the interpretation and justification of Vedic teaching. Similarly Purva-Mimamsa was concerned with the investigation of the meaning and significance of the *Brahmanas* which constitute the *karma-kanda* of the Vedas. As Hiriyanna (1932) observes, "The primary aim of the Mimamsa as a branch of learning may, therefore be described as getting back from the expression to the idea of behaviour, the solving of the important problem of the relation between speech and thought. Since the view taken of language here is that it is independent of the individual using it, the system involves a great deal of discussion relating to social or folk psychology. This psychological inquiry contains much that is valuable for the modern science of semantics of that branch of knowledge dealing with meaning in relation to linguistic forms" (p. 198).

Above all, there was *vyakarana*, the service of grammar. The two

great grammarians, Patanjali, the author of *Mahabhashya* and Bhartrihari, the author of *vakyapadi*, are associated with the genesis and development of the *sphotavada*, respectively.

Thus, the origins and development of psycholinguistics in ancient India may be traced to grammarians, philosophers and to aestheticians.

2. The Way Language is Learnt

The words and the objects denoted by them are learnt by each individul. Kunjunni Raja (1963) enumerates eight methods specified by the ancient thinkers to describe how the relation between the words and their objects are learnt (pp. 26ff).

The first is *virddhavyavahara* the usage of words by the elders. Usage in the means to learn the word as well as the object that it denotes. Kumarailabhatta in his *slokavarttika* says that there are three definite stages in this process of learning. The first is direct perception. The child hears the utterance of the speaker and sees the activity by the listener, his response to the sound. The second is inference. The child infers from the activity that the person responding has understood the meaning of the utterance. The third is *arthapatti*, postulation. The child knows that the action of the listener is inexplicable except on the presumption of the relation between the utterance and the objector action. This analysis, though logical, does not appear to be based on actual observation regarding the way in which the child learns the language.

Sabara, of 4th century A.D., in his commentary on Taimni's *Mimamsa Sutra*, deals with the problem of word and its meaning. Though according to the assumption of the school, there is 'natural' relation between the word and its meaning (Commentary on Sutra 5). Sahara argues that the meaning has to be learnt. He asserts that the first hearing of the word is not accompanied by the meaning. In fact, he says, the meaning of the word is understood only when it has been heard many times before it is looked upon as the denotes —that the word is the name and that the object is what is named.

He takes up three problems: What is a 'word'? What is meaning? What is the relation between the two? The word is the sound consisting of the letters. The meaning is the class to which the particular belongs. The relation between the word and the object is that on the word being cognized, what is denoted by it becomes cognized.

The meanings are comprehended because of learning during childhood, It is based on usage. This is the fact. This is how language is learnt. Thus Sahara expounds the usage theory based on experi-

ence, on how language is learnt by children.

Prabhakara of Mimamsa School points out that the child learns the meaning of the sentence as a whole by observing the action in response to a command like, for example, 'bring the cow' There is one sentence and there is one action in response—the cow is brought. The child observing the sentence uttered and the action, in response grasps the meaning of the sentence in one act of comprehension. When later on the command 'bring the horse' is given, there is the corresponding action. This helps the child, it is pointed out, to get the meaning of the term 'bring' which is common to both the commands and that the terms 'cow' and 'horse' refer to different animals. As Jha (1942) points out ' Thus by comparing the various sentences uttered by people and by observing the action produced, the child is able, by the mental process of exclusion and inclusion (*avapa* and *udvapa* or *envyaya* and *vyatireka*) to have a general idea about the means of individual words. This process of substitution is natural and subsconscious, rather than deliberate and conscious" (p. 135f).

Grammarians as well as logicians agree that the best method of learning a language is that of observing the use of knowledge in actual life. Children learn the language by this direct method.

The second method of learning a language is by the statements of trustworthy persons. This is called *aptavakya*. Here the learning is conscious and deliberate. The growing child learns the meanings of new words by asking his parents, teachers and others.

The third method is by using the lexicon (*kosa*) or by learning grammar we learn the meanings and the usage of words. Analogy is another method. Verbal description using analogy helps in identifying objects. Yet another method is by context.

3. Anandavardhana on Semantics

Krishnamoorthy (1974) writes, "Anandavardhana (9th century A.D.) is the first writer in Indian poetics to attempt an enquiry into semantics. He distinguished between the two well-known usages of language, viz., use of language outside poetry, on the one hand, and the unique usage exclusive to poetry, on the other. The first referential usage is a gift of convention and is well within the reach of everyone who knows the language. The second is the indirect use of language wherein meaning may be either metaphsycial or implicit" (XXVII).

The first is the *vachyartha*, the denotative meaning of the word, the *abhidha*. This is the primary meaning of the word, the *sabda*.

It is the *vachaka*, the denoter. The meaning of the word, is *artha*. It is *vachya*, the denoted. This is the normal use of the word in daily language. It is the primary meaning.

The second is the *lakshyartha*, the indicative or metaphorical meaning of the word. Here the word is used to denote a referent other than the normal one. This is the secondary meaning of the word. It is called *lakshana*. As Kunjunni Raja (1963) writes, "The well known example of *lakshana* in Sanskrit is the sentence *gangayam ghoshah*—the village is on the Gangas. Here the primary meaning of the word Gangayam is 'on the river ganges'; this is not suitable to the context, since the village cannot actually be on the stream itself; hence the actual meaning of the word 'ganga' is taken to be 'gangatatha', the bank of the river Ganges" (p. 232). Thus the secondary meaning is not understood directly from the world, but only indirectly. Normally the primary meaning occurs to the mind. But when this is found to be incompatible with the context, resort is made to *lakshana*, what is indicated. The great logician Gautama uses the term *upachara*, in his *Nyaya Sutra* (II, 2.62) for his secondary function of the words.

The secondary meaning may arise as a result of association. For example, in the sentence *Yashtikam bhojaya* (feed the stick), the Brahman is referred to as the 'stick' since he is associated with the stick which he always carries. The Mimamsakas used the metaphorical meaning to explain Vedic passages which do not make sense otherwise. The Vedic expression '*yajamanah prastarah*' literally means 'the grass-bundle is the sacrificer'. This makes nor sense. It means that the grass-bundle accomplishes the purpose served by the sacrificer and hence indicates the term 'sacrifices' (*ibid.*, p. 236).

The theory of literal and metaphysical meaning first developed by the Mimamsakas and Naiyayikas was later extended by Anandavardhana. He postulated the third policy of language that is, the *vyangyartha*, the suggestive meaning. He asserted that a word not only conveys information as in scientific and philosophical disquisitions, but also conveys emotions, as a result of the context, the intonation, the stress, the gestures, etc. Anandavardhana uses the term *dhvani* for such emotive suggestions in daily life as well as in poetry. This theory will be taken up for discussion in the chapter on aesthetics (Chapter 20).

In his work, *Sringara Prakasa*, Bhoja of 11th century, differentiates between *abhidhiyamana*, expressed meaning, *pratiyamana*, implied meaning and *dhvanirupa*, suggested meaning. The expressed meaning is the *vakyartha*, the meaning of a sentence got at by

akanksha, *sannidhi*, etc. However, when the expressed sense means nothing, the implied sense or suggested sense has to be explored. He takes the expression *nimishatyesha* which means 'she winks'. This is the primary word meaning. The term implies, he says, that the damsel is a mortal being and not a celestial being because she closes her eyes. However, if the information raises "the vision of exquisitely sparkling eyes" whose beauty excites emotion, it is the *dhvani*, the suggested sense (p. 164f).

Thus by 9th century, the Indian theorists had arrived at three meanings conveyed by words, viz., the denotative, the indicative and the suggestive meanings.

Abhinavagupta (11th century A.D.) added fourth function of words, viz., *tatparya* in order to explain the syntactic unity of a sentence. "The intention of the speaker, or the general purport of the utterance is obviously to give a unified purposeful sentence meaning." "It may be noted here that even though Anandavardhana refers to the importance of the speaker's intention in conveying the meaning of a pass A/c, he never refers to *tatparya* as a separate *vritti* or *sakti* of words; in fact he says that in linguisitic discourse there are only three functions or powers of words to be accepted; the primary, the second and the suggestive" (Kunjunni Raja, p. 214).

4. The Abhidha—the Primary Meaning of a Word

The *Tarkasamgraha* defines the *sabda*, word as *saktampadam*—a word is that which has significatory potency [38(b)]. The significative power of the word is defined as the relation that exists between the word and its meaning. Visvanatha writes in his *Bhasha Pariccheda* that the denotative function of the word is learnt from grammar, comparison, dictionary usage, etc. (p. 149). While the Mimamsakas look upon the relation between the word and its primary meaning as 'neutral', the Nyaya thinkers look upon it as 'conventional'. According to the Mimamsaka the denotative power is inherent in the world itself (I, 1.5), because it was impossible to conceive to conceive of a society without language. What they mean by the statement that words are eternal is that it is not possible to trace the origin of this relationship to a specific individual. This is called *pravadha nityata*. The word and its meaning are handed down from generation to generation in a continuous way. So that they assert that there is a 'permanent' relation between the word and its meaning.

The Nyaya-Vaiseshika theorists reject this view. *Nyaya Sutra*

asserts, *samayi katvach sabdarthasampratyayasya*—it is understood by a word (II, 1.55). They ridicule the neutralistic theory by pointing out that the world 'fire' when uttered does not burn the mouth nor does the word 'honey' sweeten it (*Sabarabhasya* I, 1.5). It is also pointed out that if words had natural relationship with the objects, the same words should have meant the same object in every society or language.

Bhartrihari, in his *Vakyapadiya* asserts that a word is a *sankata*, a symbol and that it may be permanent (*ajanika*) or *adhunika*, coined by the specialist as a technical term in a science.

Words are classified on the basis of the way in which their meanings are determind. One important means of deriving meanings of words in Sanskrit is by derivation—*yaugika*. Its meaning is determined by the component parts. For example, the word *pachaka* stands for 'cook'. The word is derived from the root *pach*, to cook and the suffix *aka* signifies the agent or action. So meanings of words are understood from grammar and etymology. The other menthod is *rudha*, conventional. In the case of words, the meaning of which cannot be determined by the roots, suffixes, etc., the meaning has to found by its usage. By convention, the term *pankaja* means the lotus. But the etymological sense is 'what grows in the mud', which does not convey it. Thus, in some cases the usage is considered more important than the etymological meaning.

Different views held regarding the primary meaning of a word. According to the Nyaya theorists of the old school a word denotes the particular *vyakti*, connotes the universal *jati*, and also stands for the shape, *akriti*, distinguishing the particular from dissimilar things (Kunjunni Raja, p. 70). According to the Samkhya theorists the primary meaning of a word is the per cent of the particular. According to the Jaina thinkers a word like 'cow' does not mean a particuiar cow but any animal with a general shape of a cow. That is, the shape, the *akriti*, is the important feature. The Mimamsaka thinkers emphasized that the primary meaning of the word is the universal. Thus, the difference of opinion arises as to which is more importent among the three features, viz., the particular object perceived, or the universal category to which the particular belongs or the shape of the perceived object, or all three of them together as the older Nyaya theorists held.

As noted earlier (Chapter 10), the Buddhist thinkers maintain that the essence of the meaning is negative in character—*apoha*. They hold that the words deal directly with the conceptual images which are purely *vikalpas*, subjective constructions. So, they arque,

there is no real relation between the words and the objects. The word 'cow' means not the animal with those features. It means only that all objects which do not belong to the category cow are excluded. They do not accept that the universal, *samanya* or *jati* exists. It is only a mental construction. What exists is the *svalakshna*, the particular object at the given time and place—the momentary particular.

The Jaina thinkers also reject the Naya-Vaiseshika view that a word indicates a class. According to them a word denotes an aspect of a multiform object—*anekanta*. As Sinha writes, "If words denoted objects ensued with one definite nature (*ekanta*), they would falsify their real nature, since they are multiform in their nature. Words denote both positive and negative character of their objects. If they denoted their positive characters only, would falsify their nature because they have positive characters at particular times in particular places and under particular circumstances. A word denotes its object, and negates other objects. The word 'jar' denotes a jar and negates a cloth and other objects. So it denotes a multiform object. If it denoted its object in its general characters, devoid of its distinctive characters, then its object would be unreal inasmuch as there is no generality, without distinctive characters" (Vol. I, p. 445).

Thus, the entire controversy regarding the meaning of a word is based on the philosophical assumption regarding the concept of *samanya*, generality. While Nyaya-Vaiseshika thinkers accept it, the Buddhist and Jaina thinkers reject it on the basis of their metaphysical assumptions.

Another view advanced is *Vyaktivada*, that the word signifies only a particular individual and not the class. Only individual cows exist. The class is incorporeal and motionless. Only individuals are corporeal and moving. A collection of cows, is a collection of individual cows. Further, they show that qualities can exist only in individuals. There are white cows and black cows. The quality refers to the particular cow.

The Mimamsakas also accept that a word denotes the *jati*, the genus. As Kumarila argues, if an individual distinct from a genus were denoted by a word, no uniform relation could be established between them, since individuals are infinite in number. So, the word does not denote one particular individual. The word 'cow' may be said to denote an individual cow qualified by the genus of cow (Sinha, Vol. I, p. 448ff). That is, a word denotes only something particular, an individual.

The ancient thinkers enunciated the principle of *artha-vyatyaya* to indicate the two kinds of changes which generally take place in the connotation of words. The first change is from wide connotation to narrow connotation. For example, the word *kama* in Vedic terminology is a word with a wide connotation standing in general for desire. But gradually in usage, the connotation narrowed down so that in later times it stood for sex desire in particular. The second kind of change is from a narrow connotation to a wider one. For example, the word *kusagra* meant originally the tip of *kusa* grass. Later on it became widened so that it stood for anything that is sharp. I am indebted to Pandit Sudhakara Chaturvedi of Bangalore who pointed out this principle. This principle recognizes that the connotation of words change as a result of usage.

5. Vakyartha, the Nature and Import of a Sentence

As seen in Chapter 10, there was a vigorous controversy among the ancient Indian thinkers regarding the way in which the meaning of a sentence arises in the mind. The Nyaya thinkers defined a sentence as a collection of words which has a single meaning. So the knowledge of the individual word is the principal clause they asserted. However, they pointed out other factor also, like verbal expectancy, congruity and proximity.

Akanksha, verbal expectancy consists in a word not being capable of conveying complete judgement in the absence of another word. *Yogyata*, congruity, consists in the sense being congruous, appropriate. *Sannidhi*, proximity consists in the articulation of words without undue delay. That is, a sentence is not a mere string of words. Certain words necessarily require certain other words to complete the sense and make a sentence. For example, a verb denotes action. But there must be an agent or an instrument or object of action. Without a subject or an object, the verb by itself does not give meaning. This is *akanksha*, expectancy. In order to illustrate *yogyata*, congruity the illustration given is a group of words like "one should sprinkle with fire". This makes no sense because there is no congruity between fire and sprinkling. Even when the first two requirements are satisfied, viz., expentancy and congruity, if the words are spoken after long intervals from each, other, they will not convey any meaning. So proximity is also another requisite. The words must be articulated so as to form one temporal units. A fourth requisite, it is pointed out, is the speaker's intention—*tatparyanischaya*. Kuppuswami Sastri obser-

ves, "The additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by the separate word is the intended relation of the concepts (*padarthasamsarga*) and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of a verbal judgement (*vakyartha*), is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words *samsarga* (*maryada*), and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words ((*abhidha* or *lakshana*)" (p. 258).

This is the main difference between the logicians on the one hand and the grammarians and aestheticians on the other. As noted earlier, the grammarian Bhartrihari propounds the concept of *sphota* and the aesthetician Anandavardhana uses the concept of *dhvani* to explain the third element over and above *abhidha* and *lakshana*. The Nyaya theorists, however, do not agree that this third element is necessary to explain how the meaning of a sentence arises. They contend that it could be explained by the concept of *anumana*, inference.

It is true that in the scientific and philosophical discourse there is no third element above perception and inference. But when we go to the realm of aesthetics, it becomes necessary to postulate the concept of *dhvani*, suggestiveness, because the meaning there, is not intellectual but emotional and imaginative.

As seen earlier, according to the grammarian, Bhartrihari a sentence is one indivisible whole, *vakyasphota*. The meaning of word as well as the meaning of the sentence, according to the *sphota* theory is one whole. It is not additive. It is one cognitive act. Either we get it or we do not.

The Nyaya theorists and the Mimamsakas do not agree with this. If the parts are not understood, they argue, how can the whole be understood. If the parts non-existent, the whole must also be non-existent. Obviously, this is a logical reputation of a fact of experience. This is hardly satisfactory. Logic has to yield place to facts.

Reference has already been made (Chapter 10) to the controversy regarding the relation of words in a sentence.

According to the theory of verbal comprehension, *anvitabhidhana* words can convey meaning only in a sentence. While each word has a definite meaning, Prabhakara asserts, the purpose of a word is to serve as a part of a sentence.

As Kunjunni Raja puts it, "On hearing the words of a sentence, we get a unitary sense which is the meaning of the sentence. The problem is whether the unitary sense arises directly from the collec-

tion of the words or indirectly through of the recollection the meanings of the individual words that comprise it. The *anvitabhindhana* theory takes the former view, while the *abhihitanvaya* theory takes the latter" (p. 194).

The Mimamsakas of the Bhatta School and some thinkers of the Nyaya School reject the *anvitabhidhana* theory and advance the *abhihitanvaya* theory of verbal comprehension. According to this view the meaning of a sentence is a concatenation of the individual items expressed by the words. On hearing a sentence, the meanings of separate words arise and then by putting them together the meaning of the sentence as a whole arises. As observed, already, the three factors of expectation, logical consistency and phonetic continuity, it is said, helps us to grasp the total meaning. This theory also assumes that the word does not produce the meaning directly. The word rouses the impressions in the mind and leads to understanding its meaning.

As Kunjunni Raja observes, "Of these two views, the former is based on the psychological analysis of the process of learning a language" (p. 206). By contrast the Bhatta and Nyaya theory of *abhihitanvaya* theory of verbal comprehension is more logical than behavioural. Actual observation of the learning process shows that language is learnt by the use of words in different contexts. The situation is also an important factor in language learning.

It may be pointed out that the Prabhakara theory of *anvitabhidhana* of verbal comprehension shows that while meanings of words are important, the actual usage of words is as important or even more important in learning to speak and write in a language. With the help of a dictionary we can learn to understand the spoken or written word. But a dictionary can never help us to speak or write in that language. To speak and write, we must not only know the meaning of individual words, we must know how they are used in communicating ideas. Secondly, the *avapa-udvada* principle is a very profound principle in language learning and in language teaching. Meanings of words as well as their correct usage get fixed in the mind through the use of the same words in different contexts. Thirdly, it recognizes the important principle that sentence-meaning is something more than the sum of the meanings of the words in the sentence.

Different terms have been used in ancient times to indicate the way in which the unified sentence-meaning arises in the mind on hearing or reading a sentence. The term *vakyasakti* points out that the sentence has the power to convey a connected sense. The term

samsarg amaryadan indicates that the meaning arises by the land of association. The third term *tatparyasakti* points to the fact that it is the intended sense that helps to relate the words and arrive at the unified meaning of the sentence (Kunjunni Raja, p. 209).

As noted earlier, Abhinavagupta adds a fourth power to a word, viz., *tatparyasakti*, to explain how the syntactic relation emerges on hearing the words in a sentence. Visvanatha in the *sahityadarpana* (II, 20) refers to the *tatparyavritti* as being accepted by the *abhihit-anvaya* theory of verbal comprehension (Kunjunni Raja, p. 217).

However, it is difficult to look upon *tatparyasakti* as a power of a word. It happens to refer rather to the sentence as a whole than to any word in the sentence.

SUMMARY

In the introduction, the scope of psycholinguistics, as it is conceived today has been mentioned. Reference has been made to the ancient thinkers in the field of philosophy, grammar and aesthetics who have worked in the field of language.

The speculations regarding the way in which language is learnt is described in the second section. The chief method is during childhood when the child hears the words and sees the actions in response and thus learns words and their meanings. Reference has also been made to the view that the child learns a language through the processes *avapa* and *udvipa*. When the same word is used in different contexts and different words in the same context, a very important principle is learning a language and in teaching a language.

The next section deals with the enunciation of Anandavardhana that words have three meanings—denotative, indicative and suggestive.

The fourth section deals with the concept of *abhidha*, the primary denotative meaning of a word. This deals with the controversy between the Mimamsakas who postulate that the relation with the word and its meaning is eternal because it is impossible to find which person gave this meaning and when the view of Nyaya thinkers who assert that meanings for words arise as a result of convention and also that in the technical field new words are used to stand for specific meanings. The grammarian Bhartrihari looks upon a word as a symbol. Attention is also drawn to the unique distinction of Sanskrit language in which the meanings of words are derived from roots. Another controversy pertains to the prob-

lem whether a word indicates a class or a particular object. This is because the Buddhists and Jainas argue that *samanya* is only a concept and not an existent.

The last section of the chapter deals with the lively controversy in the ancient times regarding the way in which the meaning of a sentence arises in the mind. Very useful concepts developed as a result of this controversy.

The whole chapter shows how in the early centuries there were keen controversies about what is today identified as the field of psycholinguistics.

CHAPTER 20

Aesthetics

1. Introduction

Man's primary concern is with the bare necessities for survival, but he has never considered it as a sufficient goal. While thinking and decision-making are important, man is primarily a being with feelings, with a wide range of responses. One of the important goals of life is to cultivate and refine the emotional reactions and feelings along with the cultivation of critical ways of thinking. The beauty of nature, the sky and the sea, the early dawn and the moonlight nights, the rivers, mountains and valleys delight him. Folk drawings, folk songs, folk dances and folk tales constitute the precious heritage of man. He experiences a sense of joy and abandon when he sings or when he listens to a song or story. The greatest joy is afforded by food and sex.

Aesthetic experience is the result of perceptual experience relatting to touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing. Aesthetic experience arises from a disinterested contemplation of phenomena, whether natural or man-made.

It is well-known that reflections on aesthetic experience have been made from very ancient times in India. An attempt has been made in this chapter to find the psychological aspects of the ancient Indian reflections on aesthetic experience.

2. The Concept of Rasa

Before describing Bharat's concept of *rasa*, it will be useful to describe what he conceived to be the purpose of drama as an art.

In the first chapter of his work, *Natyasastra* Bharata says that in the Krita Age the society was perfectly harmonious and happy. It was in the Treta Age that the society became divided by passion and greed and people became deluded by envy and anger and so were subject to joy and sorrow. As a result drama came into being. In other words, the dramatic art arose because there was conflict in society. Drama represents the good and bad actions which take place in society, containing serious situations and emotions. The purpose of drama is to portray evil actions and their results in

order to educate the audience to uphold higher ideals of life through the delightful medium of the theatre. Drama, it is said, would produce solace for the unfortunate persons who are afflicted by unhappiness, weariness and grief. It will be connected with virtue and fame (Warder, 1972, p. 16ff).

Raghavan (1963) has translated the passage as follows: "The drama is a representation of the nature or feelings of the world. In some place it depicts *dharma*, somewhere else play, material gain at another place, quietitude (*santa*) in yet another, fun at one place, fight at another place, love at one place, and killing at another . . . the virtuous ones have been given virtue, and the amorous ones love; the undisciplined ones are tamed here and the disciplined ones exhibit their discipline; it emboldens the weak, energises the heroic, enlightens the ignorant, and imparts erudition to scholars. . . it teaches fortitude to those tormented by misery and firmness to the agitated; thus it is endowed with variegated feelings and embodies varied states (p. 268).

Thus, the assumption of Bharata is that in the most ancient times social life was free from misery and grief because people did not entertain envy and greed. In the decadent age, there is conflict and sufferning. So the art of drama was invented and perfected in order to (*a*) educate people about right values of life, and (*b*) to provide them entertainment.

A fairly full-fledged theory was enunciated by Bharata in his *Natyasastra* which may have been composed in the 2nd century A.D. Bharata developed the *rasa* theory of aesthetics. He formulated the maxim, *vibhavanubhava vyabhichari samyogad rasa nishpattih—rasa* is accomplished as a result of the conjunction of *vibhava, anubhava* and *vyabhichari bhava* (VI, 32). Earlier dealing with the topics which from dramaturgy, he said "*Rasa, bhava*, (emotion), *abhinaya*, actions, technique, style, mode, production and success, song and instrumentation and theatre from the topics" (VI, 10). He enumerated eight *rasas* aesthetic sentiments, namely, erotic love (*srinagara*), humour (*hasya*), pathos (*karuna*), furious (*raudra*), heroism (*vira*), terrible (*bhayanaka*), horrible (*vibhatsa*) and marvellous (*adbhuta*). These eight aesthetic sentiments, he asserted, are based on eight *sthayibhavas*, enduring emotions, viz., love, laughter sorrow, anger effort, fear, disgust and surprise (VI, 15-17).

Bharata postulates that eight kinds of *rasa* correspond to eight kinds of basic emotions, *sthayibhovas* as follows:

Bhava (emotion)	*Rasa* (aesthetic sentiment)
1. *rati*, sex love	*srIngara*, erotic love
2. *hasa*, humour	*hasya*, commic
3. *soka*, sorrow	*karuna*, compassion
4. *krodha*, anger	*roudra*, furious
5. *utsaha*, effort	*vIra*, heroic
6. *bhaya*, fear	*bhayanaka*, terrible
7. *jugupsa*, disgust	*bibhatsa*, horrible
8. *vismaya*, wonder	*adbhuta*, marvellous.

Thus according to Bharata, the eight aesthetic sentiments experienced by a person seeing a drama or reading a poem, etc. are based on eight emotions which every human being normally experiences in daily life.

He also enumerates thirty three *vyabhIcharibhavas*, emtional states which are trensitory or secondary as compared to the eight enduring or primary emotions. They are despondency, langour, apprehension, envy, intoxication, weariness, indolence, depression, anxiety, etc. For example a woman in love waiting for her lover may feel anxious as to whether he turns up at all, or may feel disappointed when he does not turn up, or may feel jealous of the other woman who may have attracted him and so on. Thus various transitory emotions may be experienced alongside with the enduring emotion.

Vibhava consists of the objective conditions which produces the emotion. They may be of two kinds: (1) *alambana*, the person or persons with reference to whom the emotion is manifested and (2) *uddIpana*, the circumstances that excite the emotion.

Anubhava means the emotional experience which arise in the spectator as a result of seeing the theme depicted on the stage. There is the emotional equipment in man. He sees the dramatic theme depicted on the stage. This constitutes, the *vibhava*, the stimulus. The emotions he experiences on seeing the actions, etc., on the stage constitutes the *anubhava*, the response. This produces the *rasa*, the aesthetic sentiment in the minds of the spectators.

Thus, in his statement, Bharata describes the preconditions which produce the *rasa*, the aesthetic experience. There is the person, there is the situation, there is the emotion, with its various transitory states, there are the relevant *sattvika bhavas*, the bodily expressions accompanying the emotion. All these leads to *rasa-nishpatti*, the manifestation of the aesthetic experience.

Bharata declares that nothing goes on in a drama without these *rasas* being generated and experienced in the spectators.

The term *rasa* comes from the root which means taste, sweet juice, sap or essence. It is a term which occurs in the Vedas.

To explain the concept of *rasa*, Bharata gives illustration from food. Just as a dish or culinary taste is brought about by the mingling of various *vlands*, even so is the *rasa*, the aesthetic sentiment engendered by the coming together of various feelings or emotional conditions. *Rasa* is so called, he writes, because it is capable of being tasted (*asvadayate*) and that it is tasted by the cultured person when he sees the durable emotions, represented by the emotional expressions, words, gestures etc. and he enjoys the pleasure.

To the question whether the emotions come out of the *rasa* or the *rasa* out of the emotions, Bharata replies that the view that they arise from mutual contact is invalid. He asserts that it is apparent that the *rasa* arises from the emotion and not vice versa. Therefore the *rasa* cannot arise when the emotions are not represented on the stage. Further, he asserts, when emotions are represented on the stage, in the proper manner, the *rasa* experience is bound to arise (VI, 36).

Among the eight aesthetic sentiments, Bharata points out that *srIngara* (erotic love), *raudra* (furious), *vIra* (heroic) and *bIbhatsa* (horrible) are basic. The comic (*hasya*) arises from the erotic, the pathetic from the furious, the marvellous from the heroic and the terrible from the horrible.

Bharata next takes up each of the eight *rasa* and describes how they arise as a result of the dramatic representation on the stage (VI, 45).

In the seventh chapter, Bharata explains that he has used the terms *vIbhava* and *anubhava* earlier because they stand for the determinants and the consequences, respectively. By various words and actions acts represent the emotions and as a result of this the spectators experience the *rasa-anubhava*.

As to how the *rasa* arises in the minds of the spectators, Bharata says that they arise when the emotional representation is imbued with the quality of *samanya*, universality.

As Keith (1956) puts it, "He who sees on the stage, or reads the poetry, the factors which are connected with the sentiment presented, does not regard them as external to himself, whether as the property of the actor or of the hero of the play or poem, nor does he appropriate them to himself; he sees them under the aspect of universality and this causes the sentiment to be unique and pleasurable, whatever the corresponding emotion, as a per-

sonal possession, would be" (p. 389).

Thus the *rasa* aesthetic sentiment is experienced by the spectator, when he does not identify the emotion either with the actor or with himself, but universalizes it.

Thus basic emotions do not actually exist in the theatre. The actor do not experience the emotions. They show only the visible and audible effects of the emotions imagined to be present in the characters. Thus, the characters with their emotions are present only in imagination. So the audience can only imagine the emotions suggested by the actors. What the audience actually experience are only the *rasas*, the aesthetic experience. If actual emotions are experienced either by the actors or by the spectators, the results would be disastrous, indeed. The actor would express real love for the actress and cause her terrible embarrassment and the spectator may experience jealousy and go on the stage and attack the man making love. *Rasa* consists not in experiencing the emotion but only in experiencing the corresponding sentiment in a contemplative and detached manner. This is what the ancient theorist identified as *sadharanlkaran*, the universalization (See Section below).

Bharata next takes up the problem of detailed instructions regarding the representation of the 8 basic emotions and the 33 secondary emotions. He frankly admits that *vyabhlchari bhavas* are convention culture-based.

This implies, that while the basic emotion, the *sthayibhavas* are universal to all cultures, the *vyabhicharibahavas*, the accessory emotional expressions may be peculiar to each cultural group.

Bharata next explains the term *sattvika bhavas* which include tears, perspiration, horripilation, paralysis and other bodily conditions. Happiness and misery lead to these observable changes in the body. These bodily changes arise as a result of the feelings and emotions, the changes in the mental states. He writes, "In theatrical practice, situations of happiness and misery should accord with the *sattva*, the reality, behind them so that they may appear to be realistic—*yatha savarupa* (VII, 94).

It is one of the most astonishing features of ancient Indian aesthetics that there was a thinker in 2nd century A.D. who could deal so comprehensively with aesthetics as Bharata has done. The psychological analysis is very profound. He has shown that though aesthetic experience is based on the depiction of emotions on the stage, there is clear difference between the raw emotion as experienced by an individual in a concrete situation and the *rasa* as

depicted on the stage. He has built up a system by which eight enduring emotions, thirty three auxiliary emotions, eight physiological states accompanying emotions (fortynine in all) give rise to the eight aesthetic sentiments, the *rasas*. When these 49 emotions, in their appropriate combination are depicted on the stage along with speech and gestures, they will serve as *vibhava*, cause, to produce in the minds of the spectator *anubhava*, the appropriate *rasa* (VII, 45).

It must further be noted that Bharata while recognising that emotions play a very important part in producing the aesthetic experience, does not equate it with emotion. Emotion is only a constituent which gives rise to *rasa*. He clearly differentiates between *rasa*, aesthetic sentiment and the *bhava*, the emotion. As Dasgupta (1970) observes, "It should, however, be noted that no emotion is called *rasa* unless it is aesthetically excited. When a young man falls in love with a young woman and his whole frame is shaken, we cannot speak of him as being the subject of *sringara rasa*" (p. 37). *Rasa* thus is not an emotion. It is an experience produced by a work of art.

There is the poet. The poem and the reader. Where does *rasa* reside? This is one of the problems with which the ancient aestheticians were concerned. The poem is the production of the poet and the means for the aesthetic experience of the reader or the spectator of a drama. So the first problem is how the poet creates the poem? The famous illustration of Valmiki's experience is given. Valmiki saw the hunter shooting one of a pair of birds engaged in courting. When one bird was hit, the other bird cried piteously. The poet was moved by *karuna*, sympathy, for the suffering bird and by anger towards the hunter who perpetrated the crime. This is indeed an ordinary experience within the reach of anyone but it is given only to the poet to transmute his shock into a poem which have moved millions down the ages. If it was a mere personal experience, it would have ended only with anger and sympathy. It may even have led to some action like looking after the fallen bird or in taking the hunter to task. But in Valmiki, the reaction was to evocation of *karuna rasa* in him, which lead to the stimulation of his *pratibha*, poetic imagination. As later writers pointed out, the predicament of separation of birds made him put the problem on a wider canvas so that he write about the separation of Rama and Sita due to the kidnapping of Sita by Ravana.

Thus the creation of a poem is due to the unique experience in the poet's mind. It is not that the event was unique. It is the poet's

reaction that was unique.

The poem becomes an aesthetic work if it is able to stimulate the minds of the readers and make them live through the experience which the poet himself lived through.

That is, the incident leads to experience in the poet, which results in the work of art. The poem leads to the experience of the *rasa* by the readers.

So, obviously, the question where does the *rasa* reside, is pointless. It is in the mind of the poet and in the minds of the readers.

The difference between a great work of art and the ordinary works of art is that the great work can continually create the aesthetic experience in generations of readers. The inferior work is successful only for some time. The films and film songs, for example, no doubt, provide the aesthetic experience. But that experience is short-lived. The songs become state when they become old and they are replaced by new film hits. But the power to evoke the aesthetic experience of Kalidasa's dramas and poems, the sculpture of Halebid temple or the songs of Purandara Dasa or Thyagaraja, is ever fresh. This depends on the artist on the one hand and the *sahrudeyas*, the connoisseurs, capable of aesthetic appreciation, on the other. The spectator can take out only what the artist has put in.

Though Bharata enumerated only eight *rasas*, later thinkers added the nineth *rasa*, viz., *santa*, the quietistic or the calmed. Anandavardhana held that the dominant *rasa* of *Mahabharata* was *santa rasa*. The emotion corresponding to it is identified as *soma*. According to Bhoja the *sthayin* of *santa* is *dhriti*. Bhoja also introduced *preyas* or *priti* or *vatsalya* as the truth *rasa*. It it the sentiment of tenderness.

Anandavardhana also pointed out that in a work of art there will be only one dominant *rasa*, while there may be various other subordinate rasas.

3. The Concept of Dhvani

Dhvanyaloka written by Anandavardhana in 9th century A.D. is looked upon as an epoch-making work. As Krishnamoorthy (1974) writes, "The thesis of the *Dhvani* theorist can be simply stated: *Dhvani* is the quintessence of poetry; and *rasa* is the quintessence of *dhvani*. What then is *dhvani*? *Dhvani* is an exclusive poetic feature concerned with exploiting the beauty of every element in the medium of language like *alankara*, *guna* and *riti* to serve the ultimate artistic end of *rasa*" (p. XXXI).

As noted earlier (Chapter 19), Anandavardhana was the first person to enquire into semantics. He asserted in his *vritti* on verses 32 and 33 of the third chapter, that there are three meanings of words: first there is *abhidha,* the conventional denotative meaning which is used in daily life; secondly, there is *lakshana,* the metaphorical meaning and thirdly, there is *vyanjana,* the suggestive meaning of the word. He declared that poetic language is different from the language of prose, because it arouses feelings while prose language is merely informative. He said that it is not the *vachya,* the denoted meaning, but the *vyangya,* the indirect, suggestive meaning, that constituted the essence of poety.

He even went to the extent of analysing four steps in understanding a poem. The first step is *abhidhavritti,* the understanding of the meaning of the individual words in the verse, the second step is *tatparya vritti,* which gives the relation between the various words. Thus these two steps give the literal meaning of the verse. The third step is *lakshana vritti,* the understanding of the metaphorical usage of words. Finally, there is the fourth step, the *vyanjana vritti,* the understanding of the suggested meaning of the words and the verse as a whole. It is this last step which enables us to understand the aesthetic import of the verse. However, as Hanumantha Rao, (1968) in his foreword observes, this atomic analysis of the function of language was criticized by later thinkers. They asserted that in ordinary language, as in poetry, the utterance is governed by the intention of the speaker or the poet. They pointed out that there is unity in a verse or a poem and that this unity is governed by *rasa,* the aesthetic sentiment (pp. XII-XIII).

The point, however, made by Anandavardhana is that it is *dhvani,* the suggestive meaning which marks off poetry from the ordinary conventional meaning, the *vachyartha,* the explicit meaning as well as the *lakshyartha,* the secondary or the figurative meaning. He affirmed that it is *dhvani* which explains *rasa* and not either the conventional or the metaphoric meanings.

The unique feature of *rasa,* the aesthetic sentiment, is that it can never be communicated directly by words.

As Anandavardhana puts it, "That meaning which wins the admiration of refined critics is decided to be the soul of poetry. The explicit and the implicit are regarded as two aspects. Of these, the explicit is commonly known and it has been set forth in many ways through figures of speech such as the simile by other writers. But the implicit aspect is quite different from this. In the words of first rate poets, it shines supreme and towers above the beauty of

the striking external constitunts even as charm in ladies" (I, 2-4, p. 7). *Dhvani*, according to him is the latent power of the word. It can never become the object of direct verbal expression. It is this meaning which is the soul of poetry (I, 5). This is why he proceeds to assert that this suggested meaning can never be ascertained either through rules of grammar or by the lexicon. It is understood only by those who have an insight into true significance of poetry (I, 7). He even described the mental process behind it. "The suggested meaning *flashes suddenly* across the truth-perceiving minds of perceptive critics when they turn away from the literal meaning. That kind of poetry, wherein the (conventional) meaning renders itself secondary and suggests the implied meaning is designated by the learned as *Dhvani* or suggestive poetry" (I, 12-13).

In these two verses, Anandavardhana has defined *dhvani* and has also indicated the mental processes involved. The 12th verse is indeed the most atonishing verse, not only in the history of aesthetics, but also in the history of psychology in the world.

In modern psychological terminology, the ancient Indian term *dhvani* corresponds to the term *insight* as defined and described by the German Psychologist Kohler in his classic work on animal learning. It is astonishing that Anandavardhana in 9th century, has used almost the same words as Kohler used in 20th century.

The suggested meaning Anandavardhana asserts, "flashes suddenly across the mind", *jhatiti avabhasta*. This is one of the characteristic features of cognition. Things may be perceived, words may be heard or read, but the pattern-formation is something which flashes suddenly, seeing new relationship is creativity.

The second aspect of creativity that Anandavardhana has identified has two subdivisions: (a) turning away from the literal meaning and (b) making the conventional meaning secondary and thus freeing the mind so that the implied or suggested meanings have the opportunity to arise.

In the everyday life premium is placed on literal meanings of words. Simple observation of child speech shows how the child of three to four years is able to perceive new relations and use words in strikingly new ways. But the parents prevent such speech. This is how creativity which is inherent in the child is prevented from sprouting and flowering. As the child grows up he uses the word in the literal way and understands words in a literal way. Anandavardhana has shown that creativity can have an opportunity to manifest itself when people "turn away from the literal meaning.' Practically, as it were, the child is conditioned to the literal, deno-

tative meaning. Of course, it must be recognized that this is very useful to carry on the daily activities. But the danger is that most of the people in society end up with looking upon the literal, denotative meaning as the one and only way of understanding and using the word.

The other aspect to which Anandavardhana draws attention is the need to push away the secondary or conventional meanings from the mind.

What is the difference between the 'literal meaning' and the 'conventional meaning'? The literal meaning is the *vachyartha*. It refers to the linguistic aspect, the lexican aspect. The conventional aspect, refers more to the social aspect, conformity to the social usage. Both of these attitudes prevent spontaneity in response to the words and their meanings The man who takes the literal meaning is matter-of-fact in his outlook and the man who makes the conventional meaning, the primary meaning is conformist and traditional in outlook. But these attitudes militate against spontaneity, creativity and originality in understanding the words and the compositions. Through unvarying reflections both of them develop and establish sets. As a result, people are unable to see anything new. An original response is by definition of an infrequent response. The creative response is not only original but also relevant and generates ideas which are useful. An idea may be original but impractical. Such ideas cannot lead to poetry which can evoke response in the reader.

Anandavardhana himself refers to the principle of *auchitya*, propriety in selecting themes and in ensuring that the theme selected or invented should suit the dominant *rasa* (III, 10, 11 and 12). Thus, *auchitya*, propriety is a governing principle which determines whether the ideas occurring spontaneously are really creative.

It may be remarked that the problem is not about how or why ideas arise. Introspection at any moment will show how multifarious ideas and feelings arise in the mind. This is what Patanjali indicates in his sutra that the aim of yoga is to control the *chitta-vrittis*. The real problems, as Anandavardhana has shown are: (*a*) to allow the ideas to arise by turning away from literal meanings and conventional meanings, and (*b*) to select from among them those ideas which have relevance to the task on hand, in aesthetics, *auchitya*, propriety. This is the yardstick, as it were, to select only those ideas which are helpful in depicting the dominant *rasa*.

It will be very interesting to compare the assertions of Anandavardhana with the results obtained in the last two or three decades

by the research on creative thinking which has now become our important area of study.

As Krishnamoorthy (1968) pointed out, Anandavardhana borrowed the concept of *dhvani* from the reflection of the grammarian Bhartrihari whose theory of *sphota* has been referred to earlier (Chapters 10 and 19). Thus, the term *Dhvani* which was found to be used by grammarians in a threefold sense was borrowed verbatim into the field of poetics also in all the senses. It was looked upon as a very happy expression, since it could serve several purposes at one and the same time. It could be simultaneously applied to all the factors of suggestiveness in poetry, viz., the suggester (whether word or sense), the suggested meaning and the process of suggestion" (p. 40).

In *Dhvanyaloka,* Anandavardhana established his theory that suggestion is the soul of poetry—*kavyatma, dranih.* It is not the expressed sense, but rather the suggested sense that is the most important element, the essence of poetry. The quality of poetry depends on the importance given to the element of suggestiveness.

Kunjunni Raja (1963) observes "strictly speaking, the doctrine of *dhvani* is only an extension of the *rasa* theory propounded by the sage Bharata, according to which the main object of the dramatic work is to rouse *rasa* or an aesthetic emotion in the audience. Anandavardhana extended this theory to poetry . . . Suggestion, by itself, is not enough in drama or poetry; what is suggested must be charming and this charm came only through *rasa* or emotion" (p. 285).

This raises the important problem of the relation between the two concepts of *rasa* and *dhvani.*

Anandavardhana says that *dhvani* is the soul of poetry and that *rasa* is the soul of *dhvani.* What is the significance of *rasa* and *dhvani* in relation to poetry?

It must be recognized that both *rasa* and *dhvani* are psychological experiences. They are not the direct products of either the words and their meanings or their logical relations or of the themes.

Rasa, by definition is the aesthetic delight. *Dhvani* by definition is the suggested meaning, the *vyanjana* or the *vyangyartha.* It is clear that *dhvani* is the supreme means and *rasa* is the end of poetry. The *rasa* of poetry is realized through *dhvani,* the suggestive meaning of the words used.

The most significant point is that *rasa* is never directly expressed. It can only be suggested by the words, situations, etc. This is why Anandavardhana makes it clear that mere knowledge

of grammar or the meaning of words from the lexicon can never help us in appreciating poetry. Appreciation depends on the suggested meaning. Aesthetic appreciation is emotional and imaginative and not merely intellectual. The emotional element is the *rasa* and the imaginative element arises out of *dhvani*.

4. The Concept of Pratibha

The ancient Indian aestheticians were deeply concerned with the problem of the analysis of aesthetic experience and how it arises. They differentiated it from the perception, on the one hand, and from the *turiya* experience of the yogi on the other. As Hanumantha Rao (1974) points out, they used the term *alaukika* or *manasika pratyaksha* to distinguish the aesthetic perception from the ordinary sensory perception. The immediate experience of the poet was designated *Kavi sakshatkara* to distinguish it from the brahma *sakshatkara* of the yogi. They tried to account for aesthetic experience on the basis of *pratibha*, imagination. They distinguished between the contemplative imagination involved in the appreciation of beauty in nature from the creative imagination involved in the creation of a work of art. The contemplative imagination was termed *bhavayitri pratibha* or *prakasha* to distinguish it from *karayitripratibha* or *upakhya*, the creative imagination (pp. 7-8).

Srikantaiya (1970) writes, "*Pratibha* literally means a flesh across the mind—a revelation characterized by 'immediacy and freshness" (p. 62). The term *pratibha* has been used to distinguish the psychological process involved in aesthetic experience from perception on the one hand and from inference on the other. It is conceded that the poet's imagination is based on the daily experience. However, it is not the ordinary imagination of either the dreamer or the day-dreamer. Anandavardhana has described the poet's imagination as creative. "In this infinite world the poet is the creator (*Kavireva Prajapati*). He transforms (*parivartate*) the world as it pleases him." That is the the poetic imagination transforms the ordinary experience into an aesthetic experience through his *pratibha*, creative imagination.

How does the poet come to have this *pratibha*? Srikantaiya refers to Jagannatha who traces it to at least two different sources: it may be due either to some exceptional kind of culture (*vyutpatti*) or to practice (*abhyasa*). The imaginative individual is one who uses the material at his disposal with freedom, in contrast to the ordinary person who ignores or rejects fantasies. The outlook of the ordinary person is conventional and matter-of-fact.

He is practical in outlook. He is also conventional; he thinks, feels and does what the society expects him to think, feel and do. He leads a life of constraint. In other words, the ordinary person is not emancipated. He is not himself. He is what others expect him to be. The man of creative imagination, on the other hand, allows his thoughts to rise and flow freely.

Srikantaiya refers to the analysis of *pratibha* by Hemachandra, the Jaina thinker who divides *pratibha* into two classes: *sahaja* (innate) and *aupadhika* (conditioned). By Jaina definition, the soul is luminous and it is prevented from shining due to *jnanavaranlya karma* layer on it. When it is removed *pratibha* bursts forth. As Srikantaiya points out the *pratibha* will shine if the inhibitions are removed (*ibid.*, p. 71).

According to Abhinavegupta the poet's creative imagination will be stimulated by *rasanubhava*, the experience of *rasa*, emotional thrill. He who looks upon his experiences as the routine experiences can never become creative. New ideas and new images can never flash in his mind. The experience must stimulate him first so that fresh images can arise. Secondly, these images must be in harmony with the prevailing *rasa*. It is only then the ideas and images can evoke the corresponding *rasa* in the spectator of the drama or the reader of the work. That is, according to Anandavardhana, *rasa* must stimulate the poet's *pratibha* and inform the poetic creation. Otherwise it will be a mere flight of fancy, not a work of art (*ibid*, p. 72).

One of the unique features of Indian aesthetic theory is its concern with and the analysis of the spectator or reader. He is designated *sahridya* one with a kindred heart, one in whom the outpouring of the poet's heart finds its fulfilment. The response to the work of art is very important. If the artistic creation does not evoke such a response, it has failed in its purpose indeed. The same *rasa*, aesthetic experience must animate the poet as well as the reader. In this sense the reader has also to be creative. As Srikantaiya puts it, "While the poet's imagination has to seek, select and build and so create poetry, the reader has simply to re-experience what is given to it. But the latter is now less of a creative act (p. 73).

As Gnoli (1970) puts it, *pratibha*, born in the heart of the poet, flowers, as it were, in the actor, and bears fruit in the spectator (p. 80). All the three are involved in the aesthetic experience in a drama.

Thus, the two concepts of *pratibha* and *sahridaya* are very important to understand how the aesthetic experience, the *rasa*, is

evoked in the creative writer and in the spectator or reader. These concepts help us to differentiate between the creative imagination of the poet and the bizarre imagination of the paranoid or the dreamer in his sleep.

This difference is brought out more clearly by the other concept of *sadharanikarana* which is dealt with below.

5. The Concept of Sadharanikarna

Bharata has pointed out that the aesthetic experience is based on emotions. But there is a world of difference between the emotion such as the *bhava*, and the aesthetic experience, the *rasa*. What is it that transforms the raw emotion into *rasa*? In the last section we have seen that the ancient Indian aesthetician explained it on the basis of the *pratibha*, the creative imagination of the poet. Is his essay on the nature of aesthetic experience, Nagendra (1970) tries to show the relationship between an emotional experience and an aesthetic experience.

These are the ancient dictum: *na bhavahinosti raso na bhavo rasavarjitah*—the rasa is never without an emotional basis, nor can an artistic emotion exist without *rasa*. What is the relationship between the two?

The ancient thinkers divided the basic eight emotions they identified into two groups, one pleasureable and the other painful. The pleasurable emotions are love, wonder, courage and humour. The painful emotions are pathos, anger, terror and horror. However, it was recognized that the latter group of emotions lose their sting of pain when they are transmitted into their respective *rasas*. How this is done may be taken up in the next section.

In normal life we have the personal experience of the various emotions or we observe those emotions being expressed by another person. Secondly, we may recall the experiences we had lived through or observed earlier. It is clear that none of these four groups have the characteristics of the aesthetic experience. As Nagendra observes, "It is, therefore, clear beyond doubt that an aesthetic experience, though based primarily on human emotions, is not identical with our usual emotional experience. It is neither a personal experience, direct or indirect, nor is it a psycho-physical reaction to the emotional experience of the dramatic characters" (p. 119).

The ordinary emotional experience is characterized by time, space, the causing event or person, a sense of personal involvement, leading to an action to secure or to reject some object and

so on. But the aesthetic experience is freed from such limitations of time, space, causality, personal involvement, etc. This is called by the ancient thinkers as *sadharanikarana*, universalization of experience.

Bhatta Nayaka of 9th century A.D. propounded the theory of universalisation. According to this theory aesthetic experience is never personal. It is always universal. The emotional experiences are so portrayed in art that they are freed from personal limitations. They cease to be personal experiences and become common experiences of all the receptive and responsive spectators or readers.

As Krishnamurty (1974) puts it, "Impersonal, disinterested and universal delight is exclusive to poetry and termed *rasa*" (p. XXXI).

As Nagendra writes, "consequently, they cease to be part of direct physical experience of the spectator, raise him above the petty mundane experience of the self, refine the sensibility and sublimate his consciousness" (p. 117). He writes further, "The aesthetic experience is not the experience of a personal emotion, it is the experience of a universalized or liberated emotion; it is an experience of a liberated state of mind and is free from egoistic interests. As such it is a pleasant experience. It is a feeling of self-realisation or self-fulfilment through sublimated human emotions embodied in the works of art" (p. 119f). The aesthetic experience is impersonal. It is lived through in a liberated state of mind.

Another aspect of *sadharanikriti* according to Visvanatha is sympathetic identification (*Sahitya Darpana*, p. 82). "The appreciative spectator experiences the emotions which were actually experienced long ago by those who are represented on the stage by the actors, owing to the peculiar power of the activity of the various conditions of the aesthetic experience, which is called sympathy. It enables him to identify himself with the represented persons and experience the same emotions in himself" (p. 167). The spectator identifies himself with the character represented on the stage and feels the same emotion. *Parasya na parasyati mameti na mameti cha*—the spectator experiences the sentiment as his own, though it is not quite his own, as another's though not quite another's due to the make-believe (*Sahitya Darpana*, p. 83). Thus the identification is a peculiar kind of identification.

Hiriyanna (1970) writes that aesthetic experience has two characteristics: (*a*) selfless and disinterested contemplation of beauty, and (*b*) it yields a joy that is untainted by the needs of everyday life which are normally characterized by mental tension. The situations and emotions depicted by art assume a unique character which

the spectator can describe as neither real nor unreal. He neither believes nor disbelieves their reality (pp. 12-13). These features of the experience help to promote a sense of detachment and delight that is unconnected with the everyday experiences of life.

As Dasgupta (1970) observes, the actual temporal and spatial character of the situation is withdrawn from the mental field. The emotional experience loses its individual character and becomes dissociated from the normal motivations. As a result the emotional experience is universal in character (p. 38).

Commenting on universalization, Gnoli (1970) asserts, the essence of *rasa* is that it is a pleasure which has no relationship with any particular ego. The emotions, whether anger, sorrow or love do not insert themselves in the texture of daily life. They are lived through but independent of any self-interest. The images contemplated are related neither to the spectator, nor the actor, nor even the hero who is depicted. This is the consequence of the *sadharankarana*. They are freed from individuality and are universalized.

As Hanumantha Rao (1968) writes in this attitude a person and his feelings are not viewed, as is done in practical life, with partiality because he is our friend or relative or with prejudice because he is our enemy or with indifference because he is neither a friend nor a foe. In this attitude, everything is viewed as of equal interest of equal concern" (p. ix).

Thus during aesthetic experience, the spectator or reader raises himself momentarily above time, space, causality and individuality. He is beyond the stream of practical life; when immersed in the aesthetic experience he finds in it a sense of fulfilment, that is, he entertains no desires at the time. He has no lackings for the time being. It has the characteristic of blissfulness.

It may be observed that in life two aspects of univeralisation can be recognised. Our perceptions are particular. So our thinking tends to be particularistic. But at the conceptual level we are lifted in our thinking from the constraints of the particular. The thinking becomes universalistic. Conceptual thought about a problem is detached as in scientific or in philosophic thinking. Similarly in aesthetic experience and in religious experience we are freed from personal interests. This makes the experience universalistic. Particularity and personal concern make us limited in outlook and interest. Conceptual thought and aesthetic experience liberate us from such limited outlook and concern. This is how training in conceptual thinking and in aesthetic sensitivity make

an individual universalistic in outlook and feeling. Both of them liberate man from his narrow thoughts and feelings.

5 The Pleasurable Character of Aesthetic Experience

By definition, the term *rasa* stands for aesthetic pleasure or relish. So when sorrow, fear or anger is depicted on the stage, it is converted into pleasure. As Visvanatha puts it, the worldly-life pleasure or pain may lead to painful experience. But in poetry they assume *alaukika*, transcendent character. So painful scenes give rise only to pleasure (*Sahitya Darpana*, III, 6-7). Poetic sorrow is quite different from sorrow in actual life. Similarly, the theory of universalisation of Bhatta Nayaka asserts that poetic imagination presents the painful emotions of sorrow and anger in a universalised form and so the experience evoked is not personal pain or sorrow. Under the spell of imagination, sorrow loses its peculiar character. It transcends personal limits and transforms itself into pleasure. Whether the theme is romantic or comic or tragic, so long as it is succesfully portrayed as art, the experience is only of aesthetic pleasure. The painful emotion, it is true, remains painful, but the dramitist's art and the actors' art, make it sublime and not just painful. As Nagendra (1970) puts it, "Artistic creation is a process of synthesis; by effecting harmony in diffused elements, the artists create a unity in diversity and impart 'form' to the formless" (p. 136).

Aesthetic pleasure has all the ingredients of ordinary pleasure, viz., sensuousness, intellectual aspect, imagination and feelings and emotions. But it transcends the ordinary pains and pleasures of life since it is impersonal. Because it is a make-believe, one is affected by it not in a personal but in an impersonal way.

"Valmiki did not have the wordly and personal emotion of sorrow when he saw the surviving bird crying piteously and wallowing in the blood of its mate killed by the hunter. In that case he would have wept and acted like any of us and not composed a rhythmic verse. This intense constructiveness of vision goes beyond objects of physical sight . . . for grief disables but this kind of vision empowers" (Krishnamoorthy, 1974, p. X 2).

The ancient Indian thinkers identified the aesthetic experience with *sattva guna* which is free from the influence of *rajasa* and *tamasa*. The painful emotions like anger, sorrow, etc., are manifestations of *rajoguna*. But when they are transformed by the poet through his *prattbha* they rouse in the reader only the aesthetic experience that is predominantly *sattva* in character. The emotions

as experienced in daily life arise on the basis of *rajoguna*. But the emotions in aesthetic experience arise on the basis of *sattva guna*. This is why the aesthetic experience leads to pleasure and not to pain. Thus theorists link up aesthetics with the *guna* theory.

SUMMARY

After an introductory section, the famous *rasa* theory of Bharata of 2nd century A.D. is described in the second section. Bharata starts his *Natyasastra* with a description of the purpose of dramatic art. It is said that in the first age there was plenty and so there was no conflict either between individuals or between group. So there was no need for drama. This art became necessary only with the emergence of conflict and misery which arose as a result of scarcity of goods to satisy the wants of people. The purpose of drama, it is pointed out are twofold: to instruct and to entertain. Evil actions and good actions are portrayed on the stage so that people can see the consequences arising out of them. It is also pointed out that drama produces solace among the people whose life is full of misery.

Next Bharata's *rasa* theory is described. According to him aesthetic experience is provided to the spectators of a drama by portraying the emotions on the stage. He assumes that there are eight enduring emotions in man and by using them eight corresponding aesthetic experiences, the *rasas*, can be evoked in the spectators. He also posits thirty three secondary or accessory emotions and eight physical manifestation of emotions like tears, perspiration, etc. Thus, in 2nd century A.D. Bharata developed a well-thought out and well-knit theory of aesthetics. He shows the difference between an emotion, and the aesthetic experience based on it. While emotions rouse people to action, the *rasa* leads to contemplation and delight. He makes it clear that actual emotions are experinced neither by the actor on the stage nor by the spectators. It is not *bhava*, emotion that is produced but only *rasa*, the aesthetic experience. *Rasa*, it is pointed out, is the universalisation of emotional experience.

The third section describes the other famous aesthetic theory propounded in ancient India, viz., the *dhvani* theory by Anandavardhana in his *Dharanvaloka* in 9th century A.D. He showed how the unique aesthetic experience arises on the basis of the *dhvani*, the suggested meanings (*a*) verbal descriptions and the themes. He affirms that it is impossible to produce *rasa* through verbal ex-

pressions. So he asserted that words have three functions the denotative, the metaphorical and the suggestive. Further he pointed out, the suggestive meaning flashes suddenly in the minds of the spectator or readers. So the suggested meaning is neither perceptual nor inferential. This can happen only when a person turns away from the literal as well as conventional meanings. Thus, he propounds a theory of creativity. It implies that the person should abandon the literal as well as conventional outlook and keep his mind open so that new ideas and new relationships could emerge.

The fourth section describes the concept of *pratibha*, poetic imagination. The theorists distinguished between contemplative imagination termed *bhavayitri pratibha*, and creative imagination terms *Karayitripratibha*. The process of *pratibha*, involving a flash across the mind, is distinguished from perception and from inference. *pratibha*, creative imagination, was also distinguished from the imagination of the dreamer. which is errant and excursive. While the ordinary person ignores or rejects ideas which spontaneously arise in the mind, the poet uses them creatively. It is because of his *Pratibha*, the poet looks upon his experiences as unique He does not look at them as just routine experiences. As a result of his openness of mind, fresh images arise in his mind. It is the *rasa* which enable him to select and utilize the images which flash to him.

Another very important concept in the field of aesthetics is *sadharavikarana* univeralization elaborated by Bhatta Nayaka, also of 9th century A.D. While the ordinary emotional experience is characterized by time, space, causing event or person, a sense of personal involvement, etc , the aesthetic expression is freed from all such limitations. It is this freedom from limitation that makes the experience universalistic. This makes the underlying emotion common to all people. It makes it an impersonal and disinterested delight. The aesthetic experience is a liberated and liberating experience. So it is self-fulfilling. It does not generate other desires. This joy is untainted by the needs of everyday life.

The final section deals with pleasurable character of aesthetic experience. Even when emotions like sorrow, fear, etc., are portrayed by the dramatist or the poet, the resulting experience is pleasurable, because it transcends the personal emotional level. It becomes impersonal and leads to delight, *ananda*. In ancient Indian terminology, it is *sattvic* and not *rajasic* in character.

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